throbber
United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC.,
`Plaintiff-Appellant
`
`v.
`
`AT&T MOBILITY, LLC, ERICSSON INC.,
`Defendants-Appellees
`______________________
`
`2018-1449
`______________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court for the
`Eastern District of Texas in No. 6:16-cv-01003-RWS-JDL,
`Judge Robert Schroeder, III.
`______________________
`
`Decided: August 12, 2019
`______________________
`
`SHAWN DANIEL BLACKBURN, Susman Godfrey LLP,
`Houston, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also repre-
`sented by PARKER C. FOLSE, III, IAN B. CROSBY, Seattle,
`WA; ERIC J. ENGER, ALDEN HARRIS, LESLIE PAYNE, Heim,
`Payne & Chorush, LLP, Houston, TX.
`
` MICHAEL HAWES, Baker Botts, LLP, Houston, TX, ar-
`gued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by
`DOUGLAS M. KUBEHL, BETHANY ROSE FORD, JEFFERY SCOTT
`BECKER, Dallas, TX. Defendant-appellee AT&T Mobility,
`LLC also represented by BRYANT C. BOREN, JR., Palo Alto,
`CA.
`
`

`

`2
`
`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
` ______________________
`
`Before PROST, Chief Judge, REYNA and TARANTO, Circuit
`Judges.
`
`REYNA, Circuit Judge.
`Iridescent Networks, Inc. sued AT&T Mobility, LLC
`and Ericsson Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
`District of Texas for
`infringement of U.S. Patent
`No. 8,036,119. Following claim construction, the parties
`jointly stipulated to noninfringement, and the district
`court entered judgment in favor of AT&T Mobility, LLC
`and Ericsson Inc. Iridescent Networks, Inc. appeals on the
`ground that the district court erred in its construction of
`the term “high quality of service connection.” Because the
`district court correctly construed this term, we affirm.
`BACKGROUND
`I. The ’119 Patent
`Iridescent Networks, Inc. (“Iridescent”) is the assignee
`of U.S. Patent No. 8,036,119 (“the ’119 patent”), entitled
`“System and Method of Providing Bandwidth on Demand.”
`The ’119 patent is directed to a system and method of net-
`work communication that provides guaranteed bandwidth
`on demand for applications that require high bandwidth
`and minimizes data delay and loss during transmission.1
`
`
`1 Modern networks, including cellular networks,
`transfer data in small blocks called “packets.” Appellant’s
`Br. 6–7. Transmission of the packets may be affected by
`three factors: bandwidth, latency, and packet loss. “Band-
`width” refers to the maximum data transfer rate of a net-
`work. See id. at 14. “Latency” refers to the time required
`to transmit a packet across a network, with longer latency
`indicating a delay. See id. “Packet loss” refers to the loss
`of packets during transmission. See id. at 7.
`
`

`

`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`3
`
`’119 patent col. 1 ll. 19–22, 58–60, col. 3 ll. 46–48, col. 6 ll.
`21–23.
`The ’119 patent discloses that prior art networks trans-
`mit data packets in an ad hoc manner, with each packet
`taking an unpredictable route to its destination. Id. col. 1
`ll. 35–45. This is undesirable because some applications
`delivered on broadband “are very sensitive to any delay
`and . . . any variance in the delay” of packet transmission.
`Id. col. 1 l. 66–col. 2 l. 2. The ’119 patent teaches that some
`applications “are also sensitive to any packets . . . which
`may be lost in the transmission (0.0001% packet loss is the
`preferred quality for video transmission).” Id. col. 2 ll. 2–
`5. The ’119 patent also teaches that some applications re-
`quire significantly more bandwidth than others to provide
`tolerable levels of quality. Id. col. 1 ll. 58–60, col. 3 ll. 31–
`45. The ’119 patent describes video applications as exam-
`ples of such applications and explains that prior art “video
`compression methods vary greatly in the bandwidth they
`require to transport the video in real-time—some solutions
`are as low as 64 kbps up to 300 Mbps.” Id. col. 3 ll. 31–45.
`Figure 3 of the ’119 patent illustrates bandwidth, packet
`loss, and latency requirements of several applications, in-
`cluding different video applications:
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`Id. Fig. 3.
`To deal with these parameter-sensitive applications,
`the ’119 patent discloses a system and method for manag-
`ing network traffic routes and bandwidth availability to
`minimize adverse network conditions and to assure that
`the network connection maintains a requested minimum
`level of one of these three parameters. Id. col. 5 l. 64–col.
`6 l. 3. Rather than using existing ad hoc network routes,
`the invention creates custom routes to maximize the avail-
`ability of the required bandwidth, minimize packet loss,
`and reduce latency. Id. col. 5 ll. 64–67; id. col. 6 ll. 57–61.
`According to the ’119 patent, this results in a “high quality”
`network connection with bandwidth “on demand.” Id. col.
`5 ll. 23–29. Applications that do not have minimum net-
`work connection parameter requirements may be routed
`through existing “best-effort” ad hoc network connections
`using “existing network components.” Id. col. 5 ll. 14–20.
`Claim 1 is illustrative and recites:
`1. A method for providing bandwidth on demand
`comprising:
`receiving, by a controller positioned in a
`network, a request for a high quality of ser-
`vice connection supporting any one of a plu-
`rality of one-way and two-way traffic types
`between an originating end-point and a ter-
`minating end-point, wherein the request
`comes from the originating end-point and
`includes at least one of a requested amount
`of bandwidth and a codec;
`determining, by the controller, whether the
`originating end-point is authorized to use
`the requested amount of bandwidth or the
`codec and whether the terminating end-
`point can be reached by the controller;
`
`

`

`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`5
`
`directing, by the controller, a portal that is
`positioned in the network and physically
`separate from the controller to allocate lo-
`cal port resources of the portal for the con-
`nection;
`negotiating, by the controller, to reserve
`far-end resources for the terminating end-
`point; and
`providing, by the controller to the portal,
`routing instructions for traffic correspond-
`ing to the connection so that the traffic is
`directed by the portal based only on the
`routing instructions provided by the con-
`troller, wherein the portal does not perform
`any independent routing on the traffic, and
`wherein the connection extending from the
`originating end-point to the terminating
`end-point is provided by a dedicated bearer
`path that includes a required route sup-
`ported by the portal and dynamically pro-
`visioned by the controller, and wherein
`control paths for the connection are sup-
`ported only between each of the originating
`and terminating end-points and the con-
`troller and between the portal and the con-
`troller.
`Id. col. 7 l. 43–col. 8 l. 7 (emphasis added).
`The application that led to the ’119 patent is a contin-
`uation of U.S. Application No. 11/743,470 (“the parent ap-
`plication”), which issued as U.S. Patent No. 7,639,612, also
`assigned to Iridescent. Both patents share a substantially
`identical specification.
`During prosecution of the parent application, the ex-
`aminer rejected several claims containing a similar limita-
`tion: “high quality and low latency bandwidth.” J.A. 271,
`
`

`

`6
`
`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`369. The examiner explained that this limitation was re-
`jected as not enabled because the specification “d[id] not
`adequately describe how high quality and low latency are
`determined.” J.A. 368–69; see also J.A. 270–71. In re-
`sponse, the applicant amended the claims to replace the re-
`jected term with the “high quality of service connection”
`limitation at issue in this appeal. J.A. 140. The applicant
`argued that Figure 3 and its description supported this
`new claim language:
`As illustrated by the boxed set of applications on
`the left side of Fig. 3, high QoS (quality of service)
`may be viewed in the present application as having
`speeds varying from approximately 1–300 mega-
`bits per second, packet loss requirements that are
`typically about 10-5, and latency requirements that
`are typically less than one second. These are com-
`monly used parameters and, as illustrated in Fig.
`3, often vary somewhat based on the type of appli-
`cation. For example, video conferencing may be
`possible with the listed parameters, while HD
`video multicasting typically has more stringent re-
`quirements in order to be acceptable.
`. . . .
`Accordingly, Applicant submits that the term “high
`quality of service connection” is supported by the
`various connection parameters illustrated for high
`quality of service enabled bandwidth applications
`in Fig. 3.
`J.A. 141. After considering Iridescent’s arguments, the ex-
`aminer withdrew the rejection and allowed the amended
`claims containing the “high quality of service connection”
`limitation to issue.
`II. District Court Proceedings
`On July 11, 2016, Iridescent brought suit against
`AT&T Mobility, LLC and Ericsson Inc. (collectively,
`
`

`

`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`7
`
`“AT&T”) for infringement of claims 1, 3–4, 7, and 11 of the
`’119 patent. Claim 1 was the only asserted independent
`claim. During claim construction proceedings, Iridescent
`proposed broadly construing the term “high quality of ser-
`vice connection” to mean “a connection in which one or
`more quality of service connection parameters, including
`bandwidth, latency, and/or packet loss, are assured from
`end-to-end based on the requirements of the application.”
`Iridescent Networks, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 6:16-
`CV-01003, 2017 WL 3033400, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 18,
`2017) (“Claim Construction Order”). The magistrate judge,
`however, largely adopted AT&T’s proposed construction,
`construing the term to mean “a connection that assures
`connection speed of at least approximately one megabit per
`second and, where applicable based on the type of applica-
`tion, packet loss requirements that are about 10-5 and la-
`tency requirements that are less than one second.” Id. at
`*5. The magistrate judge determined that “high quality of
`service connection” is a term of degree that is “not a known
`term of art, but rather a term coined by the patentee.” Id.
`at *4. Relying on the ’119 patent’s intrinsic record, the
`magistrate judge explained that Figure 3 of the ’119 patent
`and Iridescent’s statements during prosecution of the par-
`ent application “serve to provide some standard for meas-
`uring this term of degree.” Id. at *5 (internal quotation
`marks omitted).
`Iridescent subsequently objected to the magistrate
`judge’s construction, raising the same arguments it renews
`on appeal. Iridescent Networks, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility,
`LLC, No. 6:16-CV-01003, 2017 WL 10185852, at *1–3 (E.D.
`Tex. Dec. 1, 2017) (“Order Adopting Constructions”). The
`district judge overruled Iridescent’s objections, determin-
`ing that the magistrate judge’s construction was not clearly
`erroneous or contrary to law. Id. at *3.
`The parties agreed that under the district court’s con-
`struction, AT&T’s accused network products and services
`were
`excluded, and
`they
`jointly
`stipulated
`to
`
`

`

`8
`
`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`noninfringement. On December 18, 2017, the court en-
`tered a final judgment against Iridescent. Iridescent
`timely appealed. We have jurisdiction over this appeal un-
`der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
`DISCUSSION
`Whether a district court’s construction of a claim is cor-
`rect presents a legal question that we review de novo. Info-
`Hold, Inc. v. Applied Media Techs. Corp., 783 F.3d 1262,
`1265 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We review underlying factual find-
`ings related to extrinsic evidence for clear error. E.I. du
`Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Unifrax I LLC, 921 F.3d 1060,
`1067 (Fed. Cir. 2019). When claim construction is based
`solely upon intrinsic evidence, as in this case, our review is
`de novo. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
`831, 841 (2015).
`Claim construction seeks to ascribe the meaning to a
`claim term as understood by a person of ordinary skill in
`the art at the time of invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
`F.3d 1303, 1312–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The mean-
`ing of a term “must be considered in the context of all the
`intrinsic evidence, including the claims, specification, and
`prosecution history.” Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline
`LLC, 713 F.3d 1090, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Phillips,
`415 F.3d at 1314). The prosecution history, like the speci-
`fication, provides evidence of how the U.S. Patent and
`Trademark Office and the inventor understood the patent.
`Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322,
`1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317).
`Statements made during prosecution of a parent applica-
`tion are relevant to construing terms in a patent resulting
`from a continuation application if such statements relate
`to the subject matter of the claims being construed. Ormco
`Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
`2007); see also E.I. du Pont, 921 F.3d at 1070 (“When a par-
`ent application includes statements involving ‘common
`subject matter’ with the terms at issue, those statements
`
`

`

`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`9
`
`are relevant to construction of the terms in the child pa-
`tent.”); Wang Labs., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377,
`1384 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (applying statements from prosecu-
`tion of a parent application where subject matter was com-
`mon to the continuation-in-part application).
`This appeal turns on whether the term “high quality of
`service connection” is a term of degree that is limited to the
`minimum connection parameter requirements disclosed in
`Figure 3 of the ’119 patent. We conclude that it is.
`We begin with the language of the claims. In re Power
`Integrations, Inc., 884 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (cit-
`ing Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d
`1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Here, the district court found
`that “high quality of service connection” is a coined term
`that has no ordinary meaning in the industry. Claim Con-
`struction Order, 2017 WL 3033400, at *4; Order Adopting
`Constructions, 2017 WL 10185852, at *3. We agree that
`the claim language is not sufficiently clear on its face to
`provide guidance to a person of ordinary skill in the art as
`to the meaning of the term “high quality of service connec-
`tion.” Although every network connection has some degree
`of quality of service, Reply Br. 2–3, the claims expressly
`require the connection to provide high quality of service.
`The claim language, however, is silent as to what amount
`of quality is sufficient to be “high.” We therefore look first
`to the specification, followed by the prosecution history, to
`determine the meaning of the term “high quality of service
`connection.”
`As noted above, the applicant of the ’119 patent relied
`on Figure 3 during prosecution to support an amendment
`that gave rise to the term “high quality of service connec-
`tion.” Figure 3 indicates minimum requirements for con-
`nection speed, packet loss, and latency. Figure 3 shows a
`box labeled “High QoS” (“Quality of Service”) that is drawn
`around some, but not all, listed applications. ’119 patent
`Fig. 3. The applications placed within this box have
`
`

`

`10
`
`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`connection parameter requirements consistent with the
`district court’s construction for the disputed term. For ex-
`ample, the written description explains that “[t]hese real
`time critical applications are very sensitive to any de-
`lay[,] . . . any variance in the delay[,]. . . . [and] any packets
`(or frames) which may be lost in the transmission (0.0001%
`packet loss is the preferred quality for video transmis-
`sion).” Id. at col. 1 l. 66–col. 2 l. 5. One application (“Ojo
`Video Call”) and two network transmission line technolo-
`gies (“DSL” and “Dial-up”) are placed outside the “High
`QoS” box. Id. Fig. 3. The Ojo Video Call application is
`shown to have lower minimum connection requirements
`than the applications within the box. Id. Figure 3 and the
`written description, therefore, imply that a “high quality of
`service connection” involves minimum service parameters
`required by the applications within the “High QoS” box.
`This conclusion is consistent with the prosecution history
`of the ’119 patent.
`During prosecution of the parent application, the appli-
`cant argued that “the various connection parameters illus-
`trated for high quality of service enabled bandwidth
`applications in Fig. 3” supported the term “high quality of
`service connection.” J.A. 141. The applicant stated that
`the term “may be viewed in the present application as hav-
`ing speeds varying from approximately 1–300 megabits per
`second, packet loss requirements that are typically about
`10-5, and latency requirements that are typically less than
`one second,” which are the illustrated parameters for the
`applications within the “High QoS” box in Figure 3. Id.
`Thus, the applicant relied on the minimum connection pa-
`rameter requirements described in Figure 3 to overcome
`the examiner’s § 112 enablement rejection.
`Iridescent argues that the term “high quality of service
`connection” is a mere requirement that the connection as-
`sure the level of quality that meets the service parameter
`needs of a particular service or application. Appellant’s Br.
`
`

`

`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`11
`
`14. Iridescent raises three primary arguments in support
`of its proposed construction. We address each in turn.
`First, Iridescent contends that the term serves to dis-
`tinguish a high quality of service connection from a prior
`art “best-effort” connection that does not guarantee any
`level of quality. Appellant’s Br. 13–15, 22. Iridescent
`points to the ’119 patent’s disclosure that different applica-
`tions have varying connection parameter requirements,
`and argues that “there are no hard-and-fast numerical re-
`quirements for the quality of service parameters.” Id. at
`15. This argument, however, contradicts the written de-
`scription and Figure 3 of the ’119 patent. If, as Iridescent
`contends, a “high quality of service connection” is one that
`provides only some assurance of required quality of connec-
`tion, then a connection that meets the requirements of all
`the applications listed in Figure 3 would fall within that
`definition. Yet Figure 3 excludes the Ojo Video Call appli-
`cation from the box identified as “High QoS,” even though
`that application also has specific connection parameter re-
`quirements of less than 1 megabit per second in bandwidth,
`packet loss of 10-5, and latency delay of less than 400 milli-
`seconds—parameters that would satisfy Iridescent’s pro-
`posed construction of “high quality of service connection.”
`’119 patent Fig. 3.
`Iridescent argues that Figure 3’s exclusion of the Ojo
`Video Call application from the “High QoS” box demon-
`strates only that a prior art best-effort connection is suffi-
`cient to meet that application’s connection requirements.
`Reply Br. 6. The ’119 patent, however, teaches that a best-
`effort connection provides no assurance of any amount of
`quality. See ’119 patent col. 1 ll. 23–60 (detailing the ad
`hoc nature of prior art network connections); id. col. 3 ll. 6–
`22, 46–48 (distinguishing “best-effort internet” from “guar-
`anteed high bandwidth” connections); see also Appellant’s
`Br. 7, 13. Thus, a best-effort connection may not always
`meet the connection requirements of the Ojo Video Call ap-
`plication. Rather, Figure 3 excludes that application from
`
`

`

`12
`
`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`the “High QoS” box because its connection requirements
`are lower than what the patentee intended to be covered by
`the term “high quality of service connection.”
`The written description demonstrates that the inven-
`tor knew how to describe quality assurance. For example,
`the written description teaches that prior art Multi-Proto-
`col Label Switching technology provided “packet quality as-
`surance.” ’119 patent col. 2 ll. 6–8, 43–47. The written
`description also discloses that when the prior art “IEEE
`802.1p” standard is utilized, “[s]ervices are delivered with
`assurance.” Id. col. 3 ll. 16–19. By contrast, the claims
`here require a “high quality of service connection.” When
`read in the context of the written description, the inventor’s
`decision to claim a connection that provides high quality of
`service instead of a connection that provides assured qual-
`ity of service informs a person of ordinary skill in the art
`that the claims require something more than mere assur-
`ance of quality.
`Iridescent’s statements during prosecution of the par-
`ent application also belie Iridescent’s attempt to equate
`“high” quality of service with “assured” quality of service.
`In response to the examiner’s § 112 rejection, Iridescent ar-
`gued that “high QoS (quality of service) may be viewed in
`the present application as having speeds varying from ap-
`proximately 1–300 megabits per second, packet loss re-
`quirements that are typically about 10-5, and latency
`requirements that are typically less than one second.
`These are commonly used parameters . . . .” J.A. 141. This
`language focuses on the objective characteristics of the
`quality of the connection rather than on whether any
`amount of quality is assured. In view of the intrinsic rec-
`ord, we are not persuaded that the term “high quality of
`service connection” equates with assurance of quality.
`Second, Iridescent contends that the prosecution his-
`tory is irrelevant to the claim construction question be-
`cause there is no clear and unmistakable disavowal of
`
`

`

`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`13
`
`claim scope. Appellant’s Br. 12. We disagree. We have
`explained that “[a]ny explanation, elaboration, or qualifi-
`cation presented by the inventor during patent examina-
`tion is relevant, for the role of claim construction is to
`‘capture the scope of the actual invention’ that is disclosed,
`described, and patented.” Fenner Invs., Ltd. v. Cellco
`P’ship, 778 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Re-
`tractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d
`1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011)); see also Aptalis Pharmatech,
`Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 718 F. App’x 965, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
`(relying on the prosecution history to inform a claim con-
`struction analysis without finding a disavowal of claim
`scope). Although the prosecution history may not in some
`cases be as clear a guide as the specification, it nonetheless
`“can often inform the meaning of the claim language by
`demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention
`and whether the inventor limited the invention in the
`course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower
`than it would otherwise be.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317.
`Iridescent’s reliance on 3M Innovative Properties Co. v.
`Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2013), is mis-
`placed. In 3M, we held that where there is no clear disa-
`vowal, “the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim
`term will be given its full effect.” 725 F.3d at 1326. The
`question here, however, is not whether Iridescent nar-
`rowed the scope of the disputed term during prosecution
`from its full ordinary and customary meaning. Rather, be-
`cause the disputed term is a coined term, meaning it has
`no ordinary and customary meaning, the question is
`whether the intrinsic evidence provides objective bounda-
`ries to the scope of the term. Interval Licensing LLC v.
`AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In these
`circumstances, where there is no clear ordinary and cus-
`tomary meaning of a coined term of degree, we may look to
`the prosecution history for guidance without having to first
`find a clear and unmistakable disavowal.
`
`

`

`14
`
`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`Third, Iridescent contends that even if its statements
`during prosecution may be considered, they are still irrele-
`vant to the construction of the disputed term because Iri-
`descent made those statements
`in response to an
`enablement rejection. Appellant’s Br. 27–29; Reply Br. 10–
`11. Iridescent argues that unlike an indefiniteness rejec-
`tion, an enablement rejection is not issued “to force the ap-
`plicant to define the metes and bounds of the claim.”
`Appellant’s Br. 27. This is not correct. It is long-settled
`that “[e]nablement serves the dual function in the patent
`system of ensuring adequate disclosure of the claimed in-
`vention and of preventing claims broader than the dis-
`closed invention. This important doctrine prevents both
`inadequate disclosure of an invention and overbroad claim-
`ing that might otherwise attempt to cover more than was
`actually invented.” MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage
`Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (inter-
`nal citation omitted); see also Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v.
`Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96
`(Fed. Cir. 1999). Thus, Iridescent’s statements made to
`overcome the examiner’s enablement rejection inform the
`claim construction analysis by demonstrating how Irides-
`cent understood the scope of the disputed term.
`Iridescent raises other arguments that we find unper-
`suasive. For example, Iridescent argues that the district
`court’s determination that the disputed term is a term of
`degree rests on an erroneous finding that the ’119 patent
`discloses a third “quality of service” connection. Appel-
`lant’s Br. 19–24. Iridescent asserts that the ’119 patent
`discloses only two connection types—best-effort and high
`quality of service connections—and “[t]here is no question
`of degree between” the two. Id. at 22.
`We agree that “quality of service” is not a connection
`type, but a characteristic of any network connection, much
`like “height” is a characteristic of any human being. Iri-
`descent is mistaken, however, that the district court mis-
`read “quality of service” to be a third connection type, or
`
`

`

`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`15
`
`that such a misreading is a necessary predicate to deter-
`mining that the term “high quality of service connection” is
`a term of degree. That “quality of service” is a characteris-
`tic of any network connection says nothing about the level
`of quality of service that connection provides. The district
`court was thus correct to look to the specification and the
`prosecution history for disclosure of what constitutes high
`quality of service. Because Figure 3 and the applicant’s
`prosecution history statements disclose the disputed term’s
`scope, the district court’s analysis was correct.
`Iridescent also argues that this court’s precedent fore-
`closes limiting the term “high” to numerical values. We
`disagree. In each case on which Iridescent relies, this court
`concluded that importing numerical limits into the inde-
`pendent claim at issue would have rendered a dependent
`claim meaningless. See Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal
`Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 993–94 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
`In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1348–49
`(Fed. Cir. 2002); Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., Inc., 91 F.
`App’x 669, 676 (Fed. Cir. 2004). That is not a concern here.
`Additionally, in American Seating, the claim language it-
`self defined the disputed term. 91 F. App’x at 675. By con-
`trast, the claims here provide no clear meaning or
`definition of “high quality of service connection.”
`CONCLUSION
`We have considered Iridescent’s remaining arguments
`and find them unpersuasive. We hold that the correct con-
`struction of “high quality of service connection” means “a
`connection that assures connection speed of at least ap-
`proximately one megabit per second and, where applicable
`based on the type of application, packet loss requirements
`that are about 10-5 and latency requirements that are less
`than one second.” We therefore affirm the district court’s
`judgment.
`
`AFFIRMED
`
`

`

`IRIDESCENT NETWORKS, INC. v. AT&T MOBILITY, LLC
`
`COSTS
`
`No costs.
`
`16
`
`
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket