`
`
`
`Respondent.
`
`v.
`
`AKORN, INC.,
`
`
`
`____________________
`
`ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`____________________
`APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE
`A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`____________________
`
`No. 18A-__
`
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`____________________
`
`SENJU PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. AND MITSUBISHI CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
`
`Petitioners,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Lisa Pensabene
`Anton Metlitsky
` (Counsel of Record)
`Daniel O’Boyle
`O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
`7 Times Square
`New York, N.Y. 10036
`(212) 326-2000
`ametlitsky@omm.com
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A PETITION
`FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`To: Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., Circuit Justice for the United
`
`
`
`States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
`
`1.
`
`Under this Court’s Rules 13.5 and 22, Applicants Senju
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`Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. and Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation request an
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`extension of thirty (30) days to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this case.
`
`Their petition will challenge the decision of the Federal Circuit in Senju
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`Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Akorn, Inc., 733 F. App’x 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2018), the
`
`slip copy of which is attached. App. 1-2. In support of this application,
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`Applicants state:
`
`2.
`
`The Federal Circuit issued its opinion on August 8, 2018, and it
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`denied a timely petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc on December
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`11, 2018. App. 3-4. Without an extension, the petition for a writ of certiorari
`
`would be due on March 11, 2019. With the requested extension, the petition
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`would be due on April 10, 2019. This Court’s jurisdiction will be based on 28
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`U.S.C. § 1254(1).
`
`3.
`
`This case is a serious candidate for review, presenting two
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`important and recurring questions of appellate procedure and patent law.
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`
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`a. Senju is a pharmaceutical company that invests significant
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`resources in the research and development of innovative therapeutic products
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`that address unmet medical needs in eye care. This case concerns its ’319
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`patent, which covers DUREZOL (difluprednate ophthalmic emulsion), a topical
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`1
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`
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`corticosteroid product for treating pain and inflammation associated with eye
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`surgery and endogenous anterior uveitis (inflammation of the uveal tract, which
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`lines the inside of the eye behind the cornea).
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`
`
`At the time of the invention of the ’319 patent, patients recovering
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`from ocular surgery were in need of a stable, safe, and effective anti-
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`inflammatory medication that could be used topically in the eye without
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`irritation. C.A. App. 219. There were various products on the market that were
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`prescribed for this purpose, e.g., anti-inflammatory eyedrops such as Pred Forte
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`and Econopred Plus, both prednisolone acetate suspensions. But these products
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`were unstable. C.A. App. 270-271. In suspensions, the active ingredient,
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`normally non-water soluble, remains in solid form but is suspended in liquid.
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`When stored, the active in these suspensions would separate from the aqueous
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`liquid in which it was suspended, such that the products required vigorous
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`shaking, 40 shakes or more, before use. C.A. App. 269-271. Because patients
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`typically do not follow shaking instructions, the amount of drug delivered by
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`these products varies from dose to dose, with the initial dose containing a
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`disproportionate amount of aqueous liquid compared to active, and later doses
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`frequently delivering a higher concentration of the active. See C.A. App. 270-
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`271.
`
`
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`Senju scientists looking to solve this problem had a number of
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`options for further research. First, they had to select an active ingredient.
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`Despite numerous potential anti-inflammatory agents, Senju scientists chose
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`2
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`
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`difluprednate, a potent corticosteroid known to increase intraocular pressure
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`(“IOP”), a serious side effect. C.A. App. 246-247.
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`
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`Second, Senju had to select a formulation. The evidence shows
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`there were many dosage forms at the time known to be suitable for ocular
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`administration—suspensions, solutions, and ointments being the most
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`prevalent. See C.A. App. 227. Consistent with the conventional wisdom for
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`other actives, the prior art Kimura reference had proposed a difluprednate
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`suspension. Emulsions, on the other hand, were known at the time to cause
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`irritation due to high concentrations of surfactants, which caused heavy eye
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`blinking and low bioavailability. See C.A. App. 229, C.A. App. 251. Moreover,
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`the Ding reference had shown that cyclosporin, a known cyclic oligopeptide
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`active, when
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`formulated as a castor oil emulsion, showed
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`increased
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`bioavailability in the lacrimal gland (which difluprednate was not known to
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`treat), while showing inferior bioavailability compared to other formulations in
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`the conjunctiva, a tissue that difluprednate was known to treat. See C.A. App.
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`555 (Kimura) (difluprednate treats conjunctiva, among other tissues); C.A. App.
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`699 (Ding) (bioavailability test results show castor oil cyclosporin emulsion is
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`inferior to other formulations in treating the conjunctiva and other surface eye
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`tissues).
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`
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`Despite having little reason to choose a difluprednate emulsion
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`based on the prior art, Senju scientists did just that, and compared its
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`bioavailability against a difluprednate suspension, the formulation described in
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`3
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`
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`the Kimura patent. C.A. App. 221, Patent Owner Response (“POR”) at 48.
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`Senju unexpectedly discovered that its emulsion was non-irritating and that
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`half the dose of its difluprednate emulsion increased bioavailability in the
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`aqueous humor—located in the interior of the eye—by a factor of two. C.A. App.
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`220-222. The emulsion therefore delivered four times the difluprednate
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`compared to the suspension. C.A. App. 220-222, C.A. App. 455. This surprising
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`result was summarized in a declaration by Kenichi Haruna, which was
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`presented to the PTO during examination and was a basis for granting the ’319
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`patent. C.A. App. 221-222.
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`
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`b. In April 2006, the ’319 patent was licensed in the United States
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`to Sirion, which conducted clinical studies on DUREZOL, a difluprednate
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`emulsion used as anti-inflammatory eyedrops after ocular surgery and to treat
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`uveitis (a form of ocular inflammation). C.A. App. 986. After DUROZOL’s
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`substantial success in the United States, Akorn filed an ANDA in December
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`2014 seeking to copy DUREZOL. C.A. App. 218. Patent litigation followed in
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`January 2015. C.A. App. 218-219. In May 2015, Akorn filed its IPR petition.
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`C.A. App. 66-128. After considering Akorn’s Petition and Senju’s Preliminary
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`Response, the Board instituted IPR2015-01205 to review the patentability of
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`claims 1-4, 6-10, 12-14, and 18 of the ’319 patent. C.A. App. 194. On November
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`22, 2016, the Board issued a Final Written Decision, ruling that those claims of
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`the ’319 patent are obvious. C.A. App. 26.
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`
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`In the IPR, Akorn relied on (i) the Kimura patent’s teaching of a
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`4
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`
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`difluprednate suspension to treat (among other tissues) the conjunctiva, and (ii)
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`Ding’s teaching that cyclosporin shows enhanced delivery to the lacrimal gland
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`but poor delivery to the conjunctiva using an emulsion. C.A. App. 5-7, C.A. App.
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`10-12. Akorn argued that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been
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`motivated to combine this prior art because (i) suspensions generally were
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`understood to exhibit poor dose uniformity and bioavailability, and (ii) Ding
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`purportedly showed that these problems could be solved by migrating any non-
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`water-soluble anti-inflammatory active agent—including steroids, even though
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`the active in Ding was not a steroid—from suspensions to a castor oil emulsion.
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`C.A. App. 96-103.
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`
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`In response, Senju presented substantial evidence that a
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`hypothetical artisan of ordinary skill at the time of the invention would not
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`have been motivated to combine the Kimura and Ding references on which
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`Akorn relied. Crucially, however, Senju did not limit is presentation to such
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`evidence. Rather, Senju also presented real-world evidence of non-obviousness.
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`
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`For example, Senju presented general objective evidence of non-
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`obviousness, including the unexpected results and industry praise described
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`above. See POR at 44-48 and 55-57. Particularly relevant here, Senju also
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`presented evidence to specifically rebut Akorn’s theory of obviousness—viz.,
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`that at the time of the invention, the skilled artisan would have understood that
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`steroid eye drops formulated as suspensions generally suffered from dose
`
`uniformity and biovailability problems, and that it would have been obvious
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`5
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`
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`that these problems could be solved simply by migrating the active steroid from
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`a suspension to an emulsion. This objective evidence rebutting Akorn’s theory
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`of obviousness fell into two categories.
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`
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`First, Senju presented evidence that, as a matter of fact, industry
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`actors in the real world routinely continue to formulate steroid eye drops as
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`suspensions, and do not formulate them as emulsions, suggesting that an
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`emulsion steroid formulation was far from obvious. POR at 13-15. Second,
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`Senju presented evidence that Akorn’s own expert had invented “an ophthalmic
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`formulation containing both loteprednol etabonate [a steroid] and cyclosporine
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`(a non-steroid),” and “filed a patent application on gel formulations for the
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`combination product, not emulsion formulations,” POR at 16, explaining that if
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`Akorn’s own expert invented a steroid eye drop without thinking of formulating
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`it as an emulsion, that is real-world evidence that hypothetical artisan at the
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`time of the invention would not have been motivated to do so.
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`
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`c. On November 22, 2016, the Board issued a Final Written
`
`decision, ruling that the claims of the ’319 patent are obvious over the
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`combination of Kimura and Ding. C.A. App. 26. Among numerous other errors,
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`the Board did not even mention, let alone consider, the categories of objective,
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`real-world evidence of non-obviousness discussed above—namely, actual
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`practice in the industry and Senju’s own expert’s patent.
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`
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`d. The court of appeals affirmed the Board’s decision without
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`opinion the morning after oral argument, citing Federal Circuit Rule 36.
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`6
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`
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`4.
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` The Federal Circuit’s decision raises two important questions for
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`this Court. The first is whether the Federal Circuit’s continued practice of
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`affirming Board orders without opinion under its Rule 36 violates 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 144, which requires that court to issue a “mandate and opinion” for every
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`appeal from the Patent Office. (Emphasis added). The second is whether the
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`Board (or any other factfinder) must consider all objective evidence of non-
`
`obviousness in determining whether a patent is invalid for obviousness.
`
`
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`The Rule 36 question. Ever since the advent of inter partes review
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`under the America Invents Act, the Federal Circuit has formed a well-
`
`recognized habit of failing to issue opinions in appeals from Board decisions,
`
`and instead relying on Federal Circuit Rule 36 to affirm such decisions in a
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`cursory order without opinion. Indeed, in recent years, the Federal Circuit has
`
`resolved more appeals arising from the Patent Office without opinion than with
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`opinion. See Jason Rantanen, Data of Federal Circuit Appeals and Decisions,
`
`PatentlyO (June 2, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/06/circuit-appeals-
`
`decisions.html. And that is so not only in cases that raise purely factual
`
`questions, but also in cases (such as this one) presenting pure legal issues,
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`which are reviewed de novo.
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`That practice is not only harmful to litigants and to the patent system,
`
`but violates a statutory mandate in 35 U.S.C. § 144 to issue opinions in appeals
`
`from the Patent Office. Under Federal Circuit Rule 36, the court of appeals
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`permits itself to “enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion.” Fed. Cir. R.
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`7
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`
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`36. But Congress expressly prohibits that practice in appeals from the Patent
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`Office. In 35 U.S.C. § 144, Congress directed the Federal Circuit to “issue to the
`
`Director [of the Patent Office] its mandate and opinion, which shall be entered
`
`of record in the Patent and Trademark Office and shall govern the further
`
`proceedings in the case.” (Emphasis added). The Federal Circuit’s practice of
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`nevertheless issuing judgments of affirmance “without opinion,” Fed. Cir. R. 36,
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`in appeals from the Patent Office—and, indeed, doing so in a majority of such
`
`appeals—flatly violates that congressional mandate. And because the Federal
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`Circuit has shown itself to be wedded to this extra-statutory practice, only this
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`Court’s review can bring the Federal Circuit’s approach to Patent Office
`
`Appeals back in line with the governing statutory scheme.
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`
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`The objective-evidence-of-non-obviousness question. The second
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`question presented is whether a fact-finder such as the Board is required to
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`consider all objective evidence of non-obviousness when considering a patent’s
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`validity.
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`The Board here failed entirely to consider the two categories of objective
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`evidence of non-obviousness described above. First, the Board did not even
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`acknowledge, let alone evaluate, Senju’s showing that in the real world,
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`industry participants that market steroid eye drops mostly formulate them as
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`suspensions, and no one (other than Senju’s licensee) formulates steroid eye
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`drops as an emulsion. If, as Akorn posits, it was obvious that suspensions’
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`bioavailability problems could be solved by migrating the active steroid to an
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`8
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`
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`emulsion, then others would have done so. The fact that no one has is highly
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`probative evidence contradicting Akorn’s theory of obviousness.
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`So too is Senju’s evidence that Akorn’s own expert failed to propose an
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`emulsion formulation in a patent application for a combination steroid and
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`cyclosporin eye drop, even though the patent application describes Ding in its
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`specifications (including that Ding proposed a cyclosporin emulsion in
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`particular). Akorn’s theory is that a hypothetical artisan looking at Ding would
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`think it obvious to formulate steroid eye drops as emulsions. Yet the evidence is
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`undisputed that Dr. Xia—an actual artisan—considered Ding and did not
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`propose an emulsion formulation. Again, this is highly probative, objective
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`evidence of non-obviousness, and the Board’s failure to even acknowledge it, let
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`alone consider it, was flatly contrary to this Court’s established precedent.
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`
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`
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`The court of appeals apparently accepted Akorn’s argument on
`
`appeal that the evidence just described fell within none of the traditionally
`
`named “secondary considerations” that are often raised and evaluated in
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`obviousness cases, “such . . . as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
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`needs, failure of others, etc.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18
`
`(1966). That position conflicts directly with this Court’s decision in KSR
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`International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). The traditional
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`“secondary factors” come up most often because they are potentially relevant in
`
`every case—for example, a product’s commercial success is always probative
`
`(though not always dispositive) evidence of innovation. But sometimes, a
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`9
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`
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`particular form of evidence will only be relevant because it bears directly on a
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`challenger’s particular theory of obviousness. That kind of evidence is just as
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`much of an objective guard against hindsight bias as the more common
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`“secondary considerations,” and a factfinder like the Board is just as obligated
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`to consider it before ruling on obviousness. That is why this Court expressly
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`held that a factfinder must “look at any secondary considerations that would
`
`prove instructive.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added). The Federal
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`Circuit’s failure to apply that established rule warrants this Court’s review.
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`5.
`
`This application for a 30-day extension seeks to accommodate
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`Applicants’ legitimate needs.
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` Appellants’ internal and mutual review,
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`deliberations and decisions to seek this Court’s review were within the last two
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`weeks. No prejudice to Akorn would arise from the short extension. In light of
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`counsel’s many other obligations—including an oral argument in New York
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`appellate court on March 5, 2019, in Century Indemnity Corp. v. Brooklyn
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`Union Gas (N.Y. App. Div. No. 2018-3023), an amicus curiae brief due in this
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`Court on March 8, 2019, in Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, and a brief
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`due on March 12, 2019 in the California Court of Appeal in Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
`
`v. County of Monterey (Cal. App. No. H045791)—and the complex record
`
`involved in this case, counsel would not be able to adequately prepare a petition
`
`for certiorari raising the important questions discussed above by the current
`
`due date.
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`6.
`
`For these reasons, Applicants request that the due date for their
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`10
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`
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`petition for a writ of certiorari be extended to April 10, 2019.
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`11
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`
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`Dated: February 28, 2019
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /s/ Anton Metlitsky
`
`Lisa Pensabene
`Anton Metlitsky
` (Counsel of Record)
`Daniel O’Boyle
`O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
`7 Times Square
`New York, N.Y. 10036
`(212) 326-2000
`ametlitsky@omm.com
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`No. 18A-__
`
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`____________________
`
`SENJU PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. AND MITSUBISHI CHEMICAL CORPORATION,
`
`Petitioners,
`
`
`v.
`
`AKORN, INC.,
`
`
`
`
`____________________
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`____________________
`
`
`
`
`
`Respondent.
`
`
`
`Petitioners are Senju Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. and Mitsubishi Chemical
`
`Corporation. The following corporate disclosure statement is provided in
`
`accordance with S. Ct. R. 29.6. Petitioner Senju Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. is a
`
`non-governmental corporate party to this action. Senju has no parent
`
`corporation and no company owns 10% or more of its stock. Petitioner
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`Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation is a non-governmental corporate party to this
`
`action. Mitsubishi is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mitsubishi Chemical
`
`Holdings Corp.
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`
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`
`
`
`13
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`
`
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`Dated: February 28, 2019
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`By: /s/ Anton Metlitsky
`
`Lisa Pensabene
`Anton Metlitsky
` (Counsel of Record)
`Daniel O’Boyle
`O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
`7 Times Square
`New York, N.Y. 10036
`(212) 326-2000
`ametlitsky@omm.com
`
`
`
`14
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