`
`
`
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`___________________
`
`
`CHEVRON CORPORATION, et al.,
`
`Petitioners,
`
` v.
`
`CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`___________________
`
`Respondents.
`
`On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
`to the United States Court of Appeals
`for the Ninth Circuit
`
`
`
`
`
`
`BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION TO
`PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`________________________________________________________
`
`BARBARA J. PARKER
`MARIA BEE
`ZOE M. SAVITSKY
`MALIA MCPHERSON
`CITY OF OAKLAND
`One Frank Ogawa Plaza, 6th Fl.
`Oakland, CA 94612
`
`Counsel for the People of the
`State of California and
`City of Oakland
`
`DENNIS J. HERRERA,
`RONALD P. FLYNN
`YVONNE R. MERÉ
`MATTHEW D. GOLDBERG
`ROBB W. KAPLA
`CITY AND COUNTY OF
` SAN FRANCISCO
`City Hall, Room 234
`1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place
`San Francisco, CA 94102
`
`Counsel for the People of the
`State of California and
`City & County of San Francisco
`
`VICTOR M. SHER
` Counsel of Record
`MATTHEW K. EDLING
`MICHAEL BURGER
`MARTIN D. QUIÑONES
`KATIE H. JONES
`QUENTIN C. KARPILOW
`SHER EDLING, LLP
`100 Montgomery St., Ste. 1410
`San Francisco, CA 94104
`(628) 231-2500
`vic@sheredling.com
`
`MICHAEL RUBIN
`CORINNE JOHNSON
`BARBARA J. CHISHOLM
`ALTSHULER BERZON LLP
`177 Post Street, Suite 300
`San Francisco, CA 94108
`
`Counsel for the People of the
`State of California, City of Oakland,
`and City & County of San Francisco
`
`
`
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED
`
`
`
`I.
`
`Whether a California state law public
`nuisance claim alleging wrongful and
`deceptive promotion of hazardous consumer
`goods “arises under” a congressionally
`displaced body of federal common law
`regarding
`interstate air pollution
`for
`purposes of removal jurisdiction.
`
`
`II. Whether respondents waived their right to
`appeal an erroneously denied remand
`motion by filing an amended complaint to
`conform to that erroneous ruling while
`expressly preserving their appellate rights,
`and then opposing petitioners’ motion to
`dismiss that amended complaint.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 1
`
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................... 4
`
`A. Background ....................................................... 4
`
`B. Proceedings Below ............................................ 5
`
`REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ........... 7
`
`I. No federal common law “governs” the
`People’s claims. ............................................. 7
`
`II.
`
`Petitioners’ federal-common-law theory of
`removal does not warrant review. ............. 12
`
`1. The Ninth Circuit’s application of the
` well-pleaded complaint rule does not
`
`implicate any circuit split. .................... 13
`
`2. The Ninth Circuit correctly applied
`
`this Court’s precedent. .......................... 18
`
`III. The Ninth Circuit’s application of
`Caterpillar does not warrant review. ........ 26
`
`IV. The Questions Presented have minimal
`practical importance, and this petition
`is a poor vehicle to review them. ................ 33
`
`CONCLUSION ......................................................... 35
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`
`
`CASES
`
`Albert v. Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, Inc.,
`356 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004) ............................ 28
`Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good,
`555 U.S. 70 (2008) .................................................. 9
`Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut,
`564 U.S. 410 (2011) ....................................... passim
`Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.,
`575 U.S. 320 (2015) .............................................. 22
`Atherton v. F.D.I.C.,
`519 U.S. 213 (1997) .............................................. 25
`Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
`376 U.S. 398 (1964) .............................................. 21
`Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc.,
`99 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996) ...................................... 29
`Battle v. Seibels Bruce Ins. Co.,
`288 F.3d 596 (4th Cir. 2002) ................................ 16
`Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor
`Energy (U.S.A.) Inc.,
`405 F. Supp. 3d 947 (D. Colo. 2019) ..................... 18
`Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson,
`539 U.S. 1 (2003) ............................................ 13, 20
`Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co.,
`738 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1984) ................................ 29
`Bond v. United States,
`572 U.S. 844 (2014) .............................................. 33
`Brough v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO,
`437 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1971) ................................. 28
`California v. ARC Am. Corp.,
`490 U.S. 93 (1989) ............................................ 9, 11
`Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis,
`519 U.S. 61 (1996) ......................................... passim
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`
`Page
`
`Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,
`482 U.S. 386 (1987) .................................. 12, 13, 14
`Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C.,
`999 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1993) .................................. 17
`Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Whiting,
`563 U.S. 582 (2011) .............................................. 11
`Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc.,
`505 U.S. 504 (1992) .............................................. 22
`Citizens for Odor Nuisance Abatement v.
`City of San Diego,
` 8 Cal.App.5th 350 (2017) ........................................ 9
`City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan,
`451 U.S. 304 (1981) .................................. 21, 25, 26
`City of Modesto Redev. Agency v. Superior Ct.,
`119 Cal.App.4th 28 (2004) ...................................... 8
`City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,
`993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) ........................ 14, 15, 16
`Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp.,
`294 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ............ 18, 20
`Cty. of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co.,
`137 Cal.App.4th 292 (2006) ................................ 5, 8
`Earth Island Institute v. Crystal Geyser Water Co.,
`__ F. Supp. 3d __, 2021 WL 684961 (N.D. Cal.
`Feb. 23, 2021) ........................................................ 18
`Ellingsworth v. Vermeer Mfg. Co.,
`949 F.3d 1097 (8th Cir. 2020) .............................. 30
`Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh,
`547 U.S. 677 (2006) .............................................. 17
`Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
`373 U.S. 132 (1963) ................................................ 9
`Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr.
`Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal.,
`463 U.S. 1 (1983) ............................................ 12, 23
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`
`Page
`
`Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,
`240 U.S. 650 (1916) .............................................. 10
`Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue
`Eng’g & Mfg.,
`545 U.S. 308 (2005) ....................................... passim
`Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P.,
`541 U.S. 567 (2004) .............................................. 33
`Gunn v. Minton,
`568 U.S. 251 (2013) ...............................2, 12, 14, 15
`Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
`Creek Ditch Co.,
`304 U.S. 92 (1938) ................................................ 21
`Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis.,
`406 U.S. 91 (1972) ................................................ 10
`In re Otter Tail Power Co.,
`116 F.3d 1207 (8th Cir. 1997) .............................. 16
`Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
`479 U.S. 481 (1987) ....................................... passim
`Kansas v. Colorado,
`206 U.S. 46 (1907) ................................................ 21
`King v. Marriott Int’l Inc.,
`337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003) ................................ 28
`Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp.,
`565 U.S. 625 (2012) .............................................. 21
`Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C.,
`388 F. Supp. 3d 538 (D. Md. 2019) ...................... 18
`McKesson v. Doe,
`141 S. Ct. 48 (2020) ........................................ 34, 35
`Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson,
`478 U.S. 804 (1986) .............................................. 12
`Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
`Manning,
`136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016) ............................ 2, 3, 14, 22
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`
`
`Page
`
`Miree v. DeKalb Cty., Ga.,
`433 U.S. 25 (1977) .......................................... 10, 11
`Missouri v. Illinois,
`180 U.S. 208 (1901) .............................................. 10
`Moffitt v. Residential Funding Co.,
`604 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2010) .......................... 31, 33
`Morgan Cty. War Mem’l Hosp. ex rel. Bd. of
`Directors of War Mem’l Hosp. v. Baker,
`314 F. App’x 529 (4th Cir. 2008) .................... 14, 22
`Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe
`of Indians,
`471 U.S. 845 (1985) .............................................. 21
`Negrón-Fuentes v. UPS Supply Chain, Sols.,
`532 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008) ..................................... 27
`New Jersey v. City of New York,
`283 U.S. 473 (1931) .............................................. 10
`New Mexico ex rel. Balderas v. Monsanto Co.,
`454 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (D.N.M. 2020) .................... 18
`Newton v. Capital Assurance Co.,
`245 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2001) ............................ 16
`Nicodemus v. Union Pac. Corp.,
`440 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2006) ................ 14, 19, 22
`Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers
`Union of Am., AFL-CIO,
`451 U.S. 77 (1981) ................................................ 25
`O’Melveny & Myers v. F.D.I.C.,
`512 U.S. 79 (1994) ................................................ 10
`Paros Props., LLC v. Colo. Cas. Ins. Co.,
`835 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2016) ............................ 30
`People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna,
`14 Cal.4th 1090 (1997) ..................................... 9, 10
`People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co.,
`17 Cal.App.5th 51 (2017) .................................... 8, 9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`vii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`
`Page
`Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc.,
`582 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2009) .............................. 14
`Puerto Rico Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla
`Petroleum Corp.,
`485 U.S. 495 (1988) .............................................. 25
`Quintero Cmty. Ass’n Inc. v. F.D.I.C.,
`792 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir. 2015) .............................. 30
`Republic of Philippines v. Marcos,
`806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986) .................................. 16
`Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp.,
`393 F. Supp. 3d 142 (D.R.I. 2019) ........................ 18
`Rodriguez v. F.D.I.C.,
`140 S. Ct. 713 (2020) ...................................... 10, 25
`Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc.,
`117 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1997) ................................ 17
`San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Ct.,
`13 Cal.4th 893 (1996) ............................................. 9
`Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
`542 U.S. 692 (2004) .............................................. 21
`Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp,
`297 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2002) ...................... 6, 27, 32
`Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
`451 U.S. 630 (1981) ........................................ 21, 34
`Torres v. S. Peru Copper Co.,
`113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997) ................................ 16
`Treiber & Straub, Inc. v. UPS, Inc.,
`2005 WL 2108081 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 31, 2005) ....... 16
`Treiber & Straub, Inc. v. UPS, Inc.,
`474 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2007) .......................... 15, 16
`United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.,
`332 U.S. 301 (1947) .............................................. 20
`United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd.,
`191 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 1999) ................................... 20
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`viii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued
`
`Page
`
`United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd.,
`23 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 1998) ..................... 21
`Va. Military Inst. v. United States,
`508 U.S. 946 (1993) .............................................. 35
`Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren,
`139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) .......................................... 11
`Vaden v. Discover Bank,
`556 U.S. 49 (2009) ................................................ 12
`Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.,
`384 U.S. 63 (1966) ................................................ 10
`Waste Control Specialists, LLC v. Envirocare of
`Texas, Inc., 199 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2000) ............. 28
`Zschernig v. Miller,
`389 U.S. 429 (1968) .............................................. 11
`
`STATUTES
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................ 1, 6, 15, 18
`28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ........................................ 1, 26, 31
`Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3479, 3480, 3490 ...................... 4, 10
`Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 731 .......................................... 4
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435 ....................... 10
`Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 826–31 .............. 10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`California’s 150-year-old public nuisance statute
`authorizes city and county attorneys to bring
`representative public nuisance claims on behalf of the
`People of the State of California for the wrongful and
`deceptive promotion of consumer products. This case
`involves two such actions against five oil-and-gas
`companies. The People allege that those companies
`substantially contributed to the creation of a public
`nuisance affecting infrastructure in Oakland and San
`Francisco by conducting a decades-long campaign to
`discredit the science of global warming, misrepresent
`and conceal the dangers of fossil fuels, and downplay
`the catastrophic consequences of climate change—all
`for the purpose and with the effect of inflating the
`market for their products.
`
`Applying settled legal principles, a unanimous
`Ninth Circuit panel (Ikuta, J.) rejected the companies’
`efforts to remove those state-law claims to federal
`court based on federal “arising-under” jurisdiction
`(28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a)). The panel concluded
`that neither of “the two exceptions to the well-
`pleaded-complaint rule” applied: (1) the People’s
`claims did not satisfy Grable & Sons Metal Products,
`Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S.
`308 (2005), because they did not necessarily raise a
`substantial federal issue; and (2) those claims did not
`satisfy the complete-preemption doctrine, because
`they were not encompassed by a federal cause of
`action that Congress intended to be exclusive. Pet.
`App. 12a–16a.
`
`Petitioners do not challenge either of those
`conclusions. Instead, they urge this Court to grant
`certiorari to create a third exception to the well-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`pleaded complaint rule for cases in which federal
`common law purportedly “governs” the plaintiff’s
`state-law claims but neither Grable nor complete
`preemption support removal. The Court should
`decline the invitation.
`
`First, this Court could not even consider
`petitioners’ proposed exception without creating an
`entirely new category of federal common law.
`Contrary to petitioners’ mischaracterizations of the
`complaints and California law, the People seek
`neither to regulate emissions nor to set climate
`change policy, but simply to hold petitioners liable for
`conducting deceptive marketing
`tactics while
`knowingly misrepresenting the dangers of their
`products. The People’s claims do not conflict with any
`uniquely federal interest, which federal common
`lawmaking demands. Instead, the claims fit squarely
`within the states’ traditional authority to protect
`residents from the impacts of misleading marketing
`and related practices. Federalizing the People’s
`claims would result in an unprecedented shift of
`lawmaking authority to federal judges.
`
`Second, petitioners identify no circuit conflict that
`warrants review of their proposed third exception to
`the well-pleaded complaint rule. In Grable, this Court
`established a straightforward test for determining
`whether a state-law claim “arises under” federal law
`absent complete preemption. Petitioners rely on cases
`pre-dating Grable, when no “well-defined test”
`existed, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
`Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1571 (2016), and the
`“canvas” of opinions “look[ed] like one that Jackson
`Pollock got to first,” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251,
`258 (2013). Grable brought “order to this unruly
`doctrine,” Gunn, 568 U.S. at 257, and appellate courts
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`have applied Grable to a range of federal issues since,
`including federal common law.
`
`Third, the Ninth Circuit properly applied Grable
`to the facts of these cases, and petitioners offer no
`persuasive reason to return to the “muddled” pre-
`Grable era of jurisdictional uncertainty. Manning,
`136 S. Ct. at 1571. Nor do they supply a principled
`basis for treating federal common law as anything
`more than an ordinary preemption defense that,
`under longstanding precedent, cannot create arising-
`under jurisdiction. Moreover, the Clean Air Act (CAA)
`displaced the body of federal common law that
`petitioners contend controls here. This Court has
`never held that displaced federal common law can
`render state-law claims removable, and long-settled
`precedent makes clear that it cannot. See Int’l Paper
`Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 488–89, 500 (1987); Am.
`Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423
`(2011) (AEP).
`
`As for petitioners’ second Question Presented, the
`Ninth Circuit’s fact-bound application of Caterpillar
`Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996), is equally
`uncertworthy. The People did not waive their
`objections to removal by amending their complaints
`to conform to the district court’s adverse remand
`ruling—as every circuit to consider analogous
`amendments has concluded. Nor did the panel hold
`that every case decided at the pleading stage must be
`remanded if the district court lacked jurisdiction at
`the time of removal. Instead, the panel appropriately
`declined to excuse the defects in petitioners’ removal
`based on the particular circumstances of these cases,
`after considering the relevant Caterpillar factors.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`Finally, these questions are of minimal practical
`importance. This Court’s precedent already supplies
`clear answers to both, and petitioners’ proposed
`departures from that precedent would affect at most
`a small number of cases. Even if the Court were
`inclined to create a new exception to the well-pleaded
`complaint rule or revisit its decision in Caterpillar,
`these cases would be a poor vehicle for doing so. The
`petition addresses only one potential ground for
`removal, and four other fully briefed grounds for
`removal await adjudication by the district court.
`
`STATEMENT OF THE CASE
`
`A. Background
`
`City Attorneys for the City of Oakland and the
`City and County of San Francisco brought these two
`public nuisance actions in California state court
`under California’s representative public nuisance
`law, on behalf of the People of the State of California.
`Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3479, 3480, 3490; Cal. Civ. Proc.
`Code § 731. The complaints allege that petitioners
`have, for at least thirty years, “engaged in large-scale,
`sophisticated advertising and public relations
`campaigns to promote pervasive fossil fuel usage and
`to portray fossil fuels as environmentally responsible
`and essential to human well-being,” “even in the face
`of overwhelming scientific evidence that fossil fuels
`are altering the climate and that global warming has
`become an existential threat to modern life.” CA9
`Excerpts of Record (ER) 295, 362 (ECF 29). The
`People allege that petitioners’ wrongful campaign “to
`deny and discredit
`the mainstream scientific
`consensus on global warming” was designed to
`expand the market for products petitioners knew
`were harmful. Id.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`Under California’s public nuisance statutes, the
`People must show that petitioners knowingly
`promoted and marketed their products for a use they
`knew was dangerous. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Atl.
`Richfield Co., 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 309 (2006)
`(“Liability is not based merely on production of a
`product or failure to warn,” but on “far more
`egregious” promotion activities akin “to instructing
`the purchaser to use the product in a hazardous
`manner”). Meeting that burden will entitle the People
`to an equitable abatement order requiring petitioners
`to ameliorate the public nuisance (e.g., to reinforce
`local infrastructure to improve resiliency to rising sea
`levels). See, e.g., ER 296–97, 331, 363–64, 398. The
`People’s complaints do not seek to stop global
`warming by regulating or enjoining emissions, but to
`mitigate the local nuisance impacts through discrete
`abatement measures.
`
`Although petitioners now acknowledge that fossil-
`fuel products “have led to global warming and ocean
`rise and will continue to do so,” Pet. App. 31a, they
`asserted the exact opposite throughout most of the
`period covered by these lawsuits, despite knowing the
`truth. The principal liability issues in these cases are
`whether petitioners misled the public about that
`knowledge, and whether their misrepresentations
`substantially contributed to the creation of a public
`nuisance as defined by California law. To the extent
`federal law may come into play at all, it will only be
`in connection with a potential affirmative defense of
`ordinary preemption.
`
`B. Proceedings Below
`
`The People’s state-court complaints each alleged a
`single claim under California’s representative public
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`nuisance statute. After petitioners removed, the
`People timely moved to remand, but the district court
`ruled that their claim arose under federal law and
`could only be pursued as a federal-common-law claim.
`Pet. App. 56a. In compliance with Stewart v. U.S.
`Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2002), the People
`amended their complaints “to conform to the Court’s
`ruling” by adding a claim for public nuisance under
`federal common law, while “reserv[ing] all rights with
`respect to whether jurisdiction is proper in federal
`court.” ER 63, 115, 134, 180. Shortly thereafter, the
`district court granted petitioners’ Rule 12(b)(6)
`motions, concluding that although federal common
`law “governed” the People’s claims, it provided no
`rights or remedies. Pet. App. 45a.
`
`The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s
`analysis and vacated the order denying remand,
`holding that the People’s “state-law claim for public
`nuisance does not arise under federal law for
`purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Pet. App. 2a. The panel
`further held that the People had not waived their
`challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction by amending
`their complaints to conform to the district court’s
`ruling while expressly preserving their appellate
`rights, and that considerations of finality, efficiency,
`and economy did not excuse the jurisdictional defect
`at the time of removal because the cases had been
`pending for “just over eight months” at the time of
`dismissal and “there had been no discovery.” Id. 17a–
`18a, 22a. The court remanded for the district court to
`adjudicate other asserted grounds for removal that
`the district court had not yet addressed. Id. 22a–23a.
`Those alternative grounds for federal subject-matter
`jurisdiction remain pending.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
`
`I. No federal common law “governs” the
`People’s claims.
`
`1. Petitioners’ first Question Presented rests upon
`the mistaken
`premise
`that
`the People’s
`representative public nuisance claims seek to
`regulate cross-border air pollution. Petitioners argue
`that those claims “require a court to decide whether
`global
`fossil-fuel production and
`sales are
`‘unreasonable’—and thus tortious,” which they assert
`can only be decided under the federal common law of
`“interstate and international pollution.” Pet. 2, 4.
`That assertion misrepresents the allegations in the
`People’s complaints, misunderstands the standard for
`liability under California’s representative public
`nuisance statute, and mischaracterizes the available
`remedies.
`
`The People’s complaints charge that petitioners
`wrongfully “engaged in large-scale, sophisticated
`advertising and public relations campaigns” “to deny
`and discredit the mainstream scientific consensus on
`global warming, downplay the risks of global
`warming,” and “mislea[d] the public about global
`warming”—even as petitioners’ internal research
`confirmed that climate change was an inevitable and
`growing danger and that their products are a primary
`cause of that danger. ER 295, 315, 420–21, 439. The
`People’s claims invoke core state responsibilities
`rather than uniquely federal interests. No federal
`common law has ever encompassed claims of wrongful
`promotion and deceptive business practices, which
`are within the states’ traditional authority to
`regulate—especially where, as here, the defendants’
`conduct poses severe harms to public health and
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`safety. Whatever application federal common law
`might have when a plaintiff seeks to impose liability
`for
`“interstate pollution,” neither petitioners’
`emissions nor anyone else’s are the claimed basis for
`liability here. Consequently, the Court could not
`reach petitioners’ first Question Presented without
`creating a new category of federal common law, never
`before recognized, to “govern” the People’s wrongful-
`promotion claims.
`
`2. The People’s representative public nuisance
`claims under California law do not rest on allegations
`that a defendant “simply fail[ed] to warn of a defective
`product” or engaged in the “manufacture and
`distribution” of a hazardous product. People v.
`ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 17 Cal.App.5th 51, 84
`(2017), reh’g denied (Dec. 6, 2017), rev. denied
`(Feb. 14, 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 377 (2018).
`Rather, the People allege “affirmative promotion [of
`the product] for a use [petitioners] knew to be
`hazardous.” Id.; see also City of Modesto Redev.
`Agency v. Superior Ct., 119 Cal.App.4th 28, 37–43
`(2004). That additional “affirmative conduct that
`assisted in the creation of a hazardous condition” is
`essential to the People’s public nuisance claims. Cty.
`of Santa Clara, 137 Cal.App.4th at 309.
`
`While the scope of an equitable abatement remedy
`may reflect the extent to which petitioners’ wrongful
`conduct was a proximate cause of damage to local
`infrastructure, petitioners’ liability in these cases
`rests upon proof that they conducted advertising and
`communications campaigns to promote the use of
`their products at levels they falsely claimed were safe
`and environmentally responsible, while deliberately
`concealing their risks. See ER 294–95, 315–23, 420–
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`21, 439–46; Pet. App. 12a. Remedying public
`nuisances and protecting consumers from deceptive
`business practices are core state responsibilities
`within the purview of state court systems. See, e.g.,
`California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989);
`Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 91 (2008) (state
`deceptive practices claims were not preempted by
`federal law); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
`Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 150 (1963).
`
`3. Adjudicating these cases under California law
`will not require courts to “balance” or “weigh[]” the
`value of fossil-fuel production against its harms. Pet.
`2, 8, 10. Petitioners’ contrary argument reflects their
`continuing mischaracterization of
`the People’s
`complaints. While petitioners assert that the People
`must establish “fossil-fuel production and sales are
`‘unreasonable,’” Pet. 2 (emphasis added), the issue
`under California law is whether the interference with
`a public right caused by petitioners’ wrongful
`promotion is “substantial and unreasonable,” People
`ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1105 (1997);
`Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3479, 3480. Liability follows upon
`proof that petitioners’ affirmative and deceptive
`conduct was a “substantial factor in bringing about”
`the nuisance. ConAgra, 17 Cal.App.5th at 101; see,
`e.g., Citizens for Odor Nuisance Abatement v. City of
`San Diego, 8 Cal.App.5th 350, 359
`(2017);
`Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435. To the extent
`any “balancing” is required, the court will balance the
`social utility of petitioners’ tortious deception against
`its benefits. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
`Superior Ct., 13 Cal.4th 893, 938 (1996) (citing
`Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 826–31); Acuna, 14
`Cal.4th at 1105.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`4. The People’s legal and factual allegations are
`qualitatively different from any this Court has held
`can give rise to federal common law. “The cases in
`which
`federal courts may engage
`in common
`lawmaking are few and far between.” Rodriguez v.
`F.D.I.C., 140 S. Ct. 713, 716 (2020). “[B]efore federal
`judges may claim a new area for common lawmaking,
`strict conditions must be satisfied,” id. at 717, the
`most basic being a “specific,” “concrete,” and
`“significant conflict” between a uniquely federal
`interest and the use of state law, O’Melveny & Myers
`v. F.D.I.C., 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994); see also Miree v.
`DeKalb Cty., Ga., 433 U.S. 25, 31 (1977); Wallis v. Pan
`Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69–71 (1966).
`
`In the nuisance context, the Court has recognized
`a federal common law only where a State plaintiff’s
`cause of action had the purpose and effect of
`regulating releases of contaminants from a specific
`out-of-state source. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
`Wis., 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972) (Milwaukee I); New
`Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 477, 481–483
`(1931); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650
`(1916); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241–43
`(1901); see also Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 488. The
`People’s allegations here, the elements of a California
`public nuisance action, and the relief they seek—all of
`which sound in consumer and public deception—
`do not fit that mold.
`
`The Ninth Circuit correctly held that petitioners
`have not “identif[ied] a legal issue” requiring federal
`adjudication that could satisfy Grable, and that
`petitioners’ invocation of generic “federal interests”
`was insufficient to support removal jurisdiction. Pet.
`App. 13a. Yet, petitioners’ arguments here rest on
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`their same “suggest[ion] that the [People’s] state-law
`claim implicates a variety of ‘federal interests,’”
`broadly construed. Pet. App. 13a. Even traditional
`conflict preemption analysis (which cannot support
`removal) does not countenance a “freewheeling
`judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in
`tension with federal objectives,” because “such an
`endeavor would undercut the principle that it is
`Congress rather than the courts that pre-empts state
`law.” Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S.
`582, 607 (2011) (cleaned up); see, e.g., Miree, 433 U.S.
`at 29. “Invoking some brooding federal interest or
`appealing to a judicial policy preference should never
`be enough to win preemption of a state law.” Va.
`Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1901 (2019).
`
`Petitioners ignore those bedrock principles of
`federalism and separation of powers when they ask
`this Court to create a new category of federal common
`law encompassing the People’s deception-based
`claims. Holding petitioners liable for knowing and
`deceitful corporate conduct does not implicate—much
`less conflict with—any uniquely federal interest. See
`e.g., California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101.
`Nor does combatting such conduct impermissibly
`“launch the State upon a prohibited voyage into a
`domain of exclusively federal competence.” Zschernig
`v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 442 (1968) (Stewart, J.,
`concurring). Petitioners urge the Court to conclude
`that arising-under jurisdiction applies to a public
`entity’s state-law efforts “to regulate interstate and
`international greenhouse-gas emissions,” Pet. 20, but
`the People’s complaints do nothing of the kind.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`II. Petitioners’ federal-common-law theory
`of removal does not warrant review.
`
`Even if the Court were inclined to create a new
`category of federal common law to encompass the
`People’s deception-based claims, the Ninth Circuit’s
`application of the well-pleaded complaint rule would
`not warrant review.
`
`A case arises under federal law (and is therefore
`removable) “only when the plaintiff’s statement of his
`own cause of action shows that it is based upon
`federal law.” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60
`(2009) (brackets omitted). Federal “[j]urisdiction may
`not be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff has not
`advanced.” Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson,
`478 U.S. 804, 809 n.6 (1986). Nor can it rest on “a
`federal defens