`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`SHERMAN DIVISION
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`CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14cv105
`CRIM. NO. 4:09cr193(2)
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`§§§
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`§
` §
`§
`§
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`ASTRIT BEKTESHI, #41709-424
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`VS.
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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`Movant Astrit Bekteshi, a prisoner confined at CI NE Ohio Correction Center in
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`Youngstown, Ohio, proceeding with the assistance of counsel, filed the above-styled and numbered
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`motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`On June 28, 2005, the Chicago, Illinois, office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
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`initiated an investigation targeting an Albanian Organized Crime (AOC) group headed by Astrit
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`Bekteshi (Movant). The Bekteshi organization was identified as a highly organized drug distribution
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`organization dealing with hydroponic marijuana, ecstasy, and cocaine. The marijuana and ecstasy
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`were obtained, in part, from a Chinese Organized Crime group in Vancouver, Canada, then smuggled
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`into the United States. Early in the investigation of the Bekteshi Organization, agents learned that
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`the group was obtaining cocaine from suppliers in Texas, and possibly, California and Florida.
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`Movant’s organization also operated illegal video gaming devices supplied by an Italian organized
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`crime group.
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`Movant insulated himself from the “hands-on” aspects of the operation by using trusted
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`1
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`Albanian associates. The FBI in Chicago used wire and microphone intercepts during its
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`investigation. In spite of how careful Movant and his subordinates were in their communications,
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`investigations revealed that Movant was involved in numerous drug transactions involving large
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`dollar amounts, including one occurring in Frisco, Texas. Movant and eight co-defendants were
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`charged by Indictment on October 15, 2009. Count One charged Movant with conspiracy to possess
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`with intent to distribute cocaine, heroin, 3,4 methylenedioxymethamphetamine (ecstasy), or
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`marijuana, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 846.
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`On November 15, 2011, Movant pleaded guilty to Count One pursuant to a written plea
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`agreement. Under Rule 11( c)(1)( C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Movant and the
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`Government agreed that the appropriate sentence was 135 months’ imprisonment.
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`Eight months after pleading guilty, Movant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on
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`August 2, 2012. The court held a hearing on the motion. An interpreter was provided for Movant.
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`Movant claimed that he was pressured by other prisoners to enter a plea. He also said that his
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`counsel told him that if he went to trial, he could face a life sentence. Movant claims that he pleaded
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`guilty because he was scared and because he did not understand the rules and regulations. The court
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`denied the motion on October 5, 2012.
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`The presentence report calculated Movant’s sentencing guideline range to be 168 to 210
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`months’ imprisonment. This was based on a total offense level of 35, and a criminal history category
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`of I. At sentencing, an interpreter was provided. The presentence report was read to Movant in
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`Albanian, and he confirmed he understood it. He then confirmed that the report accurately reflected
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`his background. Movant’s counsel again asked to withdraw Movant’s plea because Movant said he
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`was not guilty. Counsel and Movant confirmed Movant’s understanding that he would not receive
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`2
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`credit for acceptance of responsibility if he persisted in this posture.
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`The court accepted the findings of the presentence report, except that it found the offense
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`level to be 38, and the sentencing guideline range to be 235 to 293 months, based on Movant’s claim
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`that he was not guilty. The court accepted the plea agreement, and sentenced Movant to 135 months’
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`imprisonment pursuant to the written plea agreement and the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)( C)
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`agreement. After initially filing a notice of appeal, Movant then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.
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`The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the motion, and dismissed the
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`appeal on August 9, 2013. Movant filed the instant motion on February 15, 2014.
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` In his § 2255 motion, Movant claims that he is entitled to relief because his counsel was
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`ineffective. Specifically, Movant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to move
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`for a downward departure; (2) failing to conduct a reasonable investigation; (3) failing to reasonably
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`communicate with Movant; and (4) failing to object to the presentence report. The Government filed
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`a Response, asserting the claims are without merit. Movant did not file a Reply.
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`II. § 2255 PROCEEDINGS
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`As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that a § 2255 motion is “fundamentally different
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`from a direct appeal.” United States v. Drobny, 955 F.2d 990, 994 (5th Cir. 1992). A movant in a
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`§ 2255 proceeding may not bring a broad-based attack challenging the legality of the conviction.
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`The range of claims that may be raised in a § 2255 proceeding is narrow. A “distinction must be
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`drawn between constitutional or jurisdictional errors on the one hand, and mere errors of law on the
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`other.” United States v. Pierce, 959 F.2d 1297, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1992). A collateral attack is
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`limited to alleging errors of “constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude.” United States v. Shaid, 937
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`F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1991).
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`3
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`III. WAIVER IN MOVANT’S GUILTY PLEA
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`The Fifth Circuit has upheld the informed and voluntary waiver of post-conviction relief in
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`United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994). In United States v. Henderson, 72 F.3d
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`463, 465 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit held that a waiver may not be enforced against a § 2255
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`movant who claims that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered that waiver unknowing or
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`involuntary. In United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit held that an
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`ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised in a § 2255 proceeding survives a waiver only when
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`the claimed assistance directly affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itself. More recently,
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`the Fifth Circuit noted that it has upheld § 2255 waivers except for when there is an ineffective
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`assistance of counsel claim that affects the validity of that waiver or the plea itself or when the
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`sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. United States v. Hollins, 97 F. App’x 477, 479 (5th Cir.
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`2004).
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`Signed Plea Agreement
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`A review of the record shows that Movant signed a plea agreement containing the following
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`waiver provision:
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`Except as otherwise provided herein, the defendant expressly waives the right to
`appeal the conviction, sentence, fine and/or order of restitution or forfeiture in this
`case on all grounds. The defendant further agrees not to contest the conviction,
`sentence, fine and/or order of restitution in any post-conviction proceeding, included,
`but not limited to a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The defendant, however,
`reserves the right to appeal the following: (a) the failure of the Court, after accepting
`this agreement, to impose a sentence in accordance with the terms of this agreement;
`and (b) a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that affects the validity of the
`waiver or the plea itself.
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`4
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`It also states:
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`I have read or had read to me this plea agreement and have carefully reviewed every
`part of it with my attorney. I fully understand it and voluntarily agree to it.
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`Additionally, the plea agreement states:
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`The defendant has thoroughly reviewed all legal and factual aspects of this case with
`defense counsel and is fully satisfied with defense counsel’s legal representation.
`The defendant has received satisfactory explanations from defense counsel
`concerning each paragraph of this plea agreement, each of the defendant’s rights
`affected thereby, and the alternatives to entering a guilty plea. After conferring with
`counsel, the defendant concedes guilt and has concluded that it is in the defendant’s
`best interest to enter this agreement rather than proceeding to trial.
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`Finally, Movant stated in his plea agreement that the “plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made
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`and is not the result of force, threats, or promises other than those set forth in this Agreement.”
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`Consequently, any allegation that the guilty plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made is
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`contradicted by Movant’s signed plea agreement.
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`Plea Hearing
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`A review of the record shows that, at Movant’s change of plea hearing, held on December
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`5, 2011, Movant said:
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`5.
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`6.
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`His plea was voluntary, and he was pleading guilty because he was, indeed, guilty;
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`He understood the charges against him and the elements of the charge;
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`He understood the sentencing range;
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`He understood that the sentence would be no less than ten years and no more than life
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`imprisonment;
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`He understood how the Sentencing Guidelines might apply to his case;
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`He understood the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty;
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`5
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`7.
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`8.
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`9.
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`10.
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`11.
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`He understood the terms of his 11(c)(1)( C) agreement;
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`He understood that he would probably be deported once he had served his sentence;
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`He was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol that affected his mental
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`capabilities;
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`His guilty plea was voluntary, and not the produce of any force, threat, or promise;
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`He discussed the facts and the defenses of his case with counsel and is satisfied that
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`counsel fully considered his case;
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`12.
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`He affirmed that the written plea agreement contained the entire agreement
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`concerning his plea of guilty;
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`13.
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`He read the entire agreement, discussed it with counsel, and translated it into his
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`native language;
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`14.
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`He read the factual statement, translated it into his native language, and discussed it
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`fully with counsel, and agreed to everything contained in it;
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`15.
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`16.
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`He was fully competent to understand the charge against him and plead guilty; and
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`He was fully satisfied with the representation of his counsel.
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`See Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing, (dkt #269).
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`The court admonished Movant as to the charges against him. The court further explained the
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`rights Movant was giving up by pleading guilty to a felony. Movant stated that he understood the
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`rights that he was waiving. He also said that there had been no other promises made to him or
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`threats against him leading him to plead guilty. He said that he was pleading guilty voluntarily, of
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`his own free will, because he is guilty of the crime charged. Formal declarations in open court carry
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`with them a strong presumption of truth. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S. Ct. 1621,
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`6
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`1629, 52 L. Ed.2d 136 (1977). Although a defendant’s attestation of voluntariness at the time of the
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`plea is not an absolute bar to later contrary contentions, it places a heavy burden upon him. United
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`States v. Diaz, 733 F.2d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1984).
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`Movant fails to show that, but for trial counsel’s advice, he would have taken his chances at
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`trial. Conclusory allegations and bald assertions are insufficient to support the motion. Ross v.
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`Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1983) (“absent evidence in the record, a court cannot consider
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`a habeas petitioner’s bald assertions on a critical issue in his pro se petition (in state and federal
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`court), unsupported and unsupportable by anything else contained in the record, to be of probative
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`evidentiary value”); United States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1989); Schlang v. Heard,
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`691 F.2d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 1982). The Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant’s testimony at the plea
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`colloquy that no one attempted in any way to force him to plead guilty carries a strong presumption
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`of verity. United States v. Abreo, 30 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1994). In cases where the record
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`establishes that the defendant understood the nature of the charge against him and the direct
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`consequences of his act, the rudimentary demands of a fair proceeding and a knowing, voluntary plea
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`are satisfied. Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1980).
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`Consent to Administration of Guilty Plea
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`Additionally, on December 5, 2011, Movant signed a Consent to Administration of Guilty
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`Plea. In the consent, Movant stated that he understood his trial rights, and that by pleading guilty,
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`he knew he was giving up those rights – except for the right to counsel. Movant understood that by
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`pleading guilty, his immigration status may be affected and may lead to deportation. He affirmed
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`that he understood that the court will consult the Sentencing Guidelines in assessing a sentence, but
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`that the court is not bound by the guidelines. Movant affirmed that he was aware that the court is
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`not bound by any agreements between himself and the Government. He also understood that only
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`the United States District Judge will determine his sentence.
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`Furthermore, Movant stated that he was making his plea of guilty freely, and was not forced
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`to plead guilty. He affirmed that no promises had been made to him other than what was contained
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`in the plea agreement. He stated that he was making the plea of guilty because he was guilty.
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`Movant said he fully understood the charges, including the statutory minimum and maximum
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`penalties, as well as terms related to supervised release, special assessments, forfeiture, and
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`restitution. He said that he fully understood the plea agreement and has no reservations or questions
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`concerning it.
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`Movant stated that he understood his appeal rights and that those rights could be limited by
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`the terms of his plea agreement. He said that he realized that he may not appeal his plea of guilty
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`or withdraw his plea of guilty if his sentence is greater than what he originally believed or what was
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`told to him by counsel. He represented that he was not under the influence of any substances or
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`medications and that he was fully competent to enter a plea before the court. He also said that if he
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`had any questions, he knew he could freely consult with his attorney. Movant represented that he
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`was fully satisfied with his attorney’s representation. He affirmed that the Factual Statement that
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`he signed was true and correct, and that he had reviewed it and found no material errors in what he
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`represented to the court. He understood that his statements made in the consent were made under
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`the penalty of perjury. Any allegation that the plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made is
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`contradicted by Movant’s signed consent.
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`Findings of Facts
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`The magistrate court entered Findings of Facts on December 5, 2011. Based on the hearing
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`in which Movant pleaded guilty, the court found that Movant knowingly and voluntarily consented
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`to the administration of the Guilty Plea and Allocution. It also found that Movant and the
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`Government entered into a plea agreement filed and disclosed in open court pursuant to Fed. R.
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`Crim. P. 11(c)(2) and 11(c)(1)( C). It further found that Movant was fully competent and capable
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`of entering an informed plea, that he was aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences
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`of the plea, and that the plea of guilty was knowingly and voluntarily made, supported by an
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`independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of the offense. Any allegation
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`that the guilty plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made is further contradicted by the Findings
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`of Facts.
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`Factual Statement
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`Finally, Movant signed a Factual Statement on December 5, 2011. In it, he admitted that he
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`and one or more persons made an agreement to distribute or possess controlled substances with the
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`intent to distribute them. He knew the unlawful purpose of the agreement, but joined in it with the
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`intent to further it. He specifically conceded to participating in the following acts, among others:
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`Beginning in or about 2005, and continuing until in or about 2009, Bekteshi
`conspired with others to distribute or possess with intent to distribute at least 15
`kilograms but less than 50 kilograms of a mixture or substance containing cocaine
`and at least 100 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
`amount of marijuana in the Eastern District of Texas and elsewhere;
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`The defendant Bekteshi admits he was an organizer or leader and the criminal
`activity involved five or more participants and was otherwise extensive;
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`Bekteshi was a Chicago based narcotics trafficker;
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`On May 25, 2007, Bekteshi possessed with the intent to distribute 26 pounds of
`marijuana;
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`In or about June of 2008, Bekteshi conspired to purchase twenty-three (23) kilograms
`of cocaine;
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`On June 5, 2008, $285,000 United States currency belonging to Bekteshi was seized
`by law enforcement. This currency was intended for investment in cocaine;
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`On July 1, 2008, Bekteshi and others met to discuss purchases of cocaine from a
`Dallas, Texas source. Bekteshi supervised others at this meeting. At the meeting,
`it was discussed that the Chicago-based conspirators would routinely need 15-150
`kilograms of cocaine. The first transaction was to be for nineteen (19) kilograms of
`cocaine;
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`On July 5, 2008, co-conspirators possessed $300,000 United States currency that was
`sent to the Dallas, Texas area by Bekteshi for investment in cocaine.
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`Any allegation that the plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made is contradicted by Movant’s
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`signed Factual Statement.
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`Conclusion - Waiver in Movant’s Guilty Plea
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`In sum, the court found that Movant, after consultation with counsel, knowingly and
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`voluntarily pleaded guilty to the charges. It also found that Movant was fully competent and capable
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`of entering an informed plea, that he was aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences
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`of the plea, and that his guilty plea is a knowing and voluntary plea supported by an independent
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`basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of the offenses. Any allegation that Movant’s
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`plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made is contradicted by his signed plea agreement, the plea
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`hearing, the consent, the findings of fact, and the factual statement. Movant fails to show that he
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`did not understand the nature of a constitutional protection that he was waiving or that he had “such
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`an incomplete understanding of the charges against him that this plea cannot stand as an admission
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`of guilt.” James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1995).
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`10
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` In light of the waiver contained in Movant’s knowing and voluntary plea agreement, for the
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`court to consider his claims raised in his motion filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Movant must
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`allege that the court failed to impose a sentence in accordance with the terms of the agreement or that
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`ineffective assistance of counsel affects the validity of his waiver or plea itself. Movant does not
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`allege that the court failed to impose a sentence in accordance with the agreement. However,
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`because Movant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims could arguably affect the validity of the
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`waiver and plea itself, the court will examine them.
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`IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
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`Movant asserts that trial counsel was ineffectiveness in numerous instances.
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`Legal Standard
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`A movant who seeks to overturn his conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
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`counsel must prove his entitlement to relief by a preponderance of the evidence. James, 56 F.3d at
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`667. In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show that
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`“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” with reasonableness
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`judged under professional norms prevailing at the time counsel rendered assistance. Strickland v.
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`Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed.2d 864 (1984). The standard
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`requires the reviewing court to give great deference to counsel’s performance, strongly presuming
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`counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id., 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. The
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`right to counsel does not require errorless counsel; instead, a criminal defendant is entitled to
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`reasonably effective assistance. Boyd v. Estelle, 661 F.2d 388, 389 (5th Cir. 1981); Rubio v. Estelle,
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`689 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1982); Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1984).
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`Secondly, the movant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
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`unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
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`probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
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`at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Movant must “affirmatively prove,” not just allege, prejudice. Id., 466
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`U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. If he fails to prove the prejudice component, the court need not
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`address the question of counsel's performance. Id., 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
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`The duty of defense counsel to a defendant who desires to enter a plea of guilty is to ascertain
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`that the plea is voluntarily and knowingly made. Diaz, 733 F.2d at 376. The two-prong test
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`Strickland test applies to cases involving guilty pleas. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S. Ct.
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`366, 370, 88 L. Ed.2d 203 (1985). A movant must show that he did not understand the nature of
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`a constitutional protection he was waiving or that he had “such an incomplete understanding of the
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`charges against him that this plea cannot stand as an admission of guilt.” James, 56 F.3d at 666.
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`Thus, if a defendant understands the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his
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`plea, yet voluntarily chooses to plead guilty, the plea must be upheld on federal review. Diaz v.
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`Martin, 718 F.2d 1372, 1376-77 (5th Cir. 1983).
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`If a Movant challenges his guilty plea, there must be independent indicia of the likely merit
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`of his contentions, and mere contradictions of his statements at the guilty plea will not carry his
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`burden. Davis v. Butler, 825 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir. 1987). The validity of a guilty plea is a
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`question of law and will be upheld on habeas review if entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and
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`intelligently. Montoya v. Johnson, 226 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 2000).
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`Failure to Move for Downward Departure
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`Here, Movant claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a downward
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`departure. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel should have moved for a downward departure
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`12
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`at sentencing based on Movant’s “precarious position of serving an extended, second sentence in
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`an immigration facility subsequent to serving his period of incarceration.” Movant asserts counsel
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`should have asked for the downward departure based on Movant’s status as a deportable alien, his
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`cultural assimilation, and the hardship his deportation will cause his family.
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`Failure to Move for Downward Departure - Deportable Alien
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`In support of Movant’s claim concerning his status as a deportable alien, Movant relies on
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`Moreno v. United States, 2007 WL 2712482 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2007). The Moreno court noted
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`that a defendant’s status as a deportable alien could be considered as a factor for a downward
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`departure based on the possible extra time in custody that the defendant might serve at an
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`immigration facility. Id. at 2. The court then held that Moreno failed to meet his burden of proof
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`because he failed to show that the trial court “would have exercised its discretion to depart
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`downward.” Id. at 2-3 (“Movant’s own speculations about the sentencing phase of the case are not
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`sufficient to make a prima facie showing that counsel could have done something [that] would have
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`substantially changed his sentence.”).
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`In the instant case, Movant fails to present any evidence, from the record or otherwise, to
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`show that the court would have considered departing downward based on Movant’s status as a
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`deportable alien. Conclusory claims are insufficient to entitle a habeas corpus petitioner to relief.
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` Ross, 694 F.2d at 1011; Woods, 870 F.2d at 288; Schlang, 691 F.2d at 799. Movant fails to show
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`deficient performance or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged
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`unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.
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`at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Furthermore, Movant received the 135-month sentence for which he
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`bargained pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)( C). This issue is without merit.
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`Failure to Move for Downward Departure - Cultural Assimilation
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`Movant also claims that counsel should have argued for a downward departure based on
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`cultural assimilation. He relies on United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429, 432-33
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`(5th Cir. 2001). Although the court there noted that cultural assimilation is a permissible basis for
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`a downward departure, it held that the defendant’s situation must be atypical or extraordinary. Id.
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`at 433; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2045, 135 L. Ed.2d 392
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`(1996) (circumstances must exist that take the defendant’s case outside the “heartland” of cases
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`contemplated by the guidelines and that such departures not mentioned in the guidelines will be
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`“highly infrequent”).
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`Movant fails to present any evidence, from the record or otherwise, to show that his case is
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`atypical or extraordinary. The record shows that Movant worked as a mechanic and owned and
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`worked at a coffee shop. He said that he completed the Eighth Grade in Albania, and did not further
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`his education in the United States. The record does not show Movant’s participation in the
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`community or any religious or charity affiliations. Movant’s claim is conclusory, and as such, is
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`insufficient to entitle a habeas corpus petitioner to relief. Ross, 694 F.2d at 1011; Woods, 870 F.2d
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`at 288; Schlang, 691 F.2d at 799. He fails to show deficient performance or that there is a
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`reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged unprofessional errors, the result of the
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`proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Furthermore,
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`Movant received the 135-month sentence for which he bargained pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
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`11(c)(1)( C). This issue is without merit.
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`Failure to Move for Downward Departure - Hardship on Family
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`Movant claims that counsel should have argued for a downward departure based on the
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`hardship his family would face if he was deported. In United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 256
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`F. Supp.2d 917 (E.D. Wis., 2003), the court noted that this is a permissible basis for a downward
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`departure. In that case, a downward departure was warranted because the defendant had moved to
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`the United States when he was less than one year old, had never gone back to Mexico, and had no
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`experience living in Mexico. Id. at 920. The court also considered that almost all of the defendant’s
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`family lived in the United States – his mother, his siblings, his wife, and his children. Id.
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`In this case, the record shows that Movant came to the United States as an adult. His English
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`is limited. His wife is Albanian although she now lives in the United States. His mother and
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`siblings still live in Albania, and he reports having good relationships with them. Movant fails to
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`present any evidence, from the record or otherwise, to show that the court would have departed
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`downward based on Movant’s family status. Conclusory claims are insufficient to entitle a habeas
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`corpus petitioner to relief. Ross, 694 F.2d at 1011; Woods, 870 F.2d at 288; Schlang, 691 F.2d at
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`799. Movant fails to show deficient performance or that there is a reasonable probability that, but
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`for counsel’s alleged unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
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` Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Furthermore, he received the 135-month sentence
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`for which he bargained pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)( C). This issue is without merit.
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`Failure to Investigate
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`Movant next claims that trial counsel was ineffective in several instances for failing to
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`conduct a reasonable investigation. Trial counsel must engage in a reasonable amount of pretrial
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`investigation, and “at a minimum, . . . interview potential witnesses and . . . make an independent
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`investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th
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`Cir. 1985). A defendant who alleges a failure to investigate must allege with specificity what the
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`investigation would have revealed and how it would have altered the outcome of the trial. Gray v.
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`Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1093 (5th Cir. 1982).
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`Failure to Investigate - Abandoned Defense Efforts
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`Movant claims that his assertions of innocence “were never thoroughly investigated and that
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`his attorney instead abandoned any defense efforts leaving Bekteshi without any choice, but to enter
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`a guilty plea.” However, Movant fails to present any evidence, from the record or otherwise, to show
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`that his counsel’s alleged failure to investigate affected the outcome of his case. He provides no
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`specifics as to what counsel would have found had he investigated further. Movant’s claim is
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`conclusory, and as such, is insufficient to entitle a habeas corpus petitioner to relief. Ross, 694 F.2d
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`at 1011; Woods, 870 F.2d at 288; Schlang, 691 F.2d at 799. Movant fails to show deficient
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`performance or that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged unprofessional
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`errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.
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`Ct. at 2068. Furthermore, Movant said at his plea hearing that he was fully satisfied with counsel and
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`that counsel had fully considered his case and any defenses to the charges. He also said that he was
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`guilty, and that pleading guilty is in his best interest. This issue is meritless.
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`Failure to Investigate - Counsel Prevented Movant from Defending Himself
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`Movant next claims that counsel was ineffective when he did not allow Movant to defend
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`himself to investigators. However, Movant fails to present any evidence, from the record or
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`otherwise, to show that his counsel’s alleged failure to allow Movant to refute accusations affected
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`the outcome of his case. He provides no specifics as to how he would have supported a claim of
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`innocence. More importantly, he presents no evidence to show that there is a reasonable probability
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`that, but for counsel’s alleged unprofessional performance, the result of the proceedings would have
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`been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Movant’s claim is conclusory, and
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`as such, is insufficient to entitle a habeas corpus petitioner to relief. Ross, 694 F.2d at 1011;
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`Woods, 870 F.2d at 288; Schlang, 691 F.2d at 799. Movant fails to show deficient performance or
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`that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged unprofessional errors, the result
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`of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
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`Furthermore, Movant admitted to the facts of the case in the factual resume, and admitted to the fa