(Slip Opinion)
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`OCTOBER TERM, 2020
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`Syllabus
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`1
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`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`Syllabus
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`NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION v.
`ALSTON ET AL.
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`No. 20–512. Argued March 31, 2021—Decided June 21, 2021*
`Colleges and universities across the country have leveraged sports to
`bring in revenue, attract attention, boost enrollment, and raise money
`from alumni. That profitable enterprise relies on “amateur” student-
`athletes who compete under horizontal restraints that restrict how the
`schools may compensate them for their play. The National Collegiate
`Athletic Association (NCAA) issues and enforces these rules, which re-
`strict compensation for student-athletes in various ways. These rules
`depress compensation for at least some student-athletes below what a
`competitive market would yield.
` Against this backdrop, current and former student-athletes brought
`this antitrust lawsuit challenging the NCAA’s restrictions on compen-
`sation. Specifically, they alleged that the NCAA’s rules violate §1 of
`the Sherman Act, which prohibits “contract[s], combination[s], or con-
`spirac[ies] in restraint of trade or commerce.” 15 U. S. C. §1. Key facts
`were undisputed: The NCAA and its members have agreed to compen-
`sation limits for student-athletes; the NCAA enforces these limits on
`its member-schools; and these compensation limits affect interstate
`commerce. Following a bench trial, the district court issued a 50-page
`opinion that refused to disturb the NCAA’s rules limiting undergrad-
`uate athletic scholarships and other compensation related to athletic
`performance. At the same time, the court found unlawful and thus
`enjoined certain NCAA rules limiting the education-related benefits
`schools may make available to student-athletes. Both sides appealed.
`The Ninth Circuit affirmed in full, holding that the district court
`——————
`* Together with No. 20–520, American Athletic Conference et al. v. Al-
`ston et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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`NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
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`Syllabus
`“struck the right balance in crafting a remedy that both prevents anti-
`competitive harm to Student-Athletes while serving the procompeti-
`tive purpose of preserving the popularity of college sports.” 958 F. 3d
`1239, 1263. Unsatisfied with that result, the NCAA asks the Court to
`find that all of its existing restraints on athlete compensation survive
`antitrust scrutiny. The student-athletes have not renewed their
`across-the-board challenge and the Court thus does not consider the
`rules that remain in place. The Court considers only the subset of
`NCAA rules restricting education-related benefits that the district
`court enjoined. The Court does so based on the uncontested premise
`that the NCAA enjoys monopsony control in the relevant market—
`such that it is capable of depressing wages below competitive levels for
`student-athletes and thereby restricting the quantity of student-ath-
`lete labor.
`Held: The district court’s injunction is consistent with established anti-
`trust principles. Pp. 15–36.
`
`(a) The courts below properly subjected the NCAA’s compensation
`restrictions to antitrust scrutiny under a “rule of reason” analysis. In
`the Sherman Act, Congress tasked courts with enforcing an antitrust
`policy of competition on the theory that market forces “yield the best
`allocation” of the Nation’s resources. National Collegiate Athletic
`Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 104, n. 27.
`The Sherman Act’s prohibition on restraints of trade has long been un-
`derstood to prohibit only restraints that are “undue.” Ohio v. American
`Express Co., 585 U. S. ___, ___. Whether a particular restraint is un-
`due “presumptively” turns on an application of a “rule of reason anal-
`ysis.” Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U. S. 1, 5. That manner of analysis
`generally requires a court to “conduct a fact-specific assessment of
`market power and market structure” to assess a challenged restraint’s
`“actual effect on competition.” American Express, 585 U. S., at ___.
`Pp. 15–24.
`
`
`(1) The NCAA maintains the courts below should have analyzed
`its compensation restrictions under an extremely deferential standard
`because it is a joint venture among members who must collaborate to
`offer consumers the unique product of intercollegiate athletic competi-
`tion. Even assuming the NCAA is a joint venture, though, it is a joint
`venture with monopoly power in the relevant market. Its restraints
`are appropriately subject to the ordinary rule of reason’s fact-specific
`assessment of their effect on competition. American Express, 585
`U. S., at ___. Circumstances sometimes allow a court to determine the
`anticompetitive effects of a challenged restraint (or lack thereof) under
`an abbreviated or “quick look.” See Dagher, 547 U. S., at 7, n. 3; Board
`of Regents, 468 U. S., at 109, n. 39. But not here. Pp. 15–19.
`
`
`(2) The NCAA next contends that the Court’s decision in Board of
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`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
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`Syllabus
`Regents expressly approved the NCAA’s limits on student-athlete com-
`pensation. That is incorrect. The Court in Board of Regents did not
`analyze the lawfulness of the NCAA’s restrictions on student-athlete
`compensation. Rather, that case involved an antitrust challenge to the
`NCAA’s restraints on televising games—an antitrust challenge the
`Court sustained. Along the way, the Court commented on the NCAA’s
`critical role in maintaining the revered tradition of amateurism in col-
`lege sports as one “entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman
`Act.” Id., at 120. But that sort of passing comment on an issue not
`presented is not binding, nor is it dispositive here. Pp. 19–21.
`
`
`(3) The NCAA also submits that a rule of reason analysis is inap-
`propriate because its member schools are not “commercial enterprises”
`but rather institutions that exist to further the societally important
`noncommercial objective of undergraduate education. This submission
`also fails. The Court has regularly refused these sorts of special dis-
`pensations from the Sherman Act. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial
`Lawyers Assn., 493 U. S. 411, 424. The Court has also previously sub-
`jected the NCAA to the Sherman Act, and any argument that “the spe-
`cial characteristics of [the NCAA’s] particular industry” should exempt
`it from the usual operation of the antitrust laws is “properly addressed
`to Congress.” National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States,
`435 U. S. 679, 689. Pp. 21–24.
`
`(b) The NCAA’s remaining attacks on the district court’s decision
`lack merit. Pp. 24–36.
`
`
`(1) The NCAA contends that the district court erroneously re-
`quired it to prove that its rules are the least restrictive means of
`achieving the procompetitive purpose of preserving consumer demand
`for college sports. True, a least restrictive means test would be erro-
`neous and overly intrusive. But the district court nowhere expressly
`or effectively required the NCAA to show that its rules met that stand-
`ard. Rather, only after finding the NCAA’s restraints “patently and
`inexplicably stricter than is necessary” did the district court find the
`restraints unlawful. Pp. 24–29.
`
`
`(2) The NCAA contends the district court should have deferred to
`its conception of amateurism instead of “impermissibly redefin[ing]”
`its “product.” But a party cannot declare a restraint “immune from §
`1 scrutiny” by relabeling it a product feature. American Needle, Inc. v.
`National Football League, 560 U. S. 183, 199, n. 7. Moreover, the dis-
`trict court found the NCAA had not even maintained a consistent def-
`inition of amateurism. Pp. 29–30.
`
`
`(3) The NCAA disagrees that it can achieve the same pro-compet-
`itive benefits using substantially less restrictive alternatives and
`claims the district court’s injunction will “micromanage” its business.
`Judges must indeed be sensitive to the possibility that the “continuing
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`4
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`NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
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`Syllabus
`supervision of a highly detailed decree” could wind up impairing rather
`than enhancing competition. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Of-
`fices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U. S. 398, 415. The district court’s
`injunction honored these principles, though. The court enjoined only
`certain restraints—and only after finding both that relaxing these re-
`strictions would not blur the distinction between college and profes-
`sional sports and thus impair demand, and further that this course
`represented a significantly (not marginally) less restrictive means of
`achieving the same procompetitive benefits as the NCAA’s current
`rules. Finally, the court’s injunction preserves considerable leeway for
`the NCAA, while individual conferences remain free to impose what-
`ever rules they choose. To the extent the NCAA believes meaningful
`ambiguity exists about the scope of its authority, it may seek clarifica-
`tion from the district court. Pp. 30–36.
`958 F. 3d 1239, affirmed.
` GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. KA-
`VANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion.
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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
` Nos. 20–512 and 20–520
`_________________
` NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
`PETITIONER
`
`v.
` SHAWNE ALSTON, ET AL.
`
`20–512
`
`
`
`
`
`20–520
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`AMERICAN ATHLETIC CONFERENCE, ET AL.,
`
`PETITIONERS
`
`v.
`SHAWNE ALSTON, ET AL.
`
`ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`[June 21, 2021]
`JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`In the Sherman Act, Congress tasked courts with enforc-
`
`ing a policy of competition on the belief that market forces
`
`“yield the best allocation” of the Nation’s resources. Na-
`tional Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ.
`of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 104, n. 27 (1984). The plaintiffs be-
`fore us brought this lawsuit alleging that the National Col-
`legiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and certain of its mem-
`ber institutions violated this policy by agreeing to restrict
`
`the compensation colleges and universities may offer the
`student-athletes who play for their teams. After amassing
`a vast record and conducting an exhaustive trial, the dis-
`trict court issued a 50-page opinion that cut both ways. The
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`NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
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`Opinion of the Court
`court refused to disturb the NCAA’s rules limiting under-
`graduate athletic scholarships and other compensation re-
`
`lated to athletic performance. At the same time, the court
`struck down NCAA rules limiting the education-related
`benefits schools may offer student-athletes—such as rules
`that prohibit schools from offering graduate or vocational
`school scholarships. Before us, the student-athletes do not
`
`challenge the district court’s judgment. But the NCAA
`does. In essence, it seeks immunity from the normal oper-
`ation of the antitrust laws and argues, in any event, that
`the district court should have approved all of its existing
`restraints. We took this case to consider those objections.
`I
`A
`
`From the start, American colleges and universities have
`had a complicated relationship with sports and money. In
`1852, students from Harvard and Yale participated in what
`many regard as the Nation’s first intercollegiate competi-
`tion—a boat race at Lake Winnipesaukee, New Hampshire.
`But this was no pickup match. A railroad executive spon-
`sored the event to promote train travel to the picturesque
`lake. T. Mendenhall, The Harvard-Yale Boat Race 1852–
`1924, pp. 15–16 (1993). He offered the competitors an all-
`
`expenses-paid vacation with lavish prizes—along with un-
`limited alcohol. See A. Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals 6–
`7 (1999) (Zimbalist); Rushin, Inside the Moat, Sports Illus-
`
`trated, Mar. 3, 1997. The event filled the resort with “life
`
`and excitement,” N. Y. Herald, Aug. 10, 1852, p. 2, col. 2,
`and one student-athlete described the “‘junket’” as an ex-
`perience “‘as unique and irreproducible as the Rhodian co-
`lossus,’” Mendenhall, Harvard-Yale Boat Race, at 20.
`Life might be no “less than a boat race,” Holmes, On Re-
`
`ceiving the Degree of Doctor of Laws, Yale University Com-
`mencement, June 30, 1886, in Speeches by Oliver Wendall
`Holmes, p. 27 (1918), but it was football that really caused
`
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`Opinion of the Court
`college sports to take off. “By the late 1880s the traditional
`rivalry between Princeton and Yale was attracting 40,000
`spectators and generating in excess of $25,000 . . . in gate
`revenues.” Zimbalist 7. Schools regularly had “graduate
`students and paid ringers” on their teams. Ibid.
`Colleges offered all manner of compensation to talented
`
`
`athletes. Yale reportedly lured a tackle named James Ho-
`gan with free meals and tuition, a trip to Cuba, the exclu-
`
`sive right to sell scorecards from his games—and a job as a
`cigarette agent for the American Tobacco Company. Ibid.;
`see also Needham, The College Athlete, McClure’s Maga-
`zine, June 1905, p. 124. The absence of academic residency
`requirements gave rise to “‘tramp athletes’” who “roamed
`
`the country making cameo athletic appearances, moving on
`whenever and wherever the money was better.” F. Dealy,
`Win at Any Cost 71 (1990). One famous example was a law
`
`student at West Virginia University—Fielding H. Yost—
`“who, in 1896, transferred to Lafayette as a freshman just
`in time to lead his new teammates to victory against its
`
`arch-rival, Penn.” Ibid. The next week, he “was back at
`
`West Virginia’s law school.” Ibid. College sports became
`
`such a big business that Woodrow Wilson, then President
`
`of Princeton University, quipped to alumni in 1890 that
`“‘Princeton is noted in this wide world for three things: foot-
`ball, baseball, and collegiate instruction.’” Zimbalist 7.
`
`By 1905, though, a crisis emerged. While college football
`
`was hugely popular, it was extremely violent. Plays like the
`
`flying wedge and the players’ light protective gear led to 7
`football fatalities in 1893, 12 deaths the next year, and 18
`in 1905. Id., at 8. President Theodore Roosevelt responded
`
`by convening a meeting between Harvard, Princeton, and
`Yale to review the rules of the game, a gathering that ulti-
`
`mately led to the creation of what we now know as the
`
`NCAA. Ibid. Organized primarily as a standard-setting
`body, the association also expressed a view at its founding
`about compensating college athletes—admonishing that
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`4
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`NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
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`Opinion of the Court
`“[n]o student shall represent a College or University in any
`intercollegiate game or contest who is paid or receives, di-
`rectly or indirectly, any money, or financial concession.” In-
`tercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States Con-
`
`
`stitution By-Laws, Art. VII, §3 (1906); see also Proceedings
`of the Eleventh Annual Convention of the National Colle-
`giate Athletic Association, Dec. 28, 1916, p. 34.
`
`
`Reality did not always match aspiration. More than two
`
`decades later, the Carnegie Foundation produced a report
`on college athletics that found them still “sodden with the
`commercial and the material and the vested interests that
`these forces have created.” H. Savage, The Carnegie Foun-
`dation for the Advancement of Teaching, American College
`Athletics Bull. 23, p. 310 (1929). Schools across the country
`
`
`sought to leverage sports to bring in revenue, attract atten-
`tion, boost enrollment, and raise money from alumni. The
`University of California’s athletic revenue was over
`$480,000, while Harvard’s football revenue alone came in
`
`at $429,000. Id., at 87. College football was “not a student’s
`
`game”; it was an “organized commercial enterprise” featur-
`ing athletes with “years of training,” “professional coaches,”
`and competitions that were “highly profitable.” Id., at viii.
`
`The commercialism extended to the market for student-
`athletes. Seeking the best players, many schools actively
`participated in a system “under which boys are offered pe-
`cuniary and other inducements to enter a particular col-
`lege.” Id., at xiv–xv. One coach estimated that a rival team
`
`“spent over $200,000 a year on players.” Zimbalist 9. In
`
`1939, freshmen at the University of Pittsburgh went on
`strike because upperclassmen were reportedly earning
`
`more money. Crabb, The Amateurism Myth: A Case for a
`New Tradition, 28 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 181, 190 (2017). In
`the 1940s, Hugh McElhenny, a halfback at the University
`of Washington, “became known as the first college player
`‘ever to take a cut in salary to play pro football.’” Zimbalist
`22–23. He reportedly said: “‘[A] wealthy guy puts big
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`Opinion of the Court
`bucks under my pillow every time I score a touchdown.
`
`
`Hell, I can’t afford to graduate.’” Id., at 211, n. 17. In 1946,
`a commentator offered this view: “[W]hen it comes to chi-
`
`canery, double-dealing, and general undercover work be-
`hind the scenes, big-time college football is in a class by it-
`self.” Woodward, Is College Football on the Level?, Sport,
`Nov. 1946, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 35.
`
`In 1948, the NCAA sought to do more than admonish. It
`adopted the “Sanity Code.” Colleges Adopt the ‘Sanity
`
`Code’ To Govern Sports, N. Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1948, p. 1,
`col. 1. The code reiterated the NCAA’s opposition to “prom-
`ised pay in any form.” Hearings before the Subcommittee
`on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on
`
`Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Congress, 2d Sess.,
`
`pt. 2, p. 1094 (1978). But for the first time the code also
`
`authorized colleges and universities to pay athletes’ tuition.
`Ibid. And it created a new enforcement mechanism—
`providing for the “suspension or expulsion” of “proven of-
`fenders.” Colleges Adopt ‘Sanity Code,’ N. Y. Times, p. 1,
`col. 1. To some, these changes sought to substitute a con-
`sistent, above-board compensation system for the varying
`under-the-table schemes that had long proliferated. To oth-
`ers, the code marked “the beginning of the NCAA behaving
`as an effective cartel,” by enabling its member schools to set
`
`and enforce “rules that limit the price they have to pay for
`
`their inputs (mainly the ‘student-athletes’).” Zimbalist 10.
`
`
`The rules regarding student-athlete compensation have
`
`evolved ever since. In 1956, the NCAA expanded the scope
`of allowable payments to include room, board, books, fees,
`and “cash for incidental expenses such as laundry.” In re
`
`
`National Collegiate Athletic Assn. Athletic Grant-in-Aid
`
`Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1063 (ND Cal.
`2019) (hereinafter D. Ct. Op.). In 1974, the NCAA began
`
`permitting paid professionals in one sport to compete on an
`amateur basis in another. Brief for Historians as Amici Cu-
`
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`NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
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`Opinion of the Court
`riae 10. In 2014, the NCAA “announced it would allow ath-
`letic conferences to authorize their member schools to in-
`
`crease scholarships up to the full cost of attendance.”
`O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 802 F. 3d
`1049, 1054–1055 (CA9 2015). The 80 member schools of the
`“Power Five” athletic conferences—the conferences with
`the highest revenue in Division I—promptly voted to raise
`their scholarship limits to an amount that is generally sev-
`eral thousand dollars higher than previous limits. D. Ct.
`Op., at 1064.
`
`
`In recent years, changes have continued. The NCAA has
`
`created the “Student Assistance Fund” and the “Academic
`Enhancement Fund” to “assist student-athletes in meeting
`financial needs,” “improve their welfare or academic sup-
`
`
`port,” or “recognize academic achievement.” Id., at 1072.
`These funds have supplied money to student-athletes for
`“postgraduate scholarships” and “school supplies,” as well
`
`as “benefits that are not related to education,” such as “loss-
`of-value insurance premiums,” “travel expenses,” “cloth-
`ing,” and “magazine subscriptions.” Id., at 1072, n. 15. In
`
`2018, the NCAA made more than $84 million available
`through the Student Activities Fund and more than $48
`million available through the Academic Enhancement
`Fund. Id., at 1072. Assistance may be provided in cash or
`
`in kind, and there is no limit to the amount any particular
`student-athlete may receive. Id., at 1073. Since 2015, dis-
`
`bursements to individual students have sometimes been
`tens of thousands of dollars above the full cost of attend-
`
`ance. Ibid.
`
`The NCAA has also allowed payments “‘incidental to ath-
`
`letics participation,’” including awards for “participation or
`
`achievement in athletics” (like “qualifying for a bowl game”)
`
`and certain “payments from outside entities” (such as for
`
`“performance in the Olympics”). Id., at 1064, 1071, 1074.
`The NCAA permits its member schools to award up to (but
`no more than) two annual “Senior Scholar Awards” of
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`Opinion of the Court
`$10,000 for students to attend graduate school after their
`
`athletic eligibility expires. Id., at 1074. Finally, the NCAA
`allows schools to fund travel for student-athletes’ family
`members to attend “certain events.” Id., at 1069.
`
`Over the decades, the NCAA has become a sprawling en-
`terprise. Its membership comprises about 1,100 colleges
`
`
`and universities, organized into three divisions. Id., at
`1063. Division I teams are often the most popular and at-
`tract the most money and the most talented athletes. Cur-
`rently, Division I includes roughly 350 schools divided
`
`across 32 conferences. See ibid. Within Division I, the most
`popular sports are basketball and football. The NCAA di-
`vides Division I football into the Football Bowl Subdivision
`(FBS) and the Football Championship Subdivision, with the
`
`FBS generally featuring the best teams. Ibid. The 32 con-
`
`
`ferences in Division I function similarly to the NCAA itself,
`
`but on a smaller scale. They “can and do enact their own
`rules.” Id., at 1090.
`
`At the center of this thicket of associations and rules sits
`a massive business. The NCAA’s current broadcast con-
`tract for the March Madness basketball tournament is
`worth $1.1 billion annually. See id., at 1077, n. 20. Its tel-
`evision deal for the FBS conference’s College Football
`Playoff is worth approximately $470 million per year. See
`id., at 1063; Bachman, ESPN Strikes Deal for College Foot-
`
`ball Playoff, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21, 2012. Beyond
`these sums, the Division I conferences earn substantial rev-
`enue from regular-season games. For example, the South-
`
`eastern Conference (SEC) “made more than $409 million in
`
`revenues from television contracts alone in 2017, with its
`total conference revenues exceeding $650 million that
`
`year.” D. Ct. Op., at 1063. All these amounts have “in-
`creased consistently over the years.” Ibid.
`Those who run this enterprise profit in a different way
`
`
`than the student-athletes whose activities they oversee.
`The president of the NCAA earns nearly $4 million per
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`NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON
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`Opinion of the Court
`year. Brief for Players Association of the National Football
`League et al. as Amici Curiae 17. Commissioners of the top
`conferences take home between $2 to $5 million. Ibid. Col-
`
`lege athletic directors average more than $1 million annu-
`ally. Ibid. And annual salaries for top Division I college
`football coaches approach $11 million, with some of their
`assistants making more than $2.5 million. Id., at 17–18.
`B
`
`The plaintiffs are current and former student-athletes in
`men’s Division I FBS football and men’s and women’s Divi-
`sion I basketball. They filed a class action against the
`NCAA and 11 Division I conferences (for simplicity’s sake,
`
`we refer to the defendants collectively as the NCAA). The
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`student-athletes challenged the “current, interconnected
`
`set of NCAA rules that limit the compensation they may
`
`receive in exchange for their athletic services.” D. Ct. Op.,
`at 1062, 1065, n. 5. Specifically, they alleged that the
`NCAA’s rules violate §1 of the Sherman Act, which prohib-
`its “contract[s], combination[s], or conspirac[ies] in re-
`straint of trade or commerce.” 15 U. S. C. §1.
`
`
`After pretrial proceedings stretching years, the district
`court conducted a 10-day bench trial. It heard experts and
`lay witnesses from both sides, and received volumes of evi-
`dence and briefing, all before issuing an exhaustive deci-
`sion. In the end, the court found the evidence undisputed
`on certain points. The NCAA did not “contest evidence
`
`showing” that it and its members have agreed to compen-
`sation limits on student-athletes; the NCAA and its confer-
`ences enforce these limits by punishing violations; and
`these limits “affect interstate commerce.” D. Ct. Op., at
`1066.
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`Based on these premises, the district court proceeded to
`assess the lawfulness of the NCAA’s challenged restraints.
`This Court has “long recognized that in view of the common
`
`law and the law in this country when the Sherman Act was
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`passed, the phrase ‘restraint of trade’ is best read to mean
`
`
`‘undue restraint.’” Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U. S.
`
`___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 8) (brackets and some internal
`quotation marks omitted). Determining whether a re-
`straint is undue for purposes of the Sherman Act “presump-
`
`tively” calls for what we have described as a “rule of reason
`
`analysis.” Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U. S. 1, 5 (2006);
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`Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 60–
`62 (1911). That manner of analysis generally requires a
`court to “conduct a fact-specific assessment of market power
`
`and market structure” to assess a challenged restraint’s
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`“actual effect on competition.” American Express, 585 U. S.,
`at ___–___ (slip op., at 8–9) (internal quotation marks omit-
`ted). Always, “[t]he goal is to distinguish between re-
`
`straints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the
`consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are
`in the consumer’s best interest.” Ibid. (brackets and inter-
`nal quotation marks omitted).
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`In applying the rule of reason, the district court began by
`
`observing that the NCAA enjoys “near complete dominance
`of, and exercise[s] monopsony power in, the relevant mar-
`ket”—which it defined as the market for “athletic services
`in men’s and women’s Division I basketball and FBS foot-
`ball, wherein each class member participates in his or her
`sport-specific market.” D. Ct. Op., at 1097. The “most tal-
`ented athletes are concentrated” in the “markets for Divi-
`sion I basketball and FBS football.” Id., at 1067. There are
`no “viable substitutes,” as the “NCAA’s Division I essen-
`tially is the relevant market for elite college football and
`basketball.” Id., at 1067, 1070. In short, the NCAA and its
`
`member schools have the “power to restrain student-athlete
`compensation in any way and at any time they wish, with-
`out any meaningful risk of diminishing their market domi-
`nance.” Id., at 1070.
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`The district court then proceeded to find that the NCAA’s
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`compensation limits “produce significant anticompetitive
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`Opinion of the Court
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` effects in the relevant market.” Id., at 1067. Though mem-
`ber schools compete fiercely in recruiting student-athletes,
`the NCAA uses its monopsony power to “cap artificially the
`
`compensation offered to recruits.” Id., at 1097. In a market
`
`without the challenged restraints, the district court found,
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`“competition among schools would increase in terms of the
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`compensation they would offer to recruits, and student-
`
`athlete compensation would be higher as a result.” Id., at
`1068. “Student-athletes would receive offers that would
`more closely match the value of their athletic services.”
`Ibid. And notably, the court observed, the NCAA “did not
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`meaningfully dispute” any of this evidence. Id., at 1067; see
`also Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 (“[T]here’s no dispute that the—the
`no-pay-for-play rule imposes a significant restraint on a rel-
`evant antitrust market”).
`
`The district court next considered the NCAA’s procompet-
`
`itive justifications for its restraints. The NCAA suggested
`that its restrictions help increase output in college sports
`and maintain a competitive balance among teams. But the
`district court rejected those justifications, D. Ct. Op., at
`
`1070, n. 12, and the NCAA does not pursue them here. The
`NCAA’s only remaining defense was that its rules preserve
`
`amateurism, which in turn widens consumer choice by
`providing a unique product—amateur college sports as dis-
`tinct from professional sports. Admittedly, this asserted
`benefit accrues to consumers in the NCAA’s seller-side con-
`sumer market rather than to student-athletes whose com-
`
`pensation the NCAA fixes in its buyer-side labor market.
`But, the NCAA argued, the district court needed to assess
`its restraints in the labor market in light of their procom-
`petitive benefits in the consumer market—and the district
`court agreed to do so. Id., at 1098.
`
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`Turning to that task, the court observed that the NCAA’s
`conception of amateurism has changed steadily over the
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`years. See id., at 1063–1064, 1072–1073; see also supra, at
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`3–7. The court noted that the NCAA “nowhere define[s] the
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`nature of the amateurism they claim consumers insist
`upon.” D. Ct. Op., at 1070. And, given all this, the court
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`struggled to ascertain for itself “any coherent definition” of
`the term, id., at 1074, noting the testimony of a former SEC
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`commissioner that he’s “‘never been clear on . . . what is re-
`
`ally meant by amateurism.’” Id., at 1070–1071.
`
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`Nor did the district court find much evidence to support
`
`the NCAA’s contention that its compensation restrictions
`play a role in consumer demand. As the court put it, the
`evidence failed “to establish that the challenged compensa-
`
`tion rules, in and of themselves, have any direct connection
`to consumer demand.” Id., at 1070. The court observed, for
`
`example, that the NCAA’s “only economics expert on the is-
`sue of consumer demand” did not “study any standard
`measures of consumer demand” but instead simply “inter-
`viewed people connected with the NCAA and its schools,
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`who were chosen for him by defense counsel.” Id., at 1075.
`Meanwhile, the student-athletes presented expert testi-
`mony and other evidence showing that consumer demand
`has increased markedly despite the new types of compensa-
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`tion the NCAA has allowed in recent decades. Id., at 1074,
`
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`1076. The plaintiffs presented economic and other evidence
`suggesting as well that further increases in student-athlete
`compensation would “not negatively affect consumer de-
`mand.” Id., at 1076. At the same time, however, the district
`
`court did find that one particular aspect of the NCAA’s com-
`pensation limits “may have some effect in preserving con-
`sumer demand.” Id., at 1082. Specifically, the court found
`that rules aimed at ensuring “student-athletes do not re-
`ceive unlimited payments unrelated to education” could
`play some role in product differentiation with professional
`sports and thus help sustain consumer demand for college
`athletics. Id., at 1083.
`