`(Slip Opinion)
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`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2020
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`YELLEN, SECRETARY OF TREASURY v.
`CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS
`
` RESERVATION ET AL.
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
` No. 20–543. Argued April 19, 2021—Decided June 25, 2021*
`
`Title V of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES)
`
`Act allocates $8 billion to “Tribal governments” to compensate for un-
`
`
` budgeted expenditures made in response to COVID–19. 42 U. S. C.
`
` §801(a)(2)(B). The question in these cases is whether Alaska Native
`Corporations (ANCs) are eligible to receive any of that $8 billion. Un-
`der the CARES Act, a “Tribal government” is the “recognized govern-
`ing body of an Indian tribe” as defined in the Indian Self-Determina-
`
`tion and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). §§801(g)(5), (1). ISDA, in
`
`turn, defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or
`other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native vil-
`lage or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pur-
`suant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [(ANCSA),] which
`
`is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided
`by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” 25
`
`U. S. C. §5304(e).
`
`
`Consistent with the Department of the Interior’s longstanding view
`
`that ANCs are Indian tribes under ISDA, the Department of the Treas-
`ury determined that ANCs are eligible for relief under Title V of the
`
`CARES Act, even though ANCs are not “federally recognized tribes”
`(i.e., tribes with which the United States has entered into a govern-
`
`ment-to-government relationship). A number of federally recognized
`
`
`
`——————
`*Together with No. 20–544, Alaska Native Village Corp. Association
`
`et al. v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation et al., also on
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`certiorari to the same court.
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`2
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`
`YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
`RESERVATION
`
`Syllabus
`tribes sued. The District Court entered summary judgment for the
`
`Treasury Department and the ANCs, but the Court of Appeals for the
`
`District of Columbia Circuit reversed.
`
`Held: ANCs are “Indian tribe[s]” under ISDA and thus eligible for fund-
`ing under Title V of the CARES Act. Pp. 7–28.
`
`
`(a) The ANCs argue that they fall under the plain meaning of ISDA’s
`
`definition of “Indian tribe.” Respondents ask the Court to adopt a
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`term-of-art construction that equates being “recognized as eligible for
`the special programs and services provided by the United States to In-
`dians because of their status as Indians” with being a “federally recog-
`
`nized tribe.” Pp. 7–25.
`
`
`(1) Under the plain meaning of ISDA, ANCs are Indian tribes.
`ANCs are “established pursuant to” ANCSA and thereby “recognized
`
`as eligible” for that Act’s benefits. ANCSA, which made ANCs eligible
`
`to select tens of millions of acres of land and receive hundreds of mil-
`
`lions of tax-exempt dollars, 43 U. S. C. §§1605, 1610, 1611, is a special
`program provided by the United States to “Indians,” i.e., Alaska Na-
`
`tives. Given that ANCSA is the only statute ISDA’s “Indian tribe” def-
`
`inition mentions by name, eligibility for ANCSA’s benefits satisfies the
`definition’s final “recognized-as-eligible” clause. Pp. 7–11.
`
`
`(2) Respondents ask the Court to read ISDA’s “Indian tribe” defi-
`nition as a term of art. But respondents fail to establish that the lan-
`guage of ISDA’s recognized-as-eligible clause was an accepted way of
`
`saying “a federally recognized tribe” in 1975, when ISDA was passed.
`Nor is the mere inclusion of the word “recognized” enough to import a
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`term-of-art meaning. Respondents also fail to show that the language
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`of the recognized-as-eligible clause later became a term of art that
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`should be backdated to ISDA’s passage in 1975. Pp. 11–18.
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`
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`(3) Even if ANCs did not satisfy the recognized-as-eligible clause,
`they would still satisfy ISDA’s definition of an “Indian tribe.” If re-
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`spondents were correct that only a federally recognized tribe can sat-
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`isfy that clause, then the best way to read the “Indian tribe” definition
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`would be for the recognized-as-eligible clause not to apply to ANCs at
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`all. Otherwise, despite being prominently “includ[ed]” in the “Indian
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`tribe” definition, 25 U. S. C. §5304(e), all ANCs would be excluded by
`a federal-recognition requirement there is no reasonable prospect they
`
`
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`could ever satisfy. Pp. 18–23.
`
`
`(4) Respondents’ remaining arguments that ANCs are not Indian
`tribes under ISDA are unpersuasive. They first argue that the ANCs
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`misrepresent how meaningful a role they play under ISDA because the
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`actual number of ISDA contracts held by ANCs is negligible. This
`point is largely irrelevant. No one would argue that a federally recog-
`
`nized tribe was not an Indian tribe under ISDA just because it had
`
`
`never entered into an ISDA contract. Respondents further argue that
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`3
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`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`treating ANCs as Indian tribes would complicate the administration
`
`of ISDA. But respondents point to no evidence of such administrative
`burdens in the 45 years the Executive Branch has treated ANCs as
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`Indian tribes. Respondents also warn that blessing ANCs’ status un-
`der ISDA will give ANCs ammunition to press for participation in
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`other statutes that incorporate ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition. This
`concern cuts both ways, as adopting respondents’ position would pre-
`sumably exclude ANCs from the many other statutes incorporating
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`
`ISDA’s definition, even those under which ANCs have long benefited.
`Pp. 23–25.
`
`(b) One respondent tribe further argues that the CARES Act ex-
`cludes ANCs regardless of whether they are Indian tribes under ISDA,
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`because ANCs do not have a “recognized governing body.” In the ISDA
`context, the term “recognized governing body” has long been under-
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`stood to apply to an ANC’s board of directors, and nothing in either the
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`CARES Act or ISDA suggests that the term places additional limits on
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`the kinds of Indian tribes eligible to benefit under the statutes. Pp.
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`26–27.
`976 F. 3d 15, reversed and remanded.
`SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`C. J., and BREYER, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, and in which
`ALITO, J., joined as to Parts I, II–C, II–D, III, and IV. GORSUCH, J., filed
`a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
`_________________
` Nos. 20–543 and 20–544
`_________________
`JANET L. YELLEN, SECRETARY OF THE
`TREASURY, PETITIONER
`
`20–543
`v.
`CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS
`RESERVATION, ET AL.
`
`
`
`
`ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGE CORPORATION
`
`ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
`
`
`20–544
`v.
`CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE CHEHALIS
`
`RESERVATION, ET AL.
`ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
`[June 25, 2021]
`JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*
`
`In March 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Re-
`
`lief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, 134 Stat. 281. Ti-
`tle V of the Act allocates $8 billion of monetary relief to
`134 Stat. 502, 42 U. S. C.
`“Tribal governments.”
`
`
`§801(a)(2)(B). Under the CARES Act, a “Tribal govern-
`ment” is the “recognized governing body of an Indian tribe”
`as defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education
`Assistance Act (ISDA). §§801(g)(5), (1). ISDA, in turn, de-
`fines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation,
`
`——————
`*JUSTICE ALITO joins Parts I, II–C, II–D, III, and IV of this opinion.
`
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`2
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`
` YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
`RESERVATION
`Opinion of the Court
`or other organized group or community, including any
`
`Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as
`defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native
`Claims Settlement Act[,] which is recognized as eligible for
`
`the special programs and services provided by the United
`
`States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” 25
`U. S. C. §5304(e).
`
`The Department of the Treasury asked the Department
`of the Interior, the agency that administers ISDA, whether
`
`Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) meet that definition.
`Consistent with its longstanding view, the Interior Depart-
`ment said yes. The Treasury Department then set aside
`approximately $500 million of CARES Act funding for the
`ANCs. The question presented is whether ANCs are “In-
`dian tribe[s]” under ISDA, and are therefore eligible to re-
`ceive the CARES Act relief set aside by the Treasury De-
`partment. The Court holds that they are.
`I
`This is not the first time the Court has addressed the
`
`
`unique circumstances of Alaska and its indigenous popula-
`tion. See, e.g., Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U. S. ___ (2019); Stur-
`geon v. Frost, 577 U. S. 424 (2016); Alaska v. Native Village
`of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U. S. 520 (1998);
`
`Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U. S. 45 (1962).
`
`The “simple truth” reflected in those prior cases is that
`“Alaska is often the exception, not the rule.” Sturgeon, 577
`
`U. S., at 440. To see why, one must first understand the
`
`United States’ unique historical relationship with Alaska
`Natives.
`
`A
`When the United States purchased the Territory of
`
`
`Alaska from Russia in 1867, Alaska Natives lived in com-
`munities dispersed widely across Alaska’s 365 million
`acres. In the decades that followed, “[t]here was never an
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`3
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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`attempt in Alaska to isolate Indians on reservations,” as
`
`
` there had been in the lower 48 States. Metlakatla Indian
`
`
` Community, 369 U. S., at 51. As a consequence, the claims
`of Alaska Natives to Alaskan land remained largely unset-
`tled even following Alaska’s admission to the Union as our
`49th State in 1959.1 See Alaska Statehood Act, §4, 72 Stat.
`339; Sturgeon, 577 U. S., at 429.
`That changed in 1971 with the Alaska Native Claims Set-
`
`tlement Act (ANCSA). 85 Stat. 688, 43 U. S. C. §1601
`
`et seq. ANCSA officially dispensed with the idea of recreat-
`ing in Alaska the system of reservations that prevailed in
`the lower 48 States. It extinguished Alaska Natives’ claims
`to land and hunting rights and revoked all but one of
`Alaska’s existing reservations. §1610. In exchange, “Con-
`gress authorized the transfer of $962.5 million in state and
`federal funds and approximately 44 million acres of Alaska
`land to state-chartered private business corporations that
`were to be formed pursuant to” ANCSA. Native Village of
`
`Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U. S., at 524. These corpo-
`rations are called ANCs.
`Relevant here, ANCs come in two varieties: regional
`
`ANCs and village ANCs. To form the regional ANCs, the
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`Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to divide Alaska
`
`into 12 geographic regions. §1606(a). Within each region,
`——————
` 1There were some exceptions. Congress created by statute two Alaska
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`Native reservations: the Annette Islands Reserve in 1891 and the
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` Klukwan Reserve in 1957. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, §15, 26 Stat. 1101;
`Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. 85–271, 71 Stat. 596. Under the 1936
`
`
` Amendment to the Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 254, 49 Stat. 1250, six
`further reservations were formed. See Letter from T. Sansonetti, Solici-
`
`
` tor of the U. S. Dept. of Interior, to M. Lujan, Jr., Secretary of Interior 33
`
` (Jan. 11, 1993). Alaska also saw the creation of certain “executive order
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`reserves,” which were more limited in purpose and scope and, like all
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`reserves in Alaska besides the Annette Islands Reserve, were ultimately
`revoked by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). See gen-
`
`
`erally D. Case & D. Voluck, Alaska Natives and Americans Laws 85–112
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`(3d ed. 2012).
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`4
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`
` YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
`RESERVATION
`Opinion of the Court
`Alaska Natives were instructed to “incorporate under the
`
`laws of Alaska a Regional Corporation to conduct business
`for profit.” §1606(d). To form the village ANCs, the Act
`identified approximately 200 Alaska “Native villages,” a
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`term encompassing any community of 25 or more Alaska
`
`Natives living together as of the 1970 census. §§1602(c),
`1610(b), 1615(a). For each Alaska Native village, ANCSA
`
`ordered the “Native residents” to create an accompanying
`village corporation to “hold, invest, manage and/or distrib-
`ute lands, property, funds, and other rights and assets for
`and on behalf ” of the village. §§1602(j), 1607(a). ANCSA
`
`
`then directed the Secretary to prepare a roll showing the
`region and, if applicable, village to which each living Alaska
`Native belonged. §1604. Enrolled Alaska Natives then re-
`ceived shares in their respective ANCs. §§1606(g), 1607.
`B
`
`
`In 1975, four years after ANCSA’s enactment, Congress
`passed ISDA. 25 U. S. C. §5301 et seq. ISDA answered the
`call for a “new national policy” of “autonomy” and “control”
`for Native Americans and Alaska Natives. H. R. Doc. No.
`
`91–363, p. 3 (1970); see also Menominee Tribe of Wis. v.
`United States, 577 U. S. 250, 252 (2016) (“Congress enacted
`[ISDA] in 1975 to help Indian tribes assume responsibility
`for aid programs that benefit their members”).
`
`ISDA decentralized the provision of federal Indian bene-
`
`fits away from the Federal Government and toward Native
`American and Alaska Native organizations. ISDA allows
`any “Indian tribe” to request that the Secretary of the Inte-
`
`rior enter into a self-determination contract with a desig-
`nated “tribal organization.” §5321(a)(1). Under such a con-
`
`tract, the tribal organization delivers federally funded
`economic, infrastructure, health, or education benefits to
`the tribe’s membership.
`
`As originally drafted, ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition did
`not mention ANCs. H. R. 6372, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §1(a)
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`(1973) (defining “Indian tribe” to mean “an Indian tribe,
`
`band, nation, or Alaska Native Community for which the
`Federal Government provides special programs and ser-
`vices because of its Indian identity”). Prior to passage, how-
`ever, the definition was amended twice to include, first,
`Alaska Native villages and, second, ANCs. See H. R. Rep.
`
`No. 93–1600, p. 14 (1974) (“The Subcommittee amended the
`definition of ‘Indian tribe’ to include regional and village
`corporations established by [ANCSA]”). Today, ISDA de-
`fines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation,
`or other organized group or community, including any
`
`Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as
`
`defined in or established pursuant to [ANCSA], which is
`
`recognized as eligible for the special programs and services
`provided by the United States to Indians because of their
`
`status as Indians.” §5304(e).2
`
`Despite the express inclusion of ANCs in the definition of
`
`“Indian tribe,” a question arose in the Interior Department
`whether the “recognized-as-eligible clause” limits the defi-
`nition to “federally recognized tribes” only. A federally rec-
`ognized tribe is one that has entered into “a government-to-
`
`government relationship [with] the United States.” 1 F.
`Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law §3.02[3] (N. New-
`
`ton ed. 2012). This recognition can come in a number of
`ways: “from treaty, statute, executive or administrative or-
`
`der, or from a course of dealing with the tribe as a political
`entity.” W. Canby, American Indian Law in a Nutshell 4
`(7th ed. 2020). As private companies incorporated under
`
`state law, ANCs have never been “recognized” by the
`
`United States in this sovereign political sense.
`
`In 1976, the year after ISDA’s enactment, the Interior
`Department’s Assistant Solicitor for Indian Affairs issued a
`——————
`2In 1990, Congress made “technical corrections” to ISDA. S. Rep. No.
`
` 101–226, p. 10 (1989). Relevant here, Congress inserted a comma after
`the “Indian tribe” definition’s reference to ANCSA, bringing the defini-
`
` tion to what it is today. Act of May 24, 1990, §2(a)(1), 104 Stat. 206.
`
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`
`6
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`
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`
` YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
`RESERVATION
`Opinion of the Court
`memorandum on the status of ANCs under ISDA. App. 44–
`48. In the Assistant Solicitor’s view, the express inclusion
`
`of ANCs within the definition of “Indian tribe” confirmed
`
`that ANCs are Indian tribes under ISDA, even though they
`are not federally recognized tribes. In the decades since,
`the Interior Department has repeatedly reaffirmed that po-
`sition. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 9250 (1995) (ANCs “ha[ve]
`been designated as ‘tribes’ for the purposes of some Federal
`
`laws,” including ISDA); 58 Fed. Reg. 54364 (1993) (ANCs
`“are not governments, but they have been designated as
`
`‘tribes’ for the purposes of ” ISDA); 53 Fed. Reg. 52833
`
`
`(1988) (ISDA “specifically include[s]” ANCs).
`C
`
`In 2020, Congress incorporated ISDA’s “Indian tribe” def-
`inition into the CARES Act. 42 U. S. C. §801(g)(1). Title V
`
`of the Act allocates $150 billion to “States, Tribal govern-
`ments, and units of local government” to compensate for un-
`
`budgeted expenditures made in response to COVID–19.
`§801(a)(1). Of that $150 billion, $8 billion is reserved for
`“Tribal governments.” §801(a)(2)(B). A “Tribal govern-
`ment” is the “recognized governing body of an Indian Tribe,”
`as ISDA defines the latter term. §§801(g)(5), (1).
`
`On April 23, 2020, the Treasury Department determined
`
`that ANCs are eligible for CARES Act relief, and set aside
`more than $500 million for them (since reduced to approxi-
`mately $450 million). App. 53–54; Letter from E. Prelogar,
`
`Acting Solicitor General, to S. Harris, Clerk of Court (May
`12, 2021). Soon after the Treasury Department’s announce-
`
`ment, a number of federally recognized tribes (respondents)
`sued, arguing that only federally recognized tribes are In-
`
`dian tribes under ISDA, and thus under the CARES Act.
`Some Tribes further argued that ANCs do not have a “rec-
`
`ognized governing body” for purposes of the CARES Act and
`
`are ineligible to receive its funding for that reason as well.
`
`
`The suits were consolidated in the District Court for the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
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`
`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`District of Columbia, which ultimately entered summary
`
`judgment for the Treasury Department and the ANCs. The
`Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit re-
`
`versed. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation v.
`
`Mnuchin, 976 F. 3d 15 (2020). In its view, the recognized-
`as-eligible clause is a term of art requiring any Indian tribe
`
`to be a federally recognized tribe. Because no ANC is fed-
`erally recognized, the court reasoned, no ANC qualifies for
`funding under Title V of the CARES Act. In so holding, the
`D. C. Circuit split with the Ninth Circuit, which had held
`decades prior in Cook Inlet Native Assn. v. Bowen, 810 F. 2d
`1471 (1987), that ANCs are Indian tribes for ISDA pur-
`poses, regardless of whether they have been federally rec-
`ognized. Id., at 1474.
`
`We granted certiorari, 592 U. S. ___ (2021), to resolve the
`Circuit split and determine whether ANCs are eligible for
`the CARES Act funding set aside by the Treasury Depart-
`ment.
`
`
`II
`
`
`All but one of the respondent Tribes agree that ANCs are
`eligible to receive the CARES Act funds in question if they
`are Indian tribes for purposes of ISDA.3 The primary ques-
`tion for the Court, then, is whether ANCs satisfy ISDA’s
`definition of “Indian tribe.” The ANCs ask the Court to an-
`swer that question by looking to the definition’s plain mean-
`ing. Respondents ask the Court to adopt a term-of-art con-
`struction that equates being “recognized as eligible for the
`special programs and services provided by the United
`
`States to Indians” with being a “federally recognized tribe,”
`i.e., a tribe recognized by the United States in a sovereign
`
`
`political sense.
`
`——————
` 3The Court addresses the arguments of that one Tribe in Part III, in-
`fra.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
`RESERVATION
`Opinion of the Court
`A
`
`Starting with the plain meaning, an “Indian tribe” under
`ISDA is a “tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or
`community, including any Alaska Native village or regional
`or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant
`to [ANCSA], which is recognized as eligible for the special
`programs and services provided by the United States to In-
`dians because of their status as Indians.” 25 U. S. C.
`§5304(e). The definition’s first two clauses are straightfor-
`
`ward enough. The first lists entities that might count as
`
`Indian tribes under the Act (e.g., tribes, bands, nations).
`
`The second, “the Alaska clause,” makes clear that Alaska
`Native villages and ANCs are “includ[ed].” The third, “the
`recognized-as-eligible clause,” requires more analysis. Ac-
`cording to that clause, the listed entities must be “recog-
`nized as eligible for the special programs and services pro-
`vided by the United States to Indians because of their
`status as Indians.”
`
`ANCs, of course, are “established pursuant to” ANCSA
`
`within the meaning of the Alaska clause. They are thereby
`
`“recognized as eligible” for ANCSA’s benefits. The trickier
`question is whether eligibility for the benefits of ANCSA
`
`counts as eligibility for “the special programs and services
`provided by the United States to Indians because of their
`status as Indians.”
`
`
`It does. Contrary to the dissent’s view, post, at 9–10
`(opinion of GORSUCH, J.), ANCSA is readily described as a
`special program provided by the United States to “Indians”
`(in this case, Alaska Natives). See 43 U. S. C. §1626 (de-
`scribing ANCSA’s relationship to “other programs”). The
`
`scope of that program is substantial: ANCSA made ANCs
`eligible to select tens of millions of acres of land and receive
`
`
`hundreds of millions of tax-exempt dollars. §§1605, 1610,
`1611. Not just a one-time payment, ANCSA provides for
`revenue sharing among the regional ANCs to ensure Alaska
`
`Natives across the State benefit from an ongoing equitable
`
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`distribution of ANC profits. §1606(i). ANCSA further en-
`trusts ANCs to “hold, invest, manage and/or distribute
`lands, property, funds, and other rights and assets for and
`on behalf ” of Alaska Natives, who are the ANCs’ sharehold-
`
`
`ers, as well as to distribute dividends to them. See
`
`§§1602(j), 1606(j). Moreover, ANCs and their shareholders
`are “eligible for the benefits of ” ANCSA, §1606(d), precisely
`
`
`because of their status as Indians. See §1626(e)(1) (“For all
`purposes of Federal law, a Native Corporation shall be con-
`sidered to be a corporation owned and controlled by Na-
`tives”); note following §1601, p. 1136 (ANCSA is “‘Indian
`legislation enacted by Congress pursuant to its plenary au-
`thority under the Constitution of the United States to reg-
`
`ulate Indian affairs’”).
`
`
`Respondents do not deny that the benefits of ANCSA are
`“a” special program or service provided by the United States
`to Indians. According to respondents, however, such bene-
`fits are not “the” special programs and services provided to
`Indians (e.g., healthcare, education, and other social ser-
`vices provided by federal agencies like the Bureau of Indian
`Affairs and the Indian Health Service). “The” special pro-
`grams and services, respondents assert, are available only
`to federally recognized tribes (or, more precisely, to mem-
`
`bers of such tribes). In respondents’ view, ANCs are thus
`“includ[ed]” in the “Indian tribe” definition’s Alaska clause
`
`only to be excluded en masse from that definition by the
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`recognized-as-eligible clause.
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`That would certainly be an odd result. Fortunately, the
`text does not produce it. ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition
`
`does not specify the particular programs and services an
`
`
`entity must be eligible for to satisfy the recognized-as-
`eligible clause. Given that ANCSA is the only statute the
`
`“Indian tribe” definition mentions by name, the best read-
`ing of the definition is that being eligible for ANCSA’s ben-
`
`efits by itself satisfies the recognized-as-eligible clause.
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`YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
`RESERVATION
`Opinion of the Court
`Consider a similarly worded example. A doctor recom-
`
`mends getting a blood test every six months to “any child,
`adult, or senior, including anyone over the age of 75 whose
`blood-sugar levels have tested in the prediabetic range
`
`within the last five years, who exhibits the warning signs
`of Type 2 diabetes.” Without further context, it is unclear
`
`exactly which warning signs the doctor is referring to, or
`
`how many of those signs a child, adult, or senior must ex-
`hibit before warranting biannual testing. But it is fair to
`
`say that individuals over 75 with prediabetic blood-sugar
`levels within the last five years should get tested biannu-
`ally, even if they exhibit no other warning signs. By ex-
`pressly “including” individuals with that one warning sign,
`the doctor’s recommendation makes clear that particular
`
`sign, by itself, is warning enough.
`Just so here: Congress’ express inclusion of ANCs “estab-
`
`lished pursuant to [ANCSA]” confirms that eligibility for
`ANCSA’s benefits alone is eligibility enough to be an Indian
`tribe. ANCs thus satisfy ISDA’s Indian tribe definition, re-
`gardless of whether they and their shareholders are eligible
`
`for federal Indian programs and services other than those
`provided in ANCSA. At any rate, the one-to-one relation-
`ship respondents posit between membership in a federally
`recognized tribe and eligibility for federal Indian benefits
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`more broadly does not hold in the unique circumstances of
`Alaska. See Letter from E. Prelogar, Acting Solicitor Gen-
`eral, to S. Harris, Clerk of Court (Apr. 22, 2021) (“[T]he fed-
`eral government has historically provided benefits and ser-
`
`vices to Alaska Natives who are not enrolled members of a
`
`federally recognized Indian tribe”); D. Case & D. Voluck,
`Alaska Natives and Americans Laws 30 (3d ed. 2012)
`(“[T]he federal government has, at least since the end of the
`nineteenth century, provided a wide variety of programs
`
`and services to Alaska Natives solely because of their status
`
` as Natives”). So ANCSA is not, in fact, the only federal In-
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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
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`Opinion of the Court
`dian program or service for which ANCs and their share-
`
`holders are eligible.
`
`
`It should come as no surprise that Congress made ANCs
`
`eligible to contract under ISDA. After all, Congress itself
`
`created ANCs just four years earlier to receive the benefits
`of the Alaska land settlement on behalf of all Alaska Na-
`tives. Allowing ANCs to distribute federal Indian benefits
`more broadly is entirely consistent with the approach Con-
`gress charted in ANCSA. Accord, 1 American Indian Policy
`Review Comm’n, Final Report, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 495
`(Comm. Print 1977) (ANCs “might well be the form or or-
`
`ganization best suited to sponsor certain kinds of federally
`funded programs” in Alaska); 43 U. S. C. §1606(r) (“The au-
`thority of a Native Corporation to provide benefits . . . to
`promote the health, education, or welfare of . . . sharehold-
`ers or family members is expressly authorized and con-
`firmed”).
`
`Under the plain meaning of ISDA, ANCs are Indian
`tribes, regardless of whether they are also federally recog-
`nized tribes. In so holding, the Court does not open the door
`to other Indian groups that have not been federally recog-
`
`nized becoming Indian tribes under ISDA. Even if such
`groups qualify for certain federal benefits, that does not
`make them similarly situated to ANCs. ANCs are sui gen-
`eris entities created by federal statute and granted an enor-
`mous amount of special federal benefits as part of a legisla-
`tive experiment tailored to the unique circumstances of
`Alaska and recreated nowhere else. Moreover, with the ex-
`ception of Alaska Native villages (which are now federally
`
`recognized), no entities other than ANCs are expressly “in-
`
`clud[ed]” by name in ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition. Cf.
`Sturgeon, 577 U. S., at 440 (“All those Alaska-specific pro-
`visions reflect the simple truth that Alaska is often the ex-
`ception, not the rule”).
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` YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS
`RESERVATION
`Opinion of the Court
`B
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`Respondents urge this Court to discard the plain mean-
`
`ing of the “Indian tribe” definition in favor of a term-of-art
`construction. In respondents’ view, the 69 words of the “In-
`dian tribe” definition are a long way of saying just 8: An
`“Indian tribe” means a “federally recognized tribe.” If that
`
`is right, respondents are correct that ANCs are not Indian
`tribes, because everyone agrees they are not federally rec-
`
`ognized tribes. To prevail on this argument, however, re-
`
`spondents must demonstrate that the statutory context
`
`supports reading ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition as a term
`of art rather than according to its plain meaning. See John-
`
`son v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, 139 (2010). Their efforts
`are not persuasive.
`
`In arguing for a term-of-art construction, respondents
`first rely on a series of Acts that terminated various tribes
`starting in the late 1950s. Those Acts closed tribal mem-
`bership rolls, specified the division of tribal assets, and re-
`voked tribal constitutions. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 21, 1959,
`
`Pub. L. No. 86–322, 73 Stat. 592. Following termination,
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`the tribe and its members were no longer “entitled to any of
`the special services performed by the United States for In-
`
`dians because of their status as Indians.” §5, id., at 593. As
`
`respondents note, this language resembles (although does
`not mirror precisely) the final words of ISDA’s recognized-
`as-eligible clause. If being terminated means no longer be-
`ing “entitled to any of the special services performed by the
`United States for Indians because of their status as Indi-
`ans,” the argument goes, then being “recognized as eligible
`
`for the special programs and services provided by the
`United States to Indians because of their status as Indians”
`means being a federally recognized tribe.
`
`Respondents misjudge the relevance of these termination
`statutes. Those statutes do not contain the words “recog-
`nized as eligible”; they do not even contain the word “recog-
`
`nized.” Furthermore, the termination statutes use their
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`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
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`Opinion of the Court
`ISDA-reminiscent phrasing not as a synonym for termina-
`
`tion but to describe just one, among other, consequences of
`
`a tribe’s constitution being revoked. See, e.g., ibid. (“The
`constitution of the tribe . . . shall be revoked by the Secre-
`tary. Thereafter, the tribe and its members shall not be
`entitled to any of the special services performed by the
`United States for Indians because of their status as Indi-
`ans, all statutes of the United States that affect Indians be-
`
`cause of their status as Indians shall be inapplicable to
`them, and the laws of the several States shall apply to them
`
`in the same manner they apply to other persons or citizens
`within their jurisdiction”).
`
`Some linguistic similarity between ISDA and the termi-
`
`nation statutes does not suggest that the language of the
`recognized-as-eligible clause was an accepted way of saying
`“a federally recognized tribe”