`No. 21-1338
`
`In the
`Supreme Court of the United States
`________________
`NSO GROUP TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED AND
`Q CYBER TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED,
`Petitioners,
`
`v.
`WHATSAPP INC. AND META PLATFORMS, INC.,
`Respondents.
`________________
`On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
`the United States Court of Appeals
`for the Ninth Circuit
`________________
`REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
`________________
`Joseph N. Akrotirianakis
`Jeffrey S. Bucholtz
`Aaron Craig
` Counsel of Record
`KING & SPALDING LLP
`Zachary W. Byer
`KING & SPALDING LLP
`1700 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
`633 W. 5th Street
`Washington, DC 20006
`Suite 1600
`(202) 737-0500
`jbucholtz@kslaw.com
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`Matthew V.H. Noller
`KING & SPALDING LLP
`50 California Street
`Suite 3300
`San Francisco, CA 94105
`Counsel for Petitioners
`
`
`May 16, 2022
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`Table of Authorities .................................................... ii
`Reply Brief for Petitioners ......................................... 1
`I. The Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with
`decisions from other circuits. .............................. 2
`II. This case is an ideal vehicle to resolve the
`important question presented. ............................ 5
`III. The decision below conflicts with Samantar. ... 11
`IV. The Court should consider inviting the
`Solicitor General’s views. .................................. 12
`Conclusion ................................................................. 13
`
`
`
`ii
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Boyle v. United Techs. Corp.,
`487 U.S. 500 (1988) .................................................. 5
`Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Muzin,
`12 F.4th 789 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ........................ 4, 5, 10
`Butters v. Vance Int’l, Inc.,
`225 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2000) .................................... 3
`Doğan v. Barak,
`932 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2019) .................................. 10
`Farhang v. Indian Inst. of Tech.,
`655 F. App’x 569 (9th Cir. 2016) ........................... 10
`Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp,
`141 S. Ct. 703 (2021) ................................................ 9
`Herbage v. Meese,
`747 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1990) ................................. 8
`In re KBR, Inc.,
`893 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2018) .................................... 5
`Ivey ex rel. Carolina Golf Dev. Co. v. Lynch,
`No. 17CV439, 2018 WL 3764264
`(M.D.N.C. Aug. 8, 2018) .......................................... 4
`Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc.,
`77 F.3d 1442 (4th Cir. 1996) .................................... 7
`Moriah v. Bank of China Ltd.,
`107 F. Supp. 3d 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ...................... 4
`Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
`457 U.S. 731 (1982) ................................................ 10
`
`
`
`iii
`
`Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc.
`v. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n,
`479 U.S. 1312 (1986) .............................................. 10
`Rishikof v. Mortada,
`70 F. Supp. 3d 8 (D.D.C. 2014) ................................ 8
`Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer,
`373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) .................................. 8
`Saleh v. Titan Corp.,
`580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ...................................... 5
`Samantar v. Yousuf,
`560 U.S. 305 (2010) .................................... 3, 7, 9, 11
`Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,
`507 U.S. 349 (1993) .................................................. 9
`Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia,
`370 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2004) .................................... 3
`Yousuf v. Samantar,
`699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012) .............................. 4, 10
`Statutes
`28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ................................................... 10
`28 U.S.C. § 1291 ....................................................... 10
`28 U.S.C. § 1603 ....................................................... 11
`Other Authorities
`1 Ved P. Nanda et al.,
`Litigation of International Disputes in
`U.S. Courts § 3:59 (updated Feb. 2022) .................. 4
`
`
`
`iv
`
`Brief for the United States as
`Amicus Curiae, Mutond v. Lewis,
`No. 19-185 (U.S. May 26, 2020),
`2020 WL 2866592 ................................................ 6, 9
`Brief for the United States as
`Amicus Curiae, Odhiambo
`v. Republic of Kenya, No. 14-1206
`(U.S. May 24, 2016), 2016 WL 2997336 .................. 6
`Statement of Interest,
`Rosenberg v. Lashkar-E-Taiba,
`No. 1:10-cv-05381
`(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2012), ECF 35 ........................... 9
`Statement of Interest,
`Matar v. Dichter, No. 05 Civ. 10270
`(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2006), ECF 36 ........................... 9
`U.S. Small Bus. Admin.,
`Become a Federal Contractor,
`https://bit.ly/39b6hq4 ............................................... 6
`
`
`
`
`
`REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
`In an attempted end-run around foreign sovereign
`immunity, Respondents sued a foreign government
`contractor as a proxy for the governments that use the
`contractor’s technology. C.A. ER 53, 96. In the Fourth
`or D.C. Circuits, the defendant could have sought
`common-law conduct-based immunity as an agent of
`foreign governments. But the Ninth Circuit created a
`split of authority by holding that, unlike private
`individuals, entities can receive immunity only if they
`are components of a “foreign state” under the Foreign
`Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”)—leaving private
`entities that serve the same functions as government-
`owned entities categorically ineligible for immunity.
`App. 12, 17-19.
`That decision, which conflicts with this Court’s
`precedent, is dangerously wrong. Precluding private
`entities from seeking common-law conduct-based
`immunity will not merely hinder foreign governments
`from contracting with private entities. It also will
`impede the United States’ ability to protect its
`national security, because the government relies
`heavily on private contractors to provide the
`technology and expertise necessary to defend the
`nation against foreign and domestic threats. This
`Court’s intervention is imperative.
`To distract from the circuit split and the drastic
`consequences
`created by
`the decision below,
`Respondents point—over and over again—to the fact
`that NSO is on the Commerce Department’s Entity
`List. But NSO’s petition presents a pure legal
`question: Does common-law immunity for private
`entities survive the FSIA? The decision below is
`
`
`
`2
`
`absolute in precluding entities from invoking common-
`law immunity regardless of the nature of their work
`as government agents: “If an entity does not fall
`within the [FSIA’s] definition of ‘foreign state,’ it
`cannot claim foreign sovereign immunity. Period.”
`App. 12. Given that absolute, threshold holding,
`NSO’s petition asks the Court only to decide whether
`the common law governs NSO’s claim of immunity—
`not to apply the common law and decide, in the first
`instance, the merits of NSO’s claim. The Ninth
`Circuit’s holding covers every government contractor
`providing humanitarian aid, life-saving medical care,
`or military support. In the Ninth Circuit, a foreign
`contractor providing any of these services would be
`just as ineligible as NSO to seek common-law
`immunity. And if foreign courts follow that precedent,
`U.S. companies that supply technology, armaments,
`and other essential supplies to the United States will
`be equally exposed to litigation around the world.
`If anything, Respondents’ reliance on the Entity
`List confirms that the Court, if it does not grant the
`petition outright, should request
`the Solicitor
`General’s views. Respondents ask this Court to defer
`to their own guesses about what the government
`thinks, but the better course is for the Court to invite
`the government to speak for itself. The question
`presented is too important to start and stop with
`Respondents’ speculation.
`I. The Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with
`decisions from other circuits.
`Until the Ninth Circuit’s decision, no court had
`held that the FSIA forbids a private entity from
`seeking common-law conduct-based immunity. To the
`
`
`
`3
`
`contrary, the Fourth and D.C. Circuits have
`recognized that private entities may be eligible for
`conduct-based immunity. Pet. 11-13.
`1. Respondents cannot distinguish Butters v.
`Vance International, Inc., 225 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2000),
`on the basis that the Fourth Circuit’s holding rested
`on derivative immunity rather than conduct-based
`immunity. BIO 13-14. Although Butters may not have
`used the words “conduct-based immunity,” it applied
`the same test, holding that private agents are immune
`“when following the commands of a foreign sovereign
`employer.” 225 F.3d at 466. And it did so based on
`conduct-based immunity’s rationale, observing that
`“courts define the scope of sovereign immunity by the
`nature of the function being performed—not by the
`office or the position of the particular employee
`involved.” Id. The Fourth Circuit has recognized this
`point. See Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392,
`398-99 (4th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that Butters
`addressed the “expansion of
`foreign sovereign
`immunity” to foreign agents). And whatever label
`Respondents prefer for the foreign-agent immunity at
`issue in Butters, the undisputed bottom line is that
`Butters granted that immunity to a private entity. The
`Ninth Circuit, in contrast, held that private entities
`can never receive such immunity under any label,
`expressly disagreeing with Butters in the process.
`App. 17 n.6.
`that Butters was
`Respondents also argue
`“abrogated” by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305
`(2010), BIO 14, but Samantar nowhere rejects
`Butters’s holding that private entities are immune
`when they act as foreign governments’ agents. That
`
`
`
`4
`
`holding—as with other pre-Samantar decisions
`interpreting the FSIA—remains “instructive for post-
`Samantar questions of common law immunity.”
`Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 774 (4th Cir. 2012);
`see Ved P. Nanda et al., 1 Litigation of International
`Disputes in U.S. Courts § 3:59 n.134 (updated Feb.
`2022) (citing Butters as good law).
`Butters’s relevance to common-law immunity is
`confirmed by post-Samantar decisions relying on
`Butters to grant common-law immunity to private
`agents. Ivey ex rel. Carolina Golf Dev. Co. v. Lynch,
`No. 17CV439, 2018 WL 3764264, at *2, 6-7 (M.D.N.C.
`Aug. 8, 2018); Moriah v. Bank of China Ltd., 107 F.
`Supp. 3d 272, 277 & n.34
`(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
`Respondents dismiss these as district-court decisions
`that, as such, cannot create a circuit split, BIO 15 n.6,
`but that misses the point: Ivey and Moriah confirm
`that Butters involved the same common-law conduct-
`based immunity that the Ninth Circuit categorically
`rejected, and thus confirm that the Fourth and Ninth
`Circuits are split. Pet. 12.
`2. In fact, the D.C. Circuit explained in Broidy
`Capital Management LLC v. Muzin, 12 F.4th 789, 802
`(2021), that private entities can seek common-law
`immunity after Samantar. Respondents’ assertion
`that Broidy did not really involve a private-entity
`defendant because the entity was owned by two
`individual defendants, BIO 12-13, is bizarre. The D.C.
`Circuit identified one of the defendants as a private
`“public relations consulting firm.” 12 F.4th at 793. And
`it unambiguously analyzed that entity’s immunity
`defense under the standards for common-law conduct-
`based immunity. Id. at 799-802.
`
`
`
`5
`
`That is because, as the D.C. Circuit explained,
`“claims of immunity” by “private entities” must “rise
`or fall not under the FSIA, but the residual law and
`practice that the FSIA did not displace.” Id. at 802
`(emphasis added). That language was not “dicta.”
`BIO 13. Without it, the court could not have applied
`the test for common-law conduct-based immunity to
`the entity defendant’s immunity defense. Unlike
`Respondents, the Ninth Circuit recognized this point,
`criticizing Broidy for “presum[ing] ... that the common
`law applied to ‘private entities or individuals.’” App.
`15 n.5 (quoting Broidy, 12 F.4th at 802). That is a clear
`and acknowledged split between the Ninth and D.C.
`Circuits, which this Court should resolve.
`II. This case is an ideal vehicle to resolve the
`important question presented.
`1. As NSO explained, the question presented is
`important because the Ninth Circuit’s decision will
`expose U.S. contractors to similar suits in foreign
`courts. Pet. 14-18. Contrary
`to Respondents’
`argument, this is not “speculation.” BIO 23. The
`United States’ contractors are frequently sued in the
`United States, where courts have developed doctrines
`to prevent such suits
`from
`interfering with
`governmental activities. E.g., Boyle v. United Techs.
`Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (government-contractor
`defense); In re KBR, Inc., 893 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2018)
`(political question doctrine); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580
`F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (preemption). 1 But if the Ninth
`
`1 This Court recently called for the views of the Solicitor
`General in one such case. Midwest Air Traffic Control Serv., Inc.
`v. Badilla, No. 21-867 (U.S. May 2, 2022).
`
`
`
`6
`
`Circuit’s decision is allowed to stand, no similar
`protections will exist for U.S. contractors sued in
`foreign courts. There is no reason to doubt that the
`United States’ adversaries will take advantage of that
`opening to obstruct the United States’ intelligence and
`military operations. Respondents, for their part, filed
`this
`lawsuit
`in an avowed effort to prevent
`governments
`from
`relying on
`contractors
`in
`intelligence and law-enforcement operations. Pet. 17.
`Indeed, the Solicitor General has warned that “[i]f
`the United States permits suits against foreign
`sovereigns,” then “foreign states may reciprocate by
`permitting similar claims against the United States in
`their tribunals.” Brief for the United States as Amicus
`Curiae at 22-23, Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya,
`No. 14-1206 (U.S. May 24, 2016), 2016 WL 2997336.
`So too in the context of conduct-based immunity,
`where the Solicitor General has warned that actions
`against foreign officials in U.S. courts could prompt
`reciprocal treatment of U.S. officials in foreign courts.
`Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 16,
`Mutond v. Lewis, No. 19-185 (U.S. May 26, 2020), 2020
`WL 2866592. Respondents cannot explain why this
`concern would evaporate merely because
`the
`government agent is a private entity.
`Thus, Respondents’ attempt to downplay the
`importance of the question presented, BIO 22-23, is
`makeweight. Governments routinely rely on private-
`entity agents. Contractors are essential to the United
`States, the self-proclaimed “world’s largest customer”
`for contractors. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Become a
`Federal Contractor, https://bit.ly/39b6hq4. Whether
`here or abroad, governments regularly and necessarily
`
`
`
`7
`
`“delegate governmental functions” to private entities
`because they “cannot perform all necessary and proper
`services” alone. Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77
`F.3d 1442, 1448 (4th Cir. 1996). The decision below
`threatens governments’ ability to rely on private
`contractors.
`identify any genuine vehicle
`2. Unable to
`problems obstructing this Court’s review of the
`important question presented, Respondents proffer
`fake ones.
`a. Respondents cannot transform the purely legal
`question presented by this petition into one that
`requires further factual development. The question
`presented by NSO’s petition is not, as Respondents
`suggest, whether NSO’s common-law
`immunity
`defense will ultimately succeed. BIO 26. The question
`is what law governs NSO’s claim—the FSIA or the
`common law. The Ninth Circuit answered that
`question as a pure matter of statutory interpretation
`that does not turn on any disputed facts. App. 2-3, 18-
`19. And the legal question is worthy of review, no
`matter whether Respondents argue on remand that
`NSO is not entitled to common-law immunity on the
`facts. This Court routinely grants certiorari to clarify
`the relevant legal standard, then lets lower courts
`apply the standard in the first instance. That is what
`the Court did in Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325-26, and it
`should do the same here. 2
`
`2 Because NSO does not ask the Court to apply the common law
`and decide in the first instance whether NSO should receive
`immunity, Respondents’ arguments that NSO would lose under
`the common law are irrelevant. BIO 18-22. For what it’s worth,
`though, there is no coherent reason to exclude private entities
`
`
`
`8
`
`In any event, Respondents forfeited their factual
`arguments. In the district court, NSO raised a
`“factual” challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction by
`submitting evidence to support its entitlement to
`immunity. App. 32. That shifted the burden to
`Respondents to “furnish affidavits or other evidence
`necessary to satisfy [their] burden of establishing
`subject matter jurisdiction.” App. 25 (quoting Safe Air
`for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.
`2004)). But Respondents did not submit any evidence
`or otherwise dispute NSO’s evidence. The district
`court thus found it undisputed that NSO is an “agent[]
`of foreign governments” that acted entirely within its
`“official capacity.” App. 35. The Ninth Circuit did not
`upset that finding. As the case comes to this Court,
`therefore, it is established that NSO acted as the agent
`of foreign sovereigns. It is too late for Respondents to
`argue otherwise now.
`b. Respondents also argue that NSO cannot
`receive common-law conduct-based immunity because
`it is on the Entity List. BIO 26. Again, though,
`whether NSO should ultimately receive conduct-based
`immunity is not the question presented.
`That aside, Respondents offer no authority for
`their position—because none exists. The relevant
`
`alone from common-law immunity, which Respondents concede
`protects private individuals. BIO 12, 20-21. Conduct-based
`immunity, after all, “does not depend on the identity of the person
`or entity [seeking immunity] so much as the nature of the act for
`which the person or entity is claiming immunity.” Herbage v.
`Meese, 747 F. Supp. 60, 66 (D.D.C. 1990). The agent’s “status” is
`thus irrelevant if “the act was performed on behalf of the foreign
`state.” Rishikof v. Mortada, 70 F. Supp. 3d 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2014).
`
`
`
`9
`
`question for common-law immunity is whether a
`defendant satisfies
`the
`legal
`test
`the State
`Department has previously applied to requests for
`such immunity. Samantar, 560 U.S. at 312. The
`question is not, as Respondents would have it,
`whether the current Administration supports a
`specific defendant’s alleged conduct as a policy matter.
`BIO 26. Foreign sovereign immunity applies even
`when a defendant is sued for violating federal or
`international law. Federal Republic of Germany v.
`Philipp, 141 S. Ct. 703, 713 (2021); Saudi Arabia v.
`Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361-62 (1993). The United
`States has
`thus
`recommended
`conduct-based
`immunity for defendants accused of far worse conduct
`than anything Respondents claim NSO did. E.g.,
`Statement of Interest at 1, Rosenberg v. Lashkar-E-
`Taiba, No. 1:10-cv-05381 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2012),
`ECF 35 (recommending immunity for defendants
`allegedly involved in “terrorist attacks” that “[t]he
`United States strongly condemns”); Statement of
`Interest at 1-2, Matar v. Dichter, No. 05 Civ. 10270
`(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2006), ECF 36 (suggesting
`immunity for official accused of “war crimes,” “crimes
`against humanity,” and “extrajudicial killing” for role
`in “military attack” to which “the United States has
`voiced serious objections” (cleaned up)); see Mutond
`Amicus Br. at 17-20 (arguing conduct-based immunity
`protects foreign officials who engage in “heinous acts”
`of torture). This history disproves Respondents’
`unsupported assertion that the government would
`never “support immunity” for “activities it has
`determined are contrary to U.S. national security or
`foreign policy.” BIO 26.
`
`
`
`10
`
`c. Finally, Respondents’ argument that this
`Court must decide whether the Ninth Circuit properly
`exercised appellate jurisdiction before reaching the
`question presented, BIO 29-30, is meritless. This
`Court is not a “court[] of appeals” whose jurisdiction is
`limited to review of final judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
`Instead, this Court has certiorari jurisdiction over any
`“judgment” in any “[c]ase[] in the courts of appeals.”
`Id. § 1254(1); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741-
`42 (1982); see Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy,
`Inc. v. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 479 U.S. 1312, 1312
`(1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers) (section 1254(1) allows
`“certiorari review of interlocutory orders of federal
`courts”).
`That clearly covers the decision below. The Ninth
`Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over NSO’s appeal,
`App. 5-6, and Respondents have not cross-petitioned
`for review of that holding. This Court thus has
`jurisdiction to review the Ninth Circuit’s “judgment”
`that the FSIA precludes common-law immunity for
`private entities, 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), irrespective of
`whether the Ninth Circuit correctly held that it had
`collateral-order appellate jurisdiction. 3
`
`
`3 If it mattered, the Ninth Circuit was correct to hold that it
`jurisdiction. “[C]ommon law” conduct-based
`had appellate
`immunity is “‘an immunity from suit,’” Doğan v. Barak, 932 F.3d
`888, 895 (9th Cir. 2019), that can be raised in an interlocutory
`appeal, Farhang v. Indian Inst. of Tech., 655 F. App’x 569, 570
`(9th Cir. 2016); Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 768 n.1. The D.C. Circuit held
`the same in Broidy, rejecting Respondents’ exact argument. 12
`F.4th at 796-97.
`
`
`
`11
`
`III. The decision below conflicts with Samantar.
`Although the Court should grant certiorari
`regardless of its view of the merits of the Ninth
`Circuit’s decision, Respondents are wrong that the
`decision is consistent with Samantar. BIO 16-17; see
`Pet. 19-21. As Samantar explained, the FSIA governs
`only “whether a foreign state is entitled to sovereign
`immunity.” 560 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added). The
`FSIA’s definition of “foreign state” incorporates
`entities that, because they are state-owned “agenc[ies]
`or instrumentalit[ies],” are equivalent to foreign
`states. Id. at 314; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b). But that
`definition limits only which entities possess immunity
`as foreign states. When a plaintiff sues a defendant
`that is not “a foreign state as the [FSIA] defines that
`term,” the FSIA does not displace the common law.
`Samantar, 560 U.S. at 325.
`It is thus not true that the FSIA “comprehensively
`addresses immunity for entities.” BIO 10. The FSIA is
`“comprehensive” only “for suits against states.”
`Samantar, 560 U.S. at 323 (emphasis added). Some
`entities are, by statutory definition, “foreign states.”
`Id. at 325. Some are not. And when they are not, the
`FSIA has nothing to say about the availability of
`immunity. Id. In that instance, immunity is “governed
`by the common law.” Id. The Ninth Circuit, however,
`held exactly the opposite—that the FSIA “displaced
`common-law sovereign immunity” for entities not
`falling within the FSIA’s definition of “foreign state.”
`App. 3, 12.
`
`
`
`12
`
`IV. The Court should consider inviting the
`Solicitor General’s views.
`Given the importance of the question presented to
`the United States’
`reliance
`on
`contractors,
`Respondents cannot persuasively argue that calling
`for the views of the Solicitor General is unwarranted
`merely because the government did not file a brief
`below. BIO 31. The Court frequently calls for the
`Solicitor General’s views on petitions raising
`immunity questions, Pet. 21-22, even when the
`government did not participate in the lower courts.
`Compare CVSG, Mutond, No. 19-185 (U.S. Jan. 21,
`2020), with Docket, Mutond, No. 17-7118 (D.C. Cir.),
`and Docket, Mutond, No. 1:16-cv-01547-RCL (D.D.C.).
`If anything, inviting the Solicitor General’s views
`is even more appropriate in such cases, where the
`Court has no other way to learn the United States’
`position. Respondents’ opposition to certiorari largely
`depends on their speculation that the government
`would not support NSO. But Respondents are in no
`better position than NSO to discern the government’s
`views on legal questions—such as whether immunity
`is categorically unavailable to U.S. contractors and
`other private entities, or even whether a defendant’s
`presence on the Entity List is relevant to immunity—
`that the government has never before had an
`opportunity to address. If the Court believes the
`government’s opinion on those questions would assist
`its consideration of this petition, it should call for the
`Solicitor General’s views.
`
`
`
`13
`
`CONCLUSION
`The Court should grant the petition.
`Respectfully submitted,
`Jeffrey S. Bucholtz
` Counsel of Record
`KING & SPALDING LLP
`1700 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`(202) 737-0500
`jbucholtz@kslaw.com
`
`Joseph N. Akrotirianakis
`Aaron Craig
`Zachary W. Byer
`KING & SPALDING LLP
`633 W. 5th Street
`Suite 1600
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`(213) 443-4355
`Matthew V.H. Noller
`KING & SPALDING LLP
`50 California Street
`Suite 3300
`San Francisco, CA 94105
`(415) 318-1200
`
`Counsel for Petitioners
`
`May 16, 2022
`
`
`
`