United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC.,
`Plaintiff-Appellant
`
`GOAL ZERO, LLC,
`Plaintiff
`
`v.
`
`UNITED STATES, YINGLI GREEN ENERGY
`HOLDING COMPANY LIMITED, YINGLI GREEN
`ENERGY AMERICAS, INC., YINGLI ENERGY
`(CHINA) CO., LTD., BAODING TIANWEI YINGLI
`NEW ENERGY RESOURCES CO., LTD., TIANJIN
`YINGLI NEW ENERGY RESOURCES CO., LTD.,
`HENGSHUI YINGLI NEW ENERGY RESOURCES
`CO., LTD., LIXIAN YINGLI NEW ENERGY
`RESOURCES CO., LTD., BAODING JIASHENG
`PHOTOVOLTAIC TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,
`BEIJING TIANNENG YINGLI NEW ENERGY
`RESOURCES CO., LTD., HAINAN YINGLI NEW
`ENERGY RESOURCES CO., LTD.,
`Defendants-Appellees
`
`JINKO SOLAR IMPORT & EXPORT CO., LTD.,
`JINKOSOLAR INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, JINKO
`SOLAR CO., LTD., CHANGZHOU TRINA SOLAR
`ENERGY CO., LTD., TRINA SOLAR (CHANGZHOU)
`SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD.,
`Defendants
`______________________
`
`2018-1373
`
`

`

`2
`
`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`______________________
`
`Appeal from the United States Court of International
`Trade in Nos. 1:15-cv-00196-CRK, 1:15-cv-00231-CRK,
`Judge Claire R. Kelly.
`______________________
`
`Decided: December 12, 2018
`______________________
`
`TIMOTHY C. BRIGHTBILL, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washing-
`ton, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented
`by STEPHANIE MANAKER BELL, TESSA V. CAPELOTO, LAURA
`EL-SABAAWI, CYNTHIA CRISTINA GALVEZ, USHA
`NEELAKANTAN, ADAM MILAN TESLIK, MAUREEN E.
`THORSON.
`
` TARA K. HOGAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
`Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
`ton, DC, argued for defendant-appellee United States.
`Also represented by REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR.,
`JEANNE DAVIDSON, JOSEPH H. HUNT; MERCEDES MORNO,
`United States Department of Commerce, Washington,
`DC.
`
` SHAWN MICHAEL HIGGINS, Sidley Austin LLP, Wash-
`ington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees Yingli Green
`Energy Holding Company Limited, Yingli Green Energy
`Americas, Inc., Yingli Energy (China) Co., Ltd., Baoding
`Tianwei Yingli New Energy Resources Co., Ltd., Tianjin
`Yingli New Energy Resources Co., Ltd., Hengshui Yingli
`New Energy Resources Co., Ltd., Lixian Yingli New
`Energy Resources Co., Ltd., Baoding Jiasheng Photovolta-
`ic Technology Co., Ltd., Beijing Tianneng Yingli New
`Energy Resources Co., Ltd., Hainan Yingli New Energy
`Resources Co., Ltd. Also represented by NEIL R. ELLIS.
` ______________________
`
`
`
`

`

`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`3
`
`Before NEWMAN, WALLACH, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
`WALLACH, Circuit Judge.
`Appellant SolarWorld Americas, Inc. (“SolarWorld”)
`sued Appellee United States (“the Government”) in the
`U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”), challenging the
`U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) final
`results of an administrative review of the antidumping
`duty order covering crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells,
`whether or not assembled into modules (“subject mer-
`chandise”) from the People’s Republic of China (“China”).
`See Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not
`Assembled into Modules, from the People’s Republic of
`China, 80 Fed. Reg. 40,998, 40,998 (July 14, 2015) (final
`admin. review) (“Final Results”). After largely sustaining
`the Final Results but remanding for Commerce to recon-
`sider an issue not implicated in this appeal, see Solar-
`World Ams., Inc. v. United States (SolarWorld I), 234 F.
`Supp. 3d 1286, 1292 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2017), the CIT ulti-
`mately sustained Commerce’s final results of remand
`redetermination, see SolarWorld Ams., Inc. v. United
`States (SolarWorld II), 273 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1315 (Ct.
`Int’l Trade 2017); see also Final Results of Remand Rede-
`termination, SolarWorld Ams., Inc. v. United States, No.
`1:15-cv-00231-CRK (Ct. Int’l Trade Sept. 11, 2017), ECF
`No. 144-1; J.A. 56–57 (Judgment).
`SolarWorld, a domestic producer of subject merchan-
`dise, appeals and argues Commerce erred in its calcula-
`tion of antidumping duty margins. We have jurisdiction
`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2012). We affirm.
`BACKGROUND
`I. Legal Framework
`By statute, antidumping duties may be imposed on
`foreign merchandise sold, or likely to be sold, “in the
`
`

`

`4
`
`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`United States at less than its fair value.” 19 U.S.C.
`§ 1673 (2012).1 At the conclusion of an investigation, if
`Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission
`have made the requisite findings, Commerce “shall pub-
`lish an antidumping duty order” directing U.S. Customs
`and Border Protection (“Customs”) officers to assess
`duties on imports of goods covered by the investigation.
`Id. § 1673e(a). Each year after the order is published, if
`Commerce receives a request for an administrative review
`of the order, it shall conduct such a review. Id.
`§ 1675(a)(1).
`For every administrative review, Commerce typically
`must “determine the individual weighted average dump-
`ing margin for each known exporter and producer of the
`subject merchandise.” Id. § 1677f-1(c)(1). A dumping
`margin reflects the amount by which the “‘normal value’
`(the price a producer charges in its home market) exceeds
`the ‘export price’ (the price of the product in the United
`States) or ‘constructed export price.’”2 U.S. Steel Corp. v.
`
`
`1
`In June 2015, Congress amended the statutes con-
`taining the antidumping provisions. See Trade Prefer-
`ences Extension Act of 2015 (“TPEA”), Pub. L. No. 114-27,
`§ 502, 129 Stat. 362, 383–84. We review the Final Results
`in accordance with the TPEA because they issued after
`the TPEA became effective. See Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade
`Action Comm. v. United States, 802 F.3d 1339, 1348–52
`(Fed. Cir. 2015).
`2
`“When the foreign producer or exporter sells di-
`rectly to an unaffiliated purchaser in the United States,
`Commerce uses [export price] as the U.S. price for pur-
`poses of the comparison.” Micron Tech., Inc. v. United
`States, 243 F.3d 1301, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citation
`omitted). “However, where a sale is made by a foreign
`producer or exporter to an affiliated purchaser in the
`United States, the statute provides for use of [constructed
`
`

`

`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`5
`
`United States, 621 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (foot-
`note omitted) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A)).
`The statute explains how “normal value shall be de-
`termined” “[i]n order to achieve a fair comparison with the
`export price or constructed export price.” 19 U.S.C.
`§ 1677b(a). However, if Commerce determines the export-
`ing country is a “nonmarket economy country”3 and “finds
`that available information does not permit the normal
`value of the subject merchandise to be determined under
`[§ 1677b(a)],” then Commerce calculates normal value by
`valuing the “factors of production” used in producing the
`merchandise in comparable “market economy country or
`countries.” Id. § 1677b(c)(1). Specifically, Commerce
`must value the factors of production “to the extent possi-
`ble . . . in one or more market economy countries that
`are—(A) at a level of economic development comparable to
`that of the nonmarket economy country, and (B) signifi-
`
`
`export price] as the [U.S.] price for purposes of the com-
`parison.” Id. (citation omitted). The calculation of con-
`structed export price, as compared to export price, is
`subject to certain “[a]dditional adjustments.” 19 U.S.C.
`§ 1677a(d).
`3 A “nonmarket economy country” is “any foreign
`country that [Commerce] determines does not operate on
`market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that
`sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the
`fair value of the merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A).
`“Because it deems China to be a nonmarket economy
`country, Commerce generally considers information on
`sales in China and financial information obtained from
`Chinese producers to be unreliable for determining,
`under . . . § 1677b(a), the normal value of the subject
`merchandise.” Downhole Pipe & Equip., L.P. v. United
`States, 776 F.3d 1369, 1375 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal
`quotation marks and citation omitted).
`
`

`

`6
`
`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
` Id.
`cant producers of comparable merchandise.”
`§ 1677b(c)(4). Accordingly, in selecting these so-called
`surrogate values to represent the factors of production,
`Commerce “attempts to construct a hypothetical market
`value of that product in the nonmarket economy.” Down-
`hole Pipe, 776 F.3d at 1375 (internal quotation marks,
`brackets, and citation omitted).
`II. Procedural History
`The present dispute stems from an antidumping duty
`order that Commerce issued after an investigation and
`that covers subject merchandise from China. Crystalline
`Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into
`Modules, from the People’s Republic of China, 77 Fed.
`Reg. 73,018, 73,018 (Dec. 7, 2012) (antidumping duty
`order). In February 2014, following a timely request,
`Commerce initiated the administrative review at issue,
`covering a period of review of May 25, 2012, to November
`30, 2013. Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing
`Duty Administrative Reviews and Request for Revocation
`in Part, 79 Fed. Reg. 6147, 6147, 6150 (Feb. 3, 2014).
`Commerce limited its review to the two largest Chinese
`exporters of the subject merchandise by volume, Wuxi
`Suntech Power Co., Ltd. and Yingli Energy (China) Co.,
`Ltd. (“Yingli”). J.A. 103; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2)
`(explaining when Commerce may limit its review to a
`“reasonable number of exporters or producers”).
`In July 2015, Commerce issued the Final Results.
`80 Fed. Reg. at 40,998; see J.A. 4462–545 (providing
`excerpts
`from Commerce’s decision memorandum
`accompanying the Final Results). Commerce calculated,
`inter alia, a weighted-average dumping margin for Yingli
`of 0.79%. Final Results, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41,001.
`Commerce’s calculated margin is based in part on its
`selection of surrogate values for each of Yingli’s factors of
`production, including aluminum frames, J.A. 4537–45,
`and
`semi-finished polysilicon
`ingots and blocks,
`
`

`

`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`7
`
`J.A. 4536–37. For aluminum frames, Commerce selected
`a value derived from import data based on Thai
`Harmonized Tariff Schedule (“HTS”) Heading 7604 for
`“[a]luminum bars, rods[,] and profiles,” specifically under
`Subheading 7604.29, which covers “[a]luminum bars,
`rods[,] and profiles” “[o]ther” than those specifically
`provided for in the other subheadings at a comparable
`level, J.A. 2910; see J.A. 4542, resulting in a surrogate
`value of 189.16 Thai Bahts per kilogram, see J.A. 4375
`(identifying the surrogate value’s price). For semi-
`finished polysilicon ingots and blocks, Commerce selected
`the “world market price for polysilicon of $18.19 per
`kilogram.” J.A. 4537.4
`SolarWorld sued the Government, arguing, inter alia,
`that Commerce should have calculated a higher anti-
`dumping duty margin for Yingli because Commerce erred
`by undervaluing the surrogate values for each of Yingli’s
`inputs. SolarWorld I, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 1292. The CIT
`rejected each of SolarWorld’s challenges. Id. at 1303–07.
`Although SolarWorld argued Commerce should have
`selected an aluminum frames surrogate value derived
`from import data for Thai HTS Heading 7616, specifically
`under Subheading 7616.99, which covers, inter alia,
`“articles of aluminum [not elsewhere specified or includ-
`ed],” rather than Thai HTS Heading 7604, which covers
`“[a]luminum bars, rods[,] and profiles,” the CIT stated
`“Commerce reasonably determined that import data
`
`
`4 Commerce’s selection of these surrogate values in
`the Final Results was unchanged from its preliminary
`results of the review. See Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic
`Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the
`People’s Republic of China, 80 Fed. Reg. 1021, 1021 (Jan.
`8, 2015) (preliminary admin. review); J.A. 4374–75 (list-
`ing Yingli’s surrogate values for each factor of production
`in a spreadsheet).
`
`

`

`8
`
`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`under [Thai] HTS [H]eading 7604 is more specific.” Id. at
`1303–04 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
`The CIT also determined that Commerce reasonably
`selected a surrogate value for semi-finished polysilicon
`ingots and blocks as the best available information on the
`record for that factor of production, in part because it was
`the only surrogate value of record. Id. at 1306–07.
`DISCUSSION
`I. Standard of Review and Legal Standard
`We apply the same standard of review as the CIT, see
`Downhole Pipe, 776 F.3d at 1373, upholding Commerce
`determinations that are supported “by substantial evi-
`dence on the record” and otherwise “in accordance with
`law,” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “Although we review
`the decisions of the CIT de novo, we give great weight to
`the informed opinion of the CIT and it is nearly always
`the starting point of our analysis.” Nan Ya Plastics Corp.
`v. United States, 810 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
`(internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis, and citation
`omitted). “Substantial evidence is defined as more than a
`mere scintilla, as well as evidence that a reasonable mind
`might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” and
`Commerce’s “finding may still be supported by substantial
`evidence even if two inconsistent conclusions can be
`drawn from the evidence.” Downhole Pipe, 776 F.3d at
`1374 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
`We look to “the record as a whole, including evidence that
`supports as well as evidence that fairly detracts from the
`substantiality of the evidence.” Zhejiang DunAn Hetian
`Metal Co. v. United States, 652 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
`2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
`When valuing factors of production in the nonmarket
`economy context, the statute directs that Commerce’s
`decision “shall be based on the best available information
`regarding the values of such factors in a market economy
`country or countries.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (emphasis
`
`

`

`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`9
`
`added). Commerce has “broad discretion” to determine
`what constitutes the best available information, as this
`term “is not defined by statute.” QVD Food Co. v. United
`States, 658 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “Commerce
`generally selects, to the extent practicable, surrogate
`values that are publicly available, are product-specific,
`reflect a broad market average, and are contemporaneous
`with the period of review.” Qingdao Sea–Line Trading
`Co. v. United States, 766 F.3d 1378, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`II. Commerce’s Selection of Surrogate Values for Both
`Aluminum Frames and Semi-Finished Polysilicon Ingots
`and Blocks Is Supported by Substantial Evidence and
`Otherwise in Accordance with Law
`A. Aluminum Frames
`Commerce determined import data derived from Thai
`HTS Heading 7604 “constitute[s] the best available in-
`formation to value Yingli’s aluminum frames.” J.A. 4542.
`Commerce found that that heading “pertain[s] to non-
`hollow aluminum profiles such as those consumed by
`Yingli in this review,” J.A. 4543, and explained that the
`other data on the record for Thai HTS Heading 7616
`“includes products dissimilar to aluminum frames,”
`J.A. 4542. SolarWorld argues Yingli’s aluminum frames
`are not described by Thai HTS Heading 7604’s definition
`of aluminum profiles because they “are not uniform along
`their entire length.” Appellant’s Br. 16 (emphasis omit-
`ted). According to SolarWorld, “[b]ecause [Yingli’s] alu-
`minum frames have been further processed significantly
`beyond a mere extrusion, they have lost their character as
`an aluminum extrusion and have instead taken the form
`of a fabricated aluminum good,” such that they “no longer
`fit within the definition of a ‘profile.’” Id. at 20 (citation
`omitted). We disagree with SolarWorld.
`Substantial evidence supports Commerce’s finding
`that import data under Thai HTS Heading 7604 consti-
`tutes the best available information from which to value
`
`

`

`10
`
`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`Yingli’s aluminum frames. Thai HTS Heading 7604
`covers, inter alia, “[a]luminum bars, rods[,] and profiles,”
`with the relevant subheading selected by Commerce
`including non-hollow profiles.
` J.A. 2910 (emphases
`added) (listing hollow profiles in one subheading and, in
`Thai HTS Subheading 7604.29, which is the relevant
`subheading, identifying “[o]ther” types of aluminum
`profiles); see J.A. 4542. Heading 7604’s explanatory
`notes5 describe aluminum profiles as “[r]olled, extruded,
`drawn, forged[,] or formed products . . . of a uniform cross-
`section along their whole length.” J.A. 1384 (emphasis
`added). Yingli’s factor of production for “aluminum frame
`for module
`installation/transportation”
`fulfills these
`criteria, with Yingli’s questionnaire responses identifying
`the aluminum frames as “alloyed aluminum profiles that
`are not hollow.” J.A. 1430 (emphases added). Regarding
`uniform cross-section, Commerce appropriately rejected
`
`5
`“The World Customs Organization publishes the
`[explanatory notes] as its official interpretation of the
`Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
`[(‘the Harmonized System’)], the global system of trade
`nomenclature . . . .” Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. United
`States, 845 F.3d 1158, 1163 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (internal
`quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he United
`States and its major trading partners . . . developed a
`single modern product nomenclature for international use
`as a standard system of classifying goods for customs,”
`and therefore base their tariff classification schedules on
`the Harmonized System. Michael Simon Design, Inc. v.
`United States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220 (Ct. Int’l Trade
`2009) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation
`omitted). For instance, in 1988, Congress passed legisla-
`tion implementing the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
`United States (“HTSUS”). Omnibus Trade and Competi-
`tiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1201, 102
`Stat. 1107, 1147.
`
`

`

`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`11
`
`SolarWorld’s contention that Yingli’s profiles do not have
`a uniform cross-section and stated “that[,] while certain
`aluminum frames purchased by [Yingli] contain corners
`[thereby implying that not all of their cross-sections are
`uniform], we do not believe that this would necessarily
`change
`their classification as aluminum profiles.”
`J.A. 4544. SolarWorld misapprehends Commerce’s statu-
`tory duty when it argues that “the definitions in the HTS
`are not mere guidelines or suggestions, but are statutory
`definitions with the force of law” that Commerce must
`follow. Appellant’s Br. 17. Commerce is “not required to
`engage in a classification analysis” but instead is “re-
`quired to determine which of the competing subheadings
`constituted the best available information.” Downhole
`Pipe, 776 F.3d at 1379. Consequently, even if some
`aluminum frames do not contain perfectly uniform cross-
`sections as discussed in the explanatory note, Thai HTS
`Heading 7604 still constitutes the best available infor-
`mation under § 1677b(c)(1)(B), given the other similarities
`detailed above between Yingli’s inputs and the products
`covered by Thai HTS Heading 7604. See Home Meridian
`Int’l Inc. v. United States, 772 F.3d 1289, 1296 (Fed. Cir.
`2014) (“The data on which Commerce relies to value
`inputs must be the ‘best available information,’ but there
`is no requirement that the data be perfect.”).
`The plain text of Thai HTS Heading 7604 does not
`specify whether its reach is limited to unprocessed goods.
`See J.A. 2910. Heading 7604’s explanatory notes, howev-
`er, state that the heading specifically includes aluminum
`profiles that are “worked after production.” J.A. 1384; see
`J.A. 1384 (explaining that Heading 7604 “covers cast or
`sintered products . . . , which have been subsequently
`worked after production . . . provided that they have not
`thereby assumed the character of articles or products of
`other headings” (emphasis added)). As a result, that
`Yingli’s frames undergo some processing, such as corner
`cutting and cleaning, does not automatically remove them
`
`

`

`12
`
`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`from the ambit of Thai HTS Heading 7604. See, e.g.,
`J.A. 2664 (providing a flowchart of the processing steps).
`The other surrogate value source on the record is Thai
`HTS Heading 7616, which, in relevant part, covers prod-
`ucts, such as “[n]ails, tacks, staples . . . , screws, bolts,
`nuts, screw hooks, rivets, cotters, cotter-pins, [and] wash-
`ers,” as well as “[c]loth, grill, netting[,] and fencing, of
`aluminum wire.” J.A. 1403. Thai HTS Heading 7604’s
`inclusion of aluminum profiles that are “worked after
`production,” J.A. 1384, cuts against selection of Thai HTS
`Heading 7616, which by its own terms, covers “[o]ther
`articles of aluminum,” i.e., those that are not elsewhere
`specified or included, J.A. 1403 (emphasis added). Com-
`merce appropriately relied on Thai HTS Heading 7604
`and supported its selection, recognizing that Thai HTS
`Heading 7616 “does not include anything similar to
`aluminum profiles that were further processed into
`frames” and Thai HTS Heading 7604 is “far more specific”
`to Yingli’s inputs. J.A. 4545; see Downhole Pipe, 776 F.3d
`at 1379 (affirming Commerce’s selection of a surrogate
`value based on Indian HTS import data where Commerce
`provided a “well-reasoned explanation of its selection
`process”).
` Therefore, substantial evidence supports
`Commerce’s decision to value Yingli’s aluminum frames
`based on Thai HTS Heading 7604.
`SolarWorld’s counterarguments are unavailing. Spe-
`cifically, SolarWorld asserts Commerce erred by not
`following Customs’ classification rulings that (1) classified
`similar aluminum frames under HTSUS Heading 7616
`and another HTSUS heading, not at issue here, see Appel-
`lant’s Br. 21; and (2) classified certain “unfinished alumi-
`num articles under HTS[US H]eading 7604,” id. at 23.
`According to SolarWorld, these Customs rulings are
`“uniquely instructive.” Reply Br. 10. To the extent So-
`larWorld argues as a legal matter that Customs’ rulings
`must be afforded more weight than other evidence on the
`record, we disagree. Whereas Customs is tasked with
`
`

`

`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`13
`
`“fix[ing] the final classification” of imported merchandise
`under the HTSUS, 19 U.S.C. § 1500; see United States v.
`Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221–24 (2001) (outlining Cus-
`toms’ role in classification), Commerce is authorized to
`conduct administrative reviews of an antidumping duty
`order to “determine . . . the amount of any antidumping
`duty” necessary to remedy the effect of foreign merchan-
`dise being sold in the United States at less than its fair
`value, 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)(B); see id. § 1673. In accord-
`ance with this authorization, the statute affords Com-
`merce “broad discretion” in identifying the best available
`information on the record to value factors of production.
`QVD Food, 658 F.3d at 1323;
`see 19 U.S.C.
`§ 1677b(c)(1)(B).
`Keeping in mind these differing statutory purposes
`that dictate Customs’ and Commerce’s respective roles,
`we are informed by Judge Pogue’s conclusion in Jiangsu
`Jiasheng Photovoltaic Technology Co. v. United States.
`See 28 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1336 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014).
`There, the CIT held that “[t]he fact that Commerce has at
`times found support for its surrogate value choices in
`Customs classification rulings does not lead to the conclu-
`sion that Commerce must follow such rulings in every
`case [when valuing factors of production].” Id. Although
`“[t]he substantiality of evidence must take into account
`whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight,
`including contradictory evidence or evidence from which
`conflicting inferences could be drawn,” Huvis Corp. v.
`United States, 570 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (in-
`ternal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 19
`U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (stating that Commerce’s deci-
`sion must be supported by “substantial evidence on the
`record” (emphasis added)), a Customs ruling is only one
`type of evidence for Commerce to consider. As SolarWorld
`acknowledges, Commerce is not bound by Customs rul-
`ings on imports for purposes of a best available infor-
`mation determination. See Appellant’s Br. 22. Here,
`
`

`

`14
`
`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`Commerce considered the evidence and explained why the
`evidence should be afforded less significance. J.A. 4543–
`44; see, e.g., J.A. 4544 (stating that one Customs ruling
`provided “no explanation . . . as to why the frames should
`be classified under [Thai] HTS [Heading 7616]” (emphasis
`added)).
`Besides its claim of legal error, SolarWorld also in-
`vites us to reweigh the evidence already considered by
`Commerce. For example, SolarWorld avers Commerce
`“failed to give appropriate weight to,” Appellant’s Br. 21
`(emphasis added), and “failed to appropriately consider”
`the aforementioned Customs rulings, id. at 23 (emphasis
`added). However, we may not reweigh the evidence in
`this case. See Downhole Pipe, 776 F.3d at 1377 (“While
`Appellants invite this court to reweigh this evidence, this
`court may not do so.”). Accordingly, Commerce properly
`considered the record evidence to select a surrogate value
`for Yingli’s aluminum frames.
`B. Semi-Finished Polysilicon Ingots and Blocks
`Commerce determined the world market price for pol-
`ysilicon is the best available information to value Yingli’s
`semi-finished polysilicon ingots and blocks, as they “are
`comprised primarily of polysilicon.” J.A. 4537. “[B]ecause
`Yingli self-produces most of its ingots and blocks, [Com-
`merce] . . . accounted for the cost of the additional pro-
`cessing required to manufacture most of the ingots and
`blocks used in production.” J.A. 4537. Commerce also
`noted that “no party submitted a [surrogate value] for
`ingots and blocks which were purchased.” J.A. 4537.
`SolarWorld contends
`that Commerce
`“substantially
`undervalue[d]” this surrogate value by “valuing Yingli’s
`ingot and block purchases using a value for virgin polysil-
`icon.” Appellant’s Br. 28. According to SolarWorld,
`“Yingli’s purchased semi-finished ingots and blocks are
`manufactured from virgin polysilicon that undergoes
`significant processing,” such that Yingli paid a premium
`
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`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`15
`
`for this input. Id. at 26 (emphasis added). We disagree
`with SolarWorld.
`Substantial evidence supports Commerce’s selection
`of a surrogate value for semi-finished polysilicon ingots
`and blocks as the best available information on the rec-
`ord. Commerce relied on the world market price for
`polysilicon, derived from two data sources, to value Ying-
`li’s input. See J.A. 4537; see also J.A. 4359 (laying out
`Commerce’s calculation for this surrogate value in a factor
`of production valuation memorandum), 4375 (including
`the $18.19 per kilogram surrogate value in a spreadsheet
`for Yingli). After conducting a verification of Yingli’s
`sales and factors of production, Commerce reported that
`Yingli’s ingots and blocks are manufactured primarily
`from polysilicon, albeit polysilicon that is then further
`processed. See J.A. 4321. As the CIT observed, Com-
`merce accounted for “processing costs . . . for most mer-
`chandise” because Yingli’s “total purchases of ingots and
`blocks relative to the volume of ingots and blocks con-
`sumed during the period of review . . . was not signifi-
`cant.” SolarWorld I, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 1306 (footnote
`omitted); see id. (citing, inter alia, J.A. 1619–25). In
`addition, SolarWorld admits that, during the administra-
`tive proceedings, “it was unable to locate a surrogate
`value for polysilicon block and ingots,” meaning the world
`market price was the only surrogate value information on
`the record. Appellant’s Br. 29 n.4. “[T]he burden of
`creating an adequate record lies with interested parties
`and not with Commerce,” but SolarWorld failed to meet
`that burden because it did not provide Commerce alterna-
`tive surrogate value data. QVD Food, 658 F.3d at 1324
`(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omit-
`ted). We conclude that substantial evidence supports
`Commerce’s finding that the world market price was the
`best available information on the record.
`SolarWorld’s primary counterargument is that the
`record contained sufficient information from which Com-
`
`

`

`16
`
`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`merce could have constructed a surrogate value for Ying-
`li’s semi-finished polysilicon ingots and blocks. See Appel-
`lant’s Br. 29–30; id. at 29 (describing a process in which
`Commerce would begin with the surrogate value for
`unprocessed polysilicon “and add[] to that [the costs
`associated with] the intermediate items and steps re-
`quired to produce one unit of silicon ingot or silicon
`block”). Again, Commerce has “broad discretion” in
`determining how to value factors of production. QVD
`Food, 658 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted). Commerce
`rejected SolarWorld’s proposed construction methodology
`in reliance on Commerce’s stated practice, which is to not
`“use a respondent’s market economy purchase prices as
`benchmarks to determine whether a[ surrogate value] is
`appropriate because a respondent’s market economy
`purchase prices are proprietary information [i.e., not
`publicly available] and are not necessarily representative
`of industry-wide prices available to other producers.”
`J.A. 4537 (footnotes omitted); see Qingdao, 766 F.3d
`at 1386 (acknowledging that Commerce typically prefers
`prices that are, inter alia, “publicly available” and “reflect
`a broad market average”).
`Simply because an agency may deviate from its prac-
`tice by “explain[ing] the reason for its departure,” Alle-
`gheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1368, 1373
`(Fed. Cir. 2003); see Appellant’s Br. 30 (recognizing this
`principle), we see no reason why Commerce must deviate
`from its practice where substantial evidence supports its
`selected surrogate value. SolarWorld does not argue that
`Commerce’s stated practice is contrary to any statute or
`regulation. See generally Appellant’s Br. Under such
`circumstances, “[t]he decision to select a particular meth-
`odology rests solely within Commerce’s sound discretion.”
`Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1386, 1396
`(Fed. Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation
`omitted). Here, as discussed above, Commerce properly
`
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`SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`17
`
`selected a surrogate value for semi-finished polysilicon
`ingots and blocks.
`
`CONCLUSION
`We have considered SolarWorld’s remaining argu-
`ments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the
`Judgment of the U.S. Court of International Trade is
`AFFIRMED
`
`