`(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2020
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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`
`
`
`
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID ET AL.
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 19–511. Argued December 8, 2020—Decided April 1, 2021
`
`The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) proscribes abu-
`sive telemarketing practices by, among other things, restricting cer-
`tain communications made with an “automatic telephone dialing sys-
`tem.” The TCPA defines such “autodialers” as equipment with the
`capacity both “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, us-
`ing a random or sequential number generator,” and to dial those num-
`
`bers. 47 U. S. C. §227(a)(1). Petitioner Facebook, Inc., maintains a
`
`social media platform that, as a security feature, allows users to elect
`
`to receive text messages when someone attempts to log in to the user’s
`account from a new device or browser. Facebook sent such texts to
`
`
`Noah Duguid, alerting him to login activity on a Facebook account
`
`
`linked to his telephone number, but Duguid never created that account
`
`
`(or any account on Facebook). Duguid tried without success to stop the
`
`
`unwanted messages, and eventually brought a putative class action
`against Facebook. He alleged that Facebook violated the TCPA by
`maintaining a database that stored phone numbers and programming
`its equipment to send automated text messages. Facebook countered
`
`that the TCPA does not apply because the technology it used to text
`Duguid did not use a “random or sequential number generator.” The
`Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that §227(a)(1) applies to a notifica-
`tion system like Facebook’s that has the capacity to dial automatically
`stored numbers.
`
`Held: To qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system” under the
`
`
`TCPA, a device must have the capacity either to store a telephone
`
`
`number using a random or sequential number generator, or to produce
`
`a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator.
`
`Pp. 4–12.
`
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`
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`

`

`2
`
`
`FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`(a) This case turns on whether the clause “using a random or se-
`quential number generator” in §227(a)(1)(A) modifies both of the two
`
`verbs that precede it (“store” and “produce”), as Facebook contends, or
`
`only the closest one (“produce”), as maintained by Duguid. The most
`
`natural reading of the text and other aspects of §227(a)(1)(A) confirm
`
`Facebook’s view. First, in an ordinary case, the “series-qualifier
`canon” instructs that a modifier at the end of a series of nouns or verbs
`applies to the entire series. Here, that canon indicates that the modi-
`fying phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” quali-
`fies both antecedent verbs, “store” and “produce.” Second, the modify-
`ing phrase immediately follows a concise, integrated clause (“store or
`produce telephone numbers to be called”), which uses the word “or” to
`connect two verbs that share a common direct object (“telephone num-
`
`
`bers to be called”). Given this structure, it would be odd to apply the
`
`
`modifier to just one part of the cohesive clause. Third, the comma in
`§227(a)(1)(A) separating the modifying phrase from the antecedents
`
`suggests that the qualifier applies to all of the antecedents, instead of
`just the nearest one. Pp. 4–6.
`
`Duguid’s insistence that a limiting clause should ordinarily be read
`
`as modifying only the phrase that it immediately follows (the so-called
`
`“rule of the last antecedent”) does not help his cause for two reasons.
`
`First, the Court has declined to apply that rule in the specific context
`
`where, as here, the modifying clause appears after an integrated list.
`
`Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 344, n.
`
`4. Second, the last antecedent before the clause at issue in
`§227(a)(1)(A) is not “produce,” as Duguid argues, but rather “telephone
`
`numbers to be called.” Pp. 6–7.
`
`
`(b) The statutory context confirms that the TCPA’s autodialer defi-
`nition excludes equipment that does not use a random or sequential
`number generator. Congress found autodialer technology harmful be-
`
`cause autodialers can dial emergency lines randomly or tie up all of
`the sequentially numbered phone lines at a single entity. Facebook’s
`
`
`interpretation of §227(a)(1)(A) better matches the scope of the TCPA
`to these specific concerns. Duguid’s interpretation, on the other hand,
`would encompass any equipment that stores and dials telephone num-
`bers. Pp. 7–8.
`
`(c) Duguid’s other counterarguments do not overcome the clear com-
`
`mands of the statute’s text and broader context. First, he claims that
`
`his interpretation best accords with the “sense” of the text. It would
`
`make little sense however, to classify as autodialers all equipment
`with the capacity to store and dial telephone numbers, including vir-
`tually all modern cell phones. Second, Duguid invokes the “distribu-
`
`
`tive canon,” which provides that a series of antecedents and conse-
`quents should be distributed to one another based on how they most
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`
`
`Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`naturally relate in context. But that canon is less suited here because
`
`there is only one consequent to match to two antecedents, and in any
`
`event, the modifying phrase naturally relates to both antecedents.
`
`Third, Duguid broadly construes the TCPA’s privacy-protection goals.
`
`
`But despite Congress’ general concern about intrusive telemarketing
`
`practices, Congress ultimately chose a precise autodialer definition.
`Finally, Duguid argues that a random or sequential number generator
`is a “senescent technology,” i.e., one likely to become outdated quickly.
`That may or may not be the case, but either way, this Court cannot
`
`
`rewrite the TCPA to update it for modern technology. Congress’ cho-
`
`sen definition of an autodialer requires that the equipment in question
`
`must use a random or sequential number generator. That definition
`excludes equipment like Facebook’s login notification system, which
`does not use such technology. Pp. 8–11.
`926 F. 3d 1146, reversed and remanded.
`
`SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`C. J., and THOMAS, BREYER, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BAR-
`RETT, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
`
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`

`

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` Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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`
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
`
`
` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 19–511
`_________________
` FACEBOOK, INC., PETITIONER v.
`
`
` NOAH DUGUID, ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`[April 1, 2021]
`
` JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`
`The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA)
`proscribes abusive telemarketing practices by, among other
`things, imposing restrictions on making calls with an “au-
`tomatic telephone dialing system.” As defined by the
`
`TCPA, an “automatic telephone dialing system” is a piece of
`
`equipment with the capacity both “to store or produce tele-
`phone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential
`
`number generator,” and to dial those numbers. 47 U. S. C.
`
`§227(a)(1). The question before the Court is whether that
`
`definition encompasses equipment that can “store” and dial
`telephone numbers, even if the device does not “us[e] a ran-
`dom or sequential number generator.” It does not. To qual-
`ify as an “automatic telephone dialing system,” a device
`must have the capacity either to store a telephone number
`using a random or sequential generator or to produce a tel-
`ephone number using a random or sequential number gen-
`erator.
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID
`
`Opinion of the Court
`I
`A
`
`In 1991, Congress passed the TCPA to address “the pro-
`liferation of intrusive, nuisance calls” to consumers and
`businesses from telemarketers. §2, ¶¶1, 6, 105 Stat. 2394,
`
`note following 47 U. S. C. §227. Advances in automated
`technology made it feasible for companies to execute large-
`scale telemarketing campaigns at a fraction of the prior
`cost, dramatically increasing customer contacts.
`Infa-
`mously, the development of “robocall” technology allowed
`
`companies to make calls using artificial or prerecorded
`voices, obviating the need for live human callers altogether.
`
`
`This case concerns “automatic telephone dialing systems”
`(hereinafter autodialers), which revolutionized telemarket-
`ing by allowing companies to dial random or sequential
`blocks of telephone numbers automatically. Congress
`found autodialer technology to be uniquely harmful. It
`
`threatened public safety by “seizing the telephone lines of
`public emergency services, dangerously preventing those
`lines from being utilized to receive calls from those needing
`
`emergency services.” H. R. Rep. No. 102–317, p. 24 (1991).
`
`Indeed, due to the sequential manner in which they could
`generate numbers, autodialers could simultaneously tie up
`all the lines of any business with sequentially numbered
`phone lines. Nor were individual consumers spared: Auto-
`dialers could reach cell phones, pagers, and unlisted num-
`bers, inconveniencing consumers and imposing unwanted
`
`
`fees.1 Ibid.
`Against this technological backdrop, Congress made it
`
`unlawful to make certain calls “using any automatic tele-
`phone dialing system” to “emergency telephone line[s],” to
`
`
`
`
`——————
`1At the time Congress enacted the TCPA, most cellular providers
`charged users not only for outgoing calls but also for incoming calls. See
`
`In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Telephone Consumer Protec-
`
`tion Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14115 (2003).
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`3
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`
`Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`“guest room[s] or patient room[s] of a hospital,” or “to any
`telephone number assigned to a paging service [or] cellular
`
`telephone service” without the “prior express consent of the
`
`called party.” 47 U. S. C. §227(b)(1)(A).2 The TCPA creates
`a private right of action for persons to sue to enjoin unlaw-
`ful uses of autodialers and to recover up to $1,500 per vio-
`lation or three times the plaintiffs’ actual monetary losses.
`§227(b)(3).
`
`
`
`B
`
`Petitioner Facebook, Inc., maintains a social media plat-
`
`form with an optional security feature that sends users
`
`“login notification” text messages when an attempt is made
`to access their Facebook account from an unknown device
`or browser. If necessary, the user can then log into Face-
`book and take action to secure the account. To opt in to this
`service, the user must provide and verify a cell phone num-
`ber to which Facebook can send messages.
`
`
`In 2014, respondent Noah Duguid received several login-
`
`notification text messages from Facebook, alerting him that
`someone had attempted to access the Facebook account as-
`sociated with his phone number from an unknown browser.
`But Duguid has never had a Facebook account and never
`gave Facebook his phone number.3 Unable to stop the no-
`tifications, Duguid brought a putative class action against
`
`Facebook. He alleged that Facebook violated the TCPA by
`maintaining a database that stored phone numbers and
`programming its equipment to send automated text mes-
`sages to those numbers each time the associated account
`
`was accessed by an unrecognized device or web browser.
`——————
` 2Neither party disputes that the TCPA’s prohibition also extends to
`
`
` sending unsolicited text messages. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,
`577 U. S. 153, 156 (2016). We therefore assume that it does without con-
`
` sidering or resolving that issue.
`3As Facebook explains, it is possible that Duguid was assigned a recy-
`
`cled cell phone number that previously belonged to a Facebook user who
`opted to receive login notifications.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Facebook moved to dismiss the suit, arguing primarily
`
`that Duguid failed to allege that Facebook used an auto-
`dialer because he did not claim Facebook sent text mes-
`sages to numbers that were randomly or sequentially gen-
`erated. Rather, Facebook argued, Duguid alleged that
`Facebook sent targeted, individualized texts to numbers
`
`linked to specific accounts. The U. S. District Court for the
`Northern District of California agreed and dismissed
`Duguid’s amended complaint with prejudice. 2017 WL
`635117, *4–*5 (Feb. 16, 2017).
`The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
`
`
`reversed. As relevant here, the Ninth Circuit held that
`Duguid had stated a claim under the TCPA by alleging that
`
`Facebook’s notification system automatically dialed stored
`numbers. An autodialer, the Court of Appeals held, need
`not be able to use a random or sequential generator to store
`
`
`numbers; it need only have the capacity to “‘store numbers
`to be called’” and “‘to dial such numbers automatically.’”
`
`926 F. 3d 1146, 1151 (2019) (quoting Marks v. Crunch San
`
`Diego, LLC, 904 F. 3d 1041, 1053 (CA9 2018)).
`
`We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the
`Courts of Appeals regarding whether an autodialer must
`have the capacity to generate random or sequential phone
`numbers.4 591 U. S. ___ (2020). We now reverse the Ninth
`
`Circuit’s judgment.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`II
`
`Section 227(a)(1) defines an autodialer as:
`
`“equipment which has the capacity—
`
`——————
` 4Compare 926 F. 3d 1146, 1151–1152 (CA9 2019); Duran v. La Boom
`
`
`
` Disco, Inc., 955 F. 3d 279, 290 (CA2 2020); and Allan v. Pennsylvania
` Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 968 F. 3d 567, 579–580 (CA6 2020),
`
`with Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F. 3d 458, 468 (CA7 2020) (Bar-
`
` rett, J., for the court); Glasser v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 948 F. 3d
` 1301, 1306–1307 (CA11 2020); and Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F. 3d
`
`116, 119 (CA3 2018).
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`5
`
`
`
` Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` “(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be
`
`
`called, using a random or sequential number genera-
`tor; and
`“(B) to dial such numbers.”
`
`
`Facebook argues the clause “using a random or sequential
`number generator” modifies both verbs that precede it
`
`(“store” and “produce”), while Duguid contends it modifies
`
`only the closest one (“produce”). We conclude that the
`
`clause modifies both, specifying how the equipment must
`either “store” or “produce” telephone numbers. Because
`
`Facebook’s notification system neither stores nor produces
`
`numbers “using a random or sequential number generator,”
`it is not an autodialer.
`
`A
`
`
`We begin with the text. Congress defined an autodialer
`
`in terms of what it must do (“store or produce telephone
`numbers to be called”) and how it must do it (“using a ran-
`
`dom or sequential number generator”). The definition uses
`a familiar structure: a list of verbs followed by a modifying
`clause. Under conventional rules of grammar, “[w]hen
`there is a straightforward, parallel construction that in-
`volves all nouns or verbs in a series,” a modifier at the end
`of the list “normally applies to the entire series.” A. Scalia
`& B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
`
`Texts 147 (2012) (Scalia & Garner) (quotation modified).
`The Court often applies this interpretative rule, usually re-
`ferred to as the “series-qualifier canon.” See Paroline v.
`United States, 572 U. S. 434, 447 (2014) (citing Porto Rico
`Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U. S. 345, 348
`(1920)); see also United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 339–
`
`340 (1971). This canon generally reflects the most natural
`reading of a sentence. Imagine if a teacher announced that
`
`“students must not complete or check any homework to be
`turned in for a grade, using online homework-help web-
`sites.” It would be strange to read that rule as prohibiting
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID
`
`Opinion of the Court
`students from completing homework altogether, with or
`without online support.
`Here, the series-qualifier canon recommends qualifying
`
`
`both antecedent verbs, “store” and “produce,” with the
`phrase “using a random or sequential number generator.”
`That recommendation produces the most natural construc-
`tion, as confirmed by other aspects of §227(a)(1)(A)’s text.
`
`To begin, the modifier at issue immediately follows a con-
`
`cise, integrated clause: “store or produce telephone num-
`bers to be called.” See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employ-
`ees Retirement Fund, 583 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op.,
`at 21–22). The clause “hangs together as a unified whole,”
`id., at ___ (slip op., at 21), using the word “or” to connect
`
`two verbs that share a common direct object, “telephone
`numbers to be called.” It would be odd to apply the modifier
`(“using a random or sequential number generator”) to only
`
`a portion of this cohesive preceding clause.
`This interpretation of §227(a)(1)(A) also “heed[s] the com-
`
`mands of its punctuation.” United States Nat. Bank of Ore.
`
`v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S. 439,
`
`454 (1993). Recall that the phrase “using a random or se-
`quential number generator” follows a comma placed after
`the phrase “store or produce telephone numbers to be
`
`called.” As several leading treatises explain, “‘[a] qualify-
`
`ing phrase separated from antecedents by a comma is evi-
`dence that the qualifier is supposed to apply to all the ante-
`cedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one.’”
`W. Eskridge, Interpreting Law: A Primer on How To Read
`
`
`Statutes and the Constitution 67–68 (2016); see also 2A N.
`Singer & S. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory
`Construction §47:33, pp. 499–500 (rev. 7th ed. 2014); Scalia
`& Garner 161–162. The comma in §227(a)(1)(A) thus fur-
`
`ther suggests that Congress intended the phrase “using a
`random or sequential number generator” to apply equally
`to both preceding elements.
`
`Contrary to Duguid’s view, this interpretation does not
`
`
`
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`
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`
`

`

`
`
`7
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`
`Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`conflict with the so-called “rule of the last antecedent.” Un-
`der that rule, “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordi-
`narily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it
`immediately follows.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U. S. 20, 26
`
`
`(2003); see also Lockhart v. United States, 577 U. S. 347,
`
`351 (2016). The rule of the last antecedent is context de-
`pendent. This Court has declined to apply the rule where,
`
`like here, the modifying clause appears after an integrated
`list. See Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
`543 U. S. 335, 344, n. 4 (2005) (collecting cases). Moreover,
`even if the rule of the last antecedent were relevant here, it
`would provide no help to Duguid. The last antecedent be-
`fore “using a random or sequential number generator” is not
`“produce,” as Duguid needs it to be, but rather “telephone
`numbers to be called.” There is “no grammatical basis,”
`Cyan, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22), for arbitrarily
`stretching the modifier back to include “produce,” but not
`so far back as to include “store.”
`
`
`In sum, Congress’ definition of an autodialer requires
`that in all cases, whether storing or producing numbers to
`be called, the equipment in question must use a random or
`
`sequential number generator. This definition excludes
`equipment like Facebook’s login notification system, which
`
`does not use such technology.5
`
`——————
`5 JUSTICE ALITO notes that he “agree[s] with much of the Court’s anal-
`
`ysis,” as well as its ultimate conclusion about the interpretive question
`
`
` before us, yet he concurs in the judgment only. Post, at 1. His apprehen-
` sion appears to stem from what he sees as the Court’s “heavy reliance”
`
`on the series-qualifier canon. Ibid. Such canons, he argues, are “not
`
`inflexible rules.” Post, at 4. On that point, we agree: Linguistic canons
`
`are tools of statutory interpretation whose usefulness depends on the
`particular statutory text and context at issue. That may be all JUSTICE
`ALITO seeks to prove with his discussion and list of “sentences that
`clearly go against the canon,” post, at 3. (That the grammatical structure
`
`of every example he provides is materially dissimilar from that of the
`clause at issue in this case proves the point.) But to the extent that he
`
`
`
`
`

`

`8
`
`
`FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID
`
`Opinion of the Court
`B
`
`The statutory context confirms that the autodialer defi-
`nition excludes equipment that does not “us[e] a random or
`
`sequential number generator.” 47 U. S. C. §227(a)(1)(A).
`
`Consider the TCPA’s restrictions on the use of autodialers.
`
`As previously noted, §227(b)(1) makes it unlawful to use an
`
`autodialer to call certain “emergency telephone line[s]” and
`
`lines “for which the called party is charged for the call.”
`§227(b)(1)(A). It also makes it unlawful to use an autodialer
`“in such a way that two or more telephone lines of a multi-
`
`line business are engaged simultaneously.” §227(b)(1)(D).
`These prohibitions target a unique type of telemarketing
`equipment that risks dialing emergency lines randomly or
`tying up all the sequentially numbered lines at a single en-
`
`tity.
`
`Expanding the definition of an autodialer to encompass
`any equipment that merely stores and dials telephone num-
`
`bers would take a chainsaw to these nuanced problems
`when Congress meant to use a scalpel. Duguid’s interpre-
`
`tation of an autodialer would capture virtually all modern
`cell phones, which have the capacity to “store . . . telephone
`
`numbers to be called” and “dial such numbers.” §227(a)(1).
`The TCPA’s liability provisions, then, could affect ordinary
`
`cell phone owners in the course of commonplace usage, such
`as speed dialing or sending automated text message re-
`sponses. See §227(b)(3) (authorizing a $500 fine per viola-
`
`tion, increased to $1,500 if the sender acted “willfully” or
`
`——————
`
`
`suggests that such canons have no role to play in statutory interpreta-
`
`
`tion, or that resolving difficult interpretive questions is a simple matter
`of applying the “common understanding” of those “familiar with the Eng-
`
`lish language,” post, at 2–3, we disagree. Difficult ambiguities in statu-
`tory text will inevitably arise, despite the best efforts of legislators writ-
`ing in “English prose,” post, at 4. Courts should approach these
`interpretive problems methodically, using traditional tools of statutory
`
`interpretation, in order to confirm their assumptions about the “common
`
`understanding” of words.
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` “knowingly”).6
`
`
`Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`9
`
`
`III
`
`Duguid’s counterarguments cannot overcome the clear
`
`commands of §227(a)(1)(A)’s text and the statutory context.
`The crux of Duguid’s argument is that the autodialer defi-
`nition calls for a construction that accords with the “sense”
`of the text. Brief for Respondents 11, and n. 3. It makes
`the most “sense,” Duguid insists, to apply the phrase “using
`a random or sequential number generator” to modify only
`“produce,” which, unlike the verb “store,” is closely con-
`nected to the noun “generator.” Dictionary definitions of
`“generator,” for instance, regularly include the word “pro-
`duce,” which carries a very different meaning than “store.”
`Duguid also claims that, at the time of the TCPA’s enact-
`ment, the technical meaning of a “random number genera-
`tor” invoked ways of producing numbers, not means of stor-
`ing them.
`
`Perhaps Duguid’s interpretive approach would have
`some appeal if applying the traditional tools of interpreta-
`tion led to a “linguistically impossible” or contextually im-
`
`
`plausible outcome. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584
`
`U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 8); see also Advocate Health
`
`Care Network v. Stapleton, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip
`op., at 11) (noting that a “sense of inconceivability” might
`
`“urg[e] readers to discard usual rules of interpreting text”).
`Duguid makes a valiant effort to prove as much, but ulti-
`
`
`
`——————
`6Duguid contends that ordinary cell phones are not autodialers under
`his interpretation because they cannot dial phone numbers automati-
`cally and instead rely on human intervention. But all devices require
`
`some human intervention, whether it takes the form of programming a
`cell phone to respond automatically to texts received while in “do not dis-
`
`turb” mode or commanding a computer program to produce and dial
`phone numbers at random. We decline to interpret the TCPA as requir-
`
`ing such a difficult line-drawing exercise around how much automation
`is too much.
`
`
`
`

`

`10
`
`
`FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID
`
`Opinion of the Court
`mately comes up short. It is true that, as a matter of ordi-
`nary parlance, it is odd to say that a piece of equipment
`“stores” numbers using a random number “generator.” But
`it is less odd as a technical matter. Indeed, as early as 1988,
`the U. S. Patent and Trademark Office issued patents for
`devices that used a random number generator to store num-
`bers to be called later (as opposed to using a number gener-
`ator for immediate dialing).7 Brief for Professional Associ-
`ation for Customer Engagement et al. as Amici Curiae 15–
`21. At any rate, Duguid’s interpretation is contrary to the
`ordinary reading of the text and, by classifying almost all
`modern cell phones as autodialers, would produce an out-
`
`come that makes even less sense.
`
`Duguid’s reliance on the distributive canon fails for simi-
`lar reasons. That canon provides that “[w]here a sentence
`contains several antecedents and several consequents,”
`
`courts should “read them distributively and apply the
`
`words to the subjects which, by context, they seem most
`properly to relate.” 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutes and
`Statutory Construction §47:26, at 448. Set aside for a mo-
`
`ment that the canon’s relevance is highly questionable
`given there are two antecedents (store and produce) but
`
`only one consequent modifier (using a random or sequential
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
` 7Duguid argues that such a device would necessarily “produce” num-
`
`
` bers using the same generator technology, meaning “store or” in
`§227(a)(1)(A) is superfluous. “It is no superfluity,” however, for Congress
`to include both functions in the autodialer definition so as to clarify the
`
`domain of prohibited devices. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 511
`
`
`U. S. 531, 544, n. 7 (1994). For instance, an autodialer might use a ran-
`
`dom number generator to determine the order in which to pick phone
`numbers from a preproduced list. It would then store those numbers to
`be dialed at a later time. See Brief for Professional Association for Cus-
`
`
`tomer Engagement et al. as Amici Curiae 19. In any event, even if the
`storing and producing functions often merge, Congress may have “em-
`ployed a belt and suspenders approach” in writing the statute. Atlantic
`
`Richfield Co. v. Christian, 590 U. S. ___, ___, n. 5 (2020) (slip op., at 10,
`
`n. 5).
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` number generator). See Encino Motorcars, 584 U. S., at ___
`
`(slip op., at 8) (“[T]he distributive canon has the most force
`when the statute allows for one-to-one matching”). As just
`
`explained, the consequent “using a random or sequential
`number generator” properly relates to both antecedents.
`Duguid next turns to legislative purpose, but he merely
`
`gestures at Congress’ “broad privacy-protection goals.”
`
`Brief for Respondents 28 (emphasizing that Congress pro-
`hibited calls made using an autodialer without “ ‘prior ex-
`
`press consent of the called party’” (quoting 47 U. S. C.
`§227(b)(1)(A))). That Congress was broadly concerned
`
`about intrusive telemarketing practices, however, does not
`
`mean it adopted a broad autodialer definition. Congress ex-
`pressly found that the use of random or sequential number
`
`generator technology caused unique problems for business,
`
`emergency, and cellular lines. See supra, at 2. Unsurpris-
`ingly, then, the autodialer definition Congress employed in-
`cludes only devices that use such technology, and the auto-
`dialer prohibitions target calls made to such lines. See
`§227(b)(1)(A).8 The narrow statutory design, therefore,
`
`does not support Duguid’s broad interpretation.
`Duguid last warns that accepting Facebook’s interpreta-
`
`
`tion will “unleash” a “torrent of robocalls.” Brief for Re-
`
`spondents 38 (quotation modified). As Duguid sees it, the
`thrust of congressional action since the TCPA’s enactment
`
`has been to restrict nuisance calls. Because technology
`“adapt[s] to change,” Duguid argues, the TCPA must be
`
`treated as an “‘agile tool.’” Id., at 38, 41. To this end,
`
`Duguid asks this Court to focus not on whether a device has
`the “senescent technology,” id., at 41, of random or sequen-
`tial number generation but instead on whether it has the
`
`“capacity to dial numbers without human intervention,” id.,
`——————
` 8By contrast, Congress did impose broader prohibitions elsewhere in
`
`
` the TCPA. See, e.g., 47 U. S. C. §§227(b)(1)(A) and (B) (prohibiting “ar-
`tificial or prerecorded voice” calls, irrespective of the type of technology
`used).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`12
`
`
`FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID
`
`Opinion of the Court
`at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`To begin with, Duguid greatly overstates the effects of ac-
`
`cepting Facebook’s interpretation. The statute separately
`
`prohibits calls using “an artificial or prerecorded voice” to
`various types of phone lines, including home phones and
`
`cell phones, unless an exception applies. See 47 U. S. C.
`
`§§227(b)(1)(A) and (B). Our decision does not affect that
`prohibition. In any event, Duguid’s quarrel is with Con-
`
`gress, which did not define an autodialer as malleably as he
`
`would have liked. “Senescent” as a number generator (and
`perhaps the TCPA itself ) may be, that is no justification for
`
`eschewing the best reading of §227(a)(1)(A). This Court
`must interpret what Congress wrote, which is that “using a
`
`random or sequential number generator” modifies both
`
`“store” and “produce.”
`
`*
`*
`*
`
`We hold that a necessary feature of an autodialer under
`§227(a)(1)(A) is the capacity to use a random or sequential
`number generator to either store or produce phone numbers
`to be called. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is re-
`versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
`consistent with this opinion.
`
`
`
`
`It is so ordered.
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 592 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`
` ALITO, J., concurring
` ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`1
`
`_________________
`No. 19–511
`
`_________________
` FACEBOOK, INC., PETITIONER v.
`
`
` NOAH DUGUID, ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`[April 1, 2021]
`
` JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment.
`
`I agree with the Court that an “automatic telephone dial-
`
`ing system,” as defined in the Telephone Consumer Protec-
`tion Act of 1991, must have the capacity to “store . . . tele-
`phone numbers” by “using a random or sequential number
`generator.” 47 U. S. C. §227(a)(1)(A). I also agree with
`much of the Court’s analysis and the analysis in several
`Court of Appeals decisions on this question. See Gadelhak
`
`
`v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F. 3d 458, 463–468 (CA7 2020);
`Glasser v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 948 F. 3d 1301,
`1306–1312 (CA11 2020).
`
`
`I write separately to address the Court’s heavy reliance
`
`on one of the canons of interpretation that have come to
`
`play a prominent role in our statutory interpretation cases.
`Cataloged in a treatise written by our former colleague An-
`
`tonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, counsel for respondents
`in this case, these canons ar