` [DO NOT PUBLISH]
`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
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`____________________
`No. 23-10383
`____________________
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`NORIS BABB,
` Plaintiff-Appellant,
`versus
`SECRETARY , DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
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` Defendant-Appellee.
`
`____________________
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Middle District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 8:14-cv-01732-VMC-TBM
`____________________
`
`Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
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`2 Opinion of the Court 23-10383
`PER CURIAM:
`In 2014, Norris Babb, a federal employee, sued the Secretary
`of the Department of V eterans Affairs, alleging sex and age dis-
`crimination, retaliation, and retaliatory hostile work environmen t
`pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),
`as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), and the Age Discrimination in
`Employment Act (“ ADEA ”), 29 U.S.C. § 626. After a series of inter-
`vening decisions and appeals, the district court granted summary
`judgment in favor of the Secretary on Babb’s sex and age discrimi-
`nation claims. Babb’s Title VII retaliation claim and retaliatory hos-
`tile work environment claim proceeded to a jury trial and the jury
`returned a verdict for the Secretary on both claims.
`On appeal, Babb argues that the district court (1) misapplied
`the federal-sector employment causation standard for discrimina-
`tion and retaliation claims outlined in Babb v . Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399
`(2020) (“Babb I”), and Babb v . Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 992 F .3d
`1193 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Babb II”), in its ruling on summary judg-
`ment, and (2) abused its discretion in its jury instructi ons. After
`carefully considering the parties’ arguments and with the benefit
`of oral argument, we affirm the judgments below .
`I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`Noris Babb joined the C.W . Bill Young V A Medical Center
`(“V A ”) in 2004 as a clinical pharmacist under the auspices of the
`V A ’s Pharmacy Services division. In 2006, Babb became a pharma-
`cist in the Geriatrics Clinic at the V A, where she worked until June
`2013. During her tenure in Geriatrics , Babb worked as a member
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`of an “interdisciplinary team” of caregivers. Babb’s role and re-
`sponsibilities were governed by a service agreement between Phar-
`macy Services and Geriatrics. As such, Babb had two sets of super-
`visors: Dr. Leonard Williams , Chief of the Geriatrics Clinic, and
`several Pharmacy Services administrators, including ( 1) Dr. Gary
`Wilson, Chief of Pharmacy Services; (2) Dr. Marjorie Howard,
`Babb’s Pharmacy Services direct supervisor; (3) Dr. Keri Justice, As-
`sociate Chief of Pharmacy Services; and ( 4) Dr. Robert Stewart,
`the Clinical Pharmacy Supervisor.
`In 2009, Babb obtained an “advanced scope,” which meant
`she could practice “disease state management” (“DSM”). As a
`DSM practitioner, Babb could independently manage patients for
`certain conditions within the scope of her expertise—diabetes, hy-
`pertension, and lipids—without having to consult a physician. In
`2011, the VA implemented a new nationwide patient-care system,
`“Patient Aligned Care T eam” (“PACT”), which emphasized “conti-
`nuity of care,” and required each team member to “work[] at their
`highest…licensed capacity” to provide optimal medical care for pa-
`tients. Under PACT , GS -12 pharmacists who practiced DSM at
`least 25% of the time would be eligible for promotion to GS-13. As
`a GS -12 with an advanced scope enabling her to practice DSM,
`Babb naturally sought promotion to GS-13.
`During this period (2011–2012), Babb, along with several
`other women, began to suspect that Pharmacy Services was imple-
`menting the new qualification standards for promotion in a man-
`ner that discriminated on the basis of sex and age. Ultimately , two
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`4 Opinion of the Court 23-10383
`clinical pharmacist colleagues of Babb, Donna Trask and Anita
`Truitt, filed EEOC complaints in October 2011, which culminated
`in their filing an age and sex discrimination lawsuit against the Sec-
`retary in February 2013. Babb supported her colleagues’ allega-
`tions, first by providing statements to an EEOC investigator in April
`and May of 2012, and then, by providing deposition testimony in
`March 2014. 1 According to Babb, her “whole career …changed”
`and “took a turn in a bad direction” after “participat[ing]” in Trask
`and Truitt’s case against the Secretary.
`In June 2012, Howard, Babb’s direct supervisor, asked
`whether Babb would consider transferring to a vacant primary care
`position in “Module B.” Howard recommended Babb’s transfer be-
`cause she did not think that Babb could satisfy the 25% requirement
`for the GS-13 promotion if she stayed in the Geriatrics Clinic. But
`Babb declined. She explained that treating geriatrics was her pro-
`fessional calling and that she remained hopeful that she could see
`additional patients and thereby satisfy the new promotion crite-
`rion. Notably , around this same time, Natalia Schwartz, a younger
`female pharmacist, requested transfer to the Module B vacancy , but
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`1 In April 2016, we affirmed a federal district court ’s grant of summary judg-
`ment for the Secretary. See Trask v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 822 F.3d 1179,
`1184 (11th Cir. 2016). But, as discussed below, in Babb II we held that our
`decision in Trask was abrogated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Babb I. See
`Babb II, 992 F.3d at 1196, 1200–04 (11th Cir. 2021).
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`Pharmacy Services denied her request after deciding not to fill the
`position.
`About two months later, in August 2012, the service agree-
`ment between Pharmacy Services and Geriatric s was up for rene-
`gotiation. Both Pharmacy Services and Geriatrics initially explored
`the possibility of having Babb remain in Geriatric s and spend at
`least 25% of her time using her advanced scope to practice DSM.
`But such an arrangement was ultimately viewed as unworkable.
`Babb’s Geriatrics supervisor, Williams, concluded that (1) reserving
`25% of Babb’s time for DSM would detract from Babb’s primary
`job as a clinical pharmacist and increase wait times for patients, and
`(2) DSM was not well-suited for geriatric patients. Williams deter-
`mined that Geriatrics could only provide Babb with three slots per
`day to practice DSM, but that would fall short of the requisite 25%
`to receive a GS -13 promotion. Accordingly , the executed service
`agreement did not provide for Babb to practice DSM. Instead,
`Babb was to spend her time working as a clinical pharmacist as part
`of an integrated patient- care team, which was Williams’s prefer-
`ence.
`Because Babb would no longer practice DSM under the re-
`negotiated service agreement, Pharmacy Services initiated the pro-
`cess to remove Babb’s advanced scope, which was completed in
`February 2013.
`Around the time of the renegotiation of the service agree-
`ment, Babb’s increasing concern that she would not be able to prac-
`tice DSM in Geriatrics led her to ask about opportunities in the VA’s
`anticoagulation clinic. To facilitate her potential transfer, Babb
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`6 Opinion of the Court 23-10383
`requested anticoagulation training. But Pharmacy Services denied
`her request. Pharmacy Services explained that (1) the anticoagula-
`tion clinic was responsible for training medical residents, (2) it was
`understaffed and did not have the capacity to train others, and (3)
`such training was irrelevant to Babb’s work in Geriatric s anyway.
`Babb was denied the same request in January 2013. N o t a b l y, Phar-
`macy Services denied similar requests from other pharmacists as
`well.
`In April 2013, two positions opened in the anticoagulation
`clinic. Seizing on the opportunity to transfer out of Geriatric s,
`Babb applied. A three-member panel comprising Kim Hall, Cathe-
`rine Sypniewski, and Robert Stewart conducted interviews for the
`two positions. The panel ultimately selected Sara Grawe (age 26)
`and Amy Mack ( age 30), two younger female pharmacist s who
`scored highest on the interview .
`Babb admitted that her interview went poorly due to “anxi-
`ety and stress” and that it was “the worst interview of [her] life.”
`The panel’s testimony corroborates Babb’s recollection. Hall re-
`membered that Babb used unprofessional language (like “crap” and
`“screwed up”) and harshly criticized her colleagues. This made
`Hall question whether Babb was a good fit for the anticoagulation
`clinic, which prioritized communication skills. Sypniewski ex-
`plained that Grawe and Mack possessed significantly more antico-
`agulation experience —Babb had none —and provided better an-
`swers to difficult medical questions. And Stewart echoed Sypniew-
`ski’s a ssessment that Babb’s anticoagulation experienced was
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`“nowhere near” the selected applicants. The p anelists awarded
`Babb 39 points, falling far short of Grawe and Mack, who received
`scores of 52 points and 62 points, respectively, in part because they
`had a “significant amount” of training “in the anticoagulation
`clinic.”
`That same April, as Babb was interviewing for the anticoag-
`ulation position, Wilson, Chief of Pharmacy Services, received an
`anonymous “vulgar” letter critical of Pharmacy Services’ promo-
`tion practices for employees between GS-11 and GS-13. Pharmacy
`Services convened an administrative investigation board (“ AIB”) to
`investigate and uncover the letter’s author. Justice, Associate Chief
`of Pharmacy Services, testified to the AIB that (1) Babb was one of
`the “mow-wows,” i.e. “squeaky wheels,” who are “never happy , al-
`ways complaining,” and (2) certain employees perceived that “they
`were discriminated against because they were older and female.”
`Wilson also testified to the AIB that Babb “felt that [she was] dis-
`criminated against over age and sex.” Ultimately , Babb was ques-
`tioned in connection with the letter along with 25 other employees.
`Around this same time, Babb also requested a transfer to the
`Module B position that she had declined back in June 2012, in the
`hope that working in Module B would allow her to once again
`practice with an advanced scope and achieve a GS-13 promotion.
`Justice denied Babb’s request , explaining that (1) Pharmacy Ser-
`vices had decided not to fill that vacancy , and (2) she could not
`transfer Babb to a position with promotion potential without
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`advertising the position and allowing for a competitive application
`process.
`In May 2013, after failing to secure either the anticoagulation
`or Module B position s, Babb filed the EEOC complaint that re-
`sulted in this lawsuit. She also requested transfer to the “float
`pool,” where she could be part of a group of rotating pharmacists
`filling in for absent staff. Practicing as a “floater” did not require an
`advanced scope and presented no promotion opportunities, but at
`this point Babb simply wanted out of Geriatrics . Pharmacy Ser-
`vices approved Babb’s request, and she joined the float pool in July
`2013.
`After Babb spent several months working as a floater, an-
`other two GS-13 positions opened up. The first was a PACT assign-
`ment split between Module B and Module D, and the second was a
`half anticoagulation and half Palm Harbor clinic position. In
`March 2014, Babb accepted the PACT assignment, and in April
`2014, Justice submitted the paperwork to facilitate Babb’s GS -13
`promotion. Babb’s promotion was approved in August 2014.
`Despite the promotion, Babb was unhappy that her new
`job—which consisted of four 9-hour shifts Tuesday through Friday
`and one 4 -hour shift on Saturday mornings —only entitled her to
`four hours holiday pay for each of the five Monday federal holidays.
`The V A offered to change her schedule (by shifting her Saturday
`work to other days) so that she could receive a full eight hours of
`holiday pay on those five Mondays, but Babb declined because the
`Saturday hours came with additional pay .
`II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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`In 2014, Babb sued the Secretary of the Department of Vet-
`erans Affairs, alleging retaliation, sex and age discrimination, a hos-
`tile work environment, and a retaliatory hostile work environment
`under Title VII and the ADEA. The Secretary moved for summary
`judgment, which the district court granted in full.
`Babb appealed the district court’s decision, and we reversed
`and remanded on Babb’s sex discrimination claim but affirmed the
`district court’s other rulings. See Babb v . Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,
`743 F . App’x 280 (11th Cir. 2018). We concluded that the district
`court erred by applying the McDonnell Douglas f ramework to
`Babb’s sex discrimination claim instead of the more lenient “moti-
`vating factor” standard, which we stated in Qui v . Thomas Cnty.
`Sch. Dist., 814 F .3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016) applies to a “mixed-motive”
`claim— when a plaintiff alleges that an employer engaged in an ad-
`verse personnel action for a combination of discriminatory and
`non-discriminatory reasons. Id. at 286–87. But we rejected Babb’s
`argument that the Qui standard also applied to her age discrimi-
`nation and retaliation claims. We acknowledged that “if we were
`writing on a clean slate, we might well agree,” but that we were
`bound by our precedent in Trask , which applied the McDonnell -
`Douglas framework to such claims. Id. at 287–88. We also con-
`cluded that the district court properly evaluated and rejected Babb’s
`hostile work environment claims under Gowski’s “severe and per-
`vasive” standard. Id. at 291–92.
`Babb then petitioned the Supreme Court, which granted
`certiorari on one issue: whether the federal-sector provision of the
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`ADEA required her to prove that age was a “but -for” cause of an
`adverse personnel action. Babb I, 589 U.S. at 402. T he Supreme
`Court ruled for Babb, explaining that the plain language of § 633(a)
`of the ADEA, which mandates that “personnel actions…shall be
`made free from any discrimination based on age…”, requires a
`plaintiff to show only that “age discrimination plays any part in the
`way a decision is made.” Id. at 405–08. Imposing this looser causa-
`tion standard ensures that personnel actions are “untainted by any
`considerations of age” regardless of whether such considerations
`would have changed the outcome. Id. at 402.
`But the Supreme Court made clear that a plaintiff must still
`show “that age was a but -for cause of differential treatment” that
`ultimately played a part in the adverse employment outcome. Id.
`at 414. And the Supreme Court also explained that “plaintiffs who
`demonstrate only that they were subjected to [differential treat-
`ment] cannot obtain reinstatement, backpay , compensatory dam-
`ages, or other forms of relief related to the end result of an em-
`ployment decision.” Id. at 413. T o obtain such remedies, “plaintiffs
`must [still] show that age discrimination was a but-for cause of the
`employment outcome.” Id.
`Following the Supreme Court’s decision , we reversed and
`remanded on Babb’s age and sex discrimination claims but other-
`wise affirmed the district court. See Babb v . Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans
`Affs., 802 F . App’x 548 (11th Cir. 2020). Babb petitioned for a rehear-
`ing on two issues: (1) whether the Supreme Court’s decision ex-
`tended to Babb’s retaliation claim and (2) whether our intervening
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`decision in Monaghan v . Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F .3d 855 (11th Cir.
`2020) undermined our previous rejection of Babb’s retaliatory hos-
`tile work environment claim. Babb II, 992 F .3d at 1195.
`We granted her petition and answered in the affirmative on
`both issues. Id. at 1195–96. Because the ADEA ’s federal-sector pro-
`vision was “nearly identical” to Title VII’s retaliation provision —
`both containing the “shall be made free from any discrimination”
`language—we held that the Supreme Court’s decision abrogated
`our holding in Trask and that the district court must reassess Babb’s
`retaliation claim under the new framework outlined by the Su-
`preme Court. Id. at 1199–1205. We reasoned that “[w]ithout quite
`saying as much…it seems that the Supreme Court accepted Babb’s
`argument ‘that the District Court should not have used the McDon-
`nell Douglas f ramework.’” Id. at 1204 (quoting Babb I).
`As to Babb’s retaliatory hostile work environment claim, we
`explained that our decision in Monaghan—which held that a retali-
`atory hostile work environment claim is a subset of a retaliation
`claim rather than of a hostile work environment claim —under-
`mined Gowski, which had analyzed retaliatory hostile work envi-
`ronment claims under the “severe or pervasive” standard appropri-
`ate for hostile work environment claims. Id. at 1205–08. Instead,
`we held that retaliatory hostile work environment claims should be
`adjudicated based on the “different, less onerous standard” applied
`to retaliation claims : “whether the employer’s complained -of ac-
`tion well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making
`or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 1206–08. Accord-
`ingly , we reversed and remanded to the district court once again,
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`this time to reevaluate Babb’s age and sex discrimination claims,
`her retaliation claim, and her retaliatory hostile work environment
`claim. Id. at 1209.
`After supplemental briefing to address the intervening
`changes of law , the district court issued a renewed opinion, grant-
`ing summary judgment for the Secretary on Babb’s sex and age dis-
`crimination claims, but denying summary judgment on Babb’s re-
`taliation and retaliatory hostile work environment claims. Apply-
`ing the standard outlined in Babb I and II, the district court found
`that Babb had not shown that a reasonable jury could conclude
`from the evidence presented that Babb’s age or sex played any role
`at all in the process leading to the two alleged adverse employment
`decisions: (1) her non-selection for the anticoagulation position and
`(2) denial of her request to transfer to Module B. But applying that
`same “played any role in the decision-making” standard to Babb’s
`retaliation claim, the district court found that a reasonable jury
`could infer a causal connection between Babb’s opposition to al-
`leged discrimination and certain differential treatment she experi-
`enced in the decision-making process for several retaliatory person-
`nel actions, including the removal of her advanced scope, denial of
`her holiday pay , denial of her transfer request to Module B, and her
`non-selection for the anticoagulation position. As to Babb’s retali-
`atory hostile work environment claim, the district court found that
`a reasonable jury could conclude that Babb’s work environment
`“might well have dissuaded [her] from making or supporting a
`charge of discrimination.” Babb’s Title VII retaliation and retalia-
`tory hostile work environment claims thus proceeded to trial.
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`Prior to trial, the Secretary moved for partial reconsideration
`of the district court’s order, solely to address an inconsistency be-
`tween the district court’s ruling and one of its prior ruling s in the
`action. In analyzing Babb’s retaliation claim, the district court had
`listed the removal of Babb’s advanced scope as one of several ac-
`tionable discrete retaliatory personnel actions . However, in its
`prior ruling dismissing Babb’s Second Amended Complaint, the
`district court had held that the removal of Babb’s advanced scope
`could not constitute a discrete act of retaliation because Babb had
`failed to timely assert it as such to an EEO counselor within the
`requisite 45 -day period. Accordingly , Plaintiffs’ Third Amended
`Complaint—the operative complaint—did not identify the removal
`of the advanced scope as a discrete act of retaliation. The district
`court agreed, holding that “[t]he…removal of Dr. Babb’s Advanced
`Scope is…time-barred from consideration as a discrete act,” alt-
`hough it could “serve as circumstantial evidence of…retaliatory an-
`imus.”
`An eight-day trial followed. Babb presented testimony from
`eleven witnesses and deposition testimony . The Secretary pre-
`sented five witnesses. Collectively , the parties introduced over 100
`exhibits.
`As relevant to this appeal, the district court instructed the
`jury that testimony presented by Babb concerning age and sex dis-
`crimination experienced by Trask and Truitt was admissible “only
`for the limited purpose of proving Dr. Babb’s good faith belief that
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`[Trask and Truitt] had been discriminated against and not for any
`other purpose.”
`The district court also instructed the jury concerning the
`causation standard for Babb’s retaliation and retaliatory hostile
`work claims. The district court’s instruction for Babb’s retaliation
`claim required proving that “Defendant treated Plaintiff differently
`during the process of making the adverse employment actions
`based on Plaintiff’s EEO activity .” Likewise, the instruction for
`Babb’s retaliatory hostile work environment claim required prov-
`ing that “Plaintiff was subjected to offensive acts or sta tements
`about or because of her protected EEO activity—even if they were
`not specifically directed at her…”
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`The jury returned a verdict for the Secretary on both counts,
`finding that (1) no one had “treated [Babb] differently during the
`process of making the adverse employment acti ons based on
`[Babb’s] EEO activity” and (2) no one had “harassed [Babb] because
`of her EEO activity .”
`This appeal timely ensued.
`III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`2 By contrast, Babb’s rejected proposed instruction for her retaliation claim
`required proving that “Plaintiffs protected activity was considered by the De-
`fendant or that it played any role or part in the process of making the personnel
`action or actions. And her proposed instruction for her retaliatory hostile
`work environment claim required proving that “Plaintiff’s supervisors har-
`assed her while considering her protected activities.”
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`We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, “viewing
`all evidence and drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor
`of the nonmoving party .” Terrell v . Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 98
`F .4th 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation and quotations omitted).
`And we generally review a district court’s refusal to give a jury in-
`struction for abuse of discretion. Watkins v . City of Montgomery, Ala.,
`775 F .3d 1280, 1289 (11th Cir. 2014). “ A district court abuses its dis-
`cretion by refusing to give a requested instruction ‘only when (1)
`the requested instruction correctly state d the law , (2) the instruc-
`tion dealt with an issue properly before the jury , and (3) the failure
`to give the instruction resulted in prejudicial harm to the request-
`ing party .’” Id. at 1291 (quoting Burchfield v . CSH Transp., Inc., 636
`F .3d 1330, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)).
`IV. ANAL YSIS
`A. Sex And Age Discrimination Claims
`Prior to Babb I and II, the standard framework for evaluating
`federal-sector employment discrimination claims was the McDon-
`nell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Buckley v . Sec’y of Army,
`97 F .4th 784, 794 (11th Cir. 2024). Under this framework, a plaintiff
`carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of dis-
`crimination. Id. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden
`then shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
`tory reason for its actions. Id. Assuming it does, the burden then
`shifts back to the employee to show that the employer’s proffered
`reason is mere pretext. Id. In short, under McDonnell Douglas, “the
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`plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to show that discrimination was
`the but-for cause of her employer’s adverse personnel action.” Id.
`We have held that application of the McDonnell Douglas test
`to Title VII and ADEA federal -sector discrimination claims does
`not “make sense” post Babb I and II. Buckley, 97 F .4th at 794. This
`is because Title VII’s federal -sector provision no longer requires a
`showing of but-for causation as to the ultimate employment out-
`come, but “only that a protected characteristic played any part in
`[the] employer’s process in reaching an adverse employment deci-
`sion.” Id. Thus, using the McDonnell Douglas f ramework “is like
`requiring the plaintiff to move a boulder when she need only push
`a pebble.” Id.
`The framework is “much simpler” now . Id. at 795. “In ana-
`lyzing [a] disparate-treatment claim we return to Babb I’s directive
`and simply assess whether [the plaintiff] has proffered evidence that
`her [protected class] ‘ play[ed] any part ’ in the…decision making
`process” that resulted in the adverse employment decision. Id.; see
`Terrell, 98 F .4th at 1352 (holding that under Title VII’s federal-sector
`provision a plaintiff now “must proffer evidence that her race or
`national origin played any part in the hiring process”).
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`3 To clarify, to assert a claim for injunctive relief, a plaintiff no longer needs to
`show but-for causation as to the ultimate employment outcome; but such a
`showing is still required for monetary damages. See Babb I, 589 U.S. at 413–14.
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`Here, we conclude that the district court correctly found
`that Babb could not establish that a protected characteristic played
`any part in the decision-making processes concerning (1) her non -
`selection for the anticoagulation position and (2) the denial of her
`transfer to Module B .4 We turn first to the anticoagulation posi-
`tion.
`1. Non-Selection For Anticoagulation Position
`Babb’s argument that she was subjected to differential treat-
`ment on the basis of sex or age in her non-selection for the antico-
`agulation position boils down to two contentions: (1) two younger
`female pharmacists were selected in her stead and (2) the selection
`panel awarded additional points to applicants with residency train-
`ing and residency-trained pharmacists tend to be younger. Neither
`contention evinces unlawful differential treatment on the basis of
`sex or age.
`First, Babb provides no evidence that age or sex played any
`role in the selection of Grawe and Mack. Both younger pharma-
`cists, like Babb, were female, and the record conclusively establishes
`that the interviewing panel selected them because they “had signif-
`icantly more experience in the applied for position” and that their
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`4 Because Babb cannot even establish discrimination in the decision-making
`processes resulting in her adverse employment outcomes, Babb is not eligible
`for injunctive relief. See Babb I, 589 U.S. at 414. And it goes without saying
`that Babb is also not eligible for monetary relief, as such relief requires show-
`ing that alleged discrimination was the but -for cause of an adverse employ-
`ment decision itself. See id. at 413.
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`experience “indicated…that they should be capable of doing the
`job in an efficient and skilled manner [and] should require little
`training to practice independently .” Conversely , the interviewers
`noted that Babb had no anticoagulation experience and had acted
`unprofessionally during the interview . Indeed, Babb’s interview
`went so poorly that she acknowledged that “it was the worst inter-
`view of [her] life.”
`As for the choice to award additional points to applicants
`with residency training, the record provides no indication that priv-
`ileging residency -trained pharmacists was motivated by discrimi-
`natory considerations of age or sex. See Babb I, 589 U.S. at 406 (“age
`must be a but-for cause of…differential treatment”). As one mem-
`ber of the selecting panel explained , “a residency should…carry
`higher points than a board certification [because] a residency is one
`year of intensive focused training, mentoring, and learning for a
`pharmacist where they get extensive experien ce in disease state
`management” and there is “no substitute for the experience that
`someone gets in residency when it comes to disease state manage-
`ment advanced scope.”
`Contrast the panel’s awarding of additional points for a resi-
`dency with the hypothetical the Supreme Court used in Babb I to
`illustrate discriminatory differential treatment in the decision-mak-
`ing process:
`Suppose that a decision -maker is trying to decide
`whether to promote employee A, who is 35 years old,
`or employee B, who is 55. Under the employer’s pol-
`icy , candidates for promotion are first given numerical
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`scores based on non -discriminatory factors. Candi-
`dates over the age of 40 are then docked five points,
`and the employee with the highest score is promoted.
`Based on the non-discriminatory factors, employee A
`(the 35-year-old) is given a score of 90, and employee
`B (the 55-year-old) gets a score of 85. But employee
`B is then docked 5 points because of age and thus
`ends up with a final score of 80. The decision-maker
`looks at the candidates’ final scores and, seeing that
`employee A has the higher score, promotes employee
`A.
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`Babb I, 589 U.S. at 407.
`
`The Supreme Court explained that even though employee A
`would have had the higher score regardless, docking points from
`employee B because of his age was still a form of unlawful differ-
`ential treatment. Id. But here, unlike the Supreme Court’s hypo-
`thetical where there was a direct connection between points
`awarded and age discrimination, the connection between privileg-
`ing a residency and any possible discriminatory motivation is pure
`speculation. And such speculation does not suffice to show that
`discriminatory differential treatment pla yed a role in an adverse
`employment outcome per Babb I and II, which still require proving
`that age or gender was a “but-for cause of discrimination—that is,
`of differential treatment.” Babb I , 589 U.S. at 406; see Babb II, 992
`F .3d at 1204.
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`Babb also raises a third argument by pointing to allegations
`of gender and age discrimination by other women who worked at
`the V A. But Babb does not connect any of those general allegations
`to the specific decision -making process resulting in her non -selec-
`tion for the anticoagulation position. Even taking these allegations
`in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Babb’s inability
`to tie any of them to the individuals comprising the panel that re-
`jected her renders them immaterial . See Buckley, 97 F .4th at 795
`(finding the discrimin