

No. 20-1057

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**In the Supreme Court of the United States**

ORACLE AMERICA, INC.,  
PETITIONER,

*v.*

UNITED STATES AND AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.

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*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT*

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**REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER**

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## REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

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Amazon Web Services, Inc.’s brief in opposition underscores the need for this Court to grant certiorari to protect fundamental separation-of-powers principles. Amazon does not dispute that this Court should review the first question presented; nor does it deny that the second question presented is timely, important, and recurring. Instead, Amazon argues (at 1) that this case is a poor vehicle because the conflicts of interest at issue in the second QP are “highly fact-bound” and “not outcome-determinative.” Three points are worth emphasizing in response.

1. Oracle’s petition does not ask this Court to decide any fact-bound issue. Rather, in evaluating Oracle’s conflict-of-interest challenge, the Federal Circuit made two serious *legal* errors.

First, rather than follow this Court’s holding in *United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.*, 364 U.S. 520 (1961), that a criminal conflict of interest “alone” renders a government contract unenforceable, *id.* at 525, the Federal Circuit instead imposed an additional materiality test. See Pet. 27-28. Second, the Federal Circuit compounded the error by deferring to *the agency’s own* materiality determination, rather than deciding the issue itself. See Pet. 29-31. Both of those

(1)

errors are mistakes of law, not fact. Correcting them would thus provide great “value in other cases,” AWS Opp. 7, especially because these errors are central to the Federal Circuit’s approach in *every* procurement case involving a conflict of interest. See, e.g., *Long Island Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States*, 503 F.3d 1234, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2007); *Godley v. United States*, 5 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Notably, Amazon does not defend either aspect of the Federal Circuit’s approach.

Indeed, the supposed “intensely fact-bound” nature of the Federal Circuit’s materiality inquiry, AWS Opp. 7, is a reason to grant review, not deny it. Oracle’s point is that such an inquiry is entirely unnecessary—and inappropriate—under *Mississippi Valley*. And even if this Court were to hold (per Oracle’s alternative argument) that the lower courts should have conducted a materiality inquiry themselves, rather than deferring to a conflicted agency, articulating that governing legal principle would complete this Court’s role: The Court would presumably remand the case rather than conduct the inquiry in the first instance. See *Brownback v. King*, 141 S. Ct. 740, 747 n.4 (2021) (“[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.”) (citation omitted).

If anything, this case is remarkable in how cleanly it presents the relevant legal questions. Conflict-of-interest cases will generally be thorny vehicles because they involve fights over the threshold issue of *whether* the conflict-of-interest statute was violated at all. But here, no one disputes that at least one Department of Defense employee, Deap Ubhi, violated 18 U.S.C. § 208. (It would be hard to argue otherwise, given that the Department itself listed Ubhi as having been “personally and substantially involved” in the procurement, C.A. App. 104,862, which is the test for a Section 208 violation.) And, unlike many other government contracting cases, the

contract at issue here is not at risk of being fully performed before this Court weighs in, see AWS Opp. 2 n.\* (noting Amazon’s own active bid protest), and neither the government nor Amazon has suggested that their ongoing (but unrelated) litigation over the JEDI Cloud contract presents any obstacle to this Court’s review.

2. The question presented is also outcome-determinative. Amazon does not dispute that if *Mississippi Valley* prohibits enforcement of a conflicted contract, the disposition of this case would change—indeed, such a holding would require reversal of the judgment below. Instead, Amazon merely argues that if this Court *rejects* Oracle’s argument under *Mississippi Valley*, then it would not matter whether primary responsibility for conducting the materiality inquiry rested with the lower courts or with the conflicted agency. But that is plainly wrong as well. See Pet. 31-33.

As Oracle explained in its reply to the government (at 11), both courts below applied a deferential standard in evaluating the agency’s determination that its own conflict had not tainted the procurement. The Court of Federal Claims agreed that the facts were “certainly sufficient to raise eyebrows,” App. 107a, and it found some of the contracting officer’s “characterizations” of those facts to be “a bit generous,” *id.* at 110a. It nonetheless explained that “the limited question” was “whether any of the actions called out ma[d]e a difference to the outcome,” and “in particular, *the even narrower question before the court is whether the [contracting officer]’s conclusion of no impact is reasonable,*” *id.* at 108a (emphasis added). Accord *ibid.* (“We review the [contracting officer]’s determinations for a rational basis”). The court then applied that deferential standard, holding that the contracting officer’s

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