Exhibit A
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`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Fifth Circuit
`____________
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`No. 25-30108
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`Cyril E. Vetter; Vetter Communications Corporation,
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`Plaintiffs—Appellees,
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`versus
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`Robert Resnik; Resnik Music Group,
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`Defendants—Appellants.
`______________________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Middle District of Louisiana
`USDC No. 3:23-CV-1369
`______________________________
`
`Before Smith, Stewart, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
`Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:
`Cyril E. Vetter and Vetter Communications Corporation
`(collectively, the “Vetter Plaintiffs”) brought this lawsuit against Robert
`Resnik and Resnik Music Group (collectively, “Resnik”) seeking a
`declaration that they are the sole owners of the copyright rights to the song
`“Double Shot (Of My Baby’s Love)” (“Double Shot”) throughout the
`world. Vetter and Donald Smith wrote Double Shot. Vetter then assigned his
`copyright rights to Double Shot to a music publisher and, years later,
`terminated the assignment and recaptured his rights (“Vetter’s Recaptured
`Copyright Interest”). After Smith died, Vetter Communications
`United States Court of Appeals
`Fifth Circuit
`FILED
`January 12, 2026
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`Lyle W. Cayce
`Clerk
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`Corporation purchased the renewal copyright rights held by Smith’s heirs
`(“VCC’s Renewal Copyright Interest”). The Vetter Plaintiffs filed a
`complaint in the Middle District of Louisiana, alleg ing that they are the
`exclusive owners of the copyright rights to Double Shot, and that they may
`exploit it in the United States and abroad. The district court denied Resnik’s
`motion to dismiss and granted the Vetter Plaintiffs ’ motion for summary
`judgment. It declared the Vetter Plaintiffs to be the sole owners of th e
`copyright rights to Double Shot throughout the world. Thereafter, Resnik
`appealed. Because the district court’s declaration is supported by statutory
`text, context, and purpose, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in
`full.
`I
`A. Factual Background
`In the summer of 1962, Vetter and Smith wrote Double Shot in Baton
`Rouge, Louisiana. The following year, they transferred in an assignment
`agreement (the “1963 Assignment”) one hundred percent of their respective
`copyright interests in Double Shot to Windsong Music Publishers, Inc.
`(“Windsong”) in exchange for one dollar. The 1963 Assignment included “a
`transfer of the exclusive rights to Double Shot throughout the world for the
`full term of copyright protection, including a contingent assignment of all
`renewal period rights under the [Copyright Act of 1909].” After Double Shot
`was released and received airplay across the country, Windsong filed for a
`copyright registration for it with the U.S. Copyright Office in 1966. This
`registration provided Windsong with federal copyright protection under the
`Copyright Act of 1909 for an initial term of twenty-eight years with a possible
`renewal term of an additional twenty-eight years.
`In 1972, Smith tragically died in a plane crash. Following Smith’s
`death, his heirs and Vetter renewed the original copyright for Double Shot
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`when its original term ended in 1994 (the “Renewal Copyright”). It is
`undisputed that the transfer of Vetter and Smith’s renewal rights to
`Windsong in the 1963 Assignment was contingent on Vetter and Smith
`surviving the original term of the copyright and being alive during the renewal
`term.
`1 Because Vetter was alive during the renewal term, his renewal rights
`transferred to Windsong under the 1963 Assignment. Because Smith died
`before the start of the renewal term, his heirs obtained his renewal rights
`rather than Windsong under the 1963 Assi gnment. Therefore, Windsong
`owned fifty percent of the Renewal Copyright given the transfer of Vetter’s
`renewal rights, and Smith’s heirs owned the remaining fifty percent of the
`Renewal Copyright in 1994.
`In the spring of 1996, Vetter Communications Corporation purchased
`the renewal rights held by Smith’s heirs.
`2 Later that year, Windsong assigned
`fifty percent of its interest in the Renewal Copyright to Lyresong Music, Inc.
`(“Lyresong”). At this point, Vetter Communications Corporation owned
`fifty percent of the Renewal Copyright given its purchase from Smith’s heirs,
`and Windsong and Lyresong each owned twenty-five percent of the Renewal
`_____________________
`1 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 219 (1990) (citing Miller Music Corp. v. Charles
`N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 374–75 (1960)) (“[W]hen an author dies before the renewal
`period arrives, his executor is entitled to the renewal rights, even though the author
`previously assigned his renewal rights to another party.”).
`2 These rights are referred to as “VCC ’s Renewal Copyright Interest.” In 1996,
`Windsong also executed an assignment agreement that “reduce[d] to writing” Vetter’s
`transfer of his fifty -percent interest in the Renewal Copyright to Windsong. In their
`complaint, the Vetter Plaintiffs allege that “[t]here appears to be no legitimate basis” for
`this assignment because “per the [ Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons , 318 U.S.
`643 (1943) ] decision, the transfer of [Vetter’s] interest in the renewal term was
`accomplished through the 1963 Assignment and did not need to be ‘reduced to writing’
`again.” The district court did not address this argument because it determined that “the
`parties appear to agree upon the ultimate fact that Vetter’s renewal interest went to
`Windsong.” See Vetter v. Resnik, No. 23-CV-1369, 2024 WL 3405556, at *1 n.16 (M.D. La.
`July 12, 2024). We agree with the district court that this assignment is not at issue.
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`Copyright.
`In March 2019, Vetter sent Windsong and Lyresong a notice of
`termination under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c). The notice of termination informed
`Windsong and Lyresong that Vetter was terminating “all
`authorship/ownership rights originally granted and conveyed by [Vetter] to
`[Windsong]” under the 1963 Assignment as of May 3, 2022.
`3 In August 2019,
`Windsong’s owner informed Vetter that the company had been sold to
`Resnik.
`In 2022, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (“ ABC”)
`approached the Vetter Plaintiffs and requested an expanded license to use
`Double Shot in a television episode. Although that television episode had
`previously aired, “ABC was seeking to expand the original music license to
`include inter alia worldwide digital broadcasts and on-demand streams.” The
`Vetter Plaintiffs provided ABC with a quote, indicating that they were the
`sole and exclusive owners of Double Shot throughout the world. However,
`Resnik continued to claim twenty -five percent ownership of Double Shot
`even after receiving a copy of Vetter’s notice of termination.
`B. Procedural History
`On September 27, 2023, the Vetter Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the
`Middle District of Louisiana, urging the district court to declare them the
`sole owners of Double Shot . Resnik moved to dismiss the complaint under
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the district court denied the
`motion. The Vetter Plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment, and the
`district court granted the motion. In doing so, the district court declared
`Vetter to be the sole owner of Double Shot’s copyright throughout the world
`_____________________
`3 These rights are referred to as “Vetter’s Recaptured Copyright Interest.”
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`in Vetter’s Recaptured Copyright Interest and declared Vetter
`Communications Corporation to be the sole owner of Double Shot ’s
`copyright throughout the world in VCC ’s Renewal Copyright Interest. In
`other words, it determined that the Vetter Plaintiffs are collectively the sole
`owners of Double Shot. Resnik timely appealed.
`II
`This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the district
`court entered a final order and judgment. It granted summary judgment in
`favor of the Vetter Plaintiffs on January 29, 2025.
`We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment
`de novo. Sanders v. Christwood , 970 F.3d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing
`Burell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 820 F.3d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 2016)) .
`“Summary judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine
`dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
`matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Because Resnik does
`not argue that there is a genuine dispute of material fact, we focus on whether
`the Vetter Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
`III
` On appeal, Resnik argues that the district court erred by declaring
`Vetter to be the sole owner of Double Shot’s copyright throughout the world
`in Vetter’s Recaptured Copyright Interest for three main reasons . First, he
`asserts that Vetter’s notice of termination does not affect foreign rights based
`on the plain language of 17 U.S.C. § 304(c). Second, he contends that the
`district court’s interpretation of the statute contradicts case law on the
`statutory termination of foreign rights. And t hird, he maintains that the
`district court’s holding conflicts with U.S. treaty obligations under the Berne
`Convention and Universal Copyright Convention. We address each of these
`arguments in turn.
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`A. Statutory Interpretation
`We begin with the text of the statute i n cases of statutory
`interpretation. Matter of Durand -Day, 134 F.4th 846, 851 (5th Cir. 2025)
`(citing Matter of Imperial Petroleum Recovery Corp., 84 F.4th 264, 271 (5th Cir.
`2023) (per curiam)). We seek the statute’s “ordinary meaning.” Id. (quoting
`Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 169 (2021)). “If the text of the statute
`is clear and unambiguous, [the] inquiry ends, and [this court] give[s] effect
`to the plain language.” Id. (citing Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans &
`Vicinity v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1282–83 (5th Cir. 1994)).
`Section 304(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976 enables authors and artists
`to terminate transfers of their copyright rights covering an extended renewal
`term:
`In the case of any copyright subsisting in either its first or
`renewal term on January 1, 1978, other than a copyright in a
`work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a
`transfer or license of the renewal copyright or any right under
`it, exe cuted before January 1, 1978, by any of the persons
`designated by subsection (a)(1)(C) of this section, otherwise
`than by will, is subject to termination.
`17 U.S.C. § 304(c). Critically, section 304(c)(6)(E) provides that
`“[t]ermination of a grant under this subsection affects only those rights
`covered by the grant that arise under this title, and in no way affects rights
`arising under any other Federal, State, or foreign laws.” 17 U.S.C.
`§ 304(c)(6)(E).
`Resnik first points to the plain language of section 304(c)(6)(E) ,
`contending that it shows that Vetter’s notice of termination does not affect
`foreign rights. He asserts that this interpretation is consistent with
`congressional intent. He quotes Staff of House Committee on the Judiciary,
`89th Congress, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the
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`General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law (Committee Print 1965) ,
`explaining that the language “arising under . . . foreign laws” was meant “to
`ensure that ‘termination affects only those rights arising under the U.S.
`copyright statute and has no effect, for example, on foreign rights that are
`covered by the same contract.’”
`The Vetter Plaintiffs respond that the phrase “under this title” is
`ambiguous, so its meaning should be determined from context. They cite
`Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (“Kirtsaeng”), 568 U.S. 519 (2013) , for
`the proposition that “there is a presumption that ‘under this title’ lacks
`geographical significance when used in the Copyright Act.” For evidence of
`Congress’s intent from legislative history , the Vetter Plaintiffs cite House
`Report No. 94 -1476, at 127 (1976), which states that “[u]nder the bill,
`termination means that ownership of the rights covered by the terminated
`grant reverts to everyone who owns termination interests on the date the
`notice of termination was served.”
`The district court correctly determined that Vetter is the sole owner
`of Double Shot’s copyright throughout the world in Vetter’s Recaptured
`Copyright Interest. The district court’s holding is supported by statutory text
`and context as well as statutory purpose.
`i. Statutory Text and Context
`The district court’s holding is supported by the text of section
`304(c)(6)(E). Section 304(c)(6)(E) states that “[t]ermination of a grant
`under this subsection affects only those rights covered by the grant that arise
`under this title, and in no way affects rights arising under any other Federal,
`State, or foreign laws.” 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(E). On appeal, Resnik argues
`that the notice of termination under section 304(c) only affects domestic
`rights, not foreign rights. However, this interpretation is unpersuasive.
`According to Merriam Webster, “arise” means “to originate from a
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`source.”4 Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines “arise” as “[t]o
`originate; to stem (from).”5 Based on the plain language of “arise under this
`title,” termination covers copyrights that were granted under Title 17 of the
`U.S. Code, which includes the U.S. Copyright Act, and exclude s copyrights
`that were granted under “any other Federal, State, or foreign laws.” In other
`words, because termination affects rights that “arise under” the U.S.
`Copyright Act, and because Vetter’s rights arose under the U.S. Copyright
`Act, the plain languag e of section 304(c)(6)(E) dictates that his termination
`would be effective as to all of his rights—including his copyright to the extent
`that it extends internationally. There is no explicit geographical limitation in
`section 304(c)(6)(E) that restricts the exploitation of Vetter’s rights to uses
`within the United States. Therefore, based on the plain language of the
`statute, the district court’s holding is correct.
`While Resnik argues that the district court ignored the legal definition
`of “arise under,” this argument fails as well. He cites a test under T.B. Harms
`Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 824 (2d Cir. 1964):
`[A]n action “arises under” the Copyright Act if and only if the
`complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act . . . or
`asserts a claim requiring construct[ion] of the Act, . . . or, at the
`very least and perhaps more doubtfully, presents a case wh ere
`a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal principles
`control the disposition of the claim.
`Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1987) (c itation modified )
`(quoting T.B. Harms Co., 339 F.2d at 828). As the Vetter Plaintiffs observe,
`even under this test, this case “arises under” the Copyright Act because it
`involves “a claim requiring construct[ion] of the Act,” —namely, the
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`4 Arise, Merriam Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arise.
`5 Arise, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
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`ownership claim that requires the interpretation of section 304(c). Id. The
`Vetter Plaintiffs are also correct that “termination rights —and the second
`chance to control and benefit from a work provided by those rights —
`undoubtedly reflect a ‘distinctive policy’ of the Copyright Act that requires
`domestic principles to control the determination of [Double Shot’s]
`ownership.”
`Even if the meaning of “arise under this title” is ambiguous, the
`district court still did not err. On appeal, Vetter argues that the phrase
`“under this title” is ambiguous, so its meaning should be determined from
`context. The Supreme Court “has acknowledged that the word ‘under’ is a
`‘chameleon’ that ‘must draw its meaning from its context.’” Nat’l Ass’n of
`Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def. , 583 U.S. 109, 124 (2018) (quoting Kucana v. Holder ,
`558 U.S. 233, 245 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover,
`“[i]t is necessary and required that an interpretation of a phrase of uncertain
`reach is not confined to a single sentence when the text of the whole statute
`gives instruction as to its meaning.” Maracich v. Spears , 570 U.S. 48, 65
`(2013) (citing U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508
`U.S. 439, 455 (1993)). “Within a statute, ‘the same term usually has the same
`meaning.’” Matter of Durand -Day, 134 F.4th at 852 (quoting Pulsifer v.
`United States , 601 U.S. 124, 149 (2024)). As such, this court may consult
`other sections of the Copyright Act of 1976 with the same or similar terms to
`interpret section 304(c)(6)(E).
`The Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 109(a) of the
`Copyright Act of 1976 in Kirtsaeng is helpful for understanding whether
`section 304(c)(6)(E) affects domestic and foreign rights. Kirtsaeng involved a
`lawsuit brought by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (“Wiley”), a textbook publisher.
`Id. at 525. Wiley sued Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand studying in the United
`States, for copyright infringement because Kirtsaeng imported and resold
`textbooks from Thailand without Wiley’s permission. Id. at 527. Kirtsaeng
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`argued that the “first sale” doctrine, which enables owners of a particular
`copy of a work to resell it without permission from the copyright holder,
`permitted him to resell the textbooks without permission from Wiley. Id.; 17
`U.S.C. § 109(a). The Court considered whether the phrase “lawfully made
`under this title” in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 restricts the
`geographical scope of the “first sale” doctrine. 568 U.S. at 528. It ultimately
`held that “[section] 109(a)’s language, its context, and the common -law
`history of the ‘first sale’ doctrine, taken together, favor a non-geographical
`interpretation.” Id. at 530. It reasoned that section 109(a) “favors Kirtsaeng’s
`nongeographical interpretation, namely, that ‘lawfully made under this title’
`means made ‘in accordance with’ or ‘in compliance with’ the Copyright
`Act.” Id. It also noted that section 109(a) “says nothing about geography.” Id.
`The Court concluded that “the nongeographical reading is simple, it
`promotes a traditional copyright objec tive (combatting piracy), and it makes
`word-by-word linguistic sense.” Id.
`Because “arise under this title” in section 304(c)(6)(E) contains some
`of the same terms as “lawfully made under this title” in section 109(a), the
`former phrase likely also means “in accordance with” or “in compliance
`with” the Copyright Act. See Matter of Durand-Day, 134 F.4th at 852 (quoting
`Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at 149). Therefore, the termination provision applies to
`copyrights that were granted in accordance with the Copyright Act of 1976
`and exclude s copyrights that were granted in accordance with “any other
`Federal, State, or foreign laws.” That the Court in Kirtsaeng also adopted a
`nongeographical interpretation suggests that the district court did not err in
`similarly adopting a nongeographical reading of section 304(c)(6)(E). For
`these reasons, we conclude that the district court’s holding that Vetter is the
`sole owner of Double Shot ’s copyright throughout the world in Vetter’s
`Recaptured Copyright Interest is supported by statutory text and context.
`ii. Statutory Purpose
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`The district court’s holding is also consistent with the purpose of the
`Copyright Act of 1976. The Copyright Act of 1976 enables authors and artists
`to recapture their copyrights in works they may have assigned or transferred
`through its termination provision. 17 U.S.C. § 203.6 Congress has explained
`that “[t]he provisions of section 203 are based on the premise that the
`reversionary provisions of the present section on copyright renewal [17
`U.S.C. § 24] should be eliminated, and that the proposed law should
`substitute for them a provision safeguarding authors against unremunerative
`transfers.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). Congress continued:
`A provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal
`bargaining position of authors, resulting from the impossibility
`of determining a work’s value until it has been exploited.
`Section 203 reflects a practical compromise that will further
`the objectives of the copyright law while recognizing the
`problems and legitimate needs of all interests involved.
`H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
`The district court’s holding that Vetter is the sole owner of Double
`Shot’s copyright throughout the world in Vetter’s Recaptured Copyright
`Interest conforms with this purpose. Interpreting section 304(c)(6)(E) as
`enabling Vetter to recapture the exclusive rights to Double Shot throughout
`the world that he transferred to Windsong in the 1963 Assignment would
`safeguard against an unremunerative transfer and help correct for the
`unequal bargaining power between Vetter and Windsong. Resnik’s
`interpretation of the statute would deprive Vetter of the full set of rights he
`originally conveyed to Windsong , which is counter to the purpose of the
`_____________________
`6 Section 203 outlines the conditions for and effect of terminations of transfers in
`general. Section 304(c) provides for the termination of transfers covering an extended
`renewal period. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c).
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`statute. As t he Artists Rights Institute observes, “[d]enying terminating
`authors the full return of a worldwide grant leaves them with only half of the
`apple—the opposite of [c]ongressional intent.”
`Authors and artists ’ rights organizations illustrate how the district
`court’s nongeographical interpretation of section 304(c)(6)(E) is consistent
`with statutory purpose as well as public policy and industry norms. Amici
`curiae explain that “a return of all rights is common in contractual
`reversions,” that the music publishing industry routinely manages the
`contractual transfer of foreign rights due to statutory termination, and that
`the district court’s decision is consistent with industry norms. That
`contractual reversions of all rights are common practice in the music industry
`suggests that Congress did not intend for statutory reversions under section
`304(c)(6)(E) to apply only to U.S. rights. Moreover, they note that “[t]he
`industry’s adaptability over U.S. terminations is already evident domestically
`and, clearly, it has not destroyed the music industry.” For these reasons, the
`district court’s holding is supported by statutory purpose as well as public
`policy and industry norms.
`B. Existing Case Law
`On appeal, Resnik argues that the district court’s interpretation of the
`statute contradicts case law on the statutory termination of foreign rights. He
`cites Siegel v. Warner Bro s. Entertainment, Inc. (“Siegel”), 542 F. Supp. 2d
`1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d in part on other grounds, 504 F. App’x 586 (9th
`Cir. 2013), Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 155 F.3d
`17 (2d Cir. 1998), and Clancy v. Jack Ryan Enterprises, Ltd., No. 17-CV-3371,
`2021 WL 488683 (D. Md. Feb. 10, 2021), for the proposition that termination
`under section 304(c) only recaptures domestic rights in a work. However, we
`decline to follow these cases.
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`First, Resnik cites Siegel. In Siegel, the widow and daughter of Jerome
`Siegel sought a declaration from the court that they had terminated Siegel’s
`and Joseph Shuster’s 1938 copyright grant in the comic book superhero
`“Superman” under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c). 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1102. Siegel and
`Shuster had previously executed an assignment agreement in which they
`assigned the exclusive, worldwide rights to Superman to Detective Comics.
`Id. at 1107. Siegel’s widow and daughter later served a termination notice
`under section 304(c) to recapture Siegel’s rights. Id. at 1114. The district
`court considered the issue of which rights were recaptured through the
`termination notice, “namely, . . . whether plaintiffs have a right to
`defendants’ post -termination foreign profits from the exploitation of the
`Superman copyright. ” Id. at 1116. The court ultimately held that the
`termination notice only affected the domestic part of the original assignment.
`Id. at 1142. It reasoned that
`Congress expressly limited the reach of what was gained by the
`terminating party through exercise of the termination right;
`specifically, the terminating party only recaptured the domestic
`rights (that is, the rights arising under title 17 to the United
`States Code) of the grant to the copyright in question. Left
`expressly intact and undisturbed were any of the rights the
`original grantee or its successors in interest had gained over the
`years from the copyright through other sources of law, notably
`the right to exploit the work abroad that would be governed by
`the copyright laws of foreign nations. Thus, the statute explains
`that termination “ in no way affects rights ” the grantee or its
`successors gained “under foreign laws.”
`Id. at 1140.
`Siegel is an out -of-circuit case that relies heavily on secondary
`treatises, which are nonbinding. The district court in Siegel cites Professor
`David Nimmer’s treatise: “ A grant of copyright ‘throughout the world’ is
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`terminable only with respect to uses within the geographic limits of the
`United States. Because copyright has no extraterritorial operation, American
`law arguably is precluded from causing the termination of rights based on
`foreign copyright laws.” 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 11.02[B][2] (2025). To
`support his view, Nimmer cites another section of his treatise, which
`discusses the territorial limitations of the U.S. Copyright Act. See 3 Nimmer,
`supra, § 11.02[B][2] (citing 5 Nimmer on Copyright § 17.02[A]). It states that
`“[f ]or the most part, acts of infringement that occur outside of the
`jurisdiction of the United States are not actionable under the United States
`Copyright Act. This [is] for the reason that copyright laws do not have any
`extraterritorial operation.” 5 Nimmer, supra, § 17.02[A] (citing cases). The
`remainder of this section primarily discusses the presumption against
`extraterritoriality in the context of copyright and patent infringement.
`However, this section does not discuss copyright ownership, assignment, and
`termination, which are at issue in this case . Additionally, the termination of
`rights in this case was based on the U.S. Copyright Act rather than foreign
`copyright laws. Further, even Professor Nimmer admits that “a different
`conclusion is possible.” 3 Nimmer, supra , § 11.02[B][2] (providing an
`example). Indeed, we hold that Professor Nimmer’s view is contrary to
`statutory text, context, and purpose.
`The district court in Siegel also references Professor William Patry’s
`treatise:
`One provision is quite clear, however: termination only affects
`U.S. rights. Sections 203(b)(5) and 304(c)(6)(E) both state, in
`relevant part, that termination “in no way affects rights
`under . . . foreign laws.” Accordingly, where a U.S. author
`conveys worldwide rights and terminates under either section,
`grants in all other countries remain valid according to their terms
`or provisions in other countries’ laws.
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`7 Patry on Copyright § 25:74 (2025). Notably, Professor Patry omits key
`language from the statute: “any other Federal, State, or foreign laws.” 17
`U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(E). His interpretation can be reconciled with the district
`court’s holding because the grant of worldwide righ ts at issue in this case
`arose under U.S. copyright law rather than “other . . . foreign laws.” As such,
`the district court did not err in declining to follow Siegel and its reliance on
`Professor Nimmer and Professor Patry’s treatises b ecause these authorities
`are nonbinding and contradict the plain text and purpose of section
`304(c)(6)(E).
`Second, Resnik references Clancy v. Jack Ryan Enterprises, Ltd., 2021
`WL 488683. There, the surviving spouse of author Tom Clancy, Jr. filed a
`declaratory judgment action to resolve questions of ownership of her
`husband’s character Jack Ryan. Clancy , 2021 WL 488683, at *1. The
`surviving spouse and her daughter filed a termination notice to recapture
`rights to one of Clancy’s literary works. Id. at *45. The district court
`ultimately held that the termination notice could only apply to the domestic
`copyright in the literary work, explaining that “the worldwide grant of
`copyright is only subject to termination insofar as its U.S. component is
`concerned, but not subject to termination in the rest of the world.” Id. at *46
`(citing Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1142). In its unpublished decision, the district
`court primarily relied on Siegel and Professor Nimmer’s treatise, which are
`both flawed as discussed above.
`Third, Resnik discusses Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell
`Music, Inc., 155 F.3d 17. He relies on this case for the proposition that the
`Second Circuit “recognized that the statutory termination of rights in a
`musical composition used in the film Sleepless in Seattle only resulted in the
`recapture of the ‘domestic rights in the [s]ong.’” In that case, the Second
`Circuit considered the question of “whether the author or the publisher has
`the authority to license new uses of a pre -termination derivative work after
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`termination.” Fred Ahlert Music Corp. , 155 F.3d at 23 . However, i t did not
`consider the precise question of the geographical scope of termination under
`section 304(c)(6)(E). It only noted that “domestic rights” reverted to heirs
`when they served a termination notice, citing 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6) with no
`further support. Id. at 20. Therefore, this case also provides shaky support
`for Resnik’s argument that termination under section 304 only enables Vetter
`to exploit Double Shot within the United States.
`For these reasons, existing case law provides weak support for
`Resnik’s argument, and this court declines to follow it.
`C. International Treaty Principles
`Resnik asserts that the district court’s holding conflicts with the
`principles of national treatment and territoriality under two international
`treaties: the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention.
`Resnik explains that the principle of territoriality would be violated under the
`district court’s interpretation “[b]ecause the foreign rights in [Double Shot]
`do not arise under Title 17 of the U.S. Code, but under the domestic laws of
`each member country,” so “the termination of U.S. rights und er [s]ection
`304 ‘in no way affects’ those foreign rights.” He asserts that the principle of
`national treatment would be violated because “it would grant U.S. authors
`greater rights than the authors of other Berne and [Universal Copyright
`Convention] members are entitled to receive under U.S. law.” Resnik’s
`arguments are premised on the following theory: “[T]he U.S. Copyright Act,
`together with the implementing legislation of each other member count ry,
`creates multiple and separate copyright interests in each country, rather than
`a single overarching international master copyright that each country is
`required to honor.”
`The Vetter Plaintiffs respond that Resnik “continue [s] to overstate
`the effect of the presumption against extraterritoriality in relation to Unit