`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`TASER INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
`Plaintiff-Appellee
`
`v.
`
`PHAZZER ELECTRONICS, INC.,
`Defendant
`
`STEVEN ABBOUD,
`Sanctioned Party-Appellant
`______________________
`
`2018-2057
`______________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court for the
`Middle District of Florida in No. 6:16-cv-00366-PGB-KRS,
`Judge Paul G. Byron.
`______________________
`
`Decided: July 23, 2019
`______________________
`
`STEVEN ABBOUD, Omaha, NE, pro se.
`
`
` PAMELA BETH PETERSEN, Axon Enterprise, Inc., Scotts-
`dale, AZ, argued for plaintiff-appellee.
` ______________________
`
`Before O’MALLEY, REYNA, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
`
`
`
`2
`
`TASER INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. PHAZZER ELECTRONICS, INC.
`
`PER CURIAM.
`Steven Abboud (“Abboud”) appeals from the district
`court’s order granting in part Taser International, Inc.’s
`motion for contempt. Taser Int’l, Inc. v. Phazzer Elecs.,
`Inc., No. 6:16-cv-366, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190783 (M.D.
`Fla. May 4, 2018). Specifically, the district court held
`Phazzer Electronics, Inc. (“Phazzer”) and Abboud in civil
`contempt for violating the court’s permanent injunction by
`continuing to sell and offer to sell infringing merchandise.
`Id. at *7. Although the court found both Phazzer and Ab-
`boud in civil contempt, it declined to issue any sanctions
`stemming from that holding. Id. at *11. The court ex-
`plained that, because it had already granted Taser’s mo-
`tion
`for damages and awarded Taser a total of
`$7,869,578.74 in damages, fees, and costs from Phazzer,
`“the issuance of additional monetary sanctions would be
`punitive as opposed to coercive in nature.” Id. at *10–11.
`On appeal, Abboud argues that the district court erred
`in holding him in contempt and challenges the propriety of
`the underlying injunction. In response, Taser argues that:
`(1) Abboud has not demonstrated standing; and (2) even if
`the court finds standing, Abboud’s appeal fails on the mer-
`its. Because we agree with the first point, we need not ad-
`dress the second.
`Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of
`federal courts to “cases” and “controversies.” Lujan v. De-
`fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). A party
`invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden to establish:
`(1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the
`injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that a favor-
`able decision will likely redress the injury. Lujan, 504 U.S.
`at 560–61. To satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement, a
`party must demonstrate both that the harm is “concrete
`and particularized” and that it is “actual or imminent, not
`‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Id. at 560 (internal citations
`omitted).
`
`
`
`TASER INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. PHAZZER ELECTRONICS, INC.
`
`3
`
`Here, it is undisputed that Abboud is not a party to the
`district court action. It is also undisputed that Abboud was
`not sanctioned as a result of the district court’s civil con-
`tempt finding. Nor is there any judgment against Abboud.
`Abboud claims to have suffered “substantial harm and ir-
`reparable injury.” Abboud Br. 8. But despite having mul-
`tiple opportunities to do so, he has not alleged any
`particularized injury. Because there is no sanction against
`him and no injury, Abboud does not have standing to ap-
`peal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of stand-
`ing.
`
`DISMISSED
`
`