`
`
`
`In The
`Supreme Court of the United States
`___________
`
`MONSANTO COMPANY,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`
`v.
`
`
`ALBERTA PILLIOD AND ALVA PILLIOD,
`
`Respondents.
`___________
`
`On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
`Court of Appeal of California
`___________
`
`BRIEF OF WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION
`AND ALLIED EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION AS
`AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
`___________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`John M. Masslon II
` Counsel of Record
`Cory L. Andrews
`WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION
`2009 Massachusetts Ave. NW
`Washington, DC 20036
`(202) 588-0302
`jmasslon@wlf.org
`
`
`April 19, 2022
`
`
`
`
`
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED
`
`1. Whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
`
`and Rodenticide Act preempts state-law failure-to-
`warn claims where the warning cannot be added to a
`product without Environmental Protection Agency
`approval and EPA has repeatedly rejected the
`warning.
`
`2. Whether a punitive-damages award that is
`
`four times a substantial compensatory-damages
`award violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
`Process Clause when the defendant acted reasonably.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................................... i
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................. iv
`
`INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE .......................... 1
`
`INTRODUCTION ................................................... 2
`
`STATEMENT .......................................................... 3
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................. 5
`
`ARGUMENT ........................................................... 7
`
`I. WHETHER STATE-LAW FAILURE-TO-WARN
`CLAIMS OVER GLYPHOSATE ARE PREEMPTED
`BY FIFRA IS AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL
`IMPORTANCE ...................................................... 7
`
`A. The Process For Listing Glyphosate
`As Dangerous To Humans Was
`Unscientific Rent Seeking ..................... 7
`
`B. Companies Will Not Invest In
`Pesticides If They Will Face Liability
`For Complying With Federal Law ....... 12
`
`II. THIS CASE COULD RESOLVE UNCERTAINTY
`ABOUT IMPLIED PREEMPTION IN OTHER
`AREAS .............................................................. 14
`
`III. REVIEW IS NEEDED TO CLARIFY THE LIMITS
`ON PUNITIVE-DAMAGES AWARDS ..................... 15
`
`CONCLUSION ...................................................... 19
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`A.Y. v. Janssen Pharms. Inc.,
`224 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2019) ........................... 15
`
`Bach v. First Union Nat. Bank,
`486 F.3d 150 (6th Cir. 2007) ............................ 16
`
`Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
`544 U.S. 431 (2005) ............................................ 4
`
`BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
`517 U.S. 559 (1996) .......................................... 15
`
`Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
`Ct. of Cal., S.F. Cnty.,
`137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) ........................................ 7
`
`Byrd v. Janssen Pharm., Inc.,
`333 F. Supp. 3d 111 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) ........ 14, 15
`
`Cote v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
`985 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 2021) .......................... 16
`
`DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,
`577 U.S. 47 (2015) .............................................. 7
`
`Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
`554 U.S. 471 (2008) .................................... 17, 18
`
`Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,
`512 U.S. 415 (1994) .......................................... 15
`
`Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
`674 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2012) ........................ 16
`
`Merck Sharp & Dohme
`Corp. v. Albrecht,
`139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019) ...................................... 14
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` v
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
` Page(s)
`
`Monsanto Co. v. Off. of Env’t
`Health Hazard Assessment,
`22 Cal. App. 5th 534 (2018) ............................... 1
`
`PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,
`564 U.S. 604 (2011) .......................................... 14
`
`Saccameno v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,
`943 F.3d 1071 (7th Cir. 2019) .......................... 16
`
`State Farm Mut. Auto.
`Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
`538 U.S. 408 (2003) .............................. 15, 16, 17
`
`Wyeth v. Levine,
`555 U.S. 555 (2009) .......................................... 14
`
`Constitutional Provision
`
`U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2 ............................................ 7
`
`Statutes
`
`7 U.S.C.
`§136a(a) .............................................................. 4
`§136a(c) .............................................................. 4
`§ 136a(c)(1) ......................................................... 4
`§ 136j(a)(1)(B)..................................................... 4
`
`Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 25249.6 ......................... 3
`
`Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 25249.8(a) ..................... 3
`
`Cal. Labor Code § 6382(b)(1) .................................. 3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
` Page(s)
`
`Regulations
`
`21 C.F.R.
`§ 201.57(a)(6) .................................................... 15
`§ 201.57(a)(7) .................................................... 15
`§ 201.57(a)(10) .................................................. 15
`§ 201.57(a)(11) .................................................. 15
`§ 201.57(c)(2)(ii) ............................................... 15
`
`40 C.F.R.
`§ 156.10(a)(1)(vii) ............................................... 4
`§ 156.60 .............................................................. 4
`§ 158.500 ............................................................ 4
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Ben Webster, Weedkiller Scientist Was
`Paid £120,000 by Cancer Lawyers,
`Times of London (Oct. 18, 2017) ...................... 10
`
`Claire C. Weglarz, Unsound Expansion
`of Strict Liability Failure to Warn in
`California: Johnson v. Monsanto
`Co., WLF LEGAL OPINION LETTER
`(July 9, 2021)...................................................... 1
`
`EPA, Glyphosate .................................................. 8, 9
`
`Improved Management of Herbicides in
`Conservation Agriculture Systems
`Using Nuclear Techniques, Int’l
`Atomic Energy Agency .................................... 13
`
`Jill Wieber Lens, Procedural Due
`Process and Predictable Punitive
`Damage Awards,
`2012 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2012) ........................... 17
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`vii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
` Page(s)
`
`Kate Kelland, Cancer Agency Left in the
`Dark over Glyphosate Evidence,
`Reuters (June 14, 2017) ................................... 11
`
`Laura J. Hines & N. William Hines,
`Constitutional Constraints on
`Punitive Damages: Clarity,
`Consistency, and the
`Outlier Dilemma,
`66 Hastings L.J. 1257 (2015) ........................... 17
`
`Pesticides and food safety, Government
`of Canada (Jan. 18, 2021) ................................ 13
`
`Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E.
`Appel, Roundup Cases May Be a
`New Example of an Old Problem:
`The Post Hoc Fallacy, WLF LEGAL
`BACKGROUNDER (Aug. 9, 2019) .......................... 1
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 1
`
`INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE*
`
`Washington Legal Foundation is a nonprofit,
`public-interest law firm and policy center with
`supporters nationwide. WLF
`promotes
`free
`enterprise, individual rights, limited government,
`and the rule of law. It often appears as amicus curiae
`in cases about California’s Proposition 65. See, e.g.,
`Nat’l Assoc. of Wheat Growers v. Bonta, No. 20-16758
`(9th Cir. brief filed May 19, 2021); Monsanto Co. v.
`Off. of Env’t Health Hazard Assessment, 22 Cal. App.
`5th 534 (2018).
`
`WLF’s Legal Studies Division also regularly
`publishes pieces by outside experts on glyphosate.
`See, e.g., Claire C. Weglarz, Unsound Expansion of
`Strict Liability Failure to Warn in California:
`Johnson v. Monsanto Co., WLF LEGAL OPINION
`LETTER (July 9, 2021); Victor E. Schwartz &
`Christopher E. Appel, Roundup Cases May Be a New
`Example of an Old Problem: The Post Hoc Fallacy,
`WLF LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Aug. 9, 2019).
`
`Allied Educational Foundation is a nonprofit
`charitable and educational foundation based in
`Tenafly, New Jersey. Founded in 1964, AEF promotes
`education in diverse areas of study, including law and
`public policy. It has appeared as amicus often in this
`Court.
`
`
`
`* No party’s counsel authored any part of this brief. No
`person or entity, other than amici and their counsel, paid for the
`brief’s preparation or submission. After timely notice, all parties
`consented to amici’s filing this brief.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 2
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Recently, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
`and Northern Ireland withdrew from the European
`Union. Brexit was controversial both in England and
`abroad. But after a nationwide referendum and
`multiple general elections, the British people spoke
`loudly in support of leaving the EU.
`
`The rallying cry behind Brexit was a feeling
`that Britain was no longer making key policy
`decisions for its citizens. Rather than resulting from
`the British Parliament’s own deliberations, decisions
`affecting Brits were being made by Brussels. And the
`European Parliament made decisions binding Britain
`using European analysis based on European
`interests.
`
`This case presents a similar issue. Americans’
`elected representatives gave the Environmental
`Protection Agency authority over pesticides. EPA
`makes decisions based on its well-funded research
`that focuses on what is best for Americans. This, of
`course, is a regulation of commerce between the
`several States and foreign nations.
`
`Under the Supremacy Clause, the States
`cannot overrule this federal policy decision. But that
`has never stopped California from passing laws that
`are both expressly and conflict preempted by federal
`law. California enacted Proposition 65 and allowed
`others around the world to decide what poses a risk to
`Americans. Activists exploited this legislation to
`achieve their policy goals using civil litigation.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 3
`
` Realizing that any researcher following the
`scientific method would find glyphosate poses no risk
`to humans, activists built in multiple backup plans. A
`substance is covered by Prop 65 if only one of a
`smorgasbord of alphabet-soup agencies finds it
`potentially harmful to humans.
`
`in
`This has caused dire consequences
`California. Companies are placed in the impossible
`position of either ignoring federal law or facing
`massive liability for not following California law.
`After massive judgments in these cases, California
`piles on more by allowing juries to impose outsized
`punitive damages awards that violate the Fourteenth
`Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Enough is enough.
`This Court’s intervention is necessary, yet again, to
`remind California that it too is bound by federal law.
`
`
`STATEMENT
`
`
`Adopted by California voters in 1986, Prop 65
`provides that “[n]o person in the course of doing
`business shall knowingly and intentionally expose
`any individual to a chemical known to the state to
`cause cancer * * * without first giving clear and
`reasonable warning to such individual.” Cal. Health
`& Saf. Code § 25249.6. The State publishes a list of
`chemicals “known to the state” to cause cancer. Id.
`§ 25249.8(a). That list must include any substance
`identified as a potential carcinogen in experimental
`animals by the International Agency for Research on
`Cancer. See Cal. Labor Code § 6382(b)(1); Cal. Health
`& Saf. Code § 25249.8(a). All products including a
`detectable amount of one of the listed chemicals must
`include the warning. See Cal. Health & Saf. Code
`§ 25249.6.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 4
`
`But state law is not the final word on labeling
`pesticides. Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
`and Rodenticide Act, companies must register a
`pesticide before selling it in the United States. 7
`U.S.C. § 136a(a). The registration must include
`proposed labeling with any health warnings. E.g., id.
`§ 136a(c); 40 C.F.R. §§ 156.10(a)(1)(vii), 156.60,
`158.500. After EPA approves a label, it may not be
`altered without EPA approval. See Bates v. Dow
`Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 438 (2005); 7 U.S.C.
`§§ 136a(c)(1), 136j(a)(1)(B). This means that a
`company cannot include a Prop 65 warning on a
`pesticide without EPA approval.
`
`From the early 1980s until the early 2010s,
`Respondents used Roundup on their property. After
`being diagnosed with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, they
`sued Monsanto claiming that Roundup caused their
`non-Hodgkin’s
`lymphoma because
`it
`contains
`glyphosate.
`
`After the Superior Court refused to recognize
`that federal law preempted Respondents’ claims, the
`case went to trial. A jury awarded them over $54
`million in compensatory damages and $2 billion in
`punitive damages. The trial court reduced that
`amount to about $18 million in compensatory
`damages and $69 million in punitive damages.
`
`Monsanto appealed to the California Court of
`Appeal. As it has repeatedly done, that court held that
`federal law cannot preempt California’s labeling
`requirements. Pet. App. 30a. In its view, FIFRA
`cannot impliedly preempt a state law. See id. Then,
`ignoring the decisions of several federal courts of
`appeals,
`the court held
`that a punitive
`to
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 5
`
`compensatory damages ratio of 4:1 is permissible—
`even when compensatory damages are significant.
`Pet. App. 80a, 82a. Because the Supreme Court of
`California abdicated its responsibility to ensure that
`federal law is properly applied in the State, Pet. App.
`1a, Monsanto seeks certiorari.
`
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`
`I.A. Congress gave EPA the power to regulate
`pesticide labels and to decide what warnings are
`scientifically
`appropriate. EPA’s
`analysis
`of
`glyphosate shows that it poses no risk to humans.
`Unsurprisingly, every other reputable agency in the
`world to investigate the question has reached the
`same conclusion.
`
`The plaintiffs’ bar, however, found a loophole in
`Prop 65. Rather than allow the scientific agencies to
`review data unbiasedly, it got two moles onto one
`overseas agency. Relying on the same data that other
`groups—including California regulators—used to find
`no risk, the agency found that glyphosate may cause
`cancer in humans. So the warning that California
`requires is based on rent seeking—not science.
`
`B. Companies will face an impossible decision
`if the Court of Appeal’s decision stands. They must
`either follow federal law and subject themselves to
`billions of dollars in damages or add a warning and
`break federal law. Companies will act rationally and
`stop making pesticides and stop innovating. This will
`decrease food security both in the United States and
`abroad. In other words, people could starve if the
`decision remains.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 6
`
`II. State courts have recently abandoned this
`Court’s preemption
`jurisprudence. Rather than
`looking at whether the
`federal statutory and
`regulatory scheme impliedly preempt state laws,
`these state courts have held that States can impose
`any labeling requirements they want. This case gives
`the Court the chance to correct those errors and send
`a strong message about proper application of its
`preemption jurisprudence.
`
`III. This Court should also grant review to
`resolve a split among lower courts on how to apply its
`due-process precedents. The Court has said that when
`there
`is a substantial award of compensatory
`damages, the Due Process Clause may limit a
`punitive damages award to the amount of the
`compensatory award. Many courts have properly
`heeded this guidance. But the California Court of
`Appeal did not do so here.
`
`Capping the ratio of punitive damages to
`substantial compensatory damages at 1:1 ensures
`that parties know their risk of exposure. Rather than
`having to guess at potential punitive damages,
`companies would know that, when a damages award
`is substantial, they may be forced to pay only the
`same amount in punitive damages. This ensures
`compliance with the Due Process Clause.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 7
`
`I.
`
`
`
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`WHETHER STATE-LAW FAILURE-TO-WARN
`CLAIMS OVER GLYPHOSATE ARE PREEMPTED
`BY FIFRA IS AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL
`IMPORTANCE.
`
`The Constitution provides that when state law
`conflicts with federal law, federal law prevails. See
`U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. But the California courts treat
`this command as a mere suggestion. This Court often
`must reverse decisions from California because its
`courts allow state law to trump federal law. E.g.,
`Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., S.F.
`Cnty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); DIRECTV, Inc. v.
`Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47 (2015). The Court should once
`again step in and remind California that it too must
`play by the rules.
`
`A.
`
`The Process For Listing Glyphosate
`As Dangerous To Humans Was
`Unscientific Rent Seeking.
`
`
`One reason that Congress gave EPA the power
`to regulate pesticide labels is because of the agency’s
`scientific expertise. Rather than leave it up to state
`agencies, Congress found it necessary to nationalize
`the label-approval process. Yet under the Court of
`Appeal’s decision, each State can make its own
`decisions about pesticides. Even if that decision is
`based on zero scientific evidence, companies like
`Monsanto must
`comply with
`the
`labeling
`requirements. Allowing such state-level decisions
`eviscerates Congress’s policy goal of national
`uniformity for pesticide labeling.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 8
`
`1. IARC’s working group’s decision that
`glyphosate is a carcinogen is an outlier. No other
`scientific agency has reached the same conclusion. In
`fact, they all have reached the opposite conclusion;
`glyphosate poses no risk to humans. In 1997 and
`2007, the California Office of Environmental Health
`and Hazard Assessment determined that glyphosate
`is unlikely to pose a cancer hazard to humans. See
`Am. Pet., ¶ 35, Monsanto Co. v. Cal. Citrus Mut., 2017
`WL 3784249 (Cal. Super. Mar. 20, 2017) (No. 16-CE-
`CG-00183). These determinations were made after
`reviewing the same dataset that led the IARC to reach
`the opposite conclusion. Id. ¶ 36.
`
`So a California regulatory body found that
`glyphosate poses no risk to humans. But under Prop
`65, this determination means nothing if activists can
`persuade another agency to reach the opposite
`conclusion. Here, activists asked many agencies to
`find that glyphosate causes cancer. Most reached the
`same result that the California did. The German
`Federal Institute for Risk Assessment, European
`Food Safety Authority, Canadian Pest Management
`Regulatory
`Authority,
`and World Health
`Organization all have found no evidence that
`glyphosate harms humans. See Am. Pet., supra ¶¶ 37-
`48.
`
`is EPA’s
`importantly, however,
`Most
`conclusions about glyphosate. EPA found that there
`are “[n]o risks of concern to human health from
`current uses of glyphosate.” EPA, Glyphosate,
`https://bit.ly/38xdm3Q (last visited Apr. 18, 2022). If
`products like Roundup are “used according to label
`directions,” they “do not result in risks to children or
`adults.” Id.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` 9
`
`There is similarly “[no] indication that children
`are more sensitive to glyphosate.” EPA, supra. EPA
`reviewed “numerous studies from [many] sources”
`and “found no indication that children are more
`sensitive to glyphosate from in utero or post-natal
`exposure.” Id.
`
`After “undergo[ing] Tier I screening under
`EPA’s Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program,” EPA
`found “[n]o indication that glyphosate is an endocrine
`disruptor.” EPA, supra. In other words, “data do not
`indicate that glyphosate has the potential to interact
`with the estrogen, androgen or thyroid signaling
`path.” Id.
`
`More to the point, EPA found “[n]o evidence
`that glyphosate causes cancer in humans.” EPA,
`supra. When reaching this decision, it “considered a
`significantly more extensive and relevant dataset
`than” IARC. Id. EPA examined “studies submitted to
`support registration of glyphosate and studies EPA
`identified in the open literature.” Id.
`
`consistent with other
`“is
`finding
`This
`international
`expert
`panels
`and
`regulatory
`authorities.” EPA, supra. Along with those agencies
`listed above, others that have found glyphosate poses
`no risk to humans include the “New Zealand
`Environmental Protection Authority[] and the Food
`Safety Commission of Japan.” Id.
`
`2. Despite
`this overwhelming scientific
`evidence that glyphosate poses no risk to humans,
`IARC found that it is a carcinogen. How could such a
`supposedly expert agency veer so far off course? The
`answer is simple, unethical rent seeking.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`Christopher Portier played a leading role in
`IARC’s evaluation of glyphosate despite a severe
`financial conflict of interest. Before joining IARC,
`Portier was affiliated with the Environmental
`Defense Fund, which litigates against all use of
`pesticides. Although lacking any glyphosate expertise
`or experience, Portier chaired the IARC committee
`that proposed glyphosate as a substance to be studied
`by an IARC working group. He then served as a
`specialist and advisor to that working group.
`
`Portier did not disclose his financial ties to law
`firms that sued Monsanto for glyphosate’s alleged
`carcinogenicity. The same week that IARC listed
`glyphosate as a probable human carcinogen, Portier
`signed a lucrative consulting contract with two law
`firms, under which he assisted the firms with their
`glyphosate
`litigation. Portier soon made over
`$160,000. See Ben Webster, Weedkiller Scientist Was
`Paid £120,000 by Cancer Lawyers, Times of London
`(Oct. 18, 2017), https://bit.ly/3DJRXQv. Portier
`admitted that he had been hired by one of the law
`firms at least two months before the IARC issued its
`glyphosate determination. Id.
`
`Portier’s unethical rent seeking did not stop
`there. Later, he lobbied extensively for acceptance of
`the IARC’s determination by governmental bodies
`and for rejecting contrary findings by other scientific
`groups. When Portier engaged in such activities,
`however, he neglected to mention that he was on the
`plaintiffs’ bar’s payroll.
`
`Similarly troubling is the conduct of retired
`epidemiologist Aaron Blair, who led IARC’s review of
`glyphosate. Blair was aware of significant scientific
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`evidence showing that glyphosate is not a human
`carcinogen, yet he did not bring that evidence to the
`IARC working group’s attention. Kate Kelland,
`Cancer Agency Left in the Dark over Glyphosate
`Evidence, Reuters
`(June 14, 2017), https://
`reut.rs/370z8wf.
`
`One of the largest and best surveys of the
`effects of pesticide use on humans is the Agricultural
`Health Study, a study of about 89,000 American
`agricultural workers that has been gathering detailed
`health information for 25 years. Blair played a key
`role in a research study based on AHS data. In 2013,
`the researchers issued a draft report that concluded
`that glyphosate was not a human carcinogen. Yet
`when the final study was published, it omitted any
`discussion of glyphosate.
`
`Blair said that the glyphosate material was
`deleted from the published study “because there was
`too much to fit into one scientific paper.” Kelland,
`supra. But independent scientists who reviewed the
`draft study found no legitimate reason to exclude the
`glyphosate findings. Id. Blair conceded that the
`material exonerated glyphosate and would have
`affected IARC’s final determination had it been
`presented. Id. The material was never considered by
`the IARC working group, however, because Blair hid
`it. This suggests that Blair deliberately concealed his
`research findings—not the type of conduct one would
`expect from a scientist supervising a purportedly
`unbiased study of glyphosate.
`
`that
`shows
`scientific evidence
`the
`So
`glyphosate is not a carcinogen. Every reputable
`scientific body to examine the issue, including
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`California’s regulator and EPA, reached this result.
`The only contrary finding comes from a group that
`was
`infiltrated by the plaintiffs’ bar’s moles.
`Requiring a glyphosate warning thus undermines
`Congress’s goal of ensuring that pesticide labels
`present only
`information that
`is scientifically
`accurate. This causes consumers to pay less attention
`to the warnings on pesticide labels backed by rigorous
`scientific inquiry.
`
`B.
`
`Companies Will Not Invest In
`Pesticides
`If They Will Face
`Liability For Complying With
`Federal Law.
`
`
`If this Court declines to hear this appeal,
`immense consequences will follow. One of the main
`reasons that companies are willing to devote limited
`resources to developing and distributing pesticides is
`that they are protected from frivolous state-law
`claims. They understand that, under FIFRA and this
`Court’s precedent, state-law claims for adhering to
`EPA regulations are preempted by federal law. But if
`the Court of Appeal’s decision stands, this assurance
`will vanish. Companies will have to face the
`impossible choice of either complying with federal law
`or risking billions of dollars in state-law damages.
`
`When faced with potential liability that dwarfs
`possible profits, the companies may decide that the
`risks outweigh the rewards. This means companies
`will produce fewer effective pesticides. And fewer
`effective pesticides means less, and more expensive,
`food.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`“Pesticides play an important role in making
`sure there is enough food for everyone, by protecting
`crops from pests like insects, weeds, and fungal
`diseases.” Pesticides and food safety, Government of
`Canada (Jan. 18, 2021), https://bit.ly/3uhVOkq; see
`Improved Management of Herbicides in Conservation
`Agriculture Systems Using Nuclear Techniques, Int’l
`Atomic Energy Agency, https://bit.ly/3JfL3n3 (last
`visited Apr. 18, 2022) (“The use of herbicides is one of
`the potential
`factors
`that make agricultural
`intensification economically viable, hence improve
`food security.”). Glyphosate is one of the three most
`popular pesticides. See id.
`
`If companies must stop innovating and cannot
`use glyphosate for fear of failure-to-warn liability,
`farmers will have to use less-effective pesticides. That
`will lead to lower food yields. Then the laws of supply
`and demand will take over and food prices will rise.
`The poorest among us will be unable to put food on
`the table or will have to choose between medicine and
`food.
`
`
`Although this may appear to be a one-off
`decision, the lynchpin to our nation’s pesticide
`industry is the predictability of federal law. If a single
`state court can go off the rails and impose billions of
`dollars in costs, then companies must factor that into
`their cost-benefit analysis. Many may decide that the
`intolerable risk is not worth taking.
`
`So the legal problems with the Court of
`Appeal’s decision is not the only reason to grant
`review here. This case affects the wider pesticide
`industry. Blessing—through silence—the Court of
`Appeal’s opinion will discourage innovation. This
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`II.
`
`
`
`Court should not take that risk. Rather, it should hear
`this case and reaffirm the supremacy of federal law.
`
`THIS CASE COULD RESOLVE UNCERTAINTY
`ABOUT IMPLIED PREEMPTION IN OTHER
`AREAS.
`
`This case would clarify the scope of implied
`preemption under FIFRA. But it would also help
`clarify implied preemption in other areas too. State
`courts continue to incorrectly hold that federal laws
`do not impliedly preempt state laws about labeling—
`even when it is impossible to comply with both
`regulatory schemes. This case presents the Court
`with the opportunity to fix the problem.
`
`The Court of Appeal tried to distinguish this
`case from those under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
`Act. See Pet. App. 29a-30a. But as described in the
`Petition (at 16-17), the preemption analysis under
`FIFRA is virtually the same as that under the FDCA.
`So it comes as no surprise that a split is also present
`among lower courts about the breadth of preemption
`for drug labels. A failure-to-warn claim is preempted
`by the FDCA if (1) the warning could not have been
`added without prior FDA approval, PLIVA, Inc. v.
`Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 617-19 (2011), or (2) there is
`“clear evidence” that the FDA would not approve a
`warning required under state law. Merck Sharp &
`Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1672 (2019)
`(quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 571 (2009)).
`
`Some courts have properly applied the FDCA’s
`
`preemption claim by holding that, under the FDCA,
`drug companies cannot unilaterally change a drug’s
`label to warn of off-label uses. Byrd v. Janssen
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`Pharm., Inc., 333 F. Supp. 3d 111, 117, 120 (N.D.N.Y.
`2018); see 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.57(a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(10),
`(a)(11), (c)(2)(ii). But other courts have reached the
`opposite conclusion. In these courts’ views, state
`failure-to-warn claims for off-label use are not
`preempted by this statutory and regulatory structure.
`See, e.g., A.Y. v. Janssen Pharms. Inc., 224 A.3d 1, 17
`(Pa. Super. 2019).
`
`So this Court can clarify implied preemption
`under both FIFRA and the FDCA by granting the
`Petition. It should seize the day and give lower courts
`direction on how to apply the Court’s preemption
`precedent. The Court should not allow state courts to
`continue to ignore that precedent and permit failure-
`to-warn claims for labels regulated by federal
`agencies.
`
`
`III. REVIEW IS NEEDED TO CLARIFY THE LIMITS
`
`ON PUNITIVE-DAMAGES AWARDS.
`
`Many courts continue to ignore due-process
`limits on punitive damage awards, which were
`already “well established” two decades ago. State
`Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
`416 (2003). Ignoring due-process principles deprives
`defendants of their right to “fair notice * * * of the
`severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”
`BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)
`(citations omitted). This leads to an “arbitrary
`deprivation of property” by punitive damages bearing
`no relation to the plaintiffs’ injury. Honda Motor Co.
`v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994). The decision here
`is particularly egregious because it is based on junk
`science that EPA and almost every other scientific
`body in the world has rejected.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`16
`
`In State Farm, the Court said that “[w]hen
`compensatory damages are substantial,” a 1:1 ratio
`between
`compensatory damages and punitive
`damages may “reach the outermost limit of the due
`process guarantee.” 538 U.S. at 425. Some courts have
`disregarded this guidance as nonbinding “dicta.” E.g.,
`Cote v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 985 F.3d 840, 849
`(11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Other courts have
`taken this Court at its word and imposed a 1:1 limit
`on punitive damages when there is a substantial
`compensatory award. E.g., Saccameno v. U.S. Bank
`Nat’l Ass’n, 943 F.3d 1071, 1090 (7th Cir. 2019).
`
`Although the exact line of what is substantial
`is blurry, the judgment here meets any standard for a
`substantial award. For example, the Tenth Circuit
`has held that a $630,000 award is substantial. Jones
`v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1208 (10th
`Cir. 2012). In the Sixth Circuit, $400,000 suffices.
`Bach v. First Union Nat. Bank, 486 F.3d 150, 156 (6th
`Cir. 2007). The judgment here is 27 times the size of
`a substantial award in the Tenth Circuit and 42 times
`the size of a substantial award in the Sixth Circuit.
`So it qualifies as substantial under any test.
`
`B. Despite the Court’s prior reluctance to
`specify “a bright-line ratio,” State Farm, 538 U.S. at
`425, the Court should impose a firm 1:1 cap on the
`ratio of punitive to compensatory damages when
`compensatory damages are substantial. Such a cap
`would ensure that punitive damages bear some
`reasonable relationship to the harm and stay within
`constitutional bounds.
`
`Developments after State Farm show why the
`Court should draw a bright-line ratio for punitive
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`17
`
`damages to substantial compensatory damages.
`Despite hopes that State Farm would ensure
`defendants knew of their punitive-damage exposure,
`it
`did not
`“reduce
`the
`inconsistency
`or
`unpredictability of punitive damages awards.” Laura
`J. Hines & N. William Hines, Constitutional
`Constraints
`on Punitive Damages: Clarity,
`Consistency, and the Outlier Dilemma, 66 Hastings
`L.J. 1257, 1257 (2015).
`
`To solve the problem in maritime suits, the
`Court held that a 1:1 ratio was the maximum
`permissible punitive damages award after a $500
`million
`compensatory-damages
`award. Exxon
`Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 47