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`[PUBLISH]
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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`____________________
`
`No. 21-13116
`
`____________________
`
`
`FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
`
`
`
`
`versus
`SIMPLE HEALTH PLANS LLC,
`a Florida Limited Liability Company, et al.,
`
`
` Plaintiff-Appellee,
`
` Defendants,
`
`
`STEVEN J. DORFMAN,
`individually and as an officer, member or manager of Simple
`Health Plans LLC, Health Benefits One LLC, Health Center
`Management LLC, Innovative Customer Care LLC, Simple
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`21-13116
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`Insurance Leads LLC, and Senior Benefits One LLC,
`
`
` Defendant-Appellant.
`
`
`____________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cv-62593-DPG
`____________________
`
`Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT,
`Circuit Judges.
`
`GRANT, Circuit Judge:
`The Federal Trade Commission alleges that Steven J.
`Dorfman and his six companies engaged in unfair or deceptive
`business practices in violation of § 5(a) of the Federal Trade
`Commission Act and the Telemarketing Sales Rule. 15 U.S.C.
`§ 45(a); 16 C.F.R. Part 310. Relying on its authority under § 13(b)
`of the FTC Act, the Commission obtained a preliminary injunction
`that included an asset freeze and the imposition of a receiver.
`Dorfman now argues that the preliminary injunction must be
`dissolved because a recent Supreme Court decision undermines
`the Commission’s § 13(b) authority. See AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC
`v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341, 1344 (2021).
`
`
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`3
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`He is right that the decision limits the Commission’s § 13(b)
`authority, but wrong about what that means here.
` The
`Commission’s updated complaint also
`invokes § 19 against
`Dorfman, and that provision authorizes the asset freeze and
`receivership. We therefore affirm the order denying Dorfman’s
`emergency motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.
`I.
`A.
`For over four years—starting in 2013 and continuing until
`the Commission began this action in October 2018—Dorfman and
`the companies under his control engaged in a “bait and switch”
`scheme to sell underinclusive health insurance plans to unwitting
`consumers.1 The technical term for these plans is “limited
`indemnity plans and medical discount memberships.” But as the
`district court put it, they are more like grocery store savers cards
`than health insurance. They allow consumers to purchase medical
`services at pre-negotiated discount rates, but the consumer retains
`the risk of catastrophic medical bills. And if that risk becomes a
`reality? The plans are “practically worthless.”
`
`
`1 Because Dorfman does not challenge the district court’s findings of fact, we
`draw our recitation of the facts from the facts as they existed at the preliminary
`injunction stage. The parties have engaged in substantial discovery since the
`preliminary injunction was entered, and at summary judgment specific facts
`may be different. The facts recited here are for the purposes of this appeal
`only.
`
`
`
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`The Commission says that Dorfman led consumers to
`believe they were purchasing comprehensive insurance plans that
`would shift the risk of catastrophic bills to insurers and cover “a
`large portion of the expense for doctor’s visits, emergency room
`visits, hospital stays,
`laboratory services, and prescription
`medicine.” Dorfman’s companies also wrongly assured consumers
`that the plans they purchased would allow them to avoid the
`Affordable Care Act’s tax penalty for non-compliant plans.
`there.
`The alleged misrepresentations did not end
`According to the Commission, the companies falsely represented
`that they were experts on, and providers of, government-
`sponsored health insurance policies. On their websites, they
`claimed—again, falsely—that they were affiliated with the AARP
`and the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association. The companies’ lead
`generation tactics were also less than straightforward. For
`example, when consumers searched Google for “Obama Care
`Insurance” the top results included “obamacarequotes.org.” This
`website—which was designed to give the impression that it offered
`comprehensive health
`insurance—prompted consumers
`to
`provide their contact information. A salesperson would then
`initiate contact, following a script that Dorfman himself “wrote,
`reviewed, and approved.” Like the websites, these scripts
`contained misrepresentations designed to push consumers into
`Dorfman’s inferior plans.
`Only after payment was collected was it (sometimes)
`revealed to consumers that they had purchased limited benefit
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`5
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`plans. At the end of their calls, consumers were transferred to a
`new salesperson to hear a series of densely worded and difficult-to-
`comprehend disclosures. But before this “verification process,”
`consumers were warned not to ask any questions and were told by
`their initial sales representative that only some of the information
`they were about to hear would apply to them—a caveat designed
`to suggest that anything inconsistent with the salesperson’s earlier
`representations did not apply. Verification scripts also varied
`depending on whether the call was being recorded. If it was, the
`sales reps were directed to give honest answers to consumers’
`questions. But if it was not, they were instructed to continue to
`mislead consumers into believing that they had purchased
`comprehensive health insurance.
`
`The Commission alleges that these sales were as profitable
`as they were dishonest: Dorfman and his companies received over
`$180 million in commissions from the plans. Their customers,
`meanwhile, were stuck with surprise medical bills. In one example
`cited by the district court, a consumer was led to believe that his
`copays would be limited to $50 and his out-of-pocket expenses
`capped at $2,000. But by the time he passed away (about four
`months after purchasing his plan) he had incurred around $300,000
`in uncovered medical bills. This was only one example—extensive
`evidence detailed other injuries Dorfman’s scheme inflicted on
`consumers.
`
`
`
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`B.
`In October 2018, the Commission filed a complaint against
`Dorfman and six companies he owned and controlled.2 The
`complaint alleged violations of § 5(a) of the FTC Act, which
`broadly prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
`affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).3 It also alleged violations
`of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, which prohibits sellers and
`telemarketers from misrepresenting, whether directly or by
`implication, any “material aspect of the performance, efficacy,
`nature, or central characteristics of goods or services that are the
`subject of a sales offer.” 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(iii). In addition, the
`rule bars sellers and telemarketers from misrepresenting, whether
`directly or by implication, a “seller’s or telemarketer’s affiliation
`with, or endorsement or sponsorship by, any person or
`government entity.” Id. § 310.3(a)(2)(vii). And it prohibits sellers
`and telemarketers from making false or misleading statements to
`induce a person to pay for goods or services. Id. § 310.3(a)(4).
`Immediately after suing, the Commission obtained an ex
`parte temporary restraining order. Among other things, the order
`
`
`2 Dorfman’s companies are Simple Health Plans LLC, Health Benefits One
`LLC, Health Center Management LLC, Innovative Customer Care LLC,
`Simple Insurance Leads LLC, and Senior Benefits One LLC.
`3 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the provisions of the FTC Act as it was
`enacted. For clarity, we note that § 5(a) of the FTC Act is codified at 15 U.S.C.
`§ 45(a); § 13(b) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 53(b); and § 19 is codified at 15 U.S.C.
`§ 57b.
`
`
`
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`7
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`froze the companies’ assets and imposed a temporary receivership.
`It also prohibited Dorfman and his companies from continuing to
`make material misrepresentations and from disclosing or using
`customer information.
`Dorfman consented multiple times to an extension of the
`order, but he eventually moved to strike it. The district court
`denied his motion, and when he appealed to this Court we
`dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. FTC v. Simple Health Plans,
`LLC, No. 19-10840 (11th Cir. Apr. 16, 2019).
`The district court later granted a preliminary injunction
`continuing the measures imposed by the temporary restraining
`order, including the asset freeze and receivership. The court found
`that the Commission was likely to succeed on the merits of both
`the § 5(a) claim and the Telemarketing Sales Rule claim. The
`authority to issue the injunction was grounded exclusively in
`§ 13(b) of the FTC Act—a provision that, at that time, was broadly
`thought to authorize the Commission to seek monetary awards for
`consumer redress whenever it had reason to believe that any law it
`enforced was being violated. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
`the
`Dorfman directly appealed
`the order granting
`preliminary injunction on grounds not relevant here. FTC v.
`Simple Health Plans, LLC, 801 F. App’x 685, 687 (11th Cir. 2020)
`(unpublished).
` We held that our then-binding precedent
`compelled us to affirm. Id. at 688. With that appeal still pending,
`Dorfman filed his first motion to dissolve the preliminary
`injunction, again on grounds not relevant here. The district court
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`21-13116
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`denied that motion. On appeal, we again held that then-binding
`precedent compelled us to affirm the district court. FTC v. Simple
`Health Plans, LLC, 792 F. App’x 761, 762 (11th Cir. 2020)
`(unpublished).
`The Commission filed its first amended complaint in
`November 2019, a little more than a year after its original filing.
`Besides adding a new defendant, the Commission added one more
`basis for relief—§ 19 of the FTC Act. The district court dismissed
`parts of the amended § 5(a) claim for failure to allege sufficient facts
`detailing the individual involvement of Dorfman and the other
`defendant. Shortly after that dismissal, the Commission remedied
`this deficiency in the now-operative Second Amended Complaint.
`
`In 2021, three years into this litigation, the Supreme Court
`narrowed the relief available under § 13(b) of the FTC Act—
`monetary awards are no longer an option under that provision.
`AMG Cap. Mgmt., 141 S. Ct. at 1344. Dorfman immediately filed
`an emergency motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction,
`arguing that because § 13(b) could no longer support claims for
`monetary relief, the preliminary injunction freezing his assets and
`imposing a receivership was unlawful.
`
`The district court denied his motion, but not in reliance on
`§ 13(b). It instead grounded its authority to issue the preliminary
`injunction in § 19 of the FTC Act. Dorfman now appeals, and we
`affirm.
`
`
`
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`9
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`II.
`We review a district court’s denial of a motion to dissolve a
`preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Jones v. Governor
`of Florida, 950 F.3d 795, 806 (11th Cir. 2020). Findings of fact are
`reviewed for clear error and questions of law are reviewed de novo.
`Id.
`
`III.
`A.
`Section 13(b) of the FTC Act authorizes the district court to
`issue a “permanent injunction.” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Many courts,
`including this one, long interpreted that language to invoke the full
`scope of the district courts’ equitable powers. See, e.g., FTC v. U.S.
`Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1432–34 (11th Cir. 1984); AMG
`Cap. Mgmt., 141 S. Ct. at 1346–47. This included the power to
`grant monetary awards such as restitution and disgorgement (or
`so-called “equitable monetary relief”). AMG Cap. Mgmt., 141 S.
`Ct. at 1346–47. Using that authority, the Commission routinely
`obtained monetary awards from defendants who violated various
`consumer protection and antitrust laws. See id. But in AMG
`Capital, the Supreme Court changed that understanding—it held
`that the text and structure of the FTC Act limit the meaning of the
`term “permanent injunction” to forward-looking injunctive relief,
`rather than retrospective monetary measures. Id. at 1347–48.
`Injunctive relief, the Court clarified, “typically offers prospective
`
`
`
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`relief against ongoing or future harm.” Id. at 1347 (citing United
`States v. Oregon State Med. Soc., 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952)).
`We agree with Dorfman that after AMG Capital the
`Commission cannot rely solely on § 13(b) to support the
`preliminary
`injunction here because
`it
`includes measures
`preserving assets for monetary relief. Now that “monetary relief is
`no longer available” under § 13(b), “there is no need to preserve
`resources for a future judgment.” FTC v. On Point Cap. Partners
`LLC, 17 F.4th 1066, 1078 (11th Cir. 2021). The “imposition of an
`asset freeze or receivership” is thus inappropriate when premised
`solely on § 13(b). Id.
`But the injunction here is not premised solely on § 13(b); the
`Commission also points to § 19, the FTC Act’s consumer redress
`provision. That provision authorizes the district court to grant
`“such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to
`consumers.” 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b). Unlike § 13(b), which applies to
`violations of “any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade
`Commission,” id. § 53(b), § 19 authorizes the Commission to
`commence a civil action only if the defendant violates a “rule under
`this subchapter respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices” or
`if the Commission obtains a final cease-and-desist order respecting
`an unfair or deceptive act or practice, id. § 57b(a)(1)–(2).4
`
`
`4 Certain additional limitations apply when the Commission is seeking relief
`after obtaining a final cease and desist order. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2). But it
`is undisputed that the Commission has not obtained a cease-and-desist order.
`
`
`
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`11
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`Section 19 thus “comes with certain important limitations
`that are absent in § 13(b).” AMG Cap. Mgmt., 141 S. Ct. at 1349.
`But its potential remedies are broader, or at least different. Section
`13(b), as we have said, allows for prospective injunctive relief. 15
`U.S.C. § 53(b). Section 19, on the other hand, allows for relief
`“necessary to redress injury to consumers.” Id. § 57b(b).
`This case, then, presents two questions. First, does § 19
`apply to the Telemarketing Sales Rule? And second, if so, does it
`authorize the preliminary measures Dorfman challenges?
`
`On the first question, Dorfman argues that § 19 does not
`cover his alleged violation of the Telemarketing Sales Rule because
`that rule falls within a different subchapter than § 19. And § 19 is
`explicitly
`limited to the violation of a “rule under this
`subchapter”—that is, subchapter 1 of Title 15, Chapter 2. Id. §
`57b(a)(1). In short, Dorfman says, the Telemarketing Sales Rule
`was promulgated under the Telemarketing Act, which is not found
`in the same subchapter as § 19.
`
`True enough, but this analysis is incomplete. A more
`thorough review shows
`that rules prescribed under
`the
`Telemarketing Act—including the Telemarketing Sales Rule at
`issue here—are enforceable under § 19. See FTC v. Wash. Data
`Res., Inc., 704 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). The Act states that
`a violation of one of its rules “shall be treated as a violation of a rule
`under section 57a of this title regarding unfair or deceptive acts or
`practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 6102(c)(1). And § 57a is in subchapter 1 of
`Title 15, Chapter 2. See id. § 57a.
`
`
`
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`large make the point even more
`The statutes at
`straightforward.5 As enacted by Congress, the Telemarketing Act
`states that “[a]ny violation of any rule” prescribed under the Act
`“shall be treated as a violation of a rule under section 18 of the
`Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a) regarding unfair or
`deceptive acts or practices.” Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud
`and Abuse Prevention Act, Pub. L. 103-297, § 3(c), 108 Stat. 1545,
`1546 (1994). So—for purposes of triggering § 19—by expressly
`identifying
`the FTC Act, Congress has unambiguously
`commanded us to treat the Telemarketing Sales Rule as a rule
`enforceable under § 19.
`Still, the question remains whether § 19 authorizes the
`specific asset freeze and receivership imposed against Dorfman and
`his companies. Section 19(b) provides the district court jurisdiction
`to grant “such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury
`to consumers,” which “may include, but shall not be limited to,
`rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or
`return of property, the payment of damages, and public
`notification.” 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b). Consistent with the requirement
`that the relief be necessary to redress injury to consumers, the
`district court cannot impose “any exemplary or punitive damages.”
`Id.
`
`
`5 Although the U.S. Code is prima facie evidence of the law, the statutes at
`large represent the ultimate authority on what the law is. In re Bayou Shores
`SNF, LLC, 828 F.3d 1297, 1306 n.13 (11th Cir. 2016).
`
`
`
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`13
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`The Commission seeks rescission or reformation of
`contracts and the refund of money—forms of relief expressly
`authorized by § 19(b).6 Id. And though the statute does not
`explicitly authorize preliminary measures of relief, like the asset
`freeze and receivership sought here, it does give the district courts
`broad authority to grant remedies that are “necessary to redress
`injury to consumers.” Id. It also specifies that relief “shall not be
`limited to” the enumerated measures. Id. That language renders
`the list nonexhaustive “[b]y its own terms,” so the omission of
`preliminary measures does not mean they are not authorized. Talk
`Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 63 n.5 (2011). Instead,
`the question is whether they are “necessary to redress injury to
`consumers.” 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b).
`
`Asset freeze and receivership are forms of relief that can be,
`and often are, “necessary to redress injury to consumers.” Id. Our
`law has long recognized the need for the appointment of a receiver
`in appropriate cases to “preserve and protect” property at issue
`
`
`6 The Commission’s Second Amended Complaint seeks “rescission or
`reformation of contracts, restitution, the refund of monies paid, and the
`disgorgement of ill-gotten monies.” The Commission clarified in a July 5, 2022
`letter—and again at oral argument—that it will not seek disgorgement to the
`Treasury. So for purposes of this appeal, we accept that any requested relief
`will be used for consumer redress and attendant expenses. Cf. FTC v. Figgie
`Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 607 (9th Cir. 1993). We emphasize, however, that the
`exact contours of the relief ultimately granted are not before us in this appeal;
`we look to the final relief sought only to the extent necessary to assess whether
`the asset freeze and receivership are allowed.
`
`
`
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`pending its final disposition. See, e.g., Gordon v. Washington, 295
`U.S. 30, 37 (1935). And we have considered a “temporary freeze of
`defendant’s assets” to be “reasonably necessary to assure that the
`court’s jurisdiction would not be defeated by the defendant’s
`disposition of assets in the event the court should ultimately order
`disgorgement of the allegedly misappropriated funds.” CFTC v.
`Muller, 570 F.2d 1296, 1301 (5th Cir. 1978).7 In other words, the
`point is to ensure that if the court awards final monetary relief,
`assets will still be available to redress consumers’ injuries.
`Otherwise, the district court would be unable to provide any
`meaningful relief.
`All that to say, if preliminary measures like an asset freeze or
`a receivership are necessary to preserve funds for a future
`monetary judgment, they are authorized by § 19(b). Here, the
`district court found just that: “a preliminary injunction and asset
`freeze are necessary to protect consumers, protect assets for
`consumer redress, and preserve the status quo.” Dorfman does not
`challenge that conclusion. We therefore affirm the portions of the
`preliminary injunction imposing the asset freeze and receivership.
`
`B.
`Dorfman also seeks to vacate the parts of the injunction
`prohibiting future misrepresentations and the use or disclosure of
`
`
`7 This Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth
`Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981, in Bonner v. City of Prichard,
`661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
`
`
`
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`15
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`customer information. But Dorfman does not make an argument
`that this is compelled by AMG Capital, and that argument would
`misunderstand the extent of AMG Capital’s holding in any event.
`As we have already explained, when the Commission enforces
`§ 5(a), “[p]rospective injunctive relief is still allowed” after AMG
`Capital. On Point Cap., 17 F.4th at 1079 (citing AMG Cap. Mgmt.,
`141 S. Ct. at 1347–48). So injunctive relief relating to actions is still
`allowed under § 13(b), while injunctive relief relating to money is
`not. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order with respect
`to the portions of the preliminary injunction enjoining future
`misrepresentations and the disclosure or use of customer
`information.
`
`IV.
`Dorfman raises several other issues, but they are either
`outside the scope of this appeal or have been abandoned. Because
`this appeal comes to us on a second successive motion to dissolve
`the preliminary injunction, our review is limited to whether AMG
`Capital requires dissolution or modification of the preliminary
`injunction order. See Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass’n 117 v.
`Jefferson Cnty., 290 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002) (an appeal
`“should be permitted only to the extent necessary to consider
`whether the changed circumstances, evidence, or law requires
`modification of the order which is presumed to have been correct
`when issued”). Dorfman’s arguments on due process and the
`likelihood of success on the merits are unrelated to AMG Capital
`and therefore outside the scope of this appeal; he should have
`
`
`
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`brought them in his initial appeal of the preliminary injunction.
`And his arguments about the final form of relief, including whether
`the Commission will obtain punitive relief, are premature at this
`stage.
`
`Finally, Dorfman abandoned any argument that the
`Commission was required to renew its motion for a preliminary
`injunction after filing its Second Amended Complaint. Though he
`raises this issue in the introduction of his opening brief, he does not
`otherwise develop the argument in his briefs. “We have long held
`that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only
`passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without
`supporting arguments and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate
`Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Cote
`v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 985 F.3d 840, 846 (11th Cir. 2021) (a
`party abandons an issue when it is raised only in the introduction
`of a brief); United States v. Mathis, 767 F.3d 1264, 1275 n.2 (11th
`Cir. 2014) (appellant cannot resurrect an abandoned issue by
`raising it at oral argument).
`*
`*
`*
`Dorfman urges us to read AMG Capital as a signal to
`interpret the FTC Act with a view to “reigning in the FTC’s
`power.” But we take a different lesson. AMG Capital teaches us
`to read the FTC Act to “mean what it says.” 141 S. Ct. at 1349. In
`AMG Capital, that meant limiting § 13(b)’s provision for a
`“permanent injunction” to injunctive relief. Id. Here, that means
`recognizing the broad scope of relief available under § 19. When
`
`
`
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`17
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`the Commission enforces a rule, § 19 grants the district court
`jurisdiction to offer relief “necessary to redress
`injury to
`consumers.” 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)–(b). To preserve funds for
`consumers, the Commission sought to freeze Dorfman’s assets and
`impose a receivership over his companies. Because § 19 allows
`such relief here, we AFFIRM.
`
`