

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION**

STATE OF TEXAS	§	
By Attorney General Ken Paxton	§	
	§	
STATE OF ALASKA	§	Civil Action No.: 4:20-CV-957-SDJ
By Attorney General Treg R. Taylor	§	
	§	
STATE OF ARKANSAS	§	
By Attorney General Leslie Rutledge	§	JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
	§	
STATE OF FLORIDA	§	
By Attorney General Ashley Moody	§	
	§	
STATE OF IDAHO	§	
By Attorney General Lawrence G. Wasden	§	
	§	
STATE OF INDIANA	§	
By Attorney General Todd Rokita	§	
	§	
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY	§	
By Attorney General Daniel Cameron	§	
	§	
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI	§	
By Attorney General Lynn Fitch	§	
	§	
STATE OF MISSOURI	§	
By Attorney General Eric Schmitt	§	
	§	
STATE OF MONTANA	§	
By Attorney General Austin Knudsen	§	
	§	
STATE OF NEVADA	§	
By Attorney General Aaron D. Ford	§	
	§	
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA	§	
By Attorney General Wayne Stenehjem	§	
	§	
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO	§	
By Attorney General Domingo Emanuelli-Hernández	§	
	§	
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA	§	
By Attorney General Jason R. Ravensborg	§	

and

STATE OF UTAH
By Attorney General Sean D. Reyes

Plaintiffs,

vs.

GOOGLE LLC,

Defendant.

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AMENDED COMPLAINT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. NATURE OF THE CASE 1

II. PARTIES 8

III. JURISDICTION 9

IV. VENUE 10

V. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 10

 A. Online Display Advertising Markets 12

 1. Publishers’ Inventory Management Systems: Ad Servers 13

 2. Electronic Marketplaces for Display Advertising: Exchanges and Networks 16

 i. Display Ad Exchanges 17

 ii. Ad Networks for Display and Ad Networks for Mobile In-App Inventory 19

 3. Ad Buying Tools for Large and Small Advertisers 21

VI. THE RELEVANT MARKETS AND GOOGLE’S MARKET POWER 26

 A. Publisher Inventory Management: Publisher Ad Servers 26

 1. Publisher ad servers for web display inventory in the United States are a relevant antitrust market. 26

 2. Google has monopoly power in the publisher ad server market. 28

 B. Ad Exchanges 31

 1. Exchanges for web display inventory in the United States are a relevant antitrust market. 31

 2. Google has monopoly power in the exchange market. 33

 C. Ad Networks 35

 1. Networks for web display inventory in the United States are a relevant antitrust market. 35

 2. Google has monopoly power in the network market. 36

 D. Ad Buying Tools for Large and Small Advertisers 37

 1. Web display ad buying tools for small advertisers in the United States constitute a relevant antitrust market. 39

 2. Web display ad buying tools for large advertisers in the United States constitute a relevant antitrust market. 40

 3. Google has monopoly power in the web display ad buying tool market for small advertisers. 40

 E. YouTube 42

 1. Instream online video advertising is a relevant antitrust market in the United States.. 42

 2. Google has market power in the instream online video advertising market. 43

VII. ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT 43

 A. Google forces publishers to license Google’s ad server and trade in Google’s ad exchange. 44

 B. Google uses its control over publishers’ inventory to block exchange competition. 49

 1. Google blocks publishers from sending their inventory to more than one marketplace at a time. 50

...

- 2. Google blocks competition from non-Google exchanges and deceives publishers about Dynamic Allocation. 51
- 3. Google restricts information to foreclose competition and advantage itself. 53
 - i. Information asymmetry causes publishers and advertisers to trade on non-Google exchanges at their own risk. 55
 - ii. Google forecloses competition by using inside information to win auctions. 55
 - iii. While Google cites “privacy” as the justification for restricting access to user IDs, Google does not actually care about privacy. 59
- 4. Google blocks competing exchanges from accessing publishers’ high-value inventory and reaps the benefits for itself. 65
- C. A new industry innovation called “header bidding” promotes exchange competition; Google wants to kill it. 67
 - 1. Header bidding facilitates competition among ad exchanges. 68
 - 2. Google creates an alternative to header bidding that secretly stacks the deck in Google’s favor. 70
- D. Facebook helps Google “kill” header bidding with an unlawful agreement. 72
 - 1. Google gives Facebook a leg up in its auctions in return for Facebook backing off from header bidding. 77
 - 2. Google and Facebook agree in the [REDACTED] agreement to a secret [REDACTED] 81
- E. Google forces market participants to re-route trading through Google. 85
 - 1. Google trades ahead of bid orders to foreclose exchange competition. 85
 - 2. Google deceives exchanges to forgo header bidding. 86
 - 3. Google deceives publishers to disable rival exchanges in header bidding. 87
 - 4. Google cripples publishers’ ability to measure the success of rival exchanges in header bidding. 88
 - 5. Google obstructs publishers’ use of header bidding through caps. 89
 - 6. Google uses its scale in search to punish publishers that use header bidding. 89
 - 7. Google’s ad server gives exchanges that forego header bidding a leg up. 92
 - 8. Google excludes competition through “nontransparent pricing.” 93
 - 9. Google is trying to foreclose competition and create a “walled garden” on the open web. 94
 - i. Project [REDACTED] 94
 - ii. Privacy Sandbox 96
 - 10. Google excludes competition though Unified Pricing rules. 100
- F. Google forces advertisers to use Google’s ad buying tools. 102
 - 1. Google conduct that excludes competition in the exchange market also excludes competition in the ad buying tool markets. 102
 - 2. Google excludes competition in the market for ad buying tools by cutting YouTube off from competing ad buying tools. 103
- VIII. ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS. 105**
 - A. Anticompetitive Effects in the Publisher Ad Server Market 106
 - B. Anticompetitive Effects in the Exchange Market 108
 - C. Anticompetitive Effects in the Network Market 109
 - D. Anticompetitive Effects in the Markets for Display Ad Buying Tools for Small Advertisers and Display Ad Buying Tools for Large Advertisers. 110
 - E. Harm to Innovation 112

IX. CLAIMS 113

A. COUNT I – MONOPOLIZATION IN VIOLATION OF SECTION II OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 2 113

B. COUNT II – ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION IN VIOLATION OF SECTION II OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 2 115

C. COUNT III – UNLAWFUL TYING IN VIOLATION OF SECTION II OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 2 117

D. COUNT IV – UNLAWFUL AGREEMENT IN VIOLATION OF SECTION I OF THE SHERMAN ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1 119

E. COUNT V – SUPPLEMENTAL STATE LAW ANTITRUST CLAIMS 120

F. COUNT VI – SUPPLEMENTAL STATE LAW DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES CLAIMS 126

X. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 138

XI. DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL 145

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