throbber
No. 19-832
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`________________
`APPLE INC.,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`VIRNETX INC., LEIDOS, INC.,
`
`Respondents.
`________________
`ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
`THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`________________
`REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
`________________
`E. Joshua Rosenkranz
`Counsel of Record
`Jennifer Keighley
`Alexandra Bursak
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
`SUTCLIFFE LLP
`51 West 52nd Street
`New York, NY 10019
`(212) 506-5000
`jrosenkranz@orrick.com
`Sachi Schuricht
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
`SUTCLIFFE LLP
`405 Howard Street
`San Francisco, CA 94105
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`Mark S. Davies
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
`SUTCLIFFE LLP
`1152 15th Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`William F. Lee
`Mark C. Fleming
`Lauren B. Fletcher
`WILMER CUTLER
`PICKERING HALE AND
`DORR LLP
`60 State Street
`Boston, MA 02109
`
`

`

`i
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... ii
`I. The Federal Circuit’s Settled Position
`That Apportionment Of Damages Is Not
`Required In Prior License Cases Warrants
`This Court’s Review............................................ 1
`A. The Federal Circuit no longer requires
`apportionment in prior license cases ............ 2
`B. This case presents the important
`question of whether apportionment is
`required in prior license cases. ..................... 8
`II. Certiorari Should Also Be Granted On
`The Impact Of Intervening PTO
`Invalidations On Pending Infringement
`Actions .............................................................. 10
`CONCLUSION ........................................................ 13
`
`

`

`ii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis
`Indus., Inc.,
`575 U.S. 138 (2015) .............................................. 11
`
`City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8
`v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n,
`429 U.S. 167 (1976) ................................................2
`
`Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research
`Org. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`809 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...................... 2, 3, 4
`
`Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline
`Plow Co.,
`235 U.S. 641 (1915) ........................................ 1, 7, 8
`
`Elbit Sys. Land & C4I Ltd. v. Hughes
`Network Sys., LLC,
`927 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ..............................5
`Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc.,
`773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..............................6
`Garretson v. Clark,
`111 U.S. 120 (1884) ............................................ 1, 8
`Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.,
`529 U.S. 460 (2000) ................................................9
`
`

`

`iii
`
`Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc.,
`884 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ............................ 11
`Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC,
`735 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................ 11
`
`Prism Techs. LLC v. Sprint
`Spectrum L.P.,
`849 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ..............................7
`
`Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Time Warner
`Cable, Inc.,
`760 F. App’x 977 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ...................... 5, 6
`VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`931 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ...................... 11, 12
`VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`776 F. App’x 698 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ........................ 11
`XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, L.C.,
`890 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ...................... 11, 12
`Yee v. City of Escondido,
`503 U.S. 519 (1992) .............................................. 10
`
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a) (2006) .......................................... 11
`
`

`

`REPLY
`
`I. The Federal Circuit’s Settled Position That
`Apportionment Of Damages Is Not Required
`In Prior License Cases Warrants This
`Court’s Review.
`This Court long ago held that patent damages
`must reflect the value of the patented invention in
`“every case.” Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121
`(1884). As the petition (at 18-21, 31-34), amicus briefs
`supporting Apple, and academic articles (Pet.20, 31-
`32 & n.2) explain, Garretson reflects a foundational
`precept of an economically sound patent system. But
`over the past five years, the Federal Circuit has cre-
`ated a gaping loophole that facilitates massive dam-
`ages in patent cases where the damages claims are
`based on prior licenses, regardless of whether those
`licenses reflect the invention’s contribution to the
`end-product. Pet.18-31.
`The Court has not needed to examine apportion-
`ment of patent damages in over one hundred years,
`see Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235
`U.S. 641 (1915), since, until relatively recently, the
`lower courts have been faithful to Garretson’s com-
`mand. Yet by soliciting the Solicitor General’s views
`in a closely related apportionment case just a few
`terms ago (Pet.19), the Court has already recognized
`the importance of reviewing the Federal Circuit’s cur-
`rent caselaw in this area. And with the Federal Cir-
`cuit now using its Rule 36 procedures to reject
`challenges to its apportionment methodology, parties
`will soon stop complaining about the practice. Now is
`
`

`

`2
`
`the time for the Court to put a halt to the Federal Cir-
`cuit’s blatant disregard for this Court’s patent dam-
`ages precedent.
`Nothing in VirnetX’s opposition calls these prin-
`ciples into question. VirnetX is wrong in its reading of
`current Federal Circuit case law, § I.A, and wrong in
`its description of what occurred below, § I.B. Certio-
`rari is warranted.
`A. The Federal Circuit no longer requires
`apportionment in prior license cases.
`VirnetX points to the Federal Circuit’s “repeated
`confirmation
`that apportionment
`is required,”
`Opp.19, as proof that apportionment is alive and well.
`But this “ignore[s] the ancient wisdom that calling a
`thing by a name does not make it so.” City of Madison,
`Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n,
`429 U.S. 167, 174 (1976). The question here is not
`whether the Federal Circuit pays lip service to appor-
`tionment. It is whether the Federal Circuit’s rule that
`apportionment is automatically satisfied when rely-
`ing on prior licenses guts this requirement. It does.
`1. The Court need look no further than VirnetX’s
`own briefing in the Federal Circuit to see the gaping
`prior license loophole. VirnetX relied heavily on Com-
`monwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organi-
`sation v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1302
`(Fed. Cir. 2015) (CSIRO), in arguing that apportion-
`ment “principles are relevant only ‘where a damages
`model apportions from a royalty base.’” VirnetX Br.
`
`

`

`3
`
`49, Dkt. 49.1 VirnetX argued that “[t]hose principles
`are ‘inapplicable here’ because VirnetX ‘did not appor-
`tion from a royalty base at all.’” Id. (quoting CSIRO,
`809 F.3d at 1302). Instead, VirnetX’s damages meth-
`odology was based on royalty rates in prior licenses,
`which it claimed necessarily “captured only the value
`of its technology.” Id. VirnetX argued that its expert’s
`testimony that the prior licenses were apportioned,
`though he had no idea how, CA.II 1862-63, satisfied
`apportionment. That was so because “where, as in the
`licenses VirnetX relied upon, ‘the parties negotiated
`over the value of the asserted patent[s],’ the results of
`that negotiation embody ‘built in apportionment.’”
`VirnetX Br. 50, Dkt. 49 (quoting CSIRO, 809 F.3d at
`1303) (alteration in original).
`Before this Court, VirnetX adopts the opposite
`reading of CSIRO. It now claims the case does not ex-
`empt patentees from complying with apportionment
`when they rely on prior licenses. Opp.20. VirnetX
`points to the Federal Circuit’s separate analysis of the
`“unique considerations that apply to apportionment
`in the context of a standard-essential patent,” CSIRO,
`809 F.3d at 1304, arguing this shows CSIRO requires
`further apportionment. But these “unique” considera-
`tions are plainly irrelevant when, as here, no stand-
`ard-essential patents are at issue. As VirnetX argued
`below, CSIRO holds that prior negotiations between
`the same parties to use the same patent in the same
`
`1 “Dkt.” Refers to the Court of Appeals docket in the case at
`issue in this petition. “CA.II” refers to the appendix in that same
`case.
`
`

`

`4
`
`type of end-product “already buil[d] in apportion-
`ment.” Id. at 1303.2
`That holding—“apportionment” is “built in”—is
`what the Federal Circuit extended here to apply to li-
`censes involving different parties using different pa-
`tents in different end-products, without requiring any
`separate evidence of apportionment. After the panel’s
`decision, VirnetX further confirmed that is exactly
`how to read the Federal Circuit’s ruling. In opposing
`rehearing, VirnetX argued that it was appropriate for
`the panel to affirm without any evidence of apportion-
`ment: “Because licensees do not agree to pay for un-
`patented features, prior licenses have ‘already built in
`apportionment.’” Reh’g Resp. 8-9, Dkt. 82 (quoting
`CSIRO, 809 F.3d at 1303). VirnetX also defended the
`panel’s understanding during oral argument that
`when you “use comparable licenses” to prove a reason-
`able royalty, that “doesn’t involve an apportionment
`question.” Id. at 9 (quoting Oral Arg. Recording 21:27-
`54). VirnetX argued the court’s statements merely
`“restate[] black-letter law—and economic reality.” Id.
`That is an accurate statement of current Federal Cir-
`cuit law. But it defies, rather than reflects, this
`Court’s precedent.
`
`2 VirnetX also points to a footnote in CSIRO indicating that,
`since the Federal Circuit was already remanding, the district
`court “may also wish to consider how other factors … may have
`affected the parties’ suggested royalty rates.” CSIRO, 809 F.3d
`at 1305 n.4; Opp.20. This suggestion as to what a district court
`“may” choose to do on remand based on a separate error proves
`that the Federal Circuit no longer requires apportionment in this
`context.
`
`

`

`5
`
`2. Along with CSIRO, VirnetX also mischaracter-
`izes the reasoning of Elbit Systems Land & C4I Ltd.
`v. Hughes Network Systems, LLC, 927 F.3d 1292 (Fed.
`Cir. 2019), and Sprint Communications Co. v. Time
`Warner Cable, Inc., 760 F. App’x 977 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`In both cases, the court held that patentees could sat-
`isfy apportionment by relying on royalty rates in prior
`licenses, even for different patented inventions in dif-
`ferent end-products. Pet.24-27.
`VirnetX argues that Elbit required further evi-
`dence of apportionment. Opp.21. But the only evi-
`dence Elbit had was the expert’s conclusory testimony
`that apportionment “‘is essentially embedded in [the]
`comparable value’” from the prior license for a differ-
`ent end-product, and that “the requisite apportion-
`ment is implicitly considered within the royalty rate”
`of the prior license. Elbit, 927 F.3d at 1301 (citations
`and second alteration omitted). Elbit reiterates that a
`prior “negotiation can fulfil the apportionment re-
`quirement,” even when the prior negotiation was be-
`tween different parties about a different end-product.
`Id. VirnetX fails to address this reasoning. Opp.21.
`Instead, VirnetX points to the Federal Circuit’s
`statement in Elbit that the prior license was the ex-
`pert’s “starting point.” Opp.21 (quoting Elbit, 927 F.3d
`at 1301). But his only adjustment from this “starting
`point” was to increase the royalty rate by $3 based on
`the belief that two-way satellite communications gen-
`erally provided a 20% increase in value over older
`technology. Elbit, 927 F.3d at 1301. This increase had
`nothing to do with the patented invention’s relative
`contribution to a different end-product. Pet.26.
`
`

`

`6
`
`VirnetX also argues that Time Warner, 760 F.
`App’x 977, “was not about comparable licenses at all,”
`Opp.22. The damages methodology there, however,
`indisputably relied on one prior jury verdict and two
`prior licenses, all of which the court treated as prior
`licenses. Time Warner, 760 F. App’x at 983. Though
`the defendant had argued the prior licenses were not
`apportioned to its products, Appellant’s Reply Br.,
`Time Warner, 760 F. App’x 977 (No. 2017-2247), 2018
`WL 2048279, at *19, the Federal Circuit disagreed. It
`cited Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc., 773 F.3d
`1201, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 2014), for the proposition
`that “damages testimony regarding real-world rele-
`vant licenses ‘takes into account the very types of ap-
`portionment principles contemplated in Garretson.’”
`Time Warner, 760 F. App’x at 983-84. Again, VirnetX
`fails to address this tenet of the opinion. Opp.22.
`3. Along with misreading the Federal Circuit’s
`cases, VirnetX reimagines the facts of this case
`throughout, arguing that apportionment was satis-
`fied here because the evidence showed that the prior
`licenses were “using the same VirnetX technology, in
`the same way, to the same end.” Opp.18-19; see also
`Opp.23. VirnetX’s cited evidence shows nothing of the
`sort. The record established that the prior licenses
`covered far more patents, C.A.II 1848-49, 1863-64,
`that Apple’s accused devices are “far, far more com-
`plex” than nearly all the products covered by the prior
`licenses, C.A.II 1866, and that the patented technol-
`ogy made up a larger portion of the features of these
`products, C.A.II 10094-96.
`VirnetX also argues that the decision in the first
`appeal in this case “proves the Federal Circuit has not
`
`

`

`7
`
`created a ‘loophole’ that allows patentees to evade ap-
`portionment by basing royalties on prior comparable
`licenses.” Opp.22. But in the first trial VirnetX’s dam-
`ages methodology had employed the “royalty base” ap-
`proach, estimating how much of the overall value of
`an iPhone could be attributed to VirnetX’s patents.
`Pet.11-12, 21-22. It was not until the second trial that
`VirnetX used the “prior license” approach at issue
`here, which relied solely on prior licenses, without de-
`termining a royalty base at all. Pet.22. The Federal
`Circuit’s decision in the first appeal, therefore, does
`not, and could not, address apportionment in prior li-
`cense cases.3
`
`* * *
`At root, VirnetX seeks to condone the Federal Cir-
`cuit’s disdain for basic economics. The problem here
`is not that the Federal Circuit refused to demand
`“mathematical exactness” in apportionment. Opp.23
`(quoting Dowagiac Mfg. Co., 235 U.S. at 647). The
`problem is that the Federal Circuit requires no proof
`at all. The dicta from Dowagiac that VirnetX quotes
`does not authorize apportionment by assumption;
`
`3 VirnetX also relies on a group of cases discussing yet an-
`other distinct damages methodology not at issue here: estab-
`lished royalties. Opp.19. VirnetX indisputably did not press an
`established royalty theory. See Dowagiac, 235 U.S. at 648 (con-
`trasting established royalties, where a royalty is uniform across
`a wide range of licenses, with reasonable royalties); Prism Techs.
`LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d 1360, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
`2017) (same). In any event, the most these cases show is that
`prior licenses can measure the value of patented technology.
`Opp.19.
`
`

`

`8
`
`Dowagiac says apportionment should be based on re-
`liable testimony from “experts and persons informed
`by observation and experience.” Dowagiac, 235 U.S.
`at 647. “‘[S]uch evidence must be reliable and tangi-
`ble, and not conjectural or speculative.’” Garretson,
`111 U.S. at 121. To promote Progress, the patent dam-
`ages methodologies must be sound.
`
`important
`the
`B. This case presents
`question of whether apportionment is
`required in prior license cases.
`VirnetX next argues that apportionment—the
`principal damages question disputed below—was
`somehow waived. Opp.24-27. But Apple has argued at
`every stage of this litigation that rote reliance on prior
`licenses does not satisfy apportionment.
`1. Apple raised the apportionment issue before
`the district court, arguing that VirnetX’s “damages
`model does not apportion the incremental value that
`the patented invention adds to the end product.” App.
`18a. The district court explicitly decided the issue,
`agreeing with VirnetX that it “did not need to present”
`evidence of how prior licenses were “apportioned to
`the patents-in-suit because the real-world market
`had already done the apportionment.” App. 22a; see
`App. 25a.
`license apportionment
`facto prior
`With de
`squarely presented on appeal, Apple disputed it vig-
`orously. Apple showed that the particular complexity
`and functionality of its products, as well as the li-
`censes’ origins in settlement, undermined the district
`court’s conclusion that “[t]he licenses upon which
`
`

`

`9
`
`[VirnetX’s] analysis was based were already appor-
`tioned” for Apple’s products. App. 25a; see Apple Br.
`42, 44-45, Dkt. 41 (differences with licensee products);
`id. at 19, 43, 46-47 (settlement); Reply Br. 14-21, Dkt.
`53 (same). VirnetX dedicated a dozen pages of its brief
`to its response. See VirnetX Br. 42-54, Dkt. 49.
`Notably, VirnetX did not argue waiver before the
`Federal Circuit. Id. Given the parties’ extensive brief-
`ing on this issue, apportionment was also a focus of
`oral argument. See supra at 4; Oral Arg. Recording
`13:29-25:37; 33:29-37:34; 42:20-43:10.
`The waiver doctrine exists to ensure that “the
`lower court be fairly put on notice as to the substance
`of the issue.” Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S.
`460, 469 (2000). Here, it unquestionably was.
`2. In the face of this clear preservation, VirnetX
`makes two far-fetched waiver arguments.
`a. VirnetX first contends the petition presents
`new theories of apportionment, lamenting that it can-
`not find what it now dubs “intensity-of-use,” “differ-
`ent-use,” and “settlement” theories below. Opp.16, 24-
`26. But those “theories” are simply examples demon-
`strating the same apportionment problem Apple has
`consistently identified. See, e.g., CA.II 5141-42 (dis-
`cussing multiple modes of connection available in
`VPN-on-Demand, much like alternatives to flash in a
`camera); CA.II 5145 (discussing the impact of settle-
`ment); Apple Br. 43-47, Dkt. 41 (similar); Reply Br.
`15-16, Dkt. 53 (similar). At bare minimum, the record
`proves the “substance of the issue” was fairly pre-
`sented, preserving the issue for review. Nelson, 529
`
`

`

`10
`
`U.S. at 469; see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S.
`519, 534-35 (1992).
`b. VirnetX then takes the unusual tack of assert-
`ing Apple waived the argument by failing to raise it
`in a separate proceeding. Opp.24. According to Vir-
`netX, Apple should have raised its apportionment
`challenge to measuring damages solely by prior li-
`cense costs in the first trial. But as discussed, supra
`at 7, that trial employed a different damages method-
`ology that VirnetX ultimately “eschewed” in the sec-
`ond trial. VirnetX Br. 46, Dkt. 49. Apple could not
`have challenged in the first trial a damages method-
`ology that VirnetX had not advanced.
`II. Certiorari Should Also Be Granted On The
`Impact Of Intervening PTO Invalidations
`On Pending Infringement Actions.
`VirnetX does not dispute that whether interven-
`ing PTO invalidations apply to “appeals that remain
`pending at the rehearing or certiorari stage” is “an im-
`portant question worthy of this Court’s review.” Pet.i,
`38. VirnetX also has no comment on the observation
`that review is “especially urgent today” given the “ex-
`ponentially greater” instances of PTO invalidations
`under the new inter partes review system. Pet.38.
`Instead, VirnetX makes arguments that turn on
`irrelevant minutia.
`First, VirnetX argues that invalidations have no
`effect until claims are formally cancelled. Opp.30. But
`once the court affirms a PTO invalidity ruling, its de-
`cision has “immediate” effect “on any pending or co-
`
`

`

`11
`
`pending actions involving the patent.” XY, LLC v.
`Trans Ova Genetics, L.C., 890 F.3d 1282, 1294 (Fed.
`Cir. 2018).4 Indeed, it makes little sense to wait for
`the PTO to issue formal cancellations—a purely min-
`isterial act that is statutorily mandated as soon as the
`“appeal proceeding has terminated.” 35 U.S.C.
`§ 316(a) (2006). There is no question that the invali-
`dation appeals at issue here have terminated. VirnetX
`Inc. v. Apple Inc., 931 F.3d 1363, 1378-80 (Fed. Cir.
`2019) (VirnetX Reexamination Appeal II); VirnetX Inc.
`v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 776 F. App’x 698, 700 (Fed. Cir.
`2019).
`Second, VirnetX clings to the one FaceTime-re-
`lated claim that is not yet formally invalidated, but is
`hanging by a thread. The substance of that claim,
`claim 5 of the ’504 patent, is also claimed in the ’211
`patent. See Apple 2d Pet. Reh’g 7-8, Dkt. 99-2 (com-
`paring the two claims). The PTO has already invali-
`dated that claim of the ’211 patent, and the Federal
`Circuit has affirmed. Pet.36. As the Federal Circuit
`has repeatedly explained, a patent claim is invalid
`when it is not patentably distinct from an already in-
`validated claim. Nestle USA, Inc. v. Steuben Foods,
`Inc., 884 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Ohio Wil-
`low Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342-43
`(Fed. Cir. 2013). In fact, as explained in the petition
`(at 36), the PTO has already invalidated claim 5. To
`be sure, the Federal Circuit remanded that decision
`on narrow procedural grounds. Cisco Sys., 776 F.
`
`4 In fact, the PTO’s invalidity ruling itself can have a pre-
`clusive effect on district court proceedings. See B & B Hardware,
`Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 160 (2015).
`
`

`

`12
`
`App’x at 703-04. But VirnetX’s brief provides no rea-
`son why the PTO would come out any differently next
`time.
`Rather than explaining how claim 5 could be
`valid, VirnetX suggests that the PTO invalidations
`have no impact because of the different legal stand-
`ards at issue in PTO versus district court proceedings.
`Opp.31. VirnetX’s assertion that “[f]indings made in
`PTO proceedings … cannot be given preclusive effect
`in district-court actions,” id., is wrong. See XY, 890
`F.3d at 1294 (affirmance of PTO invalidity ruling has
`issue-preclusive effect on proceedings in district
`court).5
`Finally, VirnetX tries to minimize Apple’s argu-
`ments as a “[c]ase-[s]pecific” complaint about “docket
`management.” Opp.33. But VirnetX twists the facts,
`including its accusations of Apple’s “gamesmanship.”
`Opp.15, 33 n.8.6 Apple does not take issue with the
`coordination of proceedings involving validity and in-
`fringement of overlapping patents. That coordination
`
`5 Nor does a footnote in VirnetX Reexamination Appeal II
`indicate that the Federal Circuit has rejected Apple’s arguments.
`Opp.32. Our argument here is premised on the Federal Circuit’s
`failure to give effect to the invalidations affirmed in that very
`case.
`6 Apple has consistently refuted VirnetX’s accusations of
`“gamesmanship.” See Stay Reply 7-9, Dkt. 37-1 (Apple did not
`breach any agreements by seeking stay.); Apple Br. 64, Dkt. 41
`(Apple’s lawful stay requests were spaced over several years.).
`Likewise, Apple is not at fault for the litigation’s duration.
`Opp.1, 15, 34. VirnetX’s improper damage methodologies, App.
`105a-125a, and prejudicial statements at the second trial, CA.II
`10572, are what led to multiple trials and appeals.
`
`

`

`13
`
`makes sense. What does not make sense is for the con-
`sequences of patent invalidations—and the fate of
`massive damage judgments—to turn on which opin-
`ion the Federal Circuit issues first. At a minimum,
`this Court should GVR to correct this error.
`CONCLUSION
`For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant
`the petition for a writ of certiorari.
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`Mark S. Davies
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON
`& SUTCLIFFE LLP
`1152 15th Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20005
`
`William F. Lee
`Mark C. Fleming
`Lauren B. Fletcher
`WILMER CUTLER
`PICKERING HALE
`AND DORR LLP
`60 State Street
`Boston, MA 02109
`
`E. Joshua Rosenkranz
`Counsel of Record
`Jennifer Keighley
`Alexandra Bursak
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
`SUTCLIFFE LLP
`51 West 52nd Street
`New York, NY 10019
`(212) 506-5000
`jrosenkranz@orrick.com
`
`Sachi Schuricht
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON &
`SUTCLIFFE LLP
`405 Howard Street
`San Francisco, CA 94105
`
`February 4, 2020
`
`

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