United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE, INC.,
`Plaintiff-Appellant
`
`v.
`
`UNITED STATES,
`Defendant-Appellee
`
`PT ENTERPRISE INC., PRO-TEAM COIL NAIL
`ENTERPRISE INC., UNICATCH INDUSTRIAL CO.,
`LTD., WTA INTERNTIONAL CO., LTD., ZON MON
`CO., LTD., HOR LIANG INDUSTRIAL
`CORPORATION, PRESIDENT INDUSTRIAL INC.,
`LIANG CHYUAN INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD.,
`Defendants-Cross-Appellants
`______________________
`
`2018-1229, 2018-1251
`______________________
`
`Appeals from the United States Court of International
`Trade in Nos. 1:15-cv-00213-CRK, 1:15-cv-00220-CRK,
`Judge Claire R. Kelly.
`______________________
`
`Decided: October 3, 2019
`______________________
`
`ADAM H. GORDON, The Bristol Group PLLC, Washing-
`ton, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented
`by PING GONG.
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
` MIKKI COTTET, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United
`States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for
`defendant-appellee.
` Also
`represented by JEANNE
`DAVIDSON, JOSEPH H. HUNT, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.
`
` ANDREW THOMAS SCHUTZ, Grunfeld, Desiderio, Le-
`bowitz, Silverman & Klestadt LLP, Washington, DC, ar-
`gued for defendants-cross-appellants. Also argued by NED
`H. MARSHAK, New York, NY. Also represented by MAX
`FRED SCHUTZMAN, New York, NY; KAVITA MOHAN, Wash-
`ington, DC.
` ______________________
`
`Before NEWMAN, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.
`TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
`The United States Department of Commerce found
`that certain foreign producers and exporters were dumping
`certain products into the United States market, and it im-
`posed a small antidumping duty on their imports. A do-
`mestic company argues that Commerce should have
`imposed a higher duty. The foreign producers and export-
`ers argue that Commerce made methodological errors, the
`correction of which would reduce any dumping margin to a
`de minimis level, so that no duty would be imposed. We
`reject the domestic firm’s challenge. We partly reject the
`foreign firms’ challenge, and we remand to secure further
`explanation from Commerce about one issue.
`I
`Based on a petition from appellant Mid Continent Steel
`& Wire, Inc., Commerce initiated an antidumping duty in-
`vestigation into steel nail products from Taiwan and cer-
`tain other places. Certain Steel Nails from India, the
`Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Oman, Tai-
`wan, the Republic of Turkey, and the Socialist Republic of
`Vietnam, 79 Fed. Reg. 36,019 (Dep’t of Commerce June 25,
`2014). Commerce separated the Taiwanese investigation
`
`

`

`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`3
`
`into its own proceeding and named Taiwanese exporter PT
`Enterprise Inc. and its affiliated nail producer Pro-Team
`Coil Nail Enterprise Inc. as mandatory respondents. See
`Certain Steel Nails from Taiwan: Negative Preliminary De-
`termination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Postpone-
`ment of Final Determination, 79 Fed. Reg. 78,053, 78,054
`(Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 29, 2014) (Preliminary Determi-
`nation). Those firms are the cross-appellants before us,
`along with other Taiwanese producers of nails. We hereaf-
`ter use “PT” to refer sometimes to the cross-appellants col-
`lectively, sometimes just to PT Enterprise and Pro-Team.
`The statute directs Commerce to determine whether
`the merchandise at issue is being sold or is likely to be sold
`in the United States “at less than its fair value,” 19 U.S.C.
`§ 1673, which the statute identifies as “dumping,” id.,
`§ 1677(34) (defining “dumping” to mean “the sale or likely
`sale of goods at less than fair value”). To make the required
`determination, Commerce must assess the difference be-
`tween the “normal value” of the goods at issue (reflecting
`the home-market value) and the “export price or con-
`structed export price” of those goods (reflecting the price at
`which they are sold into the United States). See id.,
`§ 1677b(a) (stating that the determination of the existence
`of sales “at less than fair value” is to be based on a compar-
`ison of “the export price or constructed export price and
`normal value”); id., § 1677a (addressing “export price” and
`“constructed export price”); id., § 1677b (addressing “nor-
`mal value”). That difference is the “dumping margin.” Id.,
`§ 1677(35)(A) (defining “dumping margin”). If Commerce
`finds the specified less-than-fair-value sales, and the Inter-
`national Trade Commission makes certain findings about
`effects on domestic industry, “there shall be imposed upon
`such merchandise an antidumping duty, in addition to any
`other duty imposed, in an amount equal to the amount by
`which the normal value exceeds the export price (or the
`constructed export price) for the merchandise,” id., § 1673,
`i.e., in the amount of the dumping margin.
`
`

`

`4
`
`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`Addressing the fact that a foreign producer or exporter
`often makes many sales, the statute provides certain rules
`and authorizations that govern Commerce’s required de-
`terminations. Id., § 1677f-1. It defines “weighted average
`dumping margin” to mean “the percentage determined by
`dividing the aggregate dumping margins determined for a
`specific exporter or producer by the aggregate export prices
`and constructed export prices of such exporter or pro-
`ducer.” Id., § 1677(35)(B). The statute provides, as a gen-
`eral rule, that Commerce must “determine whether the
`subject merchandise is being sold in the United States at
`less than fair value” by “comparing the weighted average
`of the normal values to the weighted average of the export
`prices (and constructed export prices) for comparable mer-
`chandise” or by making the value/price comparison for each
`individual transaction. Id., § 1677f-1(d)(1)(A)(i), (ii). But
`the statute also directs Commerce to disregard weighted
`average dumping margins if they are de minimis, id.,
`§ 1673b(b)(3); and of relevance here, it provides authority
`to Commerce to compare average values (on the foreign
`side) to individual export prices or constructed export
`prices (on the U.S. side) in specified circumstances involv-
`ing disparities among the U.S. side prices for the foreign
`exporter or producer. Id., § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B).
`Certain aspects of the method adopted by Commerce
`for calculating the dumping margin in the present matter
`are unchallenged. On the U.S. side of the required compar-
`ison, Commerce used the export price, rather than a con-
`structed export price. On the foreign side, Commerce
`determined the Taiwanese normal value by determining a
`“constructed value,” which required determinations about,
`among other things, amounts PT paid for various inputs.
`19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4), (e).
`Although those basic choices are not in dispute, there
`is a dispute about how Commerce carried out its “con-
`structed value” calculation. Among the inputs PT pur-
`chased were services from many “toll” manufacturers (or
`
`

`

`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`5
`
`“tollers”)—firms that provide limited manufacturing ser-
`vices using materials or other contributions supplied or
`owned by its customers. Mid Continent has contended that
`certain of PT’s tollers should be excluded from this input
`calculation because those tollers were affiliated with PT.
`The evident concern with a “transaction between affiliated
`entities” is that it might not “adequately represent the true
`amount,” SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 630 F.3d 1365,
`1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011)—here, that PT’s payments for tolling
`to an affiliate might be artificially low, with the conse-
`quence that the constructed value might be too low, thus
`shrinking the gap between the constructed value and the
`U.S. price and, in turn, reducing the dumping margin and
`antidumping duty.
`In its Preliminary Determination, Commerce rejected
`Mid Continent’s affiliation claim as to a number of PT’s tol-
`lers and found no dumping. Preliminary Determination,
`79 Fed. Reg. at 78,054–78,055; Decision Memorandum for
`the Preliminary Determination in the Antidumping Duty
`Investigation of Certain Steel Nails from Taiwan, 79
`ITADOC 78053 (issued Dec. 17, 2014) (Preliminary Deci-
`sion Mem.). Commerce then conducted its full investiga-
`tion and analysis, including verification of key factual
`submissions.
`In its Final Determination, Commerce continued to
`find non-affiliation of certain PT tollers, contrary to Mid
`Continent’s contentions. See Certain Steel Nails from Tai-
`wan: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value,
`80 Fed. Reg. 28,959, 28,960–62 (Dep’t of Commerce May
`20, 2015) (Final Determination); Issues and Decision Mem-
`orandum for the Affirmative Final Determination in the
`Less than Fair Value Investigation of Certain Nails from
`Taiwan, 80 ITADOC 28959, at 47–53 (issued May 13, 2015)
`(Issues and Decision Mem.). But, based on some adjust-
`ments of earlier information, Commerce now found a posi-
`tive dumping margin above (though not far above) the level
`
`

`

`6
`
`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`that Commerce deems de minimis, and it imposed a duty
`in that amount. See Final Determination, 80 Fed. Reg. at
`28,961. In reaching that result, Commerce found so-called
`“differential pricing” by PT among its export prices, and it
`rejected certain of PT’s challenges to the method for ana-
`lyzing differential pricing that Commerce had set out in its
`preliminary decision memorandum. Issues and Decision
`Mem. at 15–31.
`Mid Continent filed an action in the Court of Interna-
`tional Trade (Trade Court), seeking a higher duty by chal-
`lenging Commerce’s finding of no affiliation between PT
`and certain of its tollers. PT also sued in the Trade Court,
`seeking a lower or zero duty by challenging certain aspects
`of Commerce’s calculation methodology. The Trade Court
`sustained the relevant Commerce conclusions and re-
`manded on an unrelated issue. Mid Continent Steel &
`Wire, Inc. v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1326 (Ct. Int’l
`Trade 2017). The Trade Court subsequently entered judg-
`ment sustaining Commerce’s Final Determination after
`the remand was complete. J.A. 72–73.
`Both Mid Continent and PT have timely appealed to
`this court, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
`§§ 1295(a)(5) and 2645(c). Mid Continent appeals Com-
`merce’s determination of non-affiliation between PT and
`certain of its tollers. PT cross-appeals three aspects of
`Commerce’s method of calculating the dumping margin.
`We review Commerce’s decision using the same stand-
`ard of review applied by the Trade Court, while carefully
`considering that court’s analysis. Diamond Sawblades
`Mfrs. Coal. v. United States, 866 F.3d 1304, 1310 (Fed. Cir.
`2017). We decide legal issues de novo and uphold factual
`determinations if they are supported by substantial evi-
`dence. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i); see Diamond Saw-
`blades, 866 F.3d at 1310; Dupont Teijin Films USA, LP v.
`United States, 407 F.3d 1211, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “A
`finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable
`
`

`

`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`7
`
`mind might accept the evidence to support the finding.”
`Nobel Biocare Services AG v. Instradent USA, Inc., 903
`F.3d 1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see Consol. Edison Co. v.
`NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). In carrying out its statu-
`torily assigned tasks, Commerce has discretion to make
`reasonable choices within statutory constraints. See, e.g.,
`Nucor Corp. v. United States, 927 F.3d 1243, 1248–49 (Fed.
`Cir. 2019); Apex Frozen Foods Private Ltd. v. United States,
`862 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Utility Air
`Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014); City of
`Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013). But Commerce
`must provide an explanation that is adequate to enable the
`court to determine whether the choices are in fact reason-
`able, including as to calculation methodologies. See CS
`Wind Vietnam Co., Ltd. v. United States, 832 F.3d 1367,
`1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`We address Mid-Continent’s challenge and PT’s chal-
`lenges in turn. We reject Mid Continent’s challenge. We
`reject two of PT’s challenges, but we vacate the decision of
`the Trade Court on the third challenge and remand for that
`court to remand to Commerce for further explanation.
`II
`The statute directs Commerce, when determining a
`constructed value of the merchandise at issue, to examine
`certain transactions to gauge the costs of various inputs.
`19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e). The statute provides, however, that
`“[a] transaction directly or indirectly between affiliated
`persons may be disregarded” in certain circumstances—
`specifically, “if, in the case of any element of value required
`to be considered, the amount representing that element
`does not fairly reflect the amount usually reflected in sales
`of merchandise under consideration in the market under
`consideration.” Id., § 1677b(f)(2). Mid Continent’s chal-
`lenge focuses on the threshold question of what it means
`for a transaction to be between “affiliated persons.”
`Congress has provided a definition:
`
`

`

`8
`
`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`The following persons shall be considered to be “af-
`filiated” or “affiliated persons”:
`(A) Members of a family, including brothers
`and sisters (whether by the whole or half
`blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal de-
`scendants.
`(B) Any officer or director of an organiza-
`tion and such organization.
`(C) Partners.
`(D) Employer and employee.
`(E) Any person directly or indirectly own-
`ing, controlling, or holding with power to
`vote, 5 percent or more of the outstanding
`voting stock or shares of any organization
`and such organization.
`(F) Two or more persons directly or indi-
`rectly controlling, controlled by, or under
`common control with, any person.
`(G) Any person who controls any other per-
`son and such other person.
`For purposes of this paragraph, a person shall be
`considered to control another person if the person is
`legally or operationally in a position to exercise re-
`straint or direction over the other person.
`Id., § 1677(33) (emphasis added to the “control” portions
`that are at issue here). Commerce, for its part, has adopted
`an implementing rule for antidumping duty investigations:
`“Affiliated persons” and “affiliated parties” have
`the same meaning as in [§ 1677(33)]. In determin-
`ing whether control over another person exists,
`within the meaning of [§ 1677(33)], the Secretary
`will consider the following factors, among others:
`Corporate or family groupings; franchise or joint
`
`

`

`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`9
`
`venture agreements; debt financing; and close sup-
`plier relationships. The Secretary will not find that
`control exists on the basis of these factors unless
`the relationship has the potential to impact deci-
`sions concerning the production, pricing, or cost of
`the subject merchandise or foreign like product.
`The Secretary will consider the temporal aspect of
`a relationship in determining whether control ex-
`ists; normally, temporary circumstances will not
`suffice as evidence of control.
`19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b)(3) (emphasis added).
`In the present matter, Mid-Continent contends that
`Commerce mistakenly rejected its argument that PT was
`affiliated with certain tolling companies. We reject the con-
`tention.
`Commerce made detailed findings to support its overall
`finding that PT lacked the ability to exercise control over
`those tollers—which, therefore, were not affiliated with PT.
`Commerce prominently found that there are many compa-
`nies other than PT to whom the relevant tollers “could pro-
`vide their services” if exploited by PT. Issues & Decision
`Mem. at 51, 52; see Mid Continent, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 1334
`n.11. Commerce also found that many tollers sold to others
`as well as PT and had existed before selling to PT, and that
`the tollers that had all or most of their sales to PT were
`profitable, indicating lack of exploitation. Issues & Deci-
`sion Mem. at 51–52; Mid Continent, 219 F. Supp. 3d at
`1334 & n.12. Commerce further found that PT and the tol-
`lers had no stock ownership in each other, no shared offic-
`ers or managers, and no other relationships, such as
`common familial ownership, that might suggest ability to
`control; no toller had a long-term contract with PT or a
`debt-financing agreement with PT. Issues & Decision
`Mem. at 50–52; Mid Continent, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 1334.
`We see no lack of substantial evidence to support those
`findings. And those findings permit a reasonable mind to
`
`

`

`10
`
`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`find, and so are sufficient to support the overall finding,
`that PT, while working closely with the tollers at issue, did
`not have the ability to control them. To the extent that Mid
`Continent argues that the evidence could support a con-
`trary finding, it misidentifies the relevant question, which
`is only whether the evidence supports the finding that
`Commerce made. “[T]he possibility of drawing two incon-
`sistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
`administrative agency’s finding from being supported by
`substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime
`Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966); see American Textile
`Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981); Nobel
`Biocare Services, 903 F.3d at 1375.
`Mid Continent suggests that Commerce used the
`wrong standard in answering the affiliation question. Spe-
`cifically, it suggests that Commerce did not determine
`whether PT had the ability to control the tollers at issue,
`but only whether PT had in fact exercised control. We dis-
`agree. That suggestion is contrary to what Commerce did:
`notably, it is contrary to Commerce’s reliance on the num-
`ber of other buyers available to the tollers at issue, a fact
`that directly bears on ability to control. The suggestion
`also is contrary to what Commerce said it was deciding—
`namely, whether PT “was able to exert restraint or direc-
`tion over” the tollers at issue, whether the tollers became
`“‘reliant upon’” PT, whether PT was “‘in a position to exer-
`cise restraint or direction,’” whether PT had “the ability to
`control” the tollers, and whether there was “dependence on”
`PT by the tollers. Issues & Decision Mem. at 50–52 (em-
`phases added). Because evidence of actual control is highly
`relevant to whether the ability to control exists, Com-
`merce’s consideration of such evidence does not show that
`Commerce failed to apply an ability-to-control standard.
`Finally, we see no merit in Mid Continent’s suggestion
`that Commerce made an affiliation determination for the
`tollers only on a collective basis and failed to make an in-
`dividual determination for each toller. As Mid Continent
`
`

`

`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`11
`
`itself has stated, Commerce’s decisions themselves provide
`no support for such a conclusion. A failure to analyze each
`element of a group cannot be inferred from the fact that the
`ultimate summary employs generalizations to recount
`shared facts where appropriate. And we see no basis for
`finding a concession to the contrary in a single remark by
`government counsel before the Trade Court, a remark eas-
`ily understood as simply indicating that Commerce consid-
`ered all the tollers, not just some.
`We therefore affirm Commerce’s determination that
`PT and the toll manufacturers at issue in the appeal are
`not affiliated.
`
`III
`In its cross-appeal, PT renews challenges that it
`pressed before Commerce and the Trade Court to the meth-
`ods Commerce used in calculating the dumping margin.
`The challenges now at issue focus on Commerce’s treat-
`ment of the U.S. side of the comparison required for calcu-
`lating the dumping margin—that is, on Commerce’s
`treatment of export prices. Specifically, PT challenges
`three aspects of how Commerce implemented its statutory
`authority to address situations in which there are certain
`disparities among the export prices charged for the mer-
`chandise at issue.
`
`A
`Congress recognized that the comparison required by
`the statute typically requires consideration of multiple
`transactions, necessitating choices about treating them in
`the aggregate, one at a time, or in some other way. See 19
`U.S.C. § 1677f-1. Congress provided that, “[i]n general,”
`Commerce “shall” proceed either “(i) by comparing the
`weighted average of the normal values to the weighted av-
`erage of the export prices . . . for comparable merchan-
`dise”—the “average-to-average” (A-to-A) method—or “(ii)
`by comparing the normal values of individual transactions
`
`

`

`12
`
`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`to the export prices . . . of individual transactions for com-
`parable merchandise”—the “transaction-to-transaction”
`(T-to-T) method. Id., § 1677f-1(d)(1)(A). But Congress also
`provided an “exception”:
`[Commerce] may determine whether the subject
`merchandise is being sold in the United States at
`less than fair value by comparing the weighted av-
`erage of the normal values to the export prices (or
`constructed export prices) of individual transac-
`tions for comparable merchandise, if—
`(i) there is a pattern of export prices (or constructed
`export prices) for comparable merchandise that dif-
`fer significantly among purchasers, regions, or pe-
`riods of time, and
`(ii) [Commerce] explains why such differences can-
`not be taken into account using a method described
`in paragraph (1)(A)(i) or (ii)[, i.e., the A-to-A or T-
`to-T methods].
`Id., § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B). Thus, Commerce “may” use a mixed
`method—the “average-to-transaction” (A-to-T) method—if
`the two conditions are met. See Apex, 862 F.3d at 1326–27,
`1334.
`A regulation adopted by Commerce gives the identified
`names to the three methods. 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(b). It also
`states that Commerce will use the A-to-A method “unless
`[it] determines another method is appropriate in a partic-
`ular case,” id., § 351.414(c)(1), and that it will use the T-to-
`T method “only in unusual situations, such as when there
`are very few sales of subject merchandise and the merchan-
`dise sold in each market is identical or very similar or is
`custom-made,” id., § 351.414(c)(2). The regulation does not
`specify details for implementing the A-to-T method except
`in a respect not at issue here (concerning use of “the con-
`temporaneous month” for normal-value averaging). Id.,
`§ 351.414(e), (f).
`
`

`

`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`13
`
`B
`In the present matter, Commerce adopted the A-to-T
`method by determining that the statutory conditions for its
`use were met. Specifically, it determined that there was a
`“pattern of export prices” for “comparable merchandise
`that differ[ed] significantly among purchasers, regions, or
`periods of time”—i.e., that there was so-called “differential
`pricing”—and that those differences could not be “taken
`into account” by using the other two methods. See Issues
`and Decision Mem. at 19–20; J.A. 2179. In so finding, Com-
`merce relied on a method using the “Cohen’s d test” bor-
`rowed from statistics literature, which it had only recently
`adopted. See Issues & Decision Mem. at 25 & n.111 (citing
`Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determina-
`tion of the Antidumping Duty Investigation of Xanthan
`Gum from the People’s Republic of China, 78 ITADOC
`33351 (June 4, 2013), and that ruling’s reliance on Robert
`Coe, It’s the Effect Size, Stupid: What Effect Size Is and
`Why It Is Important, Paper presented at the Annual Con-
`ference of the British Educ. Research Ass’n (Sept. 2002),
`www.leeds.ac.uk/educol/documents/00002182.htm)). Com-
`merce explained aspects of its overall method in the Pre-
`liminary Decision Mem. at 10–12, and it elaborated on
`certain details in the Issues & Decision Mem. at 15–31. See
`Mid Continent, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 1337–44.
`To determine whether the required “pattern” existed,
`Commerce applied what it identified as “a generally recog-
`nized” statistical test called the “Cohen’s d test” for testing
`differences among subsets within an overall set of data—
`here, for testing subsets of PT’s export prices defined by
`purchasers, regions, or periods of time (each a “test group”)
`by comparing them to the export prices outside the test
`group (the “comparison group”) to see if they differed sig-
`nificantly. See Preliminary Decision Mem. at 11. It calcu-
`lated a ratio called a “Cohen’s d coefficient” for each
`comparison. The numerator of that ratio is the difference
`between the mean of the test group’s prices and the mean
`
`

`

`14
`
`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`of the comparison group’s prices; the denominator is a
`measure of dispersion when pooling the test and compari-
`son groups—here, Commerce used the “pooled” variance
`(the square of the standard deviation). If the mean-to-
`mean difference in the numerator was at least four fifths of
`the pooled figure, i.e., the Cohen’s d coefficient was 0.8 or
`greater, Commerce deemed the test group’s pricing signifi-
`cantly different from the comparison group’s pricing for
`purposes of meeting the “pattern” condition. Id. at 11. Of
`significance to the issues presented on appeal, in arriving
`at the pooled dispersion figure used as the denominator of
`the ratio forming the d coefficient, Commerce used a “sim-
`ple average” of the variance of the test group and the vari-
`ance of
`the comparison group, disregarding
`the
`comparative sizes of the two groups; it did not weight the
`variances being pooled by the volume (or value or other
`characteristic) of goods sold within each group. See Issues
`& Decision Mem. at 28–29; Mid Continent, 219 F. Supp. 3d
`at 1338–39.
`Based on its calculation of Cohen’s d coefficients for
`sales by customer, region, or time segment, Commerce pro-
`ceeded to decide whether it would use an A-to-T compari-
`son rather than an A-to-A comparison, for some or all of the
`PT’s sales, as it “may” do under the statute if the specified
`pattern is present and an A-to-A (or T-to-T) comparison
`cannot account for that pattern. To make this decision,
`Commerce applied a “ratio test”—examining the percent of
`sales (by value) that have coefficients of at least 0.8—com-
`bined with a “meaningful differences” test.
`Thus, Commerce said that, in cases where the percent
`is less than 33, it would use the A-to-A method in toto,
`whereas in cases where the percent is above 66, Commerce
`would use the A-to-T method in toto. But if, as in this mat-
`ter, the percent is from 33 to 66, Commerce said, its ap-
`proach was the following: (a) use the A-to-T method to
`calculate a dumping margin for the sales having coeffi-
`cients of at least 0.8, but do so by zeroing out the non-
`
`

`

`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`15
`
`dumped sales so that they do not offset dumping margins
`from the dumped sales; (b) use the A-to-A method to calcu-
`late a dumping margin for the other sales, with no zeroing
`of non-dumped sales; and (c) arrive at an overall weighted-
`average dumping margin for all of the respondent’s sales
`by combining the two results in a way that zeroes out neg-
`ative dumping margins among the A-to-A group so that
`they do not offset positive margins among the A-to-T group.
`See Issues & Decision Mem. at 26.1 Finally, Commerce
`stated that it uses the resulting aggregate figure if there is
`a meaningful difference between doing so and simply using
`the A-to-A method, which, Commerce said, includes
`(though is not limited to) a situation in which the former
`moves the dumping margin above the de minimis thresh-
`old, as it did here. Preliminary Decision Mem. at 12. See
`generally Mid-Continent, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 1343–44.
`C
`We now address PT’s three challenges.
`1
`PT first challenges an aspect of Commerce’s method at
`the aggregation stage—specifically, its zeroing of negative
`
`1 The parties have not provided us with or pointed to
`a clear statement of the specific arithmetic steps that Com-
`merce used for the combination. Such a clear statement is
`commonly necessary to enable us to understand, and hence
`to review, an action taken by Commerce; when there is no
`such clear statement, a remand for further explanation be-
`comes more likely. In this matter, however, it is undis-
`puted that Commerce used some kind of zeroing of the
`negative-margin sales in the group to which it applied an
`A-to-A method when taking the next step of arriving at an
`overall dumping margin. That is enough for review of the
`limited (statutory) challenge presented to us concerning
`this stage of Commerce’s calculation.
`
`

`

`16
`
`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`dumping margins for sales in the A-to-A group when arriv-
`ing at the overall weighted-average dumping margin. PT
`states that the zeroing at that stage of the calculation ap-
`plies, within the broad class of merchandise at issue, to at
`least some control-number subcategories (CONNUMs)
`that contain no sales having a d coefficient of at least 0.8.
`PT objects to such zeroing.
`Commerce justified such zeroing on the ground that it
`served to avoid “reduc[ing] or completely negat[ing] the re-
`sults of the A-to-T method” and “continu[ing] to mask
`dumping.” Issues & Decision Mem. at 26–27. The Trade
`Court upheld that choice as reasonable. Mid Continent,
`219 F. Supp. 3d at 1344 (“Commerce’s decision to effectuate
`the statute by applying the mixed methodology, without
`offsets during the aggregation stage, to both preserve the
`masked dumping uncovered with A-to-T and achieve a pro-
`portionate remedy is reasonable.”). In this court, PT ex-
`pressly disclaims any challenge to that rationale as failing
`“a reasonable or arbitrary/capricious standard.” PT Br. at
`30. PT’s sole contention is that this zeroing is “contrary to
`the statutory language.” Id. We reject that contention.
`The statute prescribes preconditions for Commerce to
`use an A-to-T method in making the less-than-fair-value
`determination, but it does not specify the implementation
`choice at issue here. It says that, if the preconditions are
`met, Commerce “may determine whether the subject mer-
`chandise is being sold in the United States at less than fair
`value by comparing the weighted average of the normal
`values to the export prices (or constructed export prices) of
`individual transactions for comparable merchandise.” 19
`U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B). That language does not tell Com-
`merce that, if it finds the preconditions present, it must use
`an A-to-T comparison for all of the exporter’s/producer’s
`transactions or, if not, how it may relate the results for
`transactions to which it applies the A-to-T method to trans-
`actions to which it applies another (here, A-to-A) method.
`
`

`

`MID CONTINENT STEEL & WIRE v. UNITED STATES
`
`17
`
`The statute leaves a choice for Commerce to make reason-
`ably.
`Our precedents support this conclusion. In Apex, we
`concluded that § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B) “defines the precondi-
`tions for applying the A-T methodology, but it does not
`limit in any way the application of the A-T methodology,
`should the preconditions be met.” 862 F.3d at 1334. And
`we upheld application of the A-to-T method even to sales
`outside the pattern establishing the statutory “pattern”
`precondition. Id. at 1334–36. In an earlier case, we ex-
`plained that “[o]ur case law has repeatedly examined the
`antidumping statute and found it to be ‘silent or ambigu-
`ous’ as to zeroing methodology,” and we held that § 1677f-
`1(d)(1)(B) does not require zeroing. U.S. Steel Corp. v.
`United States, 621 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We
`see no better basis for a statutory answer to the specific
`question presented here. We therefore reject the only chal-
`lenge PT makes to Commerce’s use of zeroing in the iden-
`tified part of its calculation.
`
`2
`PT next challenges Commerce’s reliance on a d ratio of
`at least 0.8 as a rigid measure of significance of the differ-
`ence measured by the Cohen’s d test. PT argues that Com-
`merce must instead use a “flexible” threshold to deem
`insignificant certain above-0.8 differences that reflect price
`differences that are small in dollar value—such as, PT
`says, one difference in this matter that is less than half a
`penny per kilogram (the unit for pricing the nails at issue).
`This is a challenge to the reasonableness of Commerce’s
`choice of one part of the overall analysis of differential pric-
`ing, explained by Commerce in the Issues & Decision