Case 9:20-cv-00184-RC-ZJH Document 5 Filed 09/04/20 Page 1 of 33 PageID #: 111
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO.
`9:20-cv-00184-RC-ZJH
`
`
`ROLANDETTE GLENN; IDELL
`BELL; KERRY CARTWRIGHT;
`TAMMY FLETCHER; LAVEKA
`JENKINS; KIESHA JOHNSON;
`RONALD JOHNSON; DAISY WIL-
`LIAMS; DANICA WILSON; JOHN
`WYATT; CRYSTAL WYATT; and
`CLIFFORD BELL, Individually
`and as Personal Representative of
`the ESTATE OF BEVERLY
`WHITSEY,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`LUFKIN DIVISION
`
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`v.
`
`TYSON FOODS, INC.; JASON OR-
`SAK; ERICA ANTHONY; AND MA-
`RIA CRUZ,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT TYSON FOODS, INC.’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`Oral Argument Requested
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`II.
`
`
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES ................................................... 1
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................ 4
`A.
`The Complaint ......................................................................................... 4
`B.
`Federal regulation of meat and poultry facilities .................................. 5
`C.
`Designation of critical infrastructure ..................................................... 6
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................... 10
`I.
`The complaint’s allegations of causation are far too conclusory and
`speculative under Iqbal and Twombly. ........................................................... 10
`The complaint takes no account of the broad, express preemption of the
`Poultry Products Inspection Act. ..................................................................... 17
`A.
`The PPIA expressly preempts state-law requirements that differ
`from or add to the PPIA regulations .................................................... 17
`The PPIA regulates the control of “infectious disease” at poultry-
`processing facilities ............................................................................... 18
`Plaintiffs cannot impose state-law “requirements” that differ
`from or add to the PPIA’s regulations .................................................. 19
`III. The complaint takes no account of the federal designation of Tyson fa-
`cilities as critical infrastructure. ..................................................................... 22
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 25
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`
`
`
`
`-i-
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`CASES
`
`Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. v.
`Lockridge,
`403 U.S. 274 (1971) .......................................................................................... 17, 23
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ......................................................................................... passim
`Bass v. Stryker Corp.,
`669 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................... 3
`Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
`544 U.S. 431 (2005) ................................................................................................ 21
`Cary v. Hickenlooper,
`673 F. App’x 870 (10th Cir. 2016) .......................................................................... 15
`Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council,
`530 U.S. 363 (2000) .......................................................................................... 23, 24
`Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. State of S. Dakota ex rel. Payne,
`250 U.S. 163 (1919) ................................................................................................ 24
`Dames & Moore v. Regan,
`453 U.S. 654 (1981) ................................................................................................ 23
`Delaney v. Stryker Orthopaedics,
`Civ. A. No. 08-03210 (DMC), 2009 WL 564243 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2009) ................. 22
`Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc.,
`907 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1995) .................................................................................... 12
`E. Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
`532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976) .................................................................................. 23
`Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co.,
`751 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................. 11
`Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
`529 U.S. 861 (2000) .......................................................................................... 21, 25
`
`
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`
`-ii-
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`CASES (CONT.)
`Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Gerace,
`755 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1985) .................................................................................... 18
`Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace,
`954 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1992) .................................................................................. 15
`Hillman v. Maretta,
`569 U.S. 483 (2013) ................................................................................................ 23
`Hines v. Davidowitz,
`312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) ............................................................................................ 25
`Horowitz v. Stryker Corp.,
`613 F. Supp. 2d 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) ................................................................. 3, 22
`In re Abbott,
`954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020) .................................................................................. 12
`In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
`624 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................. 10
`Lloyd v. Jones,
`No. 9:18-CV-211, 2019 WL 4786874 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2019)
`(Giblin, J.) ............................................................................................................... 10
`N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. State of N. Dakota ex rel. Langer,
`250 U.S. 135 (1919) ................................................................................................ 23
`Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris,
`565 U.S. 452 (2012) .................................................................................... 18, 20, 21
`Osburn v. Anchor Labs., Inc.,
`825 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1987) .................................................................................. 21
`Peterson v. Silverado Senior Living, Inc.,
`790 F. App’x 614 (5th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................ 15
`
`
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`-iii-
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`CASES (CONT.)
`Price v. Wallace,
`Civ. A. No. 1:13cv677, 2016 WL 5339700 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2016)
`(Giblin, J.) ............................................................................................................... 12
`Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton,
`323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003)............................................................................... 23
`Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,
`552 U.S. 312 (2008) ................................................................................................ 21
`Rincon v. Covidien,
`No. 16-CV-10033 (JMF), 2017 WL 2242969 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017) ................. 15
`
`San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v.
`Garmon,
`359 U.S. 236 (1959) ................................................................................................ 25
`Scott v. Pfizer, Inc.
`249 F.R.D. 248 (E.D. Tex. 2008) ...................................................................... 20, 21
`Swindol v. Aurora Flight Scis. Corp.,
`805 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................... 5
`Terrebonne v. Blackburn,
`646 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1981) .................................................................................. 12
`Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe,
`729 F.3d 481 (2013) .................................................................................................. 5
`United States v. Garcia,
`855 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 2017) .................................................................................... 5
`Valentine v. Collier,
`960 F.3d 707 (5th Cir. 2020) .................................................................................. 12
`Waller v. Hanlon,
`922 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................ 10, 12
`
`
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`-iv-
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`STATUTES
`21 U.S.C. § 456(a) .......................................................................................................... 5
`21 U.S.C. § 467e ....................................................................................................... 6, 20
`21 U.S.C. § 678 ............................................................................................................. 20
`50 U.S.C. § 4511(a) ................................................................................................ 23, 24
`Texas Wrongful Death Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.002(b)
`(1985) ...................................................................................................................... 11
`
`
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`9 C.F.R. §§ 300 et seq. .................................................................................................. 20
`9 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 et seq. ................................................................................................. 6
`9 C.F.R. § 300.2(a).......................................................................................................... 6
`9 C.F.R. § 300.2(b)(2) ..................................................................................................... 6
`9 C.F.R. § 381.45 .......................................................................................................... 19
`9 C.F.R. § 381.36(c) ...................................................................................................... 19
`9 C.F.R. § 415.5(b)........................................................................................................ 19
`9 C.F.R. § 416.5 ............................................................................................................ 19
`9 C.F.R. § 416.5(c) ........................................................................................................ 19
`85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 18, 2020).............................................................................. 6
`85 Fed. Reg. 20,699 (Apr. 14, 2020) .............................................................................. 6
`85 Fed. Reg. 26,313 (Apr. 28, 2020) ........................................................................ 7, 23
`
`
`
`
`
`-v-
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`

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`
`MOTION
`Defendant Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Tyson”) respectfully moves under Rule 12(b)(6) to
`dismiss the complaint. The complaint fails to plausibly allege that Tyson caused the
`alleged injuries, and even if the allegations were otherwise sufficient, the alleged
`causes of action would be preempted by federal law.
`
`INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES
`The United States is facing a global pandemic whose impact and scope are with-
`out modern precedent. Millions have been infected with the novel coronavirus, and
`more than 180,000 Americans have died of complications related to COVID-19.
`This case was filed by twelve Plaintiffs. Eleven of the Plaintiffs allege that they
`are current and former Tyson employees who contracted COVID-19 and became ill
`while at work at a Tyson poultry-processing facility in Center, Texas. In addition, a
`personal representative of another Tyson employee, Beverly Whitsey, alleges that she
`passed away from the disease.
`That these individuals are among the many thousands of Americans who have
`died or suffered illness during the COVID-19 pandemic is a tragedy. But the com-
`plaint brought by Plaintiffs fails to adequately plead a plausible claim against Tyson.
`The complaint pleads no theory of liability or causation other than conclusory allega-
`tions that Tyson was negligent for allegedly failing to shut down or provide sufficient
`protective measures, and the reader is left to speculate that the absence of those
`measures caused Plaintiffs to contract COVID-19. The complaint does not allege any
`particular incident of exposure occasioned by alleged negligence, nor does it attempt
`to rule out other potential causes of infection such as community spread. The com-
`plaint simply concludes that Plaintiffs became infected because they worked at Ty-
`son. This case must be dismissed.
`
`
`
`
`1
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`

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`Tyson has proactively and aggressively responded to the pandemic, working from
`the very beginning of COVID-19’s appearance in the United States to meet or exceed
`federal workplace guidelines, and investing millions for protective measures for its
`team members. Tyson’s efforts to protect its workers while continuing to supply
`Americans with food in the face of the pandemic continue to this day.
`It is neither just nor plausible to simply assume that Plaintiffs must have con-
`tracted COVID-19 from work merely because they worked at Tyson, much less due to
`Tyson’s alleged actions. If the sparse, conclusory allegations here were sufficient, vir-
`tually any employer, retail business, restaurant, school, or host could be sued for fail-
`ing to take sufficient measures to protect anyone who worked on or visited its prem-
`ises from infection. The number of lawsuits in Texas alone would be staggering:
`
`Federal pleading standards require plausible allegations of causation, and atten-
`tion to plausibility is crucial here or the scope of litigation could become its own epi-
`demic if wholly speculative and conclusory claims can proceed. Those standards are
`especially important when applied to allegations of liability directed to a federally-
`regulated food processing facility that has been designated as critical and essential
`to the nation in order to continue to provide much-needed food during this national
`emergency. The complaint should be dismissed for the following reasons.
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`

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`First, plausibility. Plaintiffs must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
`true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
`662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). It is not sufficient to allege simply that Plaintiffs
`became infected because they worked at Tyson. To satisfy Iqbal and Twombly, Plain-
`tiffs must allege “sufficient factual matter” to “plausibly” conclude that (1) Plaintiffs
`were infected at Tyson; and (2) the infections resulted from Tyson’s negligence rather
`than from some other cause. The complaint here falls short on both counts: Plaintiffs
`have not offered any factual allegations on causation—plausible or otherwise—that
`Plaintiffs were infected at Tyson, much less due to Tyson’s negligence. To hold other-
`wise would disregard the well-established standards of Iqbal and Twombly and open
`the floodgates to potentially thousands of speculative claims.
`Second, express federal preemption. Even if it could be plausibly alleged that
`Plaintiffs were infected while at work because of Tyson’s negligence, the complaint
`must also allege how its theory of liability could fit within the express preemption of
`the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (“PPIA”). The PPIA authorizes the U.S.
`Department of Agriculture to regulate infectious diseases at poultry-processing facil-
`ities, and it has done so through a comprehensive regulatory regime that expressly
`prohibits states from adopting different or additional requirements. Yet the com-
`plaint makes no attempt to explain how Plaintiffs’ proposed state-law standards are
`consistent with the PPIA. A sufficient complaint must do so. See, e.g., Horowitz v.
`Stryker Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 271, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing complaint for
`failure to plead allegations sufficient to avoid preemption under FDA regulations),
`cited with approval in Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669 F.3d 501, 509 (5th Cir. 2012).
`Finally, the federal designations and Presidential orders. The complaint also
`takes no account of the national emergency declared by the President, the designation
`of Tyson as critical infrastructure, and the subsequent reinforcing directives by the
`
`
`
`
`3
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`

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`President. Any claim that could survive a motion to dismiss must take account of
`these federal actions in the midst of a national emergency.
`Ms. Whitsey’s death is a tragedy, and the illness experienced by the other Plain-
`tiffs is unfortunate. But legal claims arising from the COVID-19 pandemic must sat-
`isfy well-established pleading standards. The complaint does not satisfy those stand-
`ards, nor does it allege how Plaintiffs’ claims are not preempted by federal law. For
`those reasons, the complaint should be dismissed.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`The Complaint
`Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the District Court of Shelby County, Texas in June
`2020, naming Tyson employees Jason Orsak, Erica Anthony, and Maria Cruz as de-
`fendants. [Dkt. 1-1] Soon after, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Petition and added
`Tyson as a defendant. [Dkt. 1-1] All Defendants then timely removed on the basis of
`federal officer removal and federal question jurisdiction. [Dkt. 1] Rather than plead
`individualized facts, the First Amended Complaint merely alleges that each Plaintiff
`“worked at Tyson Food’s Center, Texas facility and contracted COVID-19 because of
`the unsafe working conditions at the Center, Texas facility.” [Dkt. 1-1 ¶¶ 7-47] But
`Plaintiffs allege no facts as to how, when, or why they contracted COVID-19, or ruling
`out contraction from another community source.
`Plaintiffs also vaguely assert that Tyson “failed to take adequate precautions to
`protect the workers at its meatpacking facilities, including the Center, Texas meat-
`packing facility,” and allege in particular that Tyson failed in the following respects:
`a. Requiring Plaintiffs to “continue working” at the facility;
`b. Failing to provide adequate personal protective equipment;
`c. Failing to implement social distancing;
`
`
`
`
`4
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`d. Failing to follow guidelines set forth by the World Health Organi-
`zation (“WHO”) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
`(“CDC”);
`e. Failing to warn of dangerous conditions regarding COVID-19;
`f. Failing to provide “adequate medical treatment”; and
`g. Allowing individuals infected with COVID-19 to continue working.
`[Dkt. 1-1 ¶¶ 25, 31] Again, Plaintiffs do not allege any incident or mechanism tied to
`Tyson’s alleged negligence that led to Plaintiffs’ illness, nor do they account for or
`attempt to rule out other sources of infection.
`Federal regulation of meat and poultry facilities
`B.
`Tyson is the largest food company in the U.S., providing more than 20% of the
`nation’s supply of meat and poultry—enough to feed 60 million Americans every day.
`Tyson employs more than 120,000 workers at processing facilities. Plaintiffs worked
`at a poultry-processing facility in Center, Texas. [Dkt. 1-1 ¶ 23]
`Tyson’s poultry facility is subject to federal regulation under the Poultry Prod-
`ucts Inspection Act of 1957, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451 et seq.; see also FSIS Meat, Poultry and
`Egg Product Inspection Directory at 532 (June 8, 2020) (identifying the Center facility
`as establishment number P325).1 The PPIA requires that all poultry-processing fa-
`cilities satisfy “sanitary practices [that] are required by regulations promulgated by
`the Secretary [of Agriculture].” 21 U.S.C. § 456(a). The Department’s Food Safety and
`Inspection Service (“FSIS”) promulgates the relevant regulations. See 9 C.F.R.
`
`1 https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/bf8d9766-9767-4e0c-a9f1-efea0b2a42
`bc/MPI_Directory_Establishment_Name.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. This Court may
`properly take judicial notice of information contained on a governmental agency’s
`webpage. See Swindol v. Aurora Flight Scis. Corp., 805 F.3d 516, 518-19 (5th Cir.
`2015); see also Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481, 490 n.12 (2013)
`(same); United States v. Garcia, 855 F.3d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 2017) (“This court and
`numerous others routinely take judicial notice of information contained on state
`and federal government websites.”).
`
`
`
`
`5
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`§§ 300.2(a), (b)(2). That rulemaking authority expressly preempts any attempt by the
`states to impose “additional” or “different” requirements. See 21 U.S.C. § 467e.
`FSIS has issued rigorous, detailed regulations to govern poultry processors’ fa-
`cilities and operations. See 9 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 et seq. The Center facility is subject to
`hundreds of FSIS regulations—enough to fill hundreds of pages of the Code of Federal
`Regulations—that address poultry-processing facilities and operations in minute de-
`tail, from the physical structure of the facility, to the details of the processing opera-
`tion, to the many inspection requirements such facilities must satisfy, among many
`other subjects. And, as discussed in more detail in Section II below, those regulations
`also address the use of personal protective equipment and the control of infectious
`disease.
`C. Designation of critical infrastructure
`The federal government has designated food producers as part of the country’s
`critical infrastructure, underscoring the essential nature of such producers by order-
`ing those facilities to operate pursuant to federal CDC guidelines.
`Declarations of national emergency. On March 13, 2020, the President declared
`that “the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States constitutes a national emergency,
`beginning March 1, 2020.” Exec. Office of Pres., Declaring a National Emergency Con-
`cerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337,
`15,337 (Mar. 18, 2020). Similar emergency declarations were issued for Texas and
`Shelby County. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Texas; Major Disaster and Related De-
`terminations, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,699, 20,699-700 (Apr. 14, 2020); State of Tex., Governor
`Abbott Declares State of Disaster in Texas Due to COVID-19, Mar. 13, 2020;2 Cty. of
`
`
`2 https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-declares-state-of-disaster-in-texas-
`due-to-covid-19.
`
`
`
`
`6
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`Shelby, Tex., County Judge Declaration of Local State of Disaster Due to Public
`Health Emergency, Mar. 20, 2020.3
`Critical infrastructure industries should follow CDC guidelines. Soon after, on
`March 16, the President issued Coronavirus Guidelines for America, which empha-
`sized that, unlike workers in some industries, employees in “critical infrastructure
`industr[ies],” including “food supply,” have a “special responsibility” and should “fol-
`low CDC guidance.” Exec. Office of Pres., The President’s Coronavirus Guidelines for
`America (“Coronavirus Guidelines for America”), Mar. 16, 2020, at 2.4
`Texas issued a similar order on March 31 recognizing food-processing facilities
`within the state as essential infrastructure. See State of Tex., Governor Abbott Issues
`Executive Order Implementing Essential Services and Activities Protocols, Mar. 31,
`2020, at 3 (adopting CISA definition and declaring that “all critical infrastructure
`should be allowed to remain operational”).5
`Those directives were further embodied in an April 28, 2020 executive order is-
`sued by the President under the Defense Production Act of 1950 (“DPA”), 50 U.S.C.
`§§ 4501 et seq. See Exec. Office of Pres., Executive Order on Delegating Authority Un-
`der the DPA with Respect to Food Supply Chain Resources During the National Emer-
`gency Caused by the Outbreak of COVID-19 (“Food Supply Chain Resources”), 85 Fed.
`Reg. 26,313, 26,313 (Apr. 28, 2020). In that order, the President directed the Secre-
`tary of Agriculture “to ensure that meat and poultry processors continue operations
`consistent with the guidance for their operations jointly issued by the CDC and
`
`
`3 http://www.co.shelby.tx.us/upload/page/2731/docs/Declaration%20of%20Lo-
`cal%20State%20of%20Disaster%20Due%20to%20Public%20Health%20Emer-
`gency.pdf.
`4 https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/03.16.20_coronavirus-
`guidance_8.5x11_315PM.pdf.
`5 https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-issues-executive-order-implement-
`ing-essential-services-and-activities-protocols.
`7
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`OSHA.” Id. The President specifically underscored that “[i]t is important that proces-
`sors of beef, pork, and poultry . . . in the food supply chain continue operating and
`fulfilling orders to ensure a continued supply of protein for Americans.” Id.
`The same day, the Secretary of Agriculture announced that his Department
`would “work with meat processing to affirm they will operate in accordance with the
`CDC and OSHA guidance” and “ensure that facilities implementing this guidance to
`keep employees safe can continue operating.” U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA to Imple-
`ment President Trump’s Executive Order on Meat and Poultry Processors, Apr. 28,
`2020.6 Reiterating that “[o]ur nation’s meat and poultry processing facilities play an
`integral role in the continuity of our food supply chain,” the Secretary explained that
`the CDC and OSHA guidance would “help ensure employee safety to reopen plants
`or to continue to operate those still open” and “ensure that these plants are allowed
`to operate to produce the meat protein that Americans need.” Id.
`The Department of Agriculture has continued to emphasize that “critical infra-
`structure meatpacking facilities across the United States” must continue operating
`under federal guidance for such facilities from the CDC and OSHA, which will “en-
`sure a safe and stable supply of protein is available for American consumers all while
`keeping employees safe.” U.S. Dep’t of Agric., America’s Meatpacking Facilities Prac-
`ticing Safe Reopening to Ensure a Stable Food Supply, May 8, 2020, at 1;7 see also,
`e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA, FDA Strengthen U.S. Food Supply Chain Protections
`During COVID-19 Pandemic (“Food Supply Chain Protections”), May 19, 2020, at 2
`(“All of the food and agriculture sector . . . are considered critical infrastructure, and
`
`
`6 https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2020/04/28/usda-implement-president-
`trumps-executive-order-meat-and-poultry.
`7 https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2020/05/08/americas-meatpacking-fa-
`cilities-practicing-safe-reopening-ensure.
`8
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`it is vital for the public health that they continue to operate in accordance with guide-
`lines from the CDC and OSHA regarding worker health and safety.”).8
`Continued operations are governed by federal standards. Following the Presi-
`dent’s direction, the Secretary of Agriculture ordered “meat and poultry processing
`plants” to apply the CDC and OSHA guidance “specific to the meat and poultry pro-
`cessing industry to implement practices and protocols for safeguarding the health of
`the workers and the community while staying operational or resuming operations.”
`Letter from Sonny Perdue, Sec’y of Agric., to Stakeholders (“Stakeholders Letter”)
`(May 5, 2020);9 see also Letter from Sonny Perdue, Sec’y of Agric., to Governors at 1
`(May 5, 2020) (“Governors Letter”) (same);10 U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Secretary Perdue
`Issues Letters on Meat Packing Expectations, May 6, 2020 (same).11
`With the ever-changing understanding of COVID-19, the CDC and OSHA have
`continually updated their guidance as new information about the disease comes to
`light. See Meat and Poultry Processing Workers and Employers Meat & Poultry Pro-
`cessors: Interim Guidance from CDC and the Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
`istration (OSHA) (updated July 9, 2020).12 But the message from the President and
`the Department of Agriculture has remained clear and unchanged from the begin-
`ning: Meat and poultry processors should continue to operate subject to applicable
`federal guidance from the CDC and OSHA.
`
`
`8 https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2020/05/19/usda-fda-strengthen-us-
`food-supply-chain-protections-during-covid.
`9 https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/stakeholder-letters-covid.pdf.
`10 https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/governor-letters-covid.pdf.
`11 https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2020/05/06/secretary-perdue-issues-
`letters-meat-packing-expectations.
`12 https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/meat-poul-
`try-processing-workers-employers.html.
`9
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`I.
`
`ARGUMENT
`The complaint’s allegations of causation are far too conclusory and
`speculative under Iqbal and Twombly.
`Complaints must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
`claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
`(quotation omitted). “To be plausible, the complaint’s ‘[f]actual allegations must be
`enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” In re Great Lakes Dredge
`& Dock Co., 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). “A claim has facial
`plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
`the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable . . . .” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
`Applying those standards is “a two-step inquiry.” Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590,
`599 (5th Cir. 2019). First, the Court must “identify the complaint’s well-pleaded fac-
`tual content.” Id. Significantly, the “assumption of truth” applicable to well-pleaded
`facts does not apply to “pleadings that . . . are no more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556
`U.S. at 679. As this Court has frequently noted:
`
`The Court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwar-
`ranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” While legal conclu-
`sions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must be supported
`by factual allegations. Iqbal, [556 U.S. at 678] (“[t]hreadbare recitals
`of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
`statements, do not suffice [and] [l]egal conclusions are not entitled to
`the assumption of truth.”).
`
`Lloyd v. Jones, No. 9:18-CV-211, 2019 WL 4786874, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2019)
`(Giblin, J.) (citations omitted).
`Second, having identified the “well-pleaded factual allegations,” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
`at 679, the Court “ask[s] whether th[ose] remaining allegations ‘are sufficient to
`nudge the [plaintiff’s] claim across the “plausibility” threshold,’” Waller, 922 F.3d at
`599 (quoting Doe v. Robertson, 751 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2014)). This is a “context-
`specific task” and “requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
`10
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`Case 9:20-cv-00184-RC-ZJH Document 5 Filed 09/04/20 Page 17 of 33 PageID #: 127
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`common sense,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, in determining whether the court “can rea-
`sonably infer from the complaint’s well-pleaded factual content ‘more than the mere
`possibility of [liability].’” Waller, 922 F.3d at 599 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 679).
`This standard is not met when the alleged harm could be explained by an alter-
`native theory that the complaint does not plead “sufficient factual matter” to rebut.
`Iqb