Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 1 of 18 PageID #: 968
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`MARSHALL DIVISION
`
`
`
`SMITH INTERFACE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`
`
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP
`
`
`
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
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`
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`
`
`DEFENDANTS SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 2 of 18 PageID #: 969
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`LOCAL RULE 7(A)(1) STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED .....................1
`
`III.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS .......................................................................................................2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`A Complaint Must Plausibly Allege Entitlement to Relief, Supported
`by Well-Pleaded Facts and Not Just Conclusory Allegations .................................2
`
`Alleging Willful Infringement Requires More than Bare Notice of a
`Plaintiff’s Allegation of Infringement and Knowledge of the Asserted
`Patents ......................................................................................................................3
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................4
`
`A.
`
`Smith Interface Fails to Plead Pre-Suit Knowledge of the Asserted
`Patents ......................................................................................................................4
`
`B.
`
`Smith Interface Fails to Plead Knowledge of Infringement.....................................8
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................10
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 3 of 18 PageID #: 970
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`
`
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Anascape, Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`No. 9:06-cv-158, 2008 WL 7182476 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2008) ..............................................7
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...............................................................................................................2, 3
`
`Barry v. Medtronic, Inc.,
`250 F. Supp. 3d 107 (E.D. Tex. 2017) .....................................................................................10
`
`Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)..................................................................................................6
`
`BASF Plant Sci., LP v. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Rsch. Organisation,
`28 F.4th 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ..............................................................................................8, 9
`
`Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc.,
`989 F.3d 964 (Fed. Cir. 2021)................................................................................................8, 9
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...................................................................................................................2
`
`In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig.,
`681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..............................................................................................2, 3
`
`Blitzsafe Texas, LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc.,
`No. 2:15-cv-1274-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 4778699 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2016) ...........................6
`
`Bosarge v. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics,
`796 F.3d 435 (5th Cir. 2015) .....................................................................................................3
`
`Bush Seismic Techs. LLC v. Am. Gem Soc’y,
`No. 2:14-cv-1809-JRG, 2016 WL 9115381 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2016) ....................................4
`
`Chalumeau Power Sys. v. Alcatel-Lucent,
`No. CIV.A. 11-1175-RGA, 2012 WL 6968938 (D. Del. July 18, 2012) ...................................7
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 4 of 18 PageID #: 971
`
`Dali Wireless, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns LLC,
`No. 20-cv-06469-EMC, 2022 WL 1426951 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2022) ......................................9
`
`Doe v. Robertson,
`751 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014) .....................................................................................................3
`
`Fractus, S.A. v. TCL Corp.,
`No. 2:20-cv-00097-JRG, 2021 WL 2483155 (E.D. Tex. June 2, 2021) ....................................9
`
`Gonzalez v. Kay,
`577 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................................................2
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) ...............................................................................................................3
`
`Integrated Tech. Sys., Inc. v. First Internet Bank of Indiana,
`2:16-cv-417-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 631195 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2017) ...............................5, 6, 7
`
`Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T Mobile USA, Inc.,
`No. 2:17-cv-00577-JRG, Dkt. 293 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2019) .....................................................6
`
`Mark I Marketing Corp. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,
`66 F.3d 285 (Fed. Cir. 1995)......................................................................................................7
`
`Opticurrent, LLC v. Power Integrations, Inc.,
`No. 2:16-cv-325-JRG, 2016 WL 9275395 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2016) ......................................3
`
`Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc.,
`407 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 2005) .....................................................................................................3
`
`Polnac v. City of Sulphur Springs,
`555 F. Supp. 3d 309 (E.D. Tex. 2021) ...................................................................................6, 7
`
`Sonos, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`No. C 21-07559 WHA, 2022 WL 799367 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2022) ......................................8
`
`Spherix Inc. v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
`No. CV 14-578-SLR, 2015 WL 1517508 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2015) ...........................................8
`
`State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp.,
`751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985)..............................................................................................5, 6
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C. § 284 ................................................................................................................................3
`
`
`
`iv
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 5 of 18 PageID #: 972
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`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ...............................................................................................................................2
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 .............................................................................................................................1
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 201 .........................................................................................................................6, 7
`
`
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`
`
`
`
`v
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 6 of 18 PageID #: 973
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`TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`
`Exhibit
`Exhibit A
`
`U.S. Patent No. 9,871,664
`
`Description
`
`Exhibit B
`
`U.S. Patent No. 10,949,012
`
`Exhibit C
`
`U.S. Patent Application No. 16/668,626, Information Disclosure Statement
`(July 12, 2019)
`
`Exhibit D
`
`European Patent Application No. 17 83 7243, Supplementary European
`Search Report (April 12, 2019)
`
`vi
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`
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`
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 7 of 18 PageID #: 974
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Plaintiff Smith
`
`Interface Technologies, LLC’s
`
`(“Smith
`
`Interface”) Complaint
`
`(“Complaint”) accuses Defendants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics
`
`America, Inc. (collectively, “Samsung”) of willfully infringing the Asserted Patents.1 Samsung
`
`brings this motion to dismiss these claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on
`
`which relief can be granted under the Iqbal/Twombly standard. While full of unsupported legal
`
`conclusions, the Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to support its willfulness claims.
`
`Even making all reasonable inferences in favor of Smith Interface, there is no plausible
`
`allegation that Samsung had knowledge of the Asserted Patents, much less infringement, before
`
`Smith Interface filed its Complaint. Federal Circuit law is clear: such notice is required to support
`
`a willful infringement claim. And service of the Complaint, even if considered relevant to post-
`
`suit conduct, does not alone plausibly support that Samsung acted egregiously. Accordingly,
`
`Samsung moves under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Smith Interface’s claims for willful infringement
`
`for failure to state a claim.
`
`II.
`
`LOCAL RULE 7(A)(1) STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED
`
`1. Whether Smith Interface’s Complaint fails to adequately plead a claim for willful
`infringement of the Asserted Patents, because Smith Interface does not plausibly
`allege that Samsung had pre-suit notice of infringement of those patents or that
`Samsung’s conduct was “deliberate” or “intentional.”
`
`
`
`1 U.S. Patent Nos. 10,671,212 (the “’212 Patent”); 10,606,396 (the “’396 Patent”);
`10,642,413 (the “’413 Patent”); 10,788,931 (the “’931 Patent”); 10,656,754 (the “’754 Patent”);
`10,782,819 (the “’819 Patent”); and 10,649,580 (the “’580 Patent”); and 10,656,758 (the “’758
`Patent”) (collectively, “Asserted Patents”).
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 8 of 18 PageID #: 975
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`III. LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A. A Complaint Must Plausibly Allege Entitlement to Relief, Supported by
`Well-Pleaded Facts and Not Just Conclusory Allegations
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim
`
`showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which involves “more than
`
`labels and conclusions,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft
`
`v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces . . . demands more
`
`than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). As explained by the
`
`Supreme Court, factual allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
`
`Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (same). In
`
`other words, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
`
`accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
`
`(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 603 (same).
`
`Plausibility is the touchstone of Rule 8. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
`
`pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
`
`liable for the misconduct alleged,” which demands “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
`
`has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also In re Bill of Lading Transmission &
`
`Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (same); Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at
`
`603 (same). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s
`
`liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”
`
`Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see also Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at
`
`1332 (same); Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 603 (same).
`
`Although a court must assume well-pleaded factual allegations are true, not all allegations
`
`are well-pleaded. The assumption of truth “is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of
`
`
`
`2
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 9 of 18 PageID #: 976
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`action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678; see also Plotkin
`
`v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005) (“We do not accept as true conclusory
`
`allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.”); Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at
`
`1331 (“[W]e are not required to ‘accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual
`
`inferences.’” (quoted source omitted)). To determine whether a complaint plausibly alleges an
`
`actionable claim for relief, courts therefore “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are
`
`no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see
`
`also Bosarge v. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics, 796 F.3d 435, 442 (5th Cir. 2015) (“We first identify
`
`the allegations that are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”); Doe v. Robertson, 751 F.3d 383,
`
`386-87 (5th Cir. 2014) (same).
`
`B. Alleging Willful Infringement Requires More than Bare Notice of a
`Plaintiff’s Allegation of Infringement and Knowledge of the Asserted Patents
`
`A claim under 35 U.S.C. § 284 requires proof of the defendant’s “knowledge” and “intent.”
`
`To sustain a claim under § 284, the complaint must plead facts alleging “conduct which could
`
`plausibly rise to the level of being characteristic of a pirate.” Opticurrent, LLC v. Power
`
`Integrations, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-325-JRG, 2016 WL 9275395, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2016) (“To
`
`recover enhanced damages on a claim for willful infringement, courts should consider the
`
`subjective willfulness of a patent infringer”) (citation omitted); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs.,
`
`Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016) (“The sort of conduct warranting enhanced damages has been
`
`variously described in our cases as willful, wanton, malicious, bad faith, deliberate, consciously
`
`wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate.”).
`
`Accordingly, courts dismiss allegations of willful infringement that are conclusory or based
`
`solely on the filing of a lawsuit. See, e.g., Opticurrent, 2016 WL 9275395, at *2 (dismissing where
`
`complaint “makes no effort to allege any pre-suit notice of the [asserted] Patent or any pre-suit
`
`
`
`3
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`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 10 of 18 PageID #: 977
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`conduct which could plausibly rise to the level of being ‘characteristic of a pirate.’”); Bush Seismic
`
`Techs. LLC v. Am. Gem Soc’y, No. 2:14-cv-1809-JRG, 2016 WL 9115381, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr.
`
`13, 2016) (dismissing willfulness claim where plaintiff “could not have had a good faith basis to
`
`allege willful and induced infringement based on post-suit conduct that had not yet occurred” and
`
`noting that “[a] patentee should not prospectively allege post-filing conduct in an original
`
`complaint”).
`
`IV. ARGUMENT
`
`Smith Interface’s willful infringement claims should be dismissed because Smith Interface
`
`(A) pleads insufficient facts to demonstrate that Samsung had pre-suit knowledge of the Asserted
`
`Patents, (B) pleads insufficient facts to sustain an allegation that Samsung had knowledge of
`
`infringement sufficient to demonstrate the deliberate or intentional infringement required for
`
`willfulness.
`
`A. Smith Interface Fails to Plead Pre-Suit Knowledge of the Asserted Patents
`
`Smith Interface does not allege facts showing that Samsung knew any Asserted Patent even
`
`existed before the Complaint was served. Instead, Smith Interface alleges that Samsung generally
`
`knew of some undefined concept of “Smith’s Inventions” or the so-called “Smith Patent Family,”
`
`which is comprised of unasserted “patent publications and patents sharing a common claim of
`
`priority with the Asserted Patents.” Compl. ¶¶ 35-40. Smith Interface never identifies the “Smith
`
`Patent Family” with any particularity. Rather, Smith Interface pleads that some unidentified
`
`members of the “Smith Patent Family” have been cited in hundreds of U.S. patent applications
`
`(with no alleged connection to Samsung). Id., ¶ 35. Further, Smith Interface alleges that
`
`unidentified members of the Smith Patent Family, but not any Asserted Patent, are cited in “over
`
`
`
`4
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 11 of 18 PageID #: 978
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`20 Samsung patents and patent publications.”2 Compl. ¶¶ 37-38. Indeed, the Complaint never
`
`identifies which member(s) of the “Smith Patent Family” Samsung is alleged to have known. Id.,
`
`¶¶ 37-38. These allegations are deficient for several reasons.
`
`First, the Complaint’s allegations fall short on their face because Smith Interface never
`
`alleges that any Asserted Patent was cited in (a) any of the hundreds of U.S. patent applications,
`
`(b) the “over 20” belonging to Samsung, or even (c) the two Samsung patents that Smith Interface
`
`actually identifies as citing the “Smith Patent Family.” Id., ¶¶ 35-40. Instead, Smith Interface
`
`presents unsubstantiated allegations. Contending vaguely that Samsung knew of “Smith’s
`
`Inventions” or the “Smith Patent Family”—but not any of the specific Asserted Patents—does not
`
`plausibly show knowledge of the Asserted Patents, much less any basis for willfulness. One of the
`
`most basic requirements of willfulness is that “the patent must exist and one must have knowledge
`
`of it.” State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Smith
`
`Interface’s failure to identify any patent, let alone any Asserted Patent, as known to Samsung fails
`
`that most basic requirement, and its claims of willfulness should thus be dismissed.
`
`Second, of the two Samsung patents that Smith Interface bothered to identify as allegedly
`
`citing an unidentified member of the “Smith Patent Family” (Complaint, ¶¶ 37-38), further
`
`investigation reveals Smith Interface’s sleight of hand. In both cases, the cited document was no
`
`patent, let alone one of the Asserted Patents. Rather, each identified Samsung patent identifies an
`
`application published in 2016—U.S. Patent Appl. Pub. No. 2016/0188181. Ex. A at 2; Ex. B at
`
`
`
`2 Smith Interface fails to even substantiate its vague claim that “over 20 Samsung patents
`and publications include citations” to members of the Smith Patent Family. Indeed, Smith
`Interface only relies on two Samsung patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 9,871,664 and 10,949,012, but
`neither cite any Asserted Patent. See infra at 5-6.
`5
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 12 of 18 PageID #: 979
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`2.3 The Federal Circuit has held that notice of a patent application is not, alone, sufficient for
`
`willful infringement. State Indus., 751 F.2d at 1236. This is because “[f]iling an application is no
`
`guarantee any patent will issue” and “[w]hat the scope of claims in patents that do issue will be is
`
`something totally unforeseeable.” Id.
`
`This Court has interpreted State Industries as “stand[ing] for the proposition[s] that a party
`
`cannot have notice of claims in a patent unless the claims already exist” and “a party is not
`
`obligated to continually monitor every patent application to which it has been exposed.” Blitzsafe
`
`Texas, LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1274-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 4778699, at
`
`*6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:15-cv-1274-JRG-RSP,
`
`2016 WL 4771291 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2016). According to the Complaint, Samsung was
`
`allegedly exposed to Smith Interface’s 2016 published application on January 27, 2017, and/or
`
`July 12, 2019. Compl. ¶¶ 37-38. At that time none of the claims of the Asserted Patents had issued,
`
`and Samsung had no obligation to monitor Smith Interface’s 2016 published application (let alone
`
`the dozens of later applications claiming priority thereto that had not even been filed). See
`
`Blitzsafe, 2016 WL 4778699, at *6;4 see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. T Mobile USA, Inc.,
`
`
`
`3 U.S. Patent No. 9,871,664 (Ex. A) and U.S. Patent No. 10,949,012 (Ex. B) are
`appropriately considered when deciding this Motion, because both are incorporated by reference
`in the Complaint. See Compl. ¶¶ 37-38; Polnac v. City of Sulphur Springs, 555 F. Supp. 3d 309,
`321 (E.D. Tex. 2021) (“When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a district court ‘must consider the
`complaint in its entirety, as well as . . . documents incorporated into the complaint by reference,
`and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.’”) (quoting Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631
`F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011)). Judicial notice of both documents also is appropriate, as they are
`public records “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); see
`Integrated Tech. Sys., Inc. v. First Internet Bank of Indiana, 2:16-cv-417-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL
`631195, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2017) (taking judicial notice of patent disclosure to decide
`12(b)(6) motion), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:16-cv-417-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL
`617673 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2017), aff’d, 712 F. App’x 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2018); accord Bascom
`Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
`(discussing patent specification for a 12(b)(6) motion).
`4 Because Blitzsafe makes clear that Samsung had no obligation to monitor Smith
`Interface’s patent portfolio, Smith Interface’s allegation of “constructive” knowledge of the
`Asserted Patents is baseless. See Compl. ¶ 40.
`
`
`
`6
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`

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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 13 of 18 PageID #: 980
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`No. 2:17-cv-00577-JRG, Dkt. 293 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2019) (“The Court finds that, in this case,
`
`knowledge of the patent family is too attenuated to meet the threshold to give Defendants
`
`reasonable notice of the Patents-in-Suit as an underpinning to a potential willfulness finding.”);
`
`Anascape, Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 9:06-cv-158, 2008 WL 7182476, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25,
`
`2008) (holding that “there can be no pre-suit willful infringement” based on notice of the parent
`
`patent and patent application). The Complaint thus fails to make a plausible allegation of pre-suit
`
`knowledge sufficient to show willful infringement.
`
`Third, in both Samsung patents that Smith Interface alleges provide knowledge of the
`
`“Smith Patent Family,” the subject patent application was identified to Samsung by a patent
`
`examiner. Smith Interface admits that fact with respect to one Samsung patent. Compl. ¶ 37. As to
`
`the second, the submission referenced by Smith Interface shows—again—that a patent examiner
`
`provided the application to Samsung. See Ex. C at 2-3 (July 12, 2019, IDS listing Smith Interface’s
`
`U.S. Patent Appl. Pub. No. 2016/0188181 and “Supplementary European Search Report dated
`
`April 12, 2019 in connection with European Patent Application No. 17 83 7243”), Ex. D at 2 (cited
`
`European Search Report citing the Smith Interface publication).5
`
`That a patent examiner cited a Smith Interface application is irrelevant. Courts have long
`
`held that a patent examiner’s knowledge of a patent cannot be imputed to the patent applicant. See,
`
`e.g., Chalumeau Power Sys. v. Alcatel-Lucent, No. CIV.A. 11-1175-RGA, 2012 WL 6968938, at
`
`
`
`5 Smith Interface’s allegations about Samsung’s alleged notice stemming from the
`prosecution of U.S. Patent No. 10,949,012 effectively incorporate by reference the prosecution
`records presented herewith as Ex. C and Ex. D, rendering the documents appropriate for
`consideration as part of Samsung’s motion to dismiss. Polnac, 555 F. Supp. 3d at 321. Judicial
`notice of Ex. C and Ex. D also is appropriate under Fed. R. Evid. 201 because the documents are
`public prosecution records whose legitimacy cannot be subject to reasonable dispute. See
`Integrated Tech. Sys., 2017 WL 631195 at *2; Mark I Marketing Corp. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons
`Co., 66 F.3d 285, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he prosecution history of the ’241 patent is a matter
`of public record.”).
`
`
`
`7
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`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 14 of 18 PageID #: 981
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`*1 (D. Del. July 18, 2012) (dismissing willful and induced infringement claims and rejecting
`
`plaintiff’s argument that defendants knew of the asserted patents because the examiner cited the
`
`patents during prosecution of the defendants’ patents); Spherix Inc. v. Juniper Networks, Inc., No.
`
`CV 14-578-SLR, 2015 WL 1517508, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2015) (same). Moreover, as noted
`
`above, the patent examiners identified only a patent application, which provides insufficient
`
`knowledge to support a willfulness claim.
`
`For at least these reasons, the Complaint lacks sufficient allegations of fact to plausibly
`
`conclude that Samsung had pre-suit knowledge of the Asserted Patents, and Smith Interface’s
`
`willful infringement allegations should be dismissed.
`
`B. Smith Interface Fails to Plead Knowledge of Infringement
`
`Even assuming arguendo that the Complaint pleads facts sufficient to show that Samsung
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`knew of the Asserted Patents—which it does not—the willfulness claims should still be dismissed
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`because Smith Interface has not adequately alleged that Samsung had knowledge of infringement.
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`The Federal Circuit recently made clear that mere “[k]nowledge of the asserted patent and evidence
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`of infringement is … not sufficient, for a finding of willfulness. Rather, willfulness requires
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`deliberate or intentional infringement.” Bayer Healthcare LLC v. Baxalta Inc., 989 F.3d 964, 988
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`(Fed. Cir. 2021); see also BASF Plant Sci., LP v. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Rsch. Organisation,
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`28 F.4th 1247, 1274–75 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (holding BASF’s awareness and monitoring of CSIRO
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`patents established only “[k]nowledge of the asserted patent and evidence of infringement,—
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`which is necessary, but not sufficient, for a finding of willfulness”).
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`To plead a claim for willfulness, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege not just knowledge of
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`the asserted patents, but knowledge of their alleged infringement that is deliberate or intentional,
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`which are “distinct elements.” See Sonos, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. C 21-07559 WHA, 2022 WL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 15 of 18 PageID #: 982
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`799367, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2022) (“knowledge of the patent and knowledge of infringement
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`must be pled with plausibility”), leave to appeal denied, No. 2022-134, 2022 WL 1486359 (Fed.
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`Cir. May 11, 2022); Dali Wireless, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns LLC, No. 20-cv-06469-
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`EMC, 2022 WL 1426951, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2022) (dismissing willfulness claims where
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`plaintiff failed to “establish notice of infringement”).
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`Allegations that Samsung knew about some undefined “Smith Patent Family”—or at least
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`one particular application of the “Smith Patent Family” that published years before the applications
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`for the Asserted Patents were even filed—provide no basis to conclude that Samsung deliberately
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`and intentionally infringed. Likewise, the alleged fact that the Complaint provided notice of Smith
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`Interface’s infringement claims also fails to make Samsung a willful infringer. Compl. ¶¶ 53, 75,
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`97, 121, 143, 162, 185, 207. As the Federal Circuit recently held, mere “[k]nowledge of the
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`asserted patent and evidence of infringement is . . . not sufficient, for a finding of willfulness.”
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`Bayer Healthcare, 989 F.3d at 988; see also BASF, 28 F.4th at 1274–75 (quoting Bayer). Applying
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`Bayer Healthcare, Smith Interface’s pleading—if true—“merely demonstrates . . . knowledge of
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`the [Asserted Patents] and . . . direct infringement of the asserted claims.” 989 F.3d at 988.
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`“[W]illfulness requires intentional or deliberate infringement,” which notice of an infringement
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`complaint, without more, cannot provide. Id. (finding a complaint’s infringement allegations
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`insufficient to prove willful infringement); see also BASF, 28 F.4th at 1274–75 (same).
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`At most, Smith Interface’s bare pleading reveals a case in which a patent owner alleges
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`infringement, and defendants learn of the patents-in-suit and alleged infringement for the first time
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`solely based on the lawsuit. This is precisely the type of case for which there should be no willful
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`infringement claim. See Fractus, S.A. v. TCL Corp., No. 2:20-cv-00097-JRG, 2021 WL 2483155,
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`at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 2, 2021) (dismissing willful infringement because “[w]hile [the complaint]
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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 16 of 18 PageID #: 983
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`does allege notice (and therefore knowledge) of the patents-in-suit, it does not allege any culpable
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`conduct or any set of facts supporting an inference of culpable conduct”); Barry v. Medtronic, Inc.,
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`250 F. Supp. 3d 107, 111 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (“Enhanced damages are not to be meted out in typical
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`‘garden-variety’ patent suits, and instead, should be reserved for truly ‘egregious cases.’”) (citing
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`Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1934-35 (2016)).
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`V.
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Samsung respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Smith
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`Interface’s claims for willful patent infringement.
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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 17 of 18 PageID #: 984
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`Dated: November 22, 2022
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`_/s/ Melissa R. Smith____________________
`Melissa R. Smith (TX Bar No. 24001351)
`GILLAM & SMITH, LLP
`303 S. Washington Ave.
`Marshall, TX 75670
`Telephone: (903) 934-8450
`Facsimile: (903) 934-9257
`melissa@gillamsmithlaw.com
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`Parmanand K. Sharma (pro hac vice)
`Christopher T. Blackford (pro hac vice)
`Tyler M. Akagi (pro hac vice)
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
`GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
`901 New York Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20001-4413
`(202) 408-4000
`parmanand.sharma@finnegan.com
`christopher.blackford@finnegan.com
`
`Charles H. Suh (pro hac vice)
`Joseph M. Schaffner (pro hac vice)
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
`GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
`1875 Explorer Street, 8th Floor
`Reston, VA 20190-6023
`(571) 203-2700
`charles.suh@finnegan.com
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`COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. AND
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.
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`11
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`Case 2:22-cv-00290-JRG-RSP Document 20 Filed 11/22/22 Page 18 of 18 PageID #: 985
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on November 22, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
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`Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send a Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) to
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`all counsel of record who have appeared in this case on behalf of the parties and are deemed to
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`have consented to electronic service per Local Rule CV-5(a)(3).
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`/s/ Melissa R. Smith
`Melissa R. Smith
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