`(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2020
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
`
`
`
`
`
` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, ET AL. v.
`FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 19–508. Argued January 13, 2021—Decided April 22, 2021
`
`The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against Scott Tucker
`
`and his companies alleging deceptive payday lending practices in vio-
`lation of §5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The District
`Court granted the Commission’s request pursuant to §13(b) of the Act
`for a permanent injunction to prevent Tucker from committing future
`violations of the Act, and relied on the same authority to direct Tucker
`
`to pay $1.27 billion in restitution and disgorgement. On appeal, the
`Ninth Circuit rejected Tucker’s argument that §13(b) does not author-
`ize the award of equitable monetary relief.
`Held: Section 13(b) does not authorize the Commission to seek, or a court
`
`to award, equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorge-
`ment. Pp. 3–15.
`
`(a) Congress granted the Commission authority to enforce the Act’s
`
`prohibitions on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” 15 U. S. C.
`§§45(a)(1)–(2), by commencing administrative proceedings pursuant to
`§5 of the Act. Section 5(l) of the Act authorizes the Commission, fol-
`
`
`
`lowing completion of the administrative process and the issuance of a
`
`final cease and desist order, to seek civil penalties, and permits district
`courts to “grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further eq-
`uitable relief as they deem appropriate in the enforcement of such final
`orders of the Commission.” §45(l). Section 19 of the Act further au-
`
`thorizes district courts (subject to various conditions and limitations)
`to grant “such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to
`
`
`consumers,” §57b(b), in cases where someone has engaged in unfair or
`
`deceptive conduct with respect to which the Commission has issued a
`
`final cease and desist order applicable to that person, see §57b(a)(2).
`
`Here, the Commission responded to Tucker’s payday lending practices
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC v. FTC
`
`
`Syllabus
`by seeking equitable monetary relief directly in district court under
`§13(b)’s authorization to seek a “permanent injunction.” In doing so,
`
`the Commission acted in accordance with its increasing tendency to
`
`use §13(b) to seek monetary awards without prior use of the Commis-
`sion’s traditional administrative proceedings. The desirability of the
`Commission’s practice aside, the question is whether Congress, by en-
`acting §13(b) and using the words “permanent injunction,” granted the
`
`Commission authority to obtain monetary relief directly from courts
`
`and effectively bypass the requirements of the administrative process.
`Pp. 3–6.
`
`(b) Section 13(b) does not explicitly authorize the Commission to ob-
`
`
`tain court-ordered monetary relief, and such relief is foreclosed by the
`structure and history of the Act. Section 13(b) provides that the “Com-
`
`mission may seek . . . a permanent injunction.” §53(b). By its terms,
`this provision concerns prospective injunctive relief, not retrospective
`monetary relief. Section 13(b) allows the Commission to go directly to
`district court when the Commission seeks injunctive relief pending ad-
`ministrative proceedings or when it seeks only a permanent injunc-
`tion. Other statutory provisions, in particular the conditioned and lim-
`
`ited monetary relief authorized in §19, confirm this conclusion. It is
`highly unlikely that Congress, without mentioning the matter, would
`grant the Commission authority to circumvent its traditional §5 ad-
`
`ministrative proceedings. Pp. 6–10.
`
`(c) The Commission’s contrary arguments are unavailing. First,
`
`
`
`Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, and Mitchell v. Robert
`
`DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U. S. 288, did not adopt a universal rule
`that statutory authority to grant an injunction automatically encom-
`
`passes the power to grant equitable monetary remedies. Instead, the
`
`text and structure of the particular statutory scheme at issue can limit
`
`a court’s jurisdiction in equity. Second, in enacting §19 two years after
`
`§13(b), Congress did not simply create an alternative enforcement path
`with similar remedies. The Court does not believe Congress would
`have enacted §19’s provisions expressly authorizing monetary relief if
`
`§13(b) already implicitly allowed the Commission to obtain that same
`
`monetary relief without satisfying §19’s conditions and limitations.
`Third, §19’s saving clauses—preserving “any authority of the Commis-
`
`sion under any other provision of law” and “any other remedy or right
`of action provided by State or Federal law,” §57b(e)—do not help an-
`swer whether §13(b) gave the Commission the authority to obtain eq-
`uitable monetary relief directly in court in the first place. Fourth, the
`
`Act’s 1994 and 2006 amendments, which did not modify the specific
`language at issue here, do not demonstrate congressional acquiescence
`
`to lower court rulings that favor the Commission’s interpretation of
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`
`Syllabus
`§13(b). Fifth, policy arguments that §5 and §19 are inadequate to pro-
`
`vide redress to consumers should be addressed to Congress. Pp. 10–
`
`14.
`910 F. 3d 417, reversed and remanded.
`BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
`
`3
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
`
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
`
`
` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 19–508
`_________________
` AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, ET AL.,
`
`
` PETITIONERS v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`[April 22, 2021]
`JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
`
`authorizes the Commission to obtain, “in proper cases,” a
`“permanent injunction” in federal court against “any per-
`son, partnership, or corporation” that it believes “is
`violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law” that
`the Commission enforces. 87 Stat. 592, 15 U. S. C. §53(b).
`The question presented is whether this statutory language
`
`authorizes the Commission to seek, and a court to award,
`
`equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorge-
`ment. We conclude that it does not.
`I
`Petitioner Scott Tucker controlled several companies that
`
`
`provided borrowers with short-term payday loans. The
`
`companies, operating online, would show a potential
`customer a loan’s essential terms. When the companies ex-
`
`plained those terms, they misled many customers. The
`
`companies’ written explanations seemed to say that cus-
`tomers could normally repay a loan by making a single pay-
`ment. And that payment would cost a person who, for ex-
`ample, borrowed $300 an extra $90. (The customer would
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC v. FTC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`likely repay a total of $390.) But in fine print the explana-
`tions said that the loan would be automatically renewed un-
`
`less the customer took affirmative steps to opt out. Thus,
`
`unless the customer who borrowed $300 was aware of the
`fine print and actively prevented the loan’s automatic re-
`
`newal, he or she could end up having to pay $975, not $390.
`
`Between 2008 and 2012, Tucker’s businesses made more
`
`than 5 million payday loans, amounting to more than $1.3
`billion in deceptive charges.
`
`In 2012 the Federal Trade Commission filed suit and
`claimed that Tucker and his companies were engaging in
`“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
`
`merce,” in violation of §5(a) of the Act. 15 U. S. C. §45(a)(1).
`(We shall refer to all of the defendants collectively as
`
`Tucker.) In asserting that Tucker’s practices were likely to
`mislead consumers, the Commission did not first use its
`
`own administrative proceedings. Rather, the Commission
`
`filed a complaint against Tucker directly in federal court.
`The Commission, relying upon §13(b), asked the court to is-
`sue a permanent injunction to prevent Tucker from commit-
`ting future violations of the Act. Relying on the same pro-
`
`vision, the Commission also asked the court to order
`monetary relief, in particular, restitution and disgorge-
`ment. The Commission moved for summary judgment.
`
`
`The District Court granted the Commission’s summary
`
`judgment motion. The court also granted the Commission’s
`
`request for an injunction and directed Tucker to pay $1.27
`billion in restitution and disgorgement. The court ordered
`
`the Commission to use these funds first to provide “direct
`redress to consumers” and then to provide “other equitable
`relief ” reasonably related to Tucker’s alleged business prac-
`
`tices. Finally, the court ordered the Commission to deposit
`any remaining funds in the United States Treasury as dis-
`gorgement.
`
`
`On appeal, Tucker argued that §13(b) does not authorize
`the monetary relief the District Court had granted. The
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`
`
`
` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Ninth Circuit rejected Tucker’s claim. 910 F. 3d 417 (2018).
`
`It pointed to Circuit precedent that had interpreted §13(b)
`
`
` as “empower[ing] district courts to grant any ancillary relief
`necessary to accomplish complete justice, including restitu-
`tion.” FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., 815 F. 3d 593, 598
`
`(2016); see also FTC v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F. 2d 1107,
`1113 (CA9 1982). Two judges, while recognizing that prec-
`edent in many Circuits supported that use of §13(b), ex-
`pressed doubt as to the correctness of that precedent.
`Tucker then sought certiorari in this Court. In light of
`
`
`recent differences that have emerged among the Circuits as
`
`to the scope of §13(b), we granted his petition.
`
`II
`
`The Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits, and au-
`
`thorizes the Commission to prevent, “[u]nfair methods of
`competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 15
`
`U. S. C. §§45(a)(1)–(2). The Act permits the Commission to
`
`use both its own administrative proceedings (set forth in §5
`
`of the Act) and court actions in exercising this authority. In
`construing §13(b), it is helpful to understand how the Com-
`mission’s authority (and its interpretation of that author-
`ity) has evolved over time.
`
`
`Ever since the Commission’s creation in 1914, it has been
`authorized to enforce the Act through its own administra-
`tive proceedings. Section 5 of the Act describes the relevant
`administrative proceedings in some detail. If the Commis-
`sion has “reason to believe” that a party “has been or is us-
`ing any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive
`
`act or practice,” it can file a complaint against the claimed
`
`violator and adjudicate its claim before an Administrative
`Law Judge. §45(b). The ALJ then conducts a hearing and
`
`writes a report setting forth findings of fact and reaching a
`
`
`legal conclusion. Ibid. If the ALJ concludes that the con-
`duct at issue was unfair or misleading, the ALJ will issue
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC v. FTC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`an order requiring the party to cease and desist from en-
`gaging in the unlawful conduct. Ibid. The party may then
`seek review before the Commission and eventually in a
`court of appeals, where the “findings of the Commission as
`
`to the facts” (if supported by the evidence) “shall be conclu-
`sive.” §45(c). If judicial review favors the Commission (or
`
`if the time to seek judicial review expires), the Commis-
`sion’s order normally becomes final (and enforceable).
`
`§45(g).
`In the 1970s Congress authorized the Commission to seek
`
`additional remedies in court.
`In 1973 Congress added
`§13(b), the provision at issue here. That provision permits
`
`the Commission to proceed directly to court (prior to issuing
`
`a cease and desist order) to obtain a “temporary restraining
`
`
`order or a preliminary injunction,” and also allows the Com-
`mission, “in proper cases,” to obtain a court-ordered “per-
`manent injunction.” 15 U. S. C. §53(b). In the same legis-
`lation, Congress also amended §5(l) of the Act to authorize
`district courts to award civil penalties against respondents
`who violate final cease and desist orders, and to “grant
`mandatory injunctions and such other and further equita-
`ble relief as they deem appropriate in the enforcement of
`such final orders of the Commission.” §45(l). Two years
`
`later, Congress enacted §19 of the Act, which authorizes
`district courts to grant “such relief as the court finds neces-
`sary to redress injury to consumers,” including through the
`“refund of money or return of property.” §57b(b). However,
`Congress specified that the consumer redress available un-
`der §19 could be sought only (as relevant here, and subject
`to various conditions and limitations) against those who
`have “engage[d] in any unfair or deceptive act or prac-
`tice . . . with respect to which the Commission has issued a
`final cease and desist order which is applicable to such per-
`son.” §57b(a)(2).
`Beginning in the late 1970s, the Commission began to use
`
`
`§13(b), and in particular the words “permanent injunction,”
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`5
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`to obtain court orders for redress of various kinds in con-
`sumer protection cases—without prior use of the adminis-
`trative proceedings in §5. See, e.g., FTC v. Virginia Homes
`Mfg. Corp., 509 F. Supp. 51, 59 (Md. 1981) (relying on
`
`§13(b) to order the defendant to notify past customers of
`
`their warranty rights); see also D. FitzGerald, The Genesis
`of Consumer Protection Remedies Under Section 13(b) of
`the FTC Act 1–2, Paper at FTC 90th Anniversary Sympo-
`sium, Sept. 23, 2004 (FitzGerald); Beales & Muris, Striking
`the Proper Balance: Redress Under Section 13(b) of the FTC
`Act, 79 Antitrust L. J. 1, 3–4 (2013). The Commission used
`this authority to seek and win restitution and other forms
`
`of equitable monetary relief directly in court.
`
`
`Similarly, in the late 1990s the Commission began to use
`§13(b)’s “permanent injunction” authority in antitrust cases
`to seek monetary awards, such as restitution and disgorge-
`ment—again without prior use of traditional administra-
`tive proceedings. See Complaint in FTC v. Mylan Labs.,
`
`Inc., No. 98–3114 (DC); Complaint in FTC v. The Hearst
`
`Trust, No. 01–734 (DC). In 2003 the Commission issued
`
`guidance that limited its use of §13(b) to obtain monetary
`relief to “exceptional cases” involving a “[c]lear [v]iolation”
`of the antitrust laws. Policy Statement on Monetary Equi-
`table Remedies in Competition Cases, 68 Fed. Reg. 45821
`(emphasis deleted). But in 2012 the Commission withdrew
`
`its policy statement and the limitations it imposed. See
`Withdrawal of the Commission Policy Statement on Mone-
`
`tary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, 77 Fed.
`Reg. 47071.
`
`The result is that the Commission presently uses §13(b)
`to win equitable monetary relief directly in court with great
`frequency. The Commission tells us that “the agency [now]
`brings dozens of [§13(b)] cases every year seeking a perma-
`nent injunction and the return of illegally obtained funds.”
`Brief for Respondent 8; see also, e.g., Ohlhausen, Dollars,
`Doctrine, and Damage Control: How Disgorgement Affects
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC v. FTC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the FTC’s Antitrust Mission 7, Speech at Dechert LLP, NY,
`Apr. 20, 2016 (Commission sought disgorgement in anti-
`trust cases four times between 2012 and 2016, which is “as
`
`many times as the [Commission] pursued such relief in the
`prior twenty years”). With respect to consumer protection
`
`cases, the Commission adds that “there’s no question that
`the agency brings far more cases in court than it does in the
`administrative process.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 49. In fiscal year
`
`2019, for example, the Commission filed 49 complaints in
`
`federal court and obtained 81 permanent injunctions and
`
`orders, resulting in $723.2 million in consumer redress
`
`See FTC, Fiscal Year 2021 Con-
`or disgorgement.
`
`
`gressional Budget Justification 5
`(Feb. 10, 2020),
`
`
`https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/fy-2021-
`congressional-budget-justification/fy_2021_cbj_final.pdf.
`In the same period, the Commission issued only 21 new ad-
`
`ministrative complaints and 21 final administrative orders.
`
`Our task here is not to decide whether this substitution
`of §13(b) for the administrative procedure contained in §5
`
`and the consumer redress available under §19 is desirable.
`Rather, it is to answer a more purely legal question: Did
`Congress, by enacting §13(b)’s words, “permanent injunc-
`tion,” grant the Commission authority to obtain monetary
`relief directly from courts, thereby effectively bypassing the
`process set forth in §5 and §19?
`
`III
`
`Several considerations, taken together, convince us that
`§13(b)’s “permanent injunction” language does not author-
`ize the Commission directly to obtain court-ordered mone-
`tary relief. For one thing, the language refers only to in-
`junctions. It says, “in proper cases the Commission may
`seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, a perma-
`
`nent injunction.” 15 U. S. C. §53(b) (emphasis added). An
`“injunction” is not the same as an award of equitable mon-
`etary relief. Compare, e.g., United States v. Oregon State
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Medical Soc., 343 U. S. 326, 333 (1952) (injunction typically
`
`offers prospective relief against ongoing or future harm),
`with, e.g., 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §4.1(1) (2d ed. 1993)
`
`(restitution typically offers retrospective relief to redress
`past harm). We have, however, sometimes interpreted sim-
`ilar language as authorizing judges to order equitable mon-
`
`
`etary relief. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S.
`
`
`
`395 (1946); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361
`U. S. 288 (1960).
`
`
`But if this language alone is not enough, there is more.
`The language and structure of §13(b), taken as a whole, in-
`dicate that the words “permanent injunction” have a lim-
`ited purpose—a purpose that does not extend to the grant
`of monetary relief. Those words are buried in a lengthy pro-
`vision that focuses upon purely injunctive, not monetary,
`
`relief. It says (in relevant part):
`“Whenever the Commission has reason to believe—
`
`“(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is
`
`
`violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law en-
`forced by the Federal Trade Commission, and
`
`“(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance
`of a complaint by the Commission and until such com-
`plaint is dismissed by the Commission or set aside by
`the court on review, or until the order of the Commis-
`sion made thereon has become final, would be in the
`interest of the public—
`“the Commission by any of its attorneys designated by
`it for such purpose may bring suit in a district court of
`
`the United States to enjoin any such act or practice.
`
`Upon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and
`considering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate
`success, such action would be in the public interest, and
`after notice to the defendant, a temporary restraining
`
`order or a preliminary injunction may be granted with-
`out bond: Provided, however, That if a complaint is not
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC v. FTC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`filed within such period (not exceeding 20 days) as may
`be specified by the court after issuance of the tempo-
`
`rary restraining order or preliminary injunction, the
`
`order or injunction shall be dissolved by the court and
`be of no further force and effect: Provided further, That
`in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after
`proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunc-
`
`
`tion.” 15 U. S. C. §53(b) (final emphasis added).
`
`Taken as a whole, the provision focuses upon relief that
`is prospective, not retrospective. Consider the words “is vi-
`olating” and “is about to violate” (not “has violated”) setting
`
`forth when the Commission may request injunctive relief.
`Consider too the words “pending the issuance of a com-
`plaint,” “until such complaint is dismissed,” “temporary re-
`
`straining order,” “preliminary injunction,” and so forth in
`the first half of the section. These words reflect that the
`provision addresses a specific problem, namely, that of stop-
`
`ping seemingly unfair practices from taking place while the
`
`Commission determines their lawfulness. Cf. §53(a)
`false
`(providing
`similar provisional
`relief where
`advertising regarding food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics is
`at issue). And the appearance of the words “permanent in-
`junction” (as a proviso) suggests that those words are di-
`
`rectly related to a previously issued preliminary injunction.
`They might also be read, for example, as granting
`authority for the Commission to go one step beyond the pro-
`visional and (“in proper cases”) dispense with administra-
`tive proceedings to seek what the words literally say
`
`(namely, an injunction). But to read those words as allow-
`ing what they do not say, namely, as allowing the Commis-
`
`sion to dispense with administrative proceedings to obtain
`monetary relief as well, is to read the words as going well
`beyond the provision’s subject matter. In light of the his-
`torical importance of administrative proceedings, that read-
`ing would allow a small statutory tail to wag a very large
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`9
`
`
`
`dog.
`
`Further, the structure of the Act beyond §13(b) confirms
`this conclusion. Congress in §5(l) and §19 gave district
`courts the authority to impose limited monetary penalties
`and to award monetary relief in cases where the Commis-
`sion has issued cease and desist orders, i.e., where the Com-
`
`
`mission has engaged in administrative proceedings. Since
`in these provisions Congress explicitly provided for “other
`and further equitable relief,” 15 U. S. C. §45(l), and for the
`“refund of money or return of property,” §57b(b), it likely
`did not intend for §13(b)’s more cabined “permanent injunc-
`tion” language to have similarly broad scope.
`
`More than that, the latter provision (§19) comes with cer-
`tain important limitations that are absent in §13(b). As rel-
`
`evant here, §19 applies only where the Commission begins
`its §5 process within three years of the underlying violation
`and seeks monetary relief within one year of any result-
`
`
`ing final cease and desist order. 15 U. S. C. §57b(d). And
`
`it applies only where “a reasonable man would have
`
`known under the circumstances” that the conduct at is-
`sue was “dishonest or fraudulent.” §57b(a)(2); see also
`§45(m)(1)(B)(2) (providing court-ordered monetary penal-
`ties against anyone who engages in conduct previously
`identified as prohibited in a final cease and desist order, but
`only if the violator acted with “actual knowledge that such
`act or practice is unfair or deceptive”). In addition, Con-
`
`gress enacted these other, more limited, monetary relief
`provisions at the same time as, or a few years after, it en-
`
`acted §13(b) in 1973.
`
`It is highly unlikely that Congress would have enacted
`
`provisions expressly authorizing conditioned and limited
`
`monetary relief if the Act, via §13(b), had already implicitly
`allowed the Commission to obtain that same monetary re-
`lief and more without satisfying those conditions and limi-
`
`tations. Nor is it likely that Congress, without mentioning
`the matter, would have granted the Commission authority
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
` 10
`
`
`AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC v. FTC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`so readily to circumvent its traditional §5 administrative
`proceedings. See FitzGerald 1 (arguing that, in the mid-
`1970s, “no one imagined that Section 13(b) of the [FTC] Act
`would become an important part of the Commission’s con-
`sumer protection program” (footnote omitted)).
`At the same time, to read §13(b) to mean what it says, as
`
`
`authorizing injunctive but not monetary relief, produces a
`
`coherent enforcement scheme: The Commission may obtain
`monetary relief by first invoking its administrative proce-
`dures and then §19’s redress provisions (which include lim-
`itations). And the Commission may use §13(b) to obtain in-
`junctive relief while administrative proceedings are
`foreseen or in progress, or when it seeks only injunctive re-
`
`lief. By contrast, the Commission’s broad reading would al-
`low it to use §13(b) as a substitute for §5 and §19. For the
`reasons we have just stated, that could not have been Con-
`gress’ intent. Cf. Whitman v. American Trucking Assns.,
`
`Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does not . . .
`
`hide elephants in mouseholes”).
`
`IV
`The Commission makes several arguments to the con-
`
`trary. First, the Commission points to traditional equitable
`practice and to two previous cases where we interpreted
`
`provisions authorizing injunctive relief to authorize equita-
`ble monetary relief as well. See Porter v. Warner Holding
`Co., 328 U. S. 395 (1946); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jew-
`elry, Inc., 361 U. S. 288 (1960). In Porter we said that
`
`
`“[n]othing is more clearly a part of the subject matter of a
`suit for an injunction than the recovery of that which has
`been illegally acquired and which has given rise to the ne-
`cessity for injunctive relief.” 328 U. S., at 399. In Mitchell
`
`we said that, “[w]hen Congress entrusts to an equity court
`the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory
`
`enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the
`
`historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light of
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` 11
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the statutory purposes.” 361 U. S., at 291–292. The Com-
`mission argues that these cases consequently support the
`proposition that the traditional equitable “authority to
`grant an ‘injunction’ includes the power to grant restorative
`monetary remedies.” Brief for Respondent 21.
`
`
`The problem for the Commission is that we did not in
`these two cases purport to set forth a universal rule of in-
`
`terpretation. And both cases involved different statutes.
`See Porter, 328 U. S., at 397 (Emergency Price Control Act
`provision authorizing courts to issue “‘a permanent or tem-
`porary injunction, restraining order, or other order’”);
`Mitchell, 361 U. S., at 289 (Fair Labor Standards Act provi-
`
`sion authorizing courts to “‘restrain violations’” of the Act’s
`
`antiretaliation ban). In both cases, we recognized that the
`
`text and structure of the statutory scheme at issue can, “in
`so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable infer-
`ence, restric[t] the court’s jurisdiction in equity.” Porter,
`
`328 U. S., at 398; Mitchell, 361 U. S., at 291. Thus in Porter
`we examined “other provision[s] of the [Emergency Price
`Control] Act” to determine whether they “expressly or im-
`
`pliedly preclud[e] a court from ordering restitution in the
`exercise of its equity jurisdiction.” 328 U. S., at 403. And
`
`in Mitchell we examined other provisions of the Fair Labor
`Standards Act before concluding that there was “no indica-
`tion in the language” that the statute precluded equitable
`relief in the form of lost wages. 361 U. S., at 294.
`
`Moreover, more recently, we have held, based on our
`reading of a statutory scheme as a whole, that a provision’s
`grant of an “injunction” or other equitable powers does not
`
`automatically authorize a court to provide monetary relief.
`Rather, we have said, the scope of equitable relief that a
`provision authorizes “remains a question of interpretation
`
`in each case.” Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248,
`257 (1993). Our decision in Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.,
`516 U. S. 479 (1996), is instructive. There, we considered a
`
`provision in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
` 12
`
`
`AMG CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC v. FTC
`
`Opinion of the Court
`that authorizes district courts “to restrain any person who
`
`has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present
`handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of
`any solid or hazardous waste,” and “to order such person to
`
`take such other action as may be necessary, or both.” 98
`Stat. 3268, 42 U. S. C. §6972(a). The question was whether
`this language permits courts to award restitution in the
`form of past cleanup costs. We concluded that, despite Por-
`ter, the provision’s grant of equitable authority does not au-
`thorize past cleanup costs because the relevant statutory
`
`scheme (as here) contained other “‘elaborate enforcement
`
`provisions,’” including (as here) provisions that explicitly
`
`provide for that form of relief. Meghrig, 516 U. S., at 487.
`Here, the inference against §13(b)’s authorization of mone-
`
`tary relief is strong and follows from the interpretive ap-
`
`proach we took in Meghrig.
`
`Second, the Commission argues that Congress simply
`created two enforcement avenues, one administrative and
`the other judicial, leaving the Commission the power to de-
`
`cide which of the two “separate, parallel enforcement paths”
`to take. Brief for Respondent 41. To the extent that §19
`authorizes “similar relief ” as §13(b), the Commission con-
`
`
`tinues, that reflects only the fact that each pathway is an
`alternative route to “similar endpoints.” Id., at 41–42. This
`
`
`statement, however, does not overcome the interpretive dif-
`ficulties we have set forth, for example permitting the Com-
`mission to avoid the conditions and limitations laid out in
`§19. We cannot believe that Congress merely intended to
`enact a more onerous alternative to §13(b) when it enacted
`§19 two years later.
`
`Third, the Commission points to saving clauses in §19,
`which, it says, save its ability to use §13(b) to obtain mone-
`tary relief. See id., at 42. Those clauses preserve “any au-
`
`thority of the Commission under any other provision of law”
`and preserve “any other remedy or right of action provided
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` 13
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`by State or Federal law.” 15 U. S. C. §57b(e). Here, how-
`ever, the question is not one of preserving pre-existing rem-
`
`edies given by other statutory provisions. The question is
`whether those other provisions (namely, §13(b)) gave that
`remedy in the first place.
`
`Fourth, the Commission points out that the courts of ap-
`peals have, until recently, consistently accepted its inter-
`pretation, and that Congress has in effect twice ratified that
`
`interpretation in subsequent amendments to the Act. See,
`e.g., Brief for Respondent 8, and n. 3 (citing the similar con-
`
`clusions of eight Circuits). But see FTC v. Credit Bureau
`
`Center, LLC, 937 F. 3d 764 (CA7 2019); FTC v. AbbVie Inc.,
`976 F. 3d 327 (CA3 2020). We have held that Congress’ ac-
`quiescence to a settled judicial interpretation can suggest
`adoption of that interpretation. See, e.g., Monessen South-
`
`western R. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U. S. 330, 338 (1988). We
`have also said, however, that when “Congress has not com-
`prehensively revised a statutory scheme but has made only
`isolated amendments . . . [i]t is impossible to assert with
`any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act
`represents affirmative congressional approval of [a court’s]
`
`
`statutory interpretation.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S.
`
`275, 292 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
`find this latter statement the more relevant here.
`
`The two examples of acquiescence to which the Commis-
`
`s