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Case: 19-11494 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 1 of 27
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`[PUBLISH]
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`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`
`FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`________________________
`
`No. 19-11494
`________________________
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`D.C. Docket Nos. 0:08-md-01916-KAM; 0:08-cv-60821-KAM
`
`
`
`IN RE: CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
`ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND SHAREHOLDER
`DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
`___________________________________________________
`
`0:07-cv-60821-KAM
`
`ANTONIO GONZALEZ CARRIZOSA,
`JULIE ESTER DURANGO HIGITA,
`LILIANA MARIA CARDONA,
`MARIA PATRICIA RODRIGUEZ,
`ANA FRANCISCA PALAC MORENO, et. Al.,
`
` Plaintiffs-Appellants,
`
` versus
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`CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
`an Ohio corporation,
`CHIQUITA FRESH NORTH AMERICA LLC,
`a Delaware corporation,
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` Defendants-Appellees,
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`
`

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`Case: 19-11494 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 2 of 27
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`RODERICK HILLS, et. Al.,
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` Defendants.
`___________________________________________________
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`9:08-cv-80421-KAM
`
`JOHN DOE I,
`individually and as representative of his
`deceased father JOHN DOE 2,
`JANE DOE 1,
`individually and as representative of her
`deceased mother JANE DOE 2,
`JOHN DOE 3,
`individually and as representative of his
`deceased brother JOHN DOE 4,
`JANE DOE 3,
`individually and as representative of her
`deceased husband JOHN DOE 5,
`MINOR DOES #1-4,
`by and through their guardian JOHN DOE 6,
`individually and as representative of their
`deceased mother JANE DOE 4,
`JOHN DOE 7,
`individually and as representative of his
`deceased son JOHN DOE 8,
`JANE DOE 6,
`JANE DOE 5,
`JANE DOE 7, et. Al.,
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` Plaintiffs-Appellants,
`
` versus
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`CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
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` Defendant-Appellee,
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`MOE CORPORATIONS 1-10, et. Al.,
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`
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`2
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` Defendants.
`___________________________________________________
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`9:08-cv-80465-KAM
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`JANE/JOHN DOES (1-144),
`as Legal Heirs to Peter Does 1-144, et. Al.,
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` Plaintiffs-Appellants,
`
` versus
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`CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
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` Defendant-Appellee,
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`DAVID DOES 1-10, et. Al.,
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` Defendants.
`___________________________________________________
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`9:08-cv-80508-KAM
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`JOSE LEONARDO LOPEZ VALENCIA, et. Al.,
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` Plaintiffs-Appellants,
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` versus
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`CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
`a New Jersey corporation,
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` Defendant-Appellee,
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`MOE CORPORATIONS 1-10, et. Al.,
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` Defendants.
`
`___________________________________________________
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`
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`3
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`9:17-cv-81285-KAM
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`DOES,
`1-11,
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` Plaintiffs-Appellants,
`
` versus
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`CARLA A. HILLS,
`Personal Representative of the Estate of
`Roderick M. Hills,
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` Defendant.
`
`__________________________________________________
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`9:18-cv-80248-KAM
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`JOHN DOE #1, et. Al.,
`individually and as representative of his
`deceased father JOHN DOE 2,
`
` Plaintiffs-Appellants,
`
` versus
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`CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
`a New Jersey corporation,
`
` Defendant-Appellee,
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`MOE CORPORATIONS 1-10, et. Al.,
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` Defendants.
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`________________________
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`Appeals from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of Florida
`________________________
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`(July 16, 2020)
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`Before WILSON, MARCUS, and BUSH,* Circuit Judges.
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`PER CURIAM:
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`A lawsuit is a public event. Parties who ask a court to resolve a dispute must
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`typically walk in the public eye. District courts, acting within their discretion, can
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`grant exception from this rule. But it is rare for a district court to grant privacy
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`protections for a party. It is even rarer for a district court to abuse its discretion
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`when denying privacy protections for a party.
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`The appellants here claim that this is one of those rarer cases. In this
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`multidistrict litigation (MDL), they contend that a Colombian paramilitary group
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`killed their family members. They also assert that appellee Chiquita Brands
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`International, Inc.—along with affiliated entities and directors, but we will call
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`* Honorable John K. Bush, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by
`designation.
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`them all Chiquita for short—paid the paramilitary group over $1.7 million to quell
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`labor unrest and drive other guerilla groups out of the banana-growing regions of
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`Colombia. This financial support, say the appellants, contributed to the deaths of
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`their family members.
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`Some appellants, fearing paramilitary retaliation, filed their claims under
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`pseudonyms. All appellants—named and pseudonymous—obtained a protective
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`order prohibiting the disclosure of “private facts”—facts that could reveal their
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`identities or other personal information (addresses, telephone numbers, and so on).
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`After over a decade of litigation, Chiquita challenged the privacy protections
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`as difficult and unnecessary. The district court agreed and revoked the protections.
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`The appellants appealed under the collateral-order doctrine. Because the district
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`court acted within its discretion when it held that the appellants failed to meet their
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`necessary burdens, we affirm.
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`I.
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`First, some background. Over a decade ago, Chiquita admitted to financing
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`paramilitaries in Colombia.1 The United States filed an information against
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`Chiquita, outlining the company’s involvement. Chiquita ultimately entered a
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`guilty plea and paid a $25 million fine.
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`1 See generally United States v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 1:07–cr–00055 (D.D.C.).
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`A bevy of related civil suits followed. The appellants, then proceeding in
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`separate cases, generally claimed that Chiquita bankrolled a paramilitary group
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`called the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). They also alleged that
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`Chiquita’s money helped the AUC murder their family members. Fearing reprisal
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`from the AUC or its affiliates, some appellants sought to proceed anonymously
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`(the pseudonymous appellants). Others did not (the named appellants).2
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`Alongside the named appellants, hundreds of other plaintiffs chose to proceed
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`under their true names.
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`Of the pseudonymous appellants, some received court approval to use
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`pseudonyms. Others did so without court approval. Eventually, their cases—
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`along with the cases of the named appellants and other related plaintiffs—were
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`merged into an MDL in the Southern District of Florida.
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`In the MDL, Chiquita moved to dismiss the case for forum non conveniens.
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`It argued that Colombia was the proper forum. In November 2016, the district
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`court denied the motion. Taking the plaintiffs’ allegations as true and viewing the
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`evidence in their favor, the court noted that “participation in human rights litigation
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`involving paramilitary abuses in Colombia . . . is currently a very dangerous
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`proposition.”
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`2 When referring to these groups collectively, we will call them the appellants.
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`The case then moved to discovery. During this process, the district court
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`recognized that the pseudonymous appellants were proceeding anonymously. It
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`did not, however, consider the propriety of their pseudonyms.
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`Meanwhile, the parties grappled over what protections to include in a
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`proposed protective order. Both sides generally agreed that the appellants needed
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`protection to combat the disclosure of their “private facts”—facts that could
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`publicly reveal their identities or personal information. They volleyed draft
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`protective orders back and forth. When the dust settled, the district court issued a
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`protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) that largely entered
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`all the requested private fact protections. The order did not shield these facts from
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`Chiquita, though. Chiquita knows the pseudonymous appellants’ identities and has
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`received private fact discovery.
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`These protections stood for about two years. During this time, the parties
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`picked the appellants to serve as bellwether plaintiffs for dispositive motions and
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`bellwether trials.3 As the parties inched toward summary judgment, though, the
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`administrative cost of anonymous litigation took its toll. Seeing no need for the
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`privacy protections, Chiquita moved to preclude the pseudonymous appellants’ use
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`of pseudonyms and to modify the protective order to lift the appellants’ protections
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`3 This meant that the appellants would serve as representatives for initial trials and dispositive
`motions.
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`for private facts. In April 2019, the court granted both requests in a joint order. It
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`held that the pseudonymous appellants failed to establish that their risk of physical
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`harm outweighed the general presumption of judicial openness. The court thus
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`ordered the pseudonymous appellants to reveal their identities. And for the same
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`reasons, it lifted the private fact protections for all appellants—named and
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`pseudonymous. The appellants then appealed the court’s order under the
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`collateral-order doctrine. We stayed the court’s rulings pending our decision.
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`After the appellants filed their notice of appeal, the district court entered
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`summary judgment on the merits against all the appellants save for one (Jane Doe
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`46). The district court then certified the summary judgment ruling as a final
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`judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The appellants (Jane Doe
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`46 excluded) also appealed that ruling. The summary judgment appeal remains
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`pending in a separate proceeding.
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`II.
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`Before we reach the merits, we’ll first explain why this appeal is not moot
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`for the appellants who have sustained summary judgment. Then we will analyze
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`both the district court’s denial of pseudonym protection and its decision to modify
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`its order protecting private facts.
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`A.
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`A federal court cannot decide a “moot” controversy. See Fla. Pub. Interest
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`Research Grp. Citizen Lobby, Inc. v. E.P.A., 386 F.3d 1070, 1086 (11th Cir. 2004).
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`We thus have an independent duty to ensure that this case is not moot. See id. at
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`1083, 1086. “A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the
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`parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. at 1086. This can
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`happen when events after the filing of the appeal “deprive the court of the ability”
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`to provide “meaningful relief.” Id.
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`We can provide meaningful relief here. If we were to let the court’s order
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`stand, the pseudonymous appellants would have to reveal their identities and the
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`appellants would have no protection for their private information. But if we were
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`to vacate the district court’s order, the pseudonymous appellants would remain
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`anonymous and the appellants’ private facts would remain protected. Given the
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`seriousness of the subject matter, that is no doubt “meaningful relief.” See id.
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`But there is a slight wrinkle: The district court entered summary judgment
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`against most of the appellants and certified the ruling as a final judgment. Those
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`appellants are challenging the summary judgment ruling in a different appeal. We
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`have held, at least in the preliminary injunction context, that “[o]nce a final
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`judgment is rendered, the appeal is properly taken from the final judgment.”
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`Burton v. Georgia, 953 F.2d 1266, 1272 n.9 (11th Cir. 1992). If that rule also
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`applies to collateral orders, then we could not grant meaningful relief here. The
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`appellants would instead need to raise their anonymity and private fact issues in the
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`summary judgment appeal.
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`But having reviewed Burton and its predecessors, we feel confident that its
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`rule does not apply to collateral orders. Burton merely restated a commonsense
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`principle: A permanent injunction order moots interlocutory review of a
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`corresponding preliminary injunction order because the preliminary injunction
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`order inherently “merge[s]” with the permanent injunction order. See Sec. & Exch.
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`Comm’n v. First Fin. Grp. of Tex., 645 F.2d 429, 433 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981)4;
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`Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass’n 117 v. City of Birmingham, 603 F.3d 1248, 1254
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`(11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “when a final injunction incorporates the same
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`relief as an interlocutory injunction, an appeal is properly taken only from the final
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`order” and the interlocutory appeal is moot).
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`This rule makes sense. The standard for entering a preliminary injunction
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`echoes the standard for entering a permanent injunction. Compare Chavez v. Fla.
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`SP Warden, 742 F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2014) (outlining the preliminary
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`injunction standard), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1188 (2014), with Angel Flight of Ga.,
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`Inc. v. Angel Flight Am., Inc., 522 F.3d 1200, 1208 (11th Cir. 2008) (outlining the
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`permanent injunction standard). When a permanent injunction order and a
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`4 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth
`Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981. 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
`11
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`Case: 19-11494 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 12 of 27
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`preliminary injunction order raise the same questions, it makes little sense to have
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`parallel panels deliver disjointed answers. Rather, the preliminary order is best
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`viewed as merging with the final order, as both orders speak to the merits of
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`whether the requested injunctive relief is appropriate. See Birmingham Fire
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`Fighters, 603 F.3d at 1254.
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`But that’s not true of collateral orders. Those orders, per the Supreme Court,
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`do “not make any step toward final disposition of the merits” and “will not . . .
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`merge[] in a final judgment.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
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`541, 546 (1949). We dub an order collateral only if it “(1) conclusively determines
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`an important issue that is both (2) completely separate from the merits of the case
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`and (3) effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Parker v. Am.
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`Traffic Solutions, Inc., 835 F.3d 1363, 1367 (11th Cir. 2016). Those traits differ
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`from that of a merged preliminary injunction—an order that both speaks to the
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`merits of whether injunctive relief is appropriate and can be adequately reviewed
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`on appeal from the final injunctive order. See Birmingham Fire Fighters, 603 F.3d
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`at 1254.
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`Because the key aspects of a collateral order and a preliminary injunction do
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`not line up, we hold that Burton’s rule does not apply to collateral orders. The
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`only question, then, is whether the rulings at issue qualify as collateral orders.
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`12
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`The pseudonym ruling is easy. “A district court’s order denying anonymity
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`for a party is a final appealable order under the collateral order doctrine.” Plaintiff
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`B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011).
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`Next is the private fact ruling. Though we have never considered whether a
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`ruling that modifies a protective order to revoke protections that conceal a party’s
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`identity and private information from allegedly dangerous actors qualifies as a
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`collateral order, we conclude that it does. As said before, a collateral order is one
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`that “(1) conclusively determines an important issue that is both (2) completely
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`separate from the merits of the case and (3) effectively unreviewable on appeal
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`from a final judgment.” Parker, 835 F.3d at 1367. The private fact ruling meets
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`each criterion.
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`First up is the important-issue prong. An issue is “important” enough to
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`justify collateral review when it involves a “particular value of a high order.” See
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`Royalty Network, Inc. v. Harris, 756 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir. 2014). The issue
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`must usually touch on a “substantial public interest.” See id. at 1357. As the Ninth
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`Circuit has explained, “[f]ew tenets of the United States justice system rank above
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`the conflicting principles presented” when a party seeks to shield information in a
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`judicial proceeding from public view. See Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice
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`Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). In these situations,
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`courts must weigh “the transparency and openness of this nation’s court
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`13
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`proceedings” against “the ability of private individuals to seek redress in the courts
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`without fear for their safety.” Id. And as we explained in Doe v. Frank, there are
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`“exceptional cases” in which a plaintiff may face so great a “danger of physical
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`harm” that the plaintiff’s interest in access to the judicial system outweighs the
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`public’s interest in judicial openness. 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992) (per
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`curiam).
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`The district court’s order conclusively denied protections intended to shield
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`the appellants’ sensitive information from paramilitaries. Given the serious
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`“danger of physical harm” alleged here, we conclude that protecting the appellants’
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`access to the judicial system is an important issue touching on substantial public
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`interests. See id.; Royalty Network, 756 F.3d at 1356–57.
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`We make quick work of the latter two prongs. Whether the appellants
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`should have these protections is distinct from whether they should recover against
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`Chiquita. See Parker, 835 F.3d at 1367. And once the public (or a paramilitary
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`group) learns the appellants’ private facts, they cannot be concealed again. See S.
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`Methodist Univ. Ass’n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707,
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`712 (5th Cir. 1979) (SMU). This information, without a protective order, may
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`come out at summary judgment or in other court filings. So the order is effectively
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`unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment. See Parker, 835 F.3d at 1367.
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`14
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`Because both rulings are valid collateral orders, they do not merge into the
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`final judgment. Burton therefore does not apply. And since this appeal remains
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`live, we now turn to the merits.
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`B.
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`First is the ruling denying the pseudonymous appellants leave to proceed
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`under pseudonyms. We review a district court’s ruling on a party’s use of a
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`pseudonym for abuse of discretion. Plaintiff B, 631 F.3d at 1315; Doe v. Stegall,
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`653 F.2d 180, 184 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981). This is an “extremely limited
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`and highly deferential” standard of review. In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1331
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`(11th Cir. 2007). It allows “a zone of choice within which” the district court “may
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`go either way.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en
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`banc). We must affirm the district court’s choice “unless we find that the district
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`court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal
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`standard.” Id. This is so “even if we would have gone the other way had the
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`choice been ours to make.” S.E.C. v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d 727, 733
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`(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
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`“Generally, parties to a lawsuit must identify themselves” in the pleadings.
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`Frank, 951 F.2d at 322. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) provides that
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`“every pleading” in federal court “must name all the parties.” The rule does not
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`merely further administrative convenience—“[i]t protects the public’s legitimate
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`15
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`interest in knowing all of the facts involved, including the identities of the parties.”
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`Plaintiff B, 631 F.3d at 1315.
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`Yet the rule is not absolute. A party may proceed anonymously in federal
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`court by establishing “a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary
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`and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.”
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`Id. at 1315–16 (internal quotation mark omitted). This is, however, a narrow
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`exception. Parties may use “fictitious name[s]” only in “exceptional case[s].”
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`Frank, 951 F.2d at 323.
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`We have said that the “first step” in deciding whether privacy trumps
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`publicity is to apply the “three factors analyzed” in SMU. Plaintiff B, 631 F.3d at
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`1316. Those factors include whether the party seeking anonymity (1) is
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`challenging government activity; (2) would be compelled, absent anonymity, to
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`disclose information of utmost intimacy; or (3) would be compelled, absent
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`anonymity, to admit an intent to engage in illegal conduct and thus risk criminal
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`prosecution. See id.
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`But we have made clear that this is only the first step. Along with these
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`factors, a court “should carefully review all the circumstances of a given case and
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`then decide whether the customary practice of disclosing the plaintiff’s identity
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`16
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`should yield to the plaintiff’s privacy concerns.” Id.5 Other factors to consider
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`include whether the party seeking anonymity is a minor or faces a real threat of
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`physical harm absent anonymity. See id.; see also Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186. The
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`court should also analyze whether the party’s requested anonymity poses a unique
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`threat of fundamental unfairness to the defendant. See SMU, 599 F.2d at 713
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`(listing examples). Indeed, a defendant’s “general plea for ‘openness’ is not
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`convincing” when stacked against “strong evidence” supporting a need for
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`anonymity. Plaintiff B, 631 F.3d at 1318.
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`Turning to the analysis, we start with the pseudonymous appellants’ claim
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`that the district court erred when it gave them the burden of justifying their
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`pseudonyms. In their eyes, the district court granted them leave to proceed under
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`pseudonyms in its protective order granting private fact protections. The
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`pseudonymous appellants thus claim that Chiquita—as the party seeking to modify
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`the protective order—bore the burden of establishing good cause for the
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`modification. See F.T.C. v. AbbVie Prods. LLC, 713 F.3d 54, 66 (11th Cir. 2013).
`
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`5 Given this rule, we note that, in reality, the SMU factors do not constitute a “first” step in the
`sense that either party can win at that step alone. Though a court must consider the SMU factors
`(and may well decide to consider them first), our mandate that a court must consider “all the
`circumstances of a given case” makes clear that the SMU factors are merely a few of many
`factors that a court must consider. See Plaintiff B, 631 F.3d at 1316. In practice, then, whether a
`party’s right to privacy overcomes the presumption of judicial openness is a totality-of-the-
`circumstances question.
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`We disagree. Nowhere in the protective order did the district court grant the
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`pseudonymous appellants leave to proceed anonymously. As the district court
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`recognized in a later order, it never considered the propriety of pseudonyms until
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`Chiquita moved to preclude the use of pseudonyms. Thus, the pseudonymous
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`appellants bore the burden to establish, in the first instance, that their privacy rights
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`outweigh the presumption of judicial openness. See Plaintiff B, 631 F.3d at 1315–
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`16.
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`Because the district court did not make an error of law, we can vacate only if
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`the district court made a clear error of judgment. Given this record, we hold that
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`the district court acted within its “zone of choice” when it held that the
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`pseudonymous appellants failed to show that their privacy rights outweigh the
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`presumption of judicial openness. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1259.
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`To start, the district court had ample comparator evidence to support its
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`ruling. For over a decade, hundreds of plaintiffs have litigated this case under their
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`true names, and yet nothing in the record suggests that they have faced
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`paramilitary retaliation. We of course know that different litigants may face
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`different risks of harm; the pseudonymous appellants could face a greater risk of
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`paramilitary retribution than their named co-plaintiffs. But the pseudonymous
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`appellants gave no evidence to establish that they in fact face a greater risk of
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`harm. So the district court was free to consider the named plaintiffs as
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`comparators when weighing the pseudonymous appellants’ risk of harm against the
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`presumption of judicial openness.
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`To be sure, the pseudonymous appellants claim that there is specific
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`evidence of harm here: Paramilitaries allegedly threatened and attacked a named
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`bellwether plaintiff and her family four months after her deposition. Yet the
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`district court reasonably rejected this inference. True, no one seems to dispute that
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`someone threatened and attacked the bellwether plaintiff and her family. But the
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`only credible evidence to suggest that paramilitaries assaulted her and her family
`
`for her role here is temporal proximity. A four-month connection, however, is
`
`shaky support standing alone. And there is evidence pointing the other way. For
`
`example, the bellwether plaintiff’s deposition was privileged and highly
`
`confidential, suggesting that paramilitaries could not have known about the
`
`deposition. There is also evidence showing that the alleged incidents were part of
`
`a domestic dispute unrelated to this litigation. So the district court acted within its
`
`discretion when it held that there was “insufficient evidence of a causal connection
`
`between the . . . attack and litigation activity in this MDL proceeding to justify
`
`continued use of pseudonyms.”6
`
`
`6 We reject the claim that an affidavit filed by the bellwether plaintiff’s counsel compelled the
`district court to find that paramilitaries threatened and attacked the plaintiff and her family. The
`attorney admitted in the affidavit that he has no firsthand knowledge of the incidents; he drew his
`statements solely from the secondhand accounts of nameless investigators in Colombia. The
`attorney also asserted that paramilitaries were presumably to blame, yet he gave no meaningful
`
`
`
`
`19
`
`

`

`Case: 19-11494 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 20 of 27
`
`Lacking specific evidence, the pseudonymous appellants cite general
`
`evidence showing that those who oppose paramilitary groups or paramilitary-
`
`affiliated entities face risks of paramilitary violence. But this evidence does not
`
`compel the conclusion that the MDL plaintiffs face those risks. Indeed, their
`
`evidence focuses on human rights defenders who protest paramilitary activity in
`
`Colombia, seek land restitution in Colombia, or oppose paramilitary-affiliated
`
`entities in Colombia. The evidence does not compel the finding that litigants
`
`pursuing tort claims against a paramilitary-affiliated entity in the United States face
`
`similar risks of harm.7
`
`Last, we reject the idea that the court’s pseudonym ruling conflicts with its
`
`forum non conveniens ruling. We do so for a few reasons. For one, a forum non
`
`conveniens analysis differs from a pseudonym analysis. Compare Ford v. Brown,
`
`319 F.3d 1302, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2003) (outlining the forum non conveniens
`
`analysis), with Plaintiff B, 631 F.3d at 1313–18 (outlining the pseudonym
`
`analysis). For another, the court’s statements there were not factual findings;
`
`because the forum non conveniens order came on a motion to dismiss, the court
`
`
`support for this presumption. Given these deficiencies, the district court was free to give the
`affidavit little weight.
`7 The pseudonymous appellants also contend that the district court erred in failing to consider the
`heightened publicity they will face as the case moves toward trial. We’re not convinced that the
`district court failed to consider this argument, as the court said in its order that it had considered
`all the proffered arguments. But at any rate, the pseudonymous appellants failed to support this
`argument with evidence. On this record, their publicity claim is speculative and is not enough to
`justify vacatur for abuse of discretion.
`
`
`
`20
`
`

`

`Case: 19-11494 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 21 of 27
`
`took the plaintiffs’ allegations as true and construed all the evidence in their favor.
`
`See Doc. 1194 at 4. That plaintiff-friendly standard diverges from the defendant-
`
`friendly pseudonym standard. Finally, the court entered the forum non conveniens
`
`order over two years before it entered its pseudonym order. During that time,
`
`hundreds of plaintiffs continued to litigate under their true names, yet none—as far
`
`as this record shows—suffered paramilitary retribution. As a result, the district
`
`court’s forum non conveniens ruling did not compel a different pseudonym ruling.8
`
`C.
`
`We now turn to the modification of the protective order, which lifted the
`
`appellants’ protections for private facts. We review a district court’s decision to
`
`modify a protective order for abuse of discretion. AbbVie, 713 F.3d at 61. The
`
`district court did not abuse its discretion here.
`
`We begin with a review of the law. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)
`
`allows a court to issue a protective order upon a finding of good cause. See Fed. R.
`
`Civ. P. 26(c) (“The court may, for good cause, issue [a protective order].”). The
`
`plain text of the rule suggests that a district court must find good cause to issue a
`
`
`8 We also dismiss the pseudonymous appellants’ claim that the district court erred because it
`identified no “unique threat” that their anonymity poses to Chiquita. Though we agree that their
`anonymity does not prejudice Chiquita since it knows the pseudonymous appellants’ identities,
`prejudice is just one of many factors that a court should consider. See Plaintiff B, 631 F.3d at
`1316. Given the wealth of evidence undercutting the pseudonymous appellants’ risk of harm, the
`little evidence establishing it, and the presumption of judicial openness, the court acted within its
`discretion when it denied anonymity, even without a showing of prejudice.
`21
`
`
`
`

`

`Case: 19-11494 Date Filed: 07/16/2020 Page: 22 of 27
`
`protective order. See id. But as we’ve recognized, district courts often issue
`
`stipulated protective orders without finding good cause. See Chi. Tribune Co. v.
`
`Bridgestone/Firestone, In

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