`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`VICTORIA DIVISION
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`FORMOSA PLASTICS CORPORATION,
`TEXAS,
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`Defendant.
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`COMPLAINT
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`Civil Action No.
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`6:21-cv-0043
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`Judge
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`The United States of America, acting on behalf of the United States Environmental
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`Protection Agency (“EPA”), files this Complaint and alleges as follows:
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`NATURE OF THE ACTION
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`1.
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`This is a civil environmental enforcement action for assessment of civil penalties
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`and injunctive relief brought pursuant to Section 113(b) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”),
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`42 U.S.C. § 7413(b), against Formosa Plastics Corporation, Texas (“Defendant”) for violations
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`of Sections 112(r)(1) and 112(r)(7) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(r)(1) and 7412(r)(7), and the
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`Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions promulgated at 40 C.F.R. Part 68 (the “Risk
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`Management Program” regulations), at Defendant’s petrochemical manufacturing plant located
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`at 201 Formosa Drive in Point Comfort, Texas (the “Facility”).
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`JURISDICTION, VENUE, AUTHORITY AND NOTICE
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`2.
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`This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to
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`Section 113(b) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b), and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345, and
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`1355.
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`3.
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`Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) and
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`28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and (c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1395 because Defendant does business within this
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`judicial district at its petrochemical manufacturing plant located in Point Comfort, Texas, and
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`because the actions giving rise to the violations alleged in this Complaint occurred in this judicial
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`district.
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`4.
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`Authority to bring this action is vested in the United States Department of Justice
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`pursuant to Section 305 of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7605.
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`5.
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`Notice of commencement of this action has been given to the State of Texas
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`pursuant to Section 113(b) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b).
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`PARTIES
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`6.
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`7.
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`Plaintiff is the United States of America, acting at the request of the EPA.
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`Defendant is Formosa Plastics Corporation, Texas, a corporation organized under
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`the laws of the State of Delaware.
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`8.
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`Defendant is a “person” within the meaning of Section 302(e) of the CAA,
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`42 U.S.C. § 7602(e), and within the meaning of Section 113(b) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b).
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`9.
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`At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant owned and operated a
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`petrochemical manufacturing plant at 201 Formosa Drive, Point Comfort, Texas.
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`STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
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`A. CAA Section 112(r)(1) – the “General Duty Clause”
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`10.
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`CAA Section 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1), provides in pertinent part:
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`The owners and operators of stationary sources producing,
`processing, handling or storing [any substance listed pursuant to
`Section 112(r)(3) of the CAA or any other extremely hazardous
`substance] have a general duty . . . to identify hazards which may
`result from such releases using appropriate hazard assessment
`techniques, to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps
`as are necessary to prevent releases, and to minimize the
`consequences of accidental releases which do occur.
`A “regulated substance” is any substance set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130, tables 1,
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`11.
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`2, 3, and 4. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(B).
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`12.
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`Extremely hazardous substances include regulated substances and chemicals on
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`the list of extremely hazardous substances published pursuant to Section 302 of the Emergency
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`Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 11002, at 40 C.F.R. Part
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`355, Appendices A and B, but the CAA does not limit the term to such listed substances. Thus,
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`the term “extremely hazardous substances” also includes other agents not listed or otherwise
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`identified by any Government agency that may, as the result of short-term exposure associated
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`with release to the air, cause death, injury or property damage. S. Rep. No. 228, reprinted in
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`1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3596.
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`13.
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`The term “accidental release” is defined by CAA Section 112(r)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.
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`§ 7412(r)(2)(A), as “an unanticipated emission of a regulated substance or other extremely
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`hazardous substance into the ambient air from a stationary source.”
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`B. CAA Section 112(r)(7) – Risk Management Program Regulations
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`14.
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`CAA Section 112(r)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 4712(r)(7), provides in pertinent part:
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`In order to prevent accidental releases of regulated
`(A)
`substances, the Administrator is authorized to promulgate release
`prevention, detection, and correction requirements which may
`include monitoring, record-keeping, reporting, training, vapor
`recovery, secondary containment, and other design, equipment,
`work practice, and operational requirements.
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`(B) (ii) The regulations under this subparagraph shall require the
`owner or operator of stationary sources at which a regulated
`substance is present in more than a threshold quantity to prepare and
`implement a risk management plan to detect and prevent or
`minimize accidental releases of such substances from the stationary
`source, and to provide a prompt emergency response to any such
`releases in order to protect human health and the environment. Such
`plan shall provide for compliance with the requirements of this
`subsection.
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`(B) (iii) The owner or operator of each stationary source covered by
`clause (ii) shall register a risk management plan prepared under this
`subparagraph with the Administrator before the effective date of
`regulations under clause (i) in such form and manner as the
`Administrator shall, by rule, require.
`In 1994, EPA promulgated the Risk Management Program regulations in
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`15.
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`accordance with CAA Section 112(r)(7), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7). See 40 C.F.R. Part 68,
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`Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions. These regulations require owners and operators of
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`stationary sources that have more than a threshold quantity of a regulated substance in a process
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`to develop and implement a risk management program that must be described in a risk
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`management plan (“RMP”) submitted to EPA. The RMP must include, among other things, a
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`management system, a hazard assessment, and a prevention program.
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`16.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.10, the owner or operator of a stationary source that
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`has more than a threshold quantity of a regulated substance in a process must comply with the
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`Risk Management Program regulations.
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`17.
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`CAA Section 112(r)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(C), and 40 C.F.R. § 68.3,
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`define a “stationary source” as “any buildings, structures, equipment, installations, or substance
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`emitting stationary activities (i) which belong to the same industrial group, (ii) which are located
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`on one or more contiguous properties, (iii) which are under the control of the same person, …and
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`(iv) from which an accidental release may occur.”
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`18.
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`A “process” is defined broadly to mean “any activity involving a regulated
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`substance including any use, storage, manufacturing, handling, or on-site movement of such
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`substances, or [any] combination of these activities” and “any group of vessels that are
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`interconnected, or separate vessels that are located such that a regulated substance could be
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`involved in a potential release, shall be considered a single process.” 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.
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`19.
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`A “covered process” means “a process that has a regulated substance present in
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`more than a threshold quantity as determined under [40 C.F.R.] § 68.115.” 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.
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`20.
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`The regulations at 40 C.F.R. Part 68 divide the covered processes into three
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`categories, designated as Program 1, Program 2, and Program 3, and set forth specific
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`requirements for owners and operators of stationary sources with processes that fall within the
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`respective programs.
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`21.
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`A “Program 3” process is subject to the most stringent risk management
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`requirements under the Risk Management Program regulations. Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.12,
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`the owner or operator of a stationary source with a process subject to the Program 3 requirements
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`must, among other things, comply with the prevention requirements of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.65 –
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`68.87 and the emergency response program of 40 C.F.R. §§ 68.90-68.95.
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`22.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(a), the owner or operator must perform an initial
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`process hazard analysis (“PHA”) on processes covered by 40 C.F.R. Part 68. The PHA must be
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`“appropriate to the complexity of the process and shall identify, evaluate, and control the hazards
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`involved in the process. The owner or operator must determine and document the priority order
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`for conducting process hazard analyses based on a rationale which includes such considerations
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`as extent of the process hazards, number of potentially affected employees, age of the process,
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`and operating history of the process.” 40 C.F.R. § 68.67.
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`23.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(e), the owner or operator must establish a system to
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`promptly address the PHA findings and recommendations, assure that the recommendations are
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`resolved in a timely manner and the resolution is documented, and develop a written schedule of
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`when these actions are to be completed.
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`24.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(f), at least every five years after the completion of
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`the initiation process hazard analysis, the process hazard analysis must be updated and
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`revalidated by a team meeting the requirements in 40 C.F.R. § 68.67(d) to assure that the process
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`hazard analysis is consistent with the current process.
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`25.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.69(d), the owner or operator must develop and
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`implement safe work practices (including wearing proper personal protective equipment) to
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`provide for the control of hazards during operations such as lockout/tagout; confined space entry;
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`opening process equipment or piping; and control over entrance into a stationary source by
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`maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other support personnel. These safe work practices must
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`apply to employees and contractor employees.
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`26.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.71(b), refresher training must be provided at least
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`every three years, and more often if necessary, to each employee involved in operating a process
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`to assure that the employee understands and adheres to the current operating procedures of the
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`process.
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`27.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(b), the owner or operator must establish and
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`implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing integrity of work areas and process
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`equipment, which includes pressure vessels and storage tanks, piping systems (including
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`components such as valves), relief and vent systems and devices, emergency shutdown systems,
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`controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks), and pumps.
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`28.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d), inspections and tests must be performed on
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`process equipment to ensure mechanical integrity. The inspections and testing must follow
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`recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(2). Under
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`40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(3), the frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment must be
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`consistent with applicable manufacture’s recommendations and good engineering practices, and
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`more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience.
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`29.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(d)(4), the owner or operator must document each
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`inspection and test that has been performed on process equipment. The documentation must
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`identify the date of the inspection or test, the name of the person who performed the inspection
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`or test, the serial number or other identifier of the equipment on which the inspection or test was
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`performed, a description of the inspection or test performed, and the results of the inspection or
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`test.
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`30.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(e), the owner or operator must correct deficiencies
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`in equipment that are outside acceptable limits (as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.65) before further
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`use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation.
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`31.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.73(f)(3), the owner or operator must assure that
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`maintenance materials, spare parts and equipment are suitable for the process application for
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`which they will be used.
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`32.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(a), the owner or operator must certify to having
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`evaluated compliance with the provisions of 40 C.F.R. Part 68, Subpart D, at least every three
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`years to verify that the procedures and practices developed under 40 C.F.R. Part 68, Subpart D
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`are adequate and are being followed. The required evaluation is referred to as a compliance
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`audit. 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(b).
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`33.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.79(d), the owner and operator must promptly
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`determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit,
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`and document that deficiencies have been corrected.
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`34.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.85(a), the owner or operator must issue a hot work
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`permit for hot work operations conducted on or near a covered process. Hot work is any work
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`that involves burning, welding, cutting, or using fire or spark-producing tools, or other work that
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`produces a source of ignition.
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`35.
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`Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 68.95(a), the owner or operator must develop and
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`implement an emergency response program for the purpose of protecting public health and the
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`environment. Such program must include the following elements: (1) an emergency response
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`plan, which shall be maintained at the stationary source; (2) procedures for the use of emergency
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`response equipment and for its inspection, testing, and maintenance; (3) training for all
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`employees in relevant procedures; and (4) procedures to review and update, as appropriate, the
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`emergency response plan to reflect changes at the stationary source and ensure that employees
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`are informed of changes.
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`36.
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`Pursuant to CAA Section 112(r)(7)(E), it is unlawful for any person to operate
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`any stationary source subject to the Risk Management Program requirements and regulations in
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`violation of such requirements and regulations.
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`C. Enforcement of the Clean Air Act by the United States
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`CAA Section 113(b)(2) provides that whenever a person violates any requirement
`37.
`or prohibition of Subchapter I of the CAA (42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7515), the Administrator of EPA
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`“shall, as appropriate, in the case of any person that is the owner or operator of . . . a major
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`stationary source, and may, in the case of any other person, commence a civil action for a
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`permanent or temporary injunction, or to assess and recover a civil penalty of not more than
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`$25,000 per day for each violation, or both . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2). The Federal Civil
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`Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461 note, as amended by the Debt
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`Collection Improvement Act of 1996, 31 U.S.C. § 3701 note, and the Federal Civil Penalties
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`Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–74 § 701, 129 Stat. 584,
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`599–60, requires EPA to periodically adjust its civil penalties for inflation. The statutory penalty
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`amounts for violations of CAA Section 113(b)(2) were increased by EPA’s Civil Monetary
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`Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule to $37,500 per day per violation occurring between January
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`12, 2009 and November 2, 2015, and to $102,638 for violations continuing or occurring after
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`November 2, 2015, where penalties are assessed on or after December 23, 2020. See 40 C.F.R. §
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`19.4 and 85 Fed. Reg. 83818-01 (December 23, 2020).
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`GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
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`38.
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`At all relevant times, Defendant has owned and operated the Facility within the
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`meaning of CAA Section 112(r), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r), and 40 C.F.R. Part 68.
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`39.
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`The Facility is located on approximately 2,500 acres of land in Point Comfort,
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`Texas and produces petrochemicals.
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`40.
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`At all relevant times, Defendant has operated numerous “stationary sources” as
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`defined in CAA Section 112(r)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(C), and 40 C.F.R. § 68.3 at the
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`Facility.
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`41.
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`At all relevant times, Defendant has been a “person” as defined in CAA Section
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`302(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e), and within the meaning of CAA Section 113(b), 42 U.S.C.
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`§ 7413(b).
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`42.
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`At all relevant times, the Facility processed, handled, stored, and disposed of
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`“regulated substances,” as defined in CAA Section 112(r)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(B), and
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`40 C.F.R. § 68.130, and “extremely hazardous substances,” within the meaning of CAA Section
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`112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1).
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`43.
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`At all relevant times, Defendant was subject to the “General Duty Clause” of
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`CAA Section 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1), regarding the prevention of “accidental releases”
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`at the Facility, as defined in CAA Section 112(r)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(A).
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`44.
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`The Facility consists of several “covered processes,” including the High Density
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`Polyethylene Unit No. 1; High Density Polyethylene Unit No. 2; Olefins 1 Unit; Linear Low
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`Density Polyethylene Unit; and Chlor-Alkali Unit.
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`45.
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`At all relevant times, Defendant had at least one regulated flammable and toxic
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`substance in the “covered processes” identified in Paragraph 44 above the threshold quantity as
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`set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 68.130.
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`46.
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`At all relevant times, the Facility and the “covered processes” above were subject
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`to the requirements of the “Program 3” Risk Management Program regulations pursuant to
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`40 C.F.R. §§ 68.10(d) and 68.12(d).
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`The May 2, 2013 Fire and Explosion
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`47.
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`During the construction of the High Density Polyethylene No. 1 production unit
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`(“HDPE 1”) in 1994, an Ethylene Purification Unit (“EPU”) was installed to remove impurities
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`from the ethylene supply. The EPU process was designed to have three stages of operation, with
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`each stage consisting of columns (reactors containing catalyst) and other equipment such as heat
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`exchangers (a system used to transfer heat between two or more fluids).
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`48.
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`The EPU was a “stationary source” within the meaning of CAA Section
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`112(r)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(C).
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`49.
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`The EPU is an outdoor unit and is not enclosed in any building. In its second
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`stage, the EPU stored and utilized the proprietary metal catalyst, Puraspec 3450, a mixture of
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`copper, zinc, and aluminum oxides. Copper oxide is the active catalyst. During operation of the
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`EPU, reduction reactions remove oxygen from the copper oxide, reducing it to metallic copper.
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`This process requires periodic regeneration. The regeneration process oxidizes the copper back
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`to copper oxide.
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`50.
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`Incomplete regeneration of the catalyst may result in residual hydrocarbons or
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`deposited carbon which may be capable of combustion.
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`51.
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`The Material Safety Data Sheet for Puraspec 3450 recognizes the reduced or
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`partially regenerated catalyst as pyrophoric, i.e., able to ignite spontaneously with exposure to
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`oxygen or air, and cautions that contact with air should be minimized.
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`52.
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`Puraspec 3450 in its reduced or partially regenerated state is an extremely
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`hazardous substance within the meaning of CAA Section 112(r), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r).
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`53.
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`The risk of combustion associated with reduced or partially regenerated Puraspec
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`3450 catalyst is a recognized hazard.
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`54.
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`In 1995, high temperatures were observed in one of the EPU’s second stage
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`columns during the regeneration of the catalyst. The regeneration was stopped before
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`completion, leaving the catalyst partially regenerated.
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`55.
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`In September 1995, all three stages of the EPU were taken out of service, put in
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`standby, and isolated from HDPE 1 by single block valves.
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`56.
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`The manufacturer’s operating instructions for the EPU state that after taking the
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`second stage out of service the column should be immediately purged and pressurized with
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`nitrogen. The purpose of purging the second stage column with nitrogen is to prevent any
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`residual ethylene from having extended contact with the catalyst which can lead to polymers or
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`carbon deposits on the catalyst.
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`57.
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`Defendant did not immediately purge and pressurize the system with nitrogen, as
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`specified in the manufacturer’s operating instructions.
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`58.
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`In 1996, the third stage of the EPU was placed back in service, leaving the first
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`and second stages out of service.
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`59.
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`In 2007, Defendant developed a facility-wide procedure for out-of-service
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`equipment. In 2008, a PHA recognized the first and second stages of the EPU to be out of service
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`and recommended decommissioning the equipment.
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`60.
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`61.
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`Defendant did not implement its out-of-service equipment procedure at the EPU.
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`In January 2011, in preparing the first and second stages of the EPU for blinding
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`(blinding is the process of placing steel plates between two flanges to segregate fluids or isolate
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`equipment prior to the commencement of work to prevent the release of hazardous substances
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`into the work area), the system was found to have hydrocarbons present. Many days of purging
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`the system with nitrogen took place to remove the hydrocarbons before blinding and air gaps
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`could be installed.
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`62.
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`In January 2011, Defendant completed the isolation and blinding of the first and
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`second stages, including blinding (removing) the pressure relief valves, which left no pressure
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`relief alternative in place.
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`63.
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`In September 2011, Defendant generated a proposal to remove the ethylene
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`purification section equipment from HDPE 1 to make room for an expansion in production.
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`64.
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`65.
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`No written work plan or hazard assessment for the EPU removal was conducted.
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`Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery,
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`Defendant completed a bid proposal for the removal of the EPU on January 16, 2013.
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`66.
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`Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, on
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`May 2, 2013, oxygen entered the column C212B, a reactor in the second stage of the EPU, as
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`Defendant attempted to sample the inner vapor space of the column. The oxygen reached the
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`partially-regenerated pyrophoric catalyst, Puraspec 3450. This began an exothermic reaction
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`which heated the materials in the column. An exothermic reaction is a chemical reaction that
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`releases energy through light or heat.
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`67.
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`Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, the
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`indicated temperature within the column temporarily stabilized when the oxygen feed did not
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`continue. However, the heat generated by the localized reaction was then reabsorbed by the
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`catalyst. This heating initiated a slower second exothermic reaction in a localized area within the
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`reactor, causing the temperature to gradually increase until it reached temperatures that resulted
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`in a rapid exothermic reaction.
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`68.
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`This exothermic reaction along with the presence of gas produced a significant
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`overpressure in the column. The pressure in the column could not be relieved as the pressure
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`relief system was isolated and disabled. The extreme overpressure caused the top dome flange
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`gasket to fail, resulting in an explosion, release, and fire.
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`69.
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`As a result of the explosion, pressurized flammable gases and particulate catalyst
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`Puraspec 3450 were released into the air and from the Facility in the form of intense flames and a
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`dark cloud of smoke and particulates.
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`70.
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`As a result of the May 2, 2013 explosion and fire at the Facility, Defendant
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`released an “extremely hazardous substance” into the ambient air.
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`71.
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`The release of the extremely hazardous substance constituted an “accidental
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`release” into the ambient air within the meaning of CAA Section 112(r)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.
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`§ 7412(r)(2)(A).
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`72.
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`Fourteen workers were injured, seven of whom required hospitalization, as a
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`result of the fire and explosion.
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`73.
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`The EPU was dismantled and removed from the Facility after the May 2, 2013
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`fire and explosion.
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`September 13, 2013 Fire
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`74.
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`At times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant owned and operated the High
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`Density Polyethylene Unit No. 2 (“HDPE 2”). HDPE 2 has ethylene and isobutene (regulated
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`flammable substances) present in more than threshold quantities as determined by 40 C.F.R.
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`§ 68.115 and is a covered process as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.
`
`75.
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`On September 11, 2013, operators at the HDPE 2 observed problems in the
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`Dehexanizer column of the unit, known as the C-301 column, which separates isobutane and
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`hexene. Distillation columns fractionate or separate hydrocarbon constituents, with lighter
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`fractions rising and heavier components circulating downward. Multiple trays are vertically
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`Case 6:21-cv-00043 Document 1 Filed on 09/13/21 in TXSD Page 15 of 51
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`
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`staged inside columns to collect different liquid fractions depending on elevation inside the
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`column. Vapor moves upward through risers and out through slots. The vapor bubbles up
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`through surrounding liquid on the tray. The slots are covered with “bubble caps.”
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`76.
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`It was determined that the C-301 column had a restriction and needed to be shut
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`down. Defendant’s maintenance group was required to isolate and remove all liquids from the
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`C-301 column and purge it with nitrogen. While the C-301 column was shut down, Defendant
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`planned to perform cleaning and maintenance on other pieces of equipment that required work.
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`77.
`
`On September 13, 2013, operators for the HDPE 2 opened the manways on the C-
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`301 column and conducted a visual inspection of the manways and trays that revealed a solid
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`polymer buildup. Manways are small passage ways or openings which allow a person to perform
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`interior maintenance activities on a column. The hardened polymer appeared to be plugging the
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`bubble caps on the trays. The maintenance supervisor called for hydroblasting of the C-301
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`column to remove the polymer.
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`78.
`
` On September 13, 2013, at 7:30 a.m., HDPE 2 operations unit issued Line Break
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`Permit No. 56790 to maintenance personnel and contractors working to install blinds in column
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`C-301 and other permits for work to be performed on the unit.
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`79.
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`Initially, HDPE operators used a reciprocating saw to start cutting the polymer,
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`but the polymer chunk was too hard. Operators then agreed that a small electric chainsaw would
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`be more productive.
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`80.
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`Subject to a reasonable opportunity for further investigation and discovery, a non-
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`intrinsically-safe electric chainsaw was purchased from a local hardware store and brought to the
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`Facility.
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`81.
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`At or about 9:55 a.m., HDPE 2 operations personnel started cutting the polymer
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`chunk with the electric chainsaw.
`
`82.
`
`83.
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`At approximately 10:19 a.m., a flash fire occurred at a manway on C-301.
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`Defendant’s incident report found that the electric chainsaw motor was the likely
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`ignition source for the incident by igniting an explosive environment created from dust combined
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`with flammable vapors.
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`84.
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`The fire seriously injured five persons, causing second and third degree burns and
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`$310,000 of property damage.
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`February 19, 2014 Propylene Release
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`85.
`
`At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant owned and operated the Olefins
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`1 production unit (“Olefins 1”). At all times relevant to this Complaint, Olefins 1 had propylene
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`(a regulated flammable substance) present in more than a threshold quantity as determined by 40
`
`C.F.R. § 68.115 and is a covered process as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.
`
`86.
`
`On February 19, 2014, Olefins 1 operators were having problems pulling their
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`daily sample from the propylene feed line. The sample point was connected to a ¾″ valve that
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`had been stripped. Operators then decided to move the sample location.
`
`87.
`
`Operators removed the sample hose from the stripped valve in order to install the
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`sample hose at a new sample point. Before operators could install a plug, the stripped valve
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`started sputtering and began releasing liquid propylene.
`
`88.
`
`An operator attempted to plug the valve with his hand but was unable to stop the
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`release. The operator received a cold burn from the cryogenic propylene release.
`
`89.
`
`The operator then left the area of the release to start closing valves to block in the
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`pipeline. An assisting operator responded to the area and sounded an alarm.
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`16
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`90.
`
`A supervisor assessed the leak and tried to install a plug by hand with a pair of
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`pliers and standard issue gloves. The supervisor received a cold burn from the cryogenic
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`propylene release.
`
`July 17, 2014 Cycle Gas Release
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`91.
`
`At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant owned and operated the Linear
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`Low Density Polyethylene Unit (“LLDPE”). LLDPE had ethylene and 1-butene (regulated
`
`flammable substances) present in more than a threshold quantity as determined by 40 C.F.R.
`
`§ 68.115 and, at all times relevant to this Complaint, was a covered process as defined by 40
`
`C.F.R. § 68.3.
`
`92.
`
`The High Pressure (“HP”) Nitrogen Line (N2H-41025-ABA-1 ½″ N) and the
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`Process Line (C2-41023-HSG 1-6″-S1 (FE-1407A to 4001\), which contained flammable cycle
`
`gas, are connected by a pipe-to-pipe welded connection. The LLDPE, including where the HP
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`Nitrogen Line and Process Line (C2-41023-HSG 1-6″-S1 (FE-1407A to 4001\) are connected, is
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`not enclosed in any building and is open to the outdoors.
`
`93.
`
`The cycle gas contains ethylene and 1-butene, both regulated flammable
`
`substances.
`
`94.
`
`The HP Nitrogen Line is part of the LLDPE Unit and is therefore part of a
`
`covered process.
`
`95.
`
`The HP Nitrogen Line is interconnected with the LLDPE process and could cause
`
`a regulated substance release or interfere with mitigating the consequences of an accidental
`
`release and is therefore part of the LLDPE covered process.
`
`96.
`
`On July 17, 2014, operators of the LLDPE found the HP Nitrogen Line (N2H-
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`41025-ABA-1 ½″ N) was no longer connected by weld to the Process Line (C2-41023-HSG 1-
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`17
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`Case 6:21-cv-00043 Document 1 Filed on 09/13/21 in TXSD Page 18 of 51
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`
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`6”-S1 (FE-1407A to 4001\) and a release of highly flammable cycle gas was occurring from the
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`LLDPE Train 1 reactor.
`
`97.
`
`Evaluation of the separated piping found that the weld area where the HP
`
`Nitrogen Line and the Process Line joined had “poor weld quality.”
`
`98.
`
`Defendant determined that the HP Nitrogen Line was subject to vibration, also
`
`contributing to the weld failure.
`
`99.
`
`As a result of weld failure and separation of the HP Nitrogen Line and the Process
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`Line, approximately 11,418.4 pounds of ethylene and 13,147.8 pounds of 1-butene were released
`
`to the atmosphere over a 12 hour period.
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`October 7, 2014 Chlorine Release
`
`100. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant owned and operated the Chlor-
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`Alkali Unit. At all times relevant to this Complaint, the Chlor-Alkali Unit had chlorine (a
`
`regulated toxic substance) present in more than a threshold quantity as determined by 40 C.F.R.
`
`§ 68.115 and is a covered process as defined by 40 C.F.R. § 68.3.
`
`101. On October 7, 2014, the Chlor-Alkali Unit w