Case 4:22-cv-03096 Document 5 Filed on 09/12/22 in TXSD Page 1 of 16
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`HOUSTON DIVISION
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`KONNECH, INC.,
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`PLAINTIFF,
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`v.
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`TRUE THE VOTE, INC., GREGG
`PHILLIPS, and CATHERINE
`ENGELBRECHT,
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`DEFENDANTS.
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`CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:22-CV-03096
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`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
`AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
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`Plaintiff Konnech, Inc. (“Konnech”) files this Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
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`and Preliminary Injunction and Brief in Support and shows as follows:
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`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
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`This is an action for temporary and preliminary injunctive relief arising out of Defendants
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`True the Vote, Inc., Catherine Engelbrecht, and Gregg Phillips (collectively “Defendants”)
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`admitted hacking and theft of financial and other sensitive personal data of purportedly 1.8 million
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`U.S. poll workers allegedly from a Konnech protected computer. As an initial matter, Konnech
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`has never managed customer data for 1.8 million poll workers or even a small percentage of that
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`many poll workers. But regardless, based on the extensive security measures Konnech has in
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`place, Defendants could only access any of Konnech’s data if they illegally hacked into and stole
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`data from Konnech’s protected computers. Defendants must be enjoined from taking any further
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`unlawful action and to return the information they claim to have wrongfully stolen from Konnech.
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`First, Konnech will succeed on the merits of its claims because Defendants have repeatedly
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`confessed their unlawful violation of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 1030,
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`et. seq., and the Texas Harmful Access by Computer statute. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
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`143.001; TEXAS PENAL CODE § 33.02. Specifically, Defendants claim that they and/or others
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`working in concert with them gained unauthorized access to Konnech’s protected computers and
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`obtained personal information concerning U.S. poll workers. Indeed, Defendants admit they are
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`under investigation by the FBI in connection with their unlawful conduct.
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`Second, Konnech will suffer immediate irreparable injury without injunctive relief
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`because, based on Defendants’ repeated confessions, they are interfering with Konnech’s ability
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`to control access to its protected computers and threatening to publicly disclose the data that they
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`illegally obtained. Specifically, Defendants claim to have stolen data on 1.8 million U.S. poll
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`workers—including personal identifying information, such as social security numbers, email
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`addresses, phone numbers, and banking information—from what Defendants describe as an
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`unsecured server and are threatening to publicly disclose it in advance of the 2022 midterm
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`elections. As a result, Konnech will be immediately and irreparably harmed by a breach of security
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`of Konnech’s protected computers, disclosure of confidential information, the unauthorized use
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`and/or disclosure of data from Konnech’s protected computers, loss of confidence and trust of
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`Konnech’s customers, loss of goodwill, and loss of business reputation.
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`Third, the threatened injury to Konnech far outweighs any damages that an injunction
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`might cause to Defendants. Defendants will not be damaged by enjoining them from committing
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`further unlawful acts, by returning the information they stole from Konnech, or by describing how
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`Defendants obtained data from Konnech’s protected computers without authorization, so that there
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`is no further unauthorized access to Konnech’s protected computers in connection with the 2022
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`midterm elections.
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`And fourth, it is in the public’s interest to enjoin conduct that the United States and Texas
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`have found to be unlawful, to prevent the unlawful disclosure of personal identifying and banking
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`information, and to benefit the public by increasing confidence in the U.S. election process.
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`Accordingly, Konnech is entitled to a temporary restraining order and preliminary
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`injunction enjoining Defendants, directly or indirectly, and whether alone or in concert with others:
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`(1) from accessing or attempting to access Konnech’s protected computers; (2) to return to
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`Konnech all property and data obtained from Konnech’s protected computers, whether original,
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`duplicated, computerized, handwritten, or any other form whatsoever; (3) from using, disclosing,
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`or exploiting the property and data downloaded from Konnech’s protected computers; (4) to
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`preserve, and not to delete, destroy, conceal or otherwise alter, any files or other data obtained
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`from Konnech’s protected computers; (5) to identify each individual and/or organization involved
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`in accessing Konnech’s protected computers; (6) ordering Defendants to confidentially disclose to
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`Konnech how, when, and by whom its servers were accessed without authority so that additional
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`necessary security measures can be implemented by Konnech to maintain the integrity of the data
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`therein in light of the upcoming midterm elections; and (7) ordering Defendants to identify all
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`persons and/or entities, in Defendants’ knowledge, who have had possession, custody or control
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`of any information or data from Konnech’s protected computers.
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`The Court should consider this Motion ex parte, because if Defendants or those acting in
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`concert with Defendants learn about this action and the relief sought herein, Defendants or those
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`acting in concert with Defendants may follow through on their threats to publicly release the data
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`before the Court has an opportunity to consider this Motion, and may otherwise destroy evidence
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`of their misconduct.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
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`In the summer of 2022, Defendants advertised an event they dubbed “The Pit,” scheduled
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`for August 13, 2022, at which they claimed they would disclose “devastating” information that, in
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`their words, would be definitive proof that the 2020 Presidential Election was stolen from former
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`President Donald Trump. The Pit was hosted by Defendants and attended by over 100 invite-only
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`guests, handpicked by Defendants Engelbrecht and Phillips based on who they believed would be
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`supportive of their conspiracy and who would best spread the disinformation they planned to
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`disclose. After Defendants shut off the livestream of The Pit, Defendants disclosed that they had
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`been secretly working on something they called “The Tiger Project,” during which they allegedly
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`discovered that Konnech had an unsecure server located in Wuhan, China, from which Defendants
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`claim to have obtained U.S. election data.
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`One attendee of The Pit, who is actually the producer of Defendant Phillips’ “Patriot
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`Games” podcast, immediately posted a high-level summary of what was discussed by Defendants
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`Phillips and Engelbrecht after the livestream ended. The post has been “ReTruthed” (the Truth
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`Social equivalent of a Retweet) nearly 3,000 times, including by Defendant Phillips as an apparent
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`confirmation of the event summary:
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`1 A full recitation of the facts is contained in Plaintiff’s Original Complaint.
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`(Ex. A-4.)
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`Specifically, Defendants claim that they, and/or others acting in concert with them,
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`unlawfully used a password to access a Konnech server without authorization and downloaded the
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`personal data on 1.8 million U.S. poll workers—including social security numbers, phone
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`numbers, email addresses, and banking information. (See Exs. A-1, A-2, A-4.)
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`As an initial matter, Konnech has never managed customer data for 1.8 million U.S. poll
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`workers or even a small percentage of that amount. But regardless, based on the extensive security
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`measures Konnech has in place, Defendants could only access any of Konnech’s data if they
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`illegally hacked into and stole data from Konnech’s protected computers.
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`To be clear, Konnech has never authorized Defendants, nor anyone acting in concert with
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`them, to access Konnech’s protected computers or to obtain, use, and/or disclose any data
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`contained on those protected computers. (Ex. A, Yu Aff. at ¶ 5.) Konnech takes significant
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`measures to protect the security and integrity of its protected computers, including controlling
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`access to its offices, entering into confidentiality agreements with its customers and employees,
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`and using two-factor authentication provided to a select group of Konnech employees with access
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`to the protected computers which store poll worker data. (Ex. A, Yu Aff. at ¶ 3.)
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`Defendants also falsely and maliciously claim that the data they obtained by hacking into
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`Konnech’s protected computer demonstrates that Konnech is being used as a vehicle for the
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`Chinese Communist Party to breach U.S. elections. (See Ex. A-2.) Defendants claim that they
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`took the information they stole from Konnech to the FBI, but that the FBI subsequently opened an
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`investigation of Defendants for gaining unauthorized access to Konnech’s protected computers
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`and stealing data from Konnech. (See Exs. A-1, A-3.)
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`Following The Pit, Defendants went on a media blitz to publicize their newly fabricated
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`conspiracy theory in an unabashed effort to enrich themselves at the expense of Konnech.
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`Defendant Phillips, in particular, appeared on several different podcasts and gave numerous
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`interviews where he not only continued to spew baseless lies about Konnech, but he repeatedly
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`confessed to hacking Konnech’s servers and stealing its data.
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`For example, on August 23, 2022, Defendant Phillips appeared on the “Prophets and
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`Patriots” video podcast where he described meeting his “guys” at a hotel room in Dallas, Texas,
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`where they put “towels under the doors” like “some kind of a James Bond kind of thing,” and
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`proceeded to hack into a Konnech server. (See Ex. A-1.) Indeed, Defendant Phillips admitted on
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`that podcast that they “took [Konnech’s data] directly” and that Defendant True the Vote plans to
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`publicly “release all of [Konnech’s] data” through “drops” to subscribers to Defendants’ website.
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`(Id.) Defendant Phillips also admitted that Defendants are the subjects of an ongoing FBI
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`investigation for their roles in allegedly hacking Konnech’s server and stealing their data. (Id.)
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`Likewise, on an August 30, 2022 video podcast titled, “Here’s How They’ll Try to Steal
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`the Midterms,” Defendant Phillips again described how “[his] analysts” “brought [him] to Dallas
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`into a hotel room at the Anatole Hilton Hotel” at “nearly midnight” where “they plugged one of
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`their computers into the television” and began looking at Konnech’s data on a server Defendants
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`hacked into. (See Ex. A-2.) To be sure, Defendant Phillips admits that, on “that night, in mid-
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`January of 2021, [he] personally witnessed the scrolling through millions and millions of records
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`about Americans,” which were obtained by gaining unauthorized access to Konnech’s protected
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`computer servers. (Id.) Defendant Phillips then further described how he “immediately drove
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`down to Houston” and got Defendant Engelbrecht “to come over and meet [him]” that next
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`morning, where they came up with a plan to file a complaint with the FBI and turn over the data
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`they allegedly stole. (Id.)
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`And on a September 2, 2022 video podcast hosted by Defendant Phillips called “Patriot
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`Games,”—during which he admits the FBI accused him of being “the thief that stole the Chinese
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`internet”—Defendant Engelbrecht confessed to how Defendants conspired to unlawfully access
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`Konnech’s protected computers, and how she and Defendant True the Vote “pulled in [Defendant
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`Phillip’s] team, and asked them to take a deeper dive” around the security of Konnech’s software.
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`(See Ex. A-3.)
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`Defendants are now threatening to publicly disclose, ahead of the 2022 midterm elections,
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`all of the information they obtained by unlawfully accessing and downloading information from
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`Konnech’s protected computers (see Ex. A-1), for the purpose of damaging Konnech and
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`discrediting the integrity of U.S. elections.
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`Defendants therefore admit to violating the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the
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`Texas Harmful Access by Computer statute, and further admit to stealing information from
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`Konnech that they intend to immediately disclose to the public. Unless restrained by the Court,
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`Defendants will continue their illegal activities to the immediate and irreparable harm of Konnech.
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`A.
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`Konnech Is Entitled to the Relief Sought
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`ARGUMENT
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`A plaintiff is entitled to a TRO and preliminary injunction where it shows: (a) the
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`defendant’s actions will cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff; (b) the relative lack of harm to the
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`defendant if the TRO or injunction issues; (c) the public interest in issuing the TRO or injunction;
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`and (d) the likelihood that the plaintiff will win on the merits of the lawsuit. Lakedreams v. Taylor,
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`932 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th Cir. 1991) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction); Florida Atlantic
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`University Bd. of Trustees v. Parsont, 465 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (issuing
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`preliminary injunction in connection with violation of the CFAA); MetroPCS v. Mohammed, No.
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`3:16-cv-1946-L-BK, 2017 WL 2590108, at *7 (N.D. Tex., Apr. 24, 2017) (issuing permanent
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`injunction in connection with violation of the CFAA).
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`The federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) prohibits unauthorized access to a
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`“protected computer” for purposes of obtaining information, causing damage, or perpetrating
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`fraud. Quantab Techs. Ltd. v. Golevsky, 719 F. Supp. 2d 766, 775 (S.D. Tex. 2010); 18 U.S.C. §
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`1030, et. seq. The CFAA is a criminal statute but also provides a private right of action for
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`damages and injunctive relief when a violation of the CFAA, or a conspiracy to violate the CFAA,
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`results in an aggregate loss of at least $5,000 to a plaintiff in a one-year period. 18 U.S.C. §
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`1030(c)(4). The term “loss” includes any investigative costs or expenses incurred by a plaintiff to
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`assess, investigate, restore data, remediate, or respond to an offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11).
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`The CFAA defines a computer as “an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or
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`other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and
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`includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in
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`conjunction with such device[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1). The term “protected computer” is further
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`defined to include “a computer . . . which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or
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`communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner
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`that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. §
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`1030(e)(2)(B-C).
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`The CFAA thus has four elements: (1) a defendant intentionally accessed a protected
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`computer; (2) without authorization or exceeding authorized access; (3) the defendant obtained
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`information; and (4) the plaintiff suffered damage or loss of at least $5,000. See FAU Bd. of
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`Trustees, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 1289.
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`Similarly, under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 143.001, a “person who is
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`injured or whose property has been injured as a result of a violation under Chapter 33, Penal Code,
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`has a civil cause of action if the conduct constituting the violation was committed knowingly or
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`intentionally.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 143.001. Texas Penal Code § 33.02 provides: “A
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`person commits an offense if the person knowingly accesses a computer, computer network, or
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`computer system without the effective consent of the owner.” TEX. PENAL CODE. § 33.02(a).
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`“Access” means to “approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve or intercept data
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`from, alter data or computer software in, or otherwise make use of any resource of a computer,
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`computer network, computer program, or computer system.” Id. The only apparent difference
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`between the Texas Harmful Access by Computer statute and the CFAA is that, under the Texas
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`statute, a defendant can be liable without obtaining information, and merely accessing a computer
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`without effective consent is sufficient to establish liability.
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`Konnech provides election logistics software, called PollChief, that is used by
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`governmental entities throughout the U.S. to recruit, train and schedule poll workers; coordinate
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`the distribution of equipment and supplies to polling places; and dispatch support personnel to
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`address technical and other issues. (Ex. A, Yu Aff. at ¶ 2.) It is therefore indisputable that
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`Konnech’s computers are used in or affect interstate commerce and, accordingly, Konnech’s
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`computers constitute a “protected computer” under the CFAA. (Ex. A, Yu Aff. at ¶¶ 2-3.)
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`Konnech’s data is protected by various security measures, including two-factor
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`authentication required for access. (Ex. A, Yu Aff. at ¶ 3.) Only a select group of Konnech
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`employees that have been provided with that two-factor authentication have authority to access the
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`protected computers which contain poll worker data. (Ex. A, Yu Aff. at ¶ 3.) Konnech has never
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`given consent to or authorized Defendants, nor anyone acting in concert with them, to access
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`Konnech’s protected computers or to obtain, use, and/or disclose any data contained on those
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`protected computers. (Ex. A, Yu Aff. at ¶ 5.)
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`Defendants, however, admit to intentionally gaining, and conspiring to gain, unauthorized
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`access to Konnech’s protected computers, and obtaining information contained on Konnech’s
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`protected computers. (See Exs. A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4.) Specifically, Defendants, who did not have
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`effective consent or authority to access any of Konnech’s protected computers, claim that they
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`gained unauthorized access to a server owned by Konnech using a “default password,” and viewed
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`and downloaded data pertaining to 1.8 million U.S. poll workers. (Id.); Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P.
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`v. Bledsoe, 147 F. Supp. 3d 646, 659 (E.D. Tex. 2015) (granting summary judgment where
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`evidence established defendants accessed, copied, and transferred plaintiff's files without
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`authorization); Muhammed v. State, 331 S.W.3d 187, 193 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011,
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`pet. ref’d.) (affirming jury verdict for hacking violation).
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`Konnech has suffered loss in an amount exceeding $5,000 in a one-year period, because it
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`has been required to investigate and assess Defendants’ claims, it has been required to conduct
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`additional costly security audits, and it has expended other resources in responding to and assessing
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`the need to remediate the offense. (Ex. A, Yu Aff. at ¶ 6.)
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`Accordingly, it is therefore substantially likely and, in fact, inevitable, that Konnech will
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`win on the merits of its CFAA and Harmful Access by Computer claims given Defendants’
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`repeated admission of their unlawful conduct. Konnech has thus shown a substantial likelihood
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`of success on its CFAA and Harmful Access by Computer claims.
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`B.
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`Konnech is Threatened with Immediate and Irreparable Harm
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`Unless the Court grants injunctive relief, Konnech will suffer immediate and irreparable
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`harm by: (a) the unauthorized access to Konnech’s protected computers; (b) the unauthorized use
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`and/or disclosure of data from Konnech’s protected computers; (c) interference with Konnech’s
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`control of its protected computers; (d) breach of security of Konnech’s protected computers; (e)
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`disclosure of confidential information contained on Konnech’s protected computers; and (f) loss
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`of confidence and trust of Konnech’s customers, loss of goodwill, and loss of business reputation.
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`Courts have uniformly held that mere interference with an entity’s control of its computer
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`systems constitutes irreparable injury. See FAU Bd. of Trustees, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 1296
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`(“Unsurprisingly, federal courts around the country agree that the interference with an entity’s
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`control of its computer systems constitutes irreparable injury.”); Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures,
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`Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 765, 782 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd, 749 F. App'x 557 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[I]n
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`accessing [the plaintiff's] computers without authorization, Defendants have interfered with [the
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`plaintiff's] right to control access to its own computers and have acquired data to which Defendants
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`have no lawful right in violation of the CFAA,” thus causing irreparable injury); Reliable Prop.
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`Servs., LLC v. Capital Growth Partners, LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 961, 965 (D. Minn. 2014) (finding
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`“substantial threat of irreparable harm” based on the public dissemination of information after the
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`defendant “unlawfully took volumes of detailed data” in violation of the CFAA); Enargy Power
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`Co. v. Xiaolong Wang, No. 13-11348-DJC, 2013 WL 6234625, at *10 (D. Mass. Dec. 3, 2013)
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`(“[P]revent[ing] Enargy from enjoying the uninterrupted use of its property . . . constitutes
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`irreparable harm.”).
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`If the Court were to permit Defendants to continue attacking and accessing Konnech’s
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`protected computers, Konnech could never be certain that it was adequately protecting its
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`customer’s personal information, and its failure to protect that information could lead to questions
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`about the integrity of the U.S. election process. (Ex. A, Yu Aff. at ¶ 7); Mach 1, LLC v. Adaptisoft,
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`LLC, No. SA-21-CV-00114-XR, 2021 WL 6750834, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2021) (holding
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`that enjoining defendant from damaging the system and requiring it to restore the system would
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`prevent further irreparable harm). This, in turn will lead to loss of confidence and trust of
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`Konnech’s customers, and loss of Konnech’s goodwill and business reputation. (Ex. A, Yu Aff.
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`at ¶ 7); see Mach 1, 2021 WL 6750834 at *2 (finding irreparable injury in connection with CFAA
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`violation where business “reputation will suffer as unreliable in an area where reliability is very
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`important.”); Fletcher's Original State Fair Corny Dogs, LLC v. Fletcher-Warner Holdings LLC,
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`434 F. Supp. 3d 473, 496 (E.D. Tex. 2020) (“Grounds for irreparable injury include loss of control
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`of reputation, loss of trade, and loss of goodwill.”).
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`And further, the unauthorized use and/or disclosure of data from Konnech’s protected
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`computers—which Defendants claim contains personal identifying information such as social
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`security numbers, email addresses, phone numbers, and banking information of U.S. poll
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`workers—would cause irreparable harm and would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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`personal privacy. See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 521 (protecting personal identifying
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`information); see also U.S. Dept. of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 510 U.S. 487,
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`502 (1994) (holding that nondisclosure of “home addresses substantially outweighs the negligible
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`FOIA-related public interest in disclosure” and “would constitute a ‘clearly unwarranted invasion
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`of personal privacy.’”); Lamb v. Millennium Challenge Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 204, 214-15 (D.
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`D.C. 2018) (“Generally, personal identifying information such as a person’s . . . social security
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`number may be protected under Exemption 6” of FOIA).
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`In the face of Defendants’ admitted unauthorized access to Konnech’s protected
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`computers, and their further admission of their theft of data contained on said protected computers,
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`Konnech seeks to prevent Defendants from further accessing Konnech’s protected computers
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`without authority, to return any data taken from Konnech’s protected computers, and to not
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`publicly disclose any such data or information wrongfully taken from Konnech’s protected
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`computers.
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`Konnech is plainly entitled to such relief under the law and cannot be adequately
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`compensated through money damages. Therefore, an injunction should issue.
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`C.
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`The Balance of the Hardships Weighs Decidedly in Konnech’s Favor
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`When a defendant, such as Defendants here, engage in unlawful conduct prohibited by
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`state or federal law, the Court need not consider hardship to the defendant. See FAU Bd. of
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`Trustees, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 1297; see also MediaOne of Delaware, Inc. v. E & A Beepers &
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`Cellulars, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (explaining that a defendant suffers no
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`hardship when an injunction “will merely enjoin [the defendant] from conducting a business which
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`is already prohibited by state and federal law”); accord YourNetDating, Inc. v. Mitchell, 88 F.
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`Supp. 2d 870, 872 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (explaining the defendants “will suffer no legitimate harm of
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`which they can complain if the [injunctive relief] is granted because they have no honest business
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`hacking [the plaintiff's] system[.]”).
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`If an injunction is not issued, Konnech will face significant harm to the security of its data,
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`the theft of its secured and/or confidential information and systems, the privacy of its customers
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`and, in turn, the integrity of U.S. elections. (Ex. A, Yu Aff. at ¶ 7.) On the other hand, an injunction
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`would interfere only with the Defendants’ unlawful access of Konnech’s protected computers
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`without any interruption to Defendants’ legitimate business (if any). See FAU Bd. of Trustees, 465
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`Case 4:22-cv-03096 Document 5 Filed on 09/12/22 in TXSD Page 14 of 16
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`F. Supp. 3d at 1297 (“Here, the balance weighs decidedly in FAU's favor. On the one hand, if an
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`injunction does not issue, FAU will face ‘significant harm to the security of its systems and data,
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`theft of its secured, proprietary, and/or confidential information and systems, and privacy dangers
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`to its students.’”).
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`Accordingly, the balance of hardships weighs decidedly in favor of Konnech.
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`D.
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`Injunction Is in the Public’s Interest
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`Both the Texas Harmful Access by Computer statute and the CFAA are criminal statutes
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`which provide for a private civil action, and, therefore, the public interest is advanced by enforcing
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`compliance with the laws of Texas and the United States. Id. at 1298. In other words, “[s]ince the
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`injunction does nothing more than prevent conduct that Congress has already deemed criminal, it
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`necessarily advances the public interest.” Id. Additionally, courts have routinely held that the
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`“public has an interest in ensuring that computers are not accessed without authorization.”
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`Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d at 785.
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`Moreover, the injunction implicates the privacy rights and interests of Konnech’s
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`customers and allegedly 1.8 million U.S. poll workers. See FAU Bd. of Trustees, 465 F. Supp. 3d
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`at 1298 (finding injunction in the public’s interest where defendant’s unauthorized access of
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`FAU’s protected computer implicated the privacy rights of FAU students). In fact, it is paramount
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`that the Court issue an injunction to secure the integrity of the upcoming 2022 midterm elections—
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`and other future elections given that Defendants’ misconduct will deter election logistic providers
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`from providing their services, which are pivotal to running a smooth and trustworthy election
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`process—which is undoubtedly in the public’s interest.
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`An injunction issued against Defendants is therefore in the public’s interest.
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`Case 4:22-cv-03096 Document 5 Filed on 09/12/22 in TXSD Page 15 of 16
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`CONCLUSION
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`Konnech, Inc. respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion and issue a Temporary
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`Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction enjoining Defendants, directly or indirectly, and
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`whether alone or in concert with others: (1) from accessing or attempting to access Konnech’s
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`protected computers; (2) to return to Konnech all property and data obtained from Konnech’s
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`protected computers, whether original, duplicated, computerized, handwritten, or any other form
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`whatsoever; (3) from using, disclosing, or exploiting the property and data downloaded from
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`Konnech’s protected computers; (4) to preserve, and not to delete, destroy, conceal or otherwise
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`alter, any files or other data obtained from Konnech’s protected computers; (5) to identify each
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`individual and/or organization involved in accessing Konnech’s protected computers; (6) ordering
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`Defendants to confidentially disclose to Konnech how, when, and by whom its servers were
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`accessed without authority so that additional necessary security measures can be implemented by
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`Konnech to maintain the integrity of the data therein in light of the upcoming midterm elections;
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`and (7) ordering Defendants to identify all persons and/or entities, in Defendants’ knowledge, who
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`have had possession, custody or control of any information or data from Konnech’s protected
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`computers.
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`Dated: September 12, 2022
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`KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP
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`/s/ Constantine Z. Pamphilis
`Constantine Z. Pamphilis
`Attorney in Charge
`Texas State Bar No. 00794419
`SDTX Bar No. 19378
`DPamphilis@kasowitz.com
`Nathan W. Richardson
`Texas State Bar No. 24094914
`SDTX Bar No. 24094914
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`By:
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`Case 4:22-cv-03096 Document 5 Filed on 09/12/22 in TXSD Page 16 of 16
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`NRichardson@kasowitz.com
`1415 Louisiana Street, Suite 2100
`Houston, Texas 77002
`(713) 220-8800
`(713) 222-0843 (fax)
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`Attorneys for Plaintiff Konnech, Inc.
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`CERTIFICATE REQUESTING EX PARTE HEARING
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`I hereby certify that no notice has been given to Defendants or their counsel, and request
`that the Court consider this Motion ex parte, because if Defendants or those acting in concert with
`Defendants learn about this action and the relief sought herein, Defendants or those acting in
`concert with Defendants may follow through on their threats to publicly release the data before the
`Court has an opportunity to consider this Motion, and may otherwise destroy evidence of their
`misconduct.
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`/s/ Constantine Z. Pamphilis
`Constantine Z. Pamphilis
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