`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`REINALDO CASTILLO, GONZALO PADRON
`MARINO, MAYDA ROTELLA, JULIA GARCIA,
`SHOPS ON FLAGER INC., JOSE F. DUMENIGO,
`DORA A. DUMENIGO, HUMBERTO J. DIAZ,
`JOSEFA MARCIA DIAZ, LUIS CRESPO, JOSE LUIS
`NAPOLE, GRACE BARSELLO NAPOLE,
`BERNARDO D. MANDULEY, NORMA A.
`MANDULEY, DANILO A. RODRIGUEZ, DORA
`RODRIGUEZ, AVIMAEL AREVALO, ODALYS
`AREVALO, DALIA ESPINOSA, DANIEL ESPINOSA,
`SOFIRA GONZALEZ, LOURDEZ RODRIGUEZ,
`ALBERTO PEREZ, MAYRA LOPEZ, NIRALDO
`HERNANDEZ PADRON, MERCEDES ALINA
`FALERO, LUISA PALENCIA, XIOMARA
`RODRIGUEZ, HUGO E. DIAZ, AND, CONCEPCION
`V. DIAZ, AS CO-TRUSTEES OF THE DIAZ FAMILY
`REVOCABLE TRUST, SOUTH AMERICAN TILE,
`LLC, GLADYS HERNANDEZ, NELSON MENENDEZ,
`JOSE MARTIN MARTINEZ, NORMA DEL
`SOCORRO GOMEZ, OSVALDO BORRAS, JR., LUIS
`R. SCHMIDT,
`Plaintiffs-Appellants
`
`v.
`
`UNITED STATES,
`Defendant-Appellee
`______________________
`
`2019-1158
`______________________
`
`
`
`
`Case: 19-1158 Document: 78 Page: 2 Filed: 02/20/2020
`
`2
`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
`in Nos. 1:16-cv-01624-MBH, 1:17-cv-01931-MBH, Senior
`Judge Marian Blank Horn.
`______________________
`
`Decided: February 20, 2020
`______________________
`
`MEGHAN SUE LARGENT, LewisRice, St. Louis, MO, ar-
`gued for plaintiffs-appellants. Plaintiffs-appellants Gon-
`zalo Padron Marino, Mayda Rotella, Julia Garcia, Jose F.
`Dumenigo, Dora A. Dumenigo, Dalia Espinosa, Daniel Es-
`pinosa, Sofira Gonzalez, Mayra Lopez, South American
`Tile, LLC, Gladys Hernandez, Jose Martin Martinez,
`Norma del Socorro Gomez, Luis R. Schmidt, Humberto J.
`Diaz, Josefa Marcia Diaz also represented by LINDSAY
`BRINTON.
`
` JAMES H. HULME, Arent Fox LLP, Washington, DC, for
`plaintiffs-appellants Reinaldo Castillo, Danilo A. Rodri-
`guez, Dora Rodriguez.
`
` MARK F. HEARNE, II, True North Law Group, LLC, St.
`Louis, MO, for plaintiffs-appellants Shops on Flager Inc.,
`Luis Crespo, Jose Luis Napole, Grace Barsello Napole, Ber-
`nardo D. Manduley, Norma A. Manduley, Avimael Arevalo,
`Odalys Arevalo, Lourdez Rodriguez, Alberto Perez, Niraldo
`Hernandez Padron, Mercedes Alina Falero, Luisa Palencia,
`Xiomara Rodriguez, Hugo E. Diaz, Concepcion V. Diaz,
`Nelson Menendez, Osvaldo Borras, Jr. Also represented by
`STEPHEN S. DAVIS.
`
` KEVIN WILLIAM MCARDLE, Environment & Natural Re-
`source Division, United States Department of Justice,
`Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also rep-
`resented by JEFFREY B. CLARK, ERIC GRANT.
` ______________________
`
`
`
`
`Case: 19-1158 Document: 78 Page: 3 Filed: 02/20/2020
`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`3
`
`Before WALLACH, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
`TARANTO, Circuit Judge
`Reinaldo Castillo and others own plots of land abutting
`a railroad right-of-way that was long ago granted to, and
`for decades used by, the Florida East Coast Railway Co. in
`Dade County, Florida. It is undisputed before us that,
`when the railway company eventually abandoned the
`right-of-way for rail use (the purpose for which the right-
`of-way was granted), full rights to the underlying land—
`title unencumbered by the right-of-way easement—would
`have reverted to whoever owned such rights, had there
`been no overriding governmental action. But there was
`such governmental action: the railway company success-
`fully petitioned a federal agency to have the railroad corri-
`dor turned into a recreational trail. The landowners sued
`the United States in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging
`that the agency’s conversion of the railroad right-of-way
`into a recreational trail constituted a taking of their rights
`in the corridor land abutting their properties and that the
`United States must pay just compensation for that taking.
`To establish their ownership of the corridor land, the plain-
`tiffs relied on a Florida-law doctrine known as the “center-
`line presumption,” which, where it applies, provides that
`when a road or other corridor forms the boundary of a land-
`owner’s parcel, that landowner owns the fee interest in the
`abutting corridor land up to the corridor’s centerline, un-
`less there is clear evidence to the contrary.
`In proceedings on summary-judgment motions, the
`government argued that the landowners did not own the
`land to the centerline of the railroad corridor at issue. The
`trial court agreed with the government, holding that the
`only reasonable finding on the evidence in this case was
`that the centerline presumption was overcome or was in-
`applicable. See Castillo v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 707
`(2018) (SJ Op.); Castillo v. United States, 140 Fed. Cl. 590
`(2018) (Reconsideration Op.). The landowners appeal. We
`
`
`
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`
`4
`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`conclude that the trial court misapplied the centerline pre-
`sumption to the evidence. We reverse and remand.
`I
`A
`When a railroad stops using a railroad right-of-way to
`operate a rail line, Section 8(d) of the National Trails Sys-
`tem Act Amendments of 1983 (Trails Act), 16 U.S.C.
`§ 1247(d), “allows [the] railroad to negotiate with a state,
`municipality, or private group (the ‘trail operator’) to as-
`sume financial and managerial responsibility for operating
`the railroad right-of-way as a recreational trail.” Caldwell
`v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The
`federal government’s Surface Transportation Board (STB)
`has exclusive and plenary authority to “regulate the con-
`struction, operation, and abandonment of most railroad
`lines in the United States.” Id. at 1228. If the railroad and
`trail operator reach a trail agreement and notify the STB,
`the STB may issue a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Aban-
`donment (NITU), 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d), which permits the
`railroad to discontinue rail service on the right-of-way and
`allows for trail use of the right-of-way indefinitely. Rogers
`v. United States, 814 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
`The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause provides that
`private property shall not “be taken for public use, without
`just compensation.” If, in the absence of a conversion to
`trail use, state law would provide for return to a person of
`full rights in the land, “[a] taking occurs when, pursuant to
`the Trails Act, state law reversionary interests are effec-
`tively eliminated in connection with a conversion of a rail-
`road right-of-way to trail use.” Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1228;
`see also Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1552
`(Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc). Accordingly, the government
`must provide just compensation to the owner of the rever-
`sionary rights eliminated by a Trails Act conversion. See
`Rogers, 814 F.3d at 1303.
`
`
`
`Case: 19-1158 Document: 78 Page: 5 Filed: 02/20/2020
`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`5
`
`B
`In the fall of 1924, Florida East Coast Railway Co.
`(FEC Railway) obtained a 1.2-mile long right-of-way ease-
`ment (of a basically north-south orientation) in Dade
`County, Florida, by way of four condemnation orders in the
`Dade County Circuit Court. See J.A. 708–09 (P. Russo
`judgment); J.A. 710–12 (R.S. Stanley judgment); J.A. 712–
`13 (W.H. Johnson judgment); J.A. 713–16 (J. Pyles judg-
`ment). The FEC Railway completed most of the rail line on
`the right-of-way in 1932 and soon began operations on the
`line as part of its South Little River Branch Line.
`As relevant here, the land to the east of the right-of-
`way eventually came into the hands of two families: the
`Merwitzers and the Mosses. The Merwitzers owned the
`land to the east of the right-of-way obtained by FEC Rail-
`way in the P. Russo judgment. The Merwitzers acquired
`this land from a 1945 deed from Mr. and Ms. T.C. Hollett
`(the 1945 Hollett-Merwitzer deed). On September 30,
`1947, the Merwitzers recorded a subdivision plat of the
`land, entitled “Zena Gardens.” The recorded subdivision
`plat includes the following description:
`That Louis Merwitzer and Rebecca Merwitzer his
`wife owners of the S.E. ¼ of the S.E. ¼ of Section 2,
`Township 54 South, Range 40 East, Miami, Dade
`County, Florida, excepting therefrom a strip of
`land off the westerly side which is the right of way
`of the Okeechobee-Miami Extension of the Florida
`East Coast Railway have caused to be made the at-
`tached plat entitled “Zena Gardens.”
`The Streets, Avenues and Terrace as shown to-
`gether with all existing and future planting, trees
`and shrubbery there on are hereby dedicated to the
`perpetual use of the Public for proper purposes re-
`serving to the said Louis Merwitzer and Rebecca
`Merwitzer, his wife, their heirs, successors or
`
`
`
`Case: 19-1158 Document: 78 Page: 6 Filed: 02/20/2020
`
`6
`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`assigns, the reversion or reversions thereof when-
`ever discontinued by law.
`J.A. 759.
`The Mosses owned land north of the Merwitzers’ land
`and east of the FEC Railway right-of-way. The relevant
`portion of the right-of-way had been obtained by FEC Rail-
`way in the other three condemnation orders—the R.S.
`Stanley, W.H. Johnson, and J. Pyles judgments. The
`Mosses acquired this land from a 1949 deed from the Es-
`tate of Lucy Cotton (the 1949 Cotton-Moss deed). On No-
`vember 3, 1949, Mr. and Ms. Moss recorded a subdivision
`plat of the land, entitled “Princess Park Manor.” The rec-
`orded subdivision plat includes the following description:
`That ERVING A. MOSS and HARRIETT E. MOSS
`his wife, owners of the South ½ of the N.E. ¼, South
`of the Canal and East of the Florida East Coast
`Right-of-Way, located in Sec. 2 TWP 54 South,
`RGE. 40 East, Dade County Florida; being the land
`East of the Florida East Coast Right-of-Way and
`between Flagler Street and the Tamiami canal and
`extending East to Ludlum Road, ALSO [t]he West
`½ of the Northeast ¼ of the Southeast ¼ less the
`Florida East Coast Right-of-Way all in Sec. 2 Town-
`ship 54 South RGE. 40 East, Dade County Florida,
`Said Florida East Coast Right-of-Way being the
`right-of-way of the Okeechobee Miami Extension of
`the Florida East Coast Railway, have caused to be
`made the attached Plat entitled “Princess Park
`Manor.”
`The Streets, Avenues, Roads, Terraces, Courts and
`Alleys as shown together with all existing and fu-
`ture planting, trees and shrubbery thereon are
`hereby dedicated to the perpetual use of the public
`for proper purposes, reserving the said ERVING A.
`MOSS and HARRIETT E. MOSS, his wife their
`
`
`
`Case: 19-1158 Document: 78 Page: 7 Filed: 02/20/2020
`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`7
`
`heirs; successors or assigns, the reversion or rever-
`sions thereof whenever discontinued by law.
`J.A. 757.
`Between March 1977 and July 2016, Reinaldo Castillo,
`Nelson Menendez, and others acquired, by deed, title to
`parcels of land in Zena Gardens and Princess Park Manor.
`The deeds did not themselves specify the precise parcel
`boundaries but referred to the parcels by lot numbers
`within the subdivision plats. See, e.g., J.A. 920 (conveying
`“Lot 8, in Block 11, of ZENA GARDENS, according to the
`Plat thereof”).
`On January 21, 2016, FEC Railway requested author-
`ity from the STB to abandon the right-of-way, including the
`portion that abuts Zena Gardens and Princess Park Manor.
`On November 1, 2016, Florida East Coast Industries (FEC
`Industries) requested issuance of an NITU that would al-
`low it to operate a trail on the corridor. The STB granted
`the request and issued an NITU, which allowed FEC In-
`dustries “to negotiate with FEC [Railway] for acquisition of
`the Line for use as a trail under [Section 8(d) of the Trails
`Act].” J.A. 268. FEC Railway and FEC Industries notified
`the STB on July 18, 2017, that “they ha[d] entered a Pur-
`chase Sale Agreement . . . for the rail banking/interim trail
`use of the 1.21-mile” right-of-way. J.A. 695.
`C
`In December 2016, Mr. Castillo and other landowners
`(collectively the Castillo plaintiffs), along with Mr. Menen-
`dez and other landowners (collectively, the Menendez
`plaintiffs), separately sued the federal government in the
`Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the STB’s issuance
`of the NITU authorizing conversion of the FEC right-of-
`way into a public recreational trail constituted a taking of
`their property, entitling them to just compensation. The
`trial court consolidated the cases. After filing their plead-
`ings, the parties stipulated that at the time the STB issued
`
`
`
`Case: 19-1158 Document: 78 Page: 8 Filed: 02/20/2020
`
`8
`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`the NITU, each plaintiff owned land—in either the Zena
`Gardens or the Princess Park Manor subdivision—adja-
`cent to the FEC right-of-way. The Castillo plaintiffs’ corri-
`dor-abutting land is split between the two subdivisions; the
`Menendez plaintiffs’ corridor-abutting land lies entirely in
`Princess Park Manor. SJ Op., 138 Fed. Cl. at 714.
`The Castillo and Menendez plaintiffs (collectively, the
`landowners) filed separate motions for partial summary
`judgment, asking the court to determine that the NITU
`constituted a taking.1 The landowners argued that FEC
`Railway had only an easement over, not fee-simple title to,
`the land underlying the FEC right-of-way and that the
`easement was limited to operating a railway. They argued
`that the NITU constituted a taking because, in its absence,
`once FEC Railway abandoned use of the corridor for rail
`service, the landowners would have regained full posses-
`sion of the abutting corridor land, east of and up to the cen-
`terline, which they claimed they owned under Florida law.
`The government opposed the landowners’ motions and
`filed its own cross-motions for summary judgment. As to
`the Menendez plaintiffs, the government sought summary
`judgment that the Menendez plaintiffs could not establish
`
`1 The Castillo plaintiffs sought partial summary
`judgment as to the government’s liability for portions of the
`right-of-way granted to FEC Railway in all four condemna-
`tion orders and a portion of the right-of way obtained by a
`1923 deed from G.F. and Mary Holman. See Castillo’s Mo-
`tion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Castillo v. United
`States, 138 Fed. Cl. 707 (2018) (No. 1:16-cv-01624), ECF
`No. 23. The Menendez plaintiffs sought the same relief
`with respect to portions of the right-of-way granted to FEC
`Railway in three of the four condemnation orders. Menen-
`dez’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Menen-
`dez v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 707 (2018) (No. 1:17-cv-
`01931), ECF No. 20.
`
`
`
`Case: 19-1158 Document: 78 Page: 9 Filed: 02/20/2020
`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`9
`
`that they owned the land underlying the right-of-way ob-
`tained by the railway in the condemnation orders. As to
`the Castillo plaintiffs, with respect to the issues now before
`us, the government argued that the Castillo plaintiffs had
`not established their entitlement to summary judgment in
`their favor regarding their ownership of any of the corridor
`land.2
`The government’s main argument was that the land-
`owners had established ownership of only their parcels ad-
`jacent to the right-of-way and not any land underlying the
`right-of-way. Specifically, the government pointed to lan-
`guage in the September 1947 Zena Gardens plat “excepting
`. . . a strip of land off the westerly side which is the right of
`way of the . . . [FEC] Railway,” J.A. 759, and language in
`the November 1949 Princess Park Manor plat describing
`the subdivision as being “east of the Florida East Coast
`right-of-way,” J.A. 757. According to the government, that
`language, together with certain other language, shows that
`the Merwitzers and Mosses excluded the FEC right-of-way
`from conveyances made according to the September 1947
`and November 1949 plats. Government’s Cross-Motion for
`Summary Judgment at 12–13, Castillo v. United States,
`138 Fed. Cl. 707 (2018) (No. 1:16-cv-01624), ECF No. 25.
`To prove ownership of the land underlying the right-of-
`way, the landowners invoked a doctrine of Florida property
`law, i.e., the centerline presumption. Under that doctrine,
`in its principal relevance to the issue presented to the trial
`court on summary judgment, if a grantor conveys property
`identified as bounded by a road, stream, or similar corridor,
`
`2 The government sought summary judgment that
`FEC Railway received fee simple title to the portion of the
`corridor land conveyed in the 1923 deed from G.F. and
`Mary Holman. The trial court agreed, SJ Op., 138 Fed. Cl.
`at 730–34, and the landowners do not challenge that aspect
`of the trial court’s ruling.
`
`
`
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`
`10
`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`and the grantor owns the land under that boundary corri-
`dor, the grant also conveys title to the land underlying the
`corridor up to the corridor’s centerline, unless there is clear
`evidence of non-conveyance as to that corridor land. Land-
`owners’ Reply in Support of Their Motion for Partial Sum-
`mary Judgment at 7–9, Castillo v. United States, 138 Fed.
`Cl. 707 (2018) (No. 1:16-cv-01624), ECF No. 32 (citing
`Smith v. Horn, 70 So. 435 (Fla. 1915)). According to the
`landowners, the 1947 and 1949 plats’ descriptions and de-
`pictions, on which the government relied, failed to rebut
`the centerline presumption.
`On June 29, 2018, the trial court resolved the sum-
`mary-judgment motions in favor of the government. SJ
`Op., 138 Fed. Cl. at 742. The trial court made similar de-
`terminations for the lots in both Zena Gardens and Prin-
`cess Park Manor, namely, that there is no genuine issue of
`triable fact because the plat descriptions and depictions of
`the subdivisions rebut the centerline presumption by
`clearly showing that the Merwitzers and Mosses “did not
`intend to pass title to the railroad corridor to the grantees
`of the subdivision parcels adjacent to the railroad corridor.”
`Id. at 740, 742. In particular, the trial court concluded that
`the Zena Gardens plat “makes a specific point to ‘except[]’
`the railroad corridor from the description of [the] land plat-
`ted,” id. at 740, and that the Princess Park Manor plat de-
`scribes the parcels in the plat as both “East of the [FEC
`Railway] Right-of-Way” and “less the [FEC Railway] Right-
`of-Way,” id. at 741, thus excluding the railroad corridor. In
`the trial court’s view, the absence of the railroad right-of-
`way from the paragraph in both plat descriptions dedicat-
`ing the “Streets” and “Avenues” to the public confirms that
`the individual lot conveyances did not include the railroad
`right-of-way. Id. at 740, 741. Finally, again relying just on
`the plats, the court concluded that the pictorial depictions
`of the subdivisions in the plats indicate that none of the
`parcels “extend onto the railroad corridor but, instead, end
`
`
`
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`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`11
`
`at the edge of the railroad corridor,” meaning that the rail-
`road corridor is not included in the subdivision plat. Id.
`The landowners filed motions for reconsideration, ar-
`guing that the trial court misapplied the centerline pre-
`sumption.3 To prove that the Merwitzers and Mosses did
`not retain for themselves a fee estate in the strip of land
`under the right-of-way easement, the landowners pre-
`sented, for the first time, two pre-platting chain of title re-
`ports—one for a parcel in Zena Gardens and one for a
`parcel in Princess Park Manor. See J.A. 880–81; J.A. 882–
`84 (Zena Gardens parcel chain of title report); J.A. 928–30
`(Princess Park Manor parcel chain of title report). The
`Zena Gardens report included the 1945 Hollett-Merwitzer
`deed, and the Princess Park Manor report included the
`1949 Cotton-Moss deed. In response, the government sub-
`mitted a 1937 quitclaim tax deed that, the government as-
`serted, showed a conveyance of the land underlying the
`FEC right-of-way from the Southern Drainage District di-
`rectly to the FEC Railway.
`On October 30, 2018, the trial court denied the land-
`owners’ motions for reconsideration. See Reconsideration
`Op., 140 Fed. Cl. at 606. The trial court found no clear er-
`ror in its determination that the Merwitzers (in September
`1947) and the Mosses (in November 1949) made clear their
`intent not to convey title to the land underlying the FEC
`
`3 The Castillo landowners also argued that the trial
`court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the
`government for the portions of the FEC right-of-way ob-
`tained by condemnation order because the government had
`not moved for summary judgment with respect to those
`portions of the right-of-way. The trial court rejected the
`argument without disputing the premise about the limited
`scope of the government’s motion. Reconsideration Op.,
`140 Fed. Cl. at 604–05. On appeal, the Castillo plaintiffs
`have not challenged that procedural ruling.
`
`
`
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`
`12
`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`right-of-way. Id. at 601. The trial court then considered
`the pre-platting chain of title reports submitted by the
`landowners and found that these reports were public rec-
`ords available to the landowners at the time they filed their
`summary-judgment motions, and thus “should not have
`been left for a post-decision motion for reconsideration.”
`Id. Nonetheless, the trial court considered the reports and
`adopted a new basis to reject the landowners’ claims,
`namely, that the Merwitzers and Mosses did not them-
`selves own the land underlying the right-of-way when the
`subdivisions were platted. Id. at 601–02. The trial court
`supported this determination with the language of the
`1945 Hollett-Merwitzer deed and the 1949 Cotton-Moss
`deed. Id. The trial court ruled that the 1945 Hollett-Mer-
`witzer deed conveyed land “less [the] certain strip of land”
`that is the right-of-way and that the 1949 Cotton-Moss
`deed stated that the land conveyed was “East of the [FEC]
`right-of-way” and “less the [FEC] Right-of-Way.” Id. (quot-
`ing J.A. 897, 943). The trial court did not address the 1937
`quitclaim tax deed submitted by the government.
`The landowners timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
`under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
`II
`We review a decision of the Court of Federal Claims
`granting summary judgment de novo. See Rogers, 814 F.3d
`at 1305. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
`shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
`fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
`law.” Court of Federal Claims Rule 56(a). We review the
`denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of dis-
`cretion. See Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States,
`512 F.3d 1347, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “An abuse of discre-
`tion occurs when a court misunderstands or misapplies the
`relevant law or makes a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”
`Id.
`
`
`
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`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`13
`
`We analyze the property rights of the parties in a rails-
`to-trails case under the relevant state’s law, which in this
`case is Florida law. Rogers, 814 F.3d at 1305. We decide
`legal issues, under federal or state law, de novo. Hash v.
`United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`A
`The landowners argue that the trial court misapplied
`the centerline presumption under Florida law. Specifi-
`cally, they argue that the court, in its summary-judgment
`opinion, improperly interpreted the Zena Gardens and
`Princess Park Manor plats as reserving a reversionary in-
`terest in the FEC right-of-way to the Merwitzers and
`Mosses, so that the subsequent deeds to the subdivision
`parcels at issue did not grant any ownership of land in the
`railroad corridor. We agree with the landowners.
`Long ago, the Supreme Court of the United States de-
`scribed the centerline presumption as a “familiar principle
`of law” to the effect that “a grant of land bordering on a
`road or river, carries the title to the centre of the river or
`road, unless the terms or circumstances of the grant indi-
`cate a limitation of its extent by the exterior lines.” Banks
`v. Ogden, 69 U.S. 57, 68 (1864). A note to the Florida Su-
`preme Court’s 1887 decision in Florida Southern Railway
`Co. v. Brown described the rule as applicable to a “deed de-
`scribing land as bounded by a street or other way,” rather
`than “as being bounded by the side line of the street”: the
`deed “passes all the title of the grantor in and to the soil of
`such way, extending to the center line thereof, subject to
`the easement of the public, in the absence of an express or
`implied reservation of such street or way.” 1 So. 512, 515
`(Fla. 1887). In 1915, the Florida Supreme Court in Smith
`v. Horn applied the centerline presumption to the streets
`of a subdivision plat:
`Where the owner of land has it . . . platted, showing
`subdivisions thereof, with spaces for intervening
`streets
`. . . and conveyances
`in
`fee of the
`
`
`
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`
`14
`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`subdivisions are made with reference to such . . .
`plat, the owner thereby evinces an intention to ded-
`icate an easement in the streets or other highways
`to the public use . . . and the title of the grantees of
`subdivisions abutting on such streets in the ab-
`sence of a contrary showing, extends to the center
`of such highway, subject to the public easement.
`70 So. 435, 436 (Fla. 1915); see also Servando Bldg. Co. v.
`Zimmerman, 91 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1956) (recognizing
`that Florida codified the centerline presumption in part for
`subdivision plats at Fla. Stat. § 177.08 (1955), now
`§ 177.085); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Southern Inv. Co., 44
`So. 351, 353 (Fla. 1907) (“The proprietor of lots abutting on
`a public street is presumed, in the absence of evidence to
`the contrary, to own the soil to the center of the street.”
`(internal quotations omitted)).4
`The centerline presumption can be rebutted in two
`ways of relevance here. First, the party challenging the
`presumption may “present evidence of the grantor’s intent
`not to convey to the centerline” of the easement. Bischoff
`v. Walker, 107 So. 3d 1165, 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
`Second, a party can show that “the strip of land being
`claimed is titled in someone else.” Rogers v. United States,
`184 So. 3d 1087, 1098 (Fla. 2015).
`We have not been pointed to a decision under Florida
`law that specifically rules on a contested issue about
`
`
`In a recent case, the Florida Supreme Court de-
`4
`clined to consider “whether or to what extent t[he] ‘center
`line presumption’ rule still applies to property adjacent to
`streets and highways in Florida today.” Rogers v. United
`States, 184 So. 3d 1087, 1099 n.7 (Fla. 2015). At present,
`the rule is a fixture of Florida law. See, e.g., Bischoff v.
`Walker, 107 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (Florida
`court applying centerline presumption).
`
`
`
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`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`15
`
`whether railroad rights-of-way, like streets and certain
`other corridors, come within the centerline presumption.
`But in the absence of a contrary indication under Florida
`law, we conclude that the centerline presumption applies
`to railroad rights-of-way that serve as boundaries of a plot,
`including a plot within a subdivision.
`Florida courts have applied the centerline presumption
`to highways, streets, canals, and nonnavigable streams.
`See, e.g., Smith, 70 So. at 436 (applying centerline pre-
`sumption to “nonnavigable stream or highway”); Bischoff,
`107 So. 3d at 1168–71 (applying centerline presumption to
`a canal). In both Florida Southern Railway and Seaboard
`Air Line Railway, the boundary involved was a street being
`used by a railway, though not exclusively. A railroad right-
`of-way is relevantly akin to other corridors: it comes within
`the core rationale of the centerline presumption. When a
`property description includes a two-dimensional corridor
`(having width as well as length) as a boundary, that bound-
`ary often needs to be translated into one or more one-di-
`mensional boundaries to identify ownership, such as when
`the right-of-way use of the corridor ends; and the centerline
`presumption supplies a default rule to perform that im-
`portant task—with the content of the rule being a pre-
`sumption that the corridor, commonly a narrow strip, is not
`to be owned separately from the abutting land. See, e.g.,
`Dale A. Whitman et al., The Law of Property § 11.2 at 713,
`719 (4th ed. 2019) (“deeds, to be valid, must describe or oth-
`erwise identify the land affected,” and “[m]onuments hav-
`ing significant width,” such as “public streets and
`highways,” “raise interesting problems” of precisely identi-
`fying the lines that bound the land; the centerline pre-
`sumption solves that problem). The translation problem
`solved by the centerline presumption is presented by rail-
`road rights-of-way as by other corridors.
`Moreover, in Bischoff, the Florida District Court of Ap-
`peals described the centerline presumption as applying to
`a boundary defined by a “monument.” See Bischoff, 107 So.
`
`
`
`Case: 19-1158 Document: 78 Page: 16 Filed: 02/20/2020
`
`16
`
`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`3d at 1168 (“The presumption is that ownership extends to
`the centerline of a monument . . . .”). Florida Statute
`§ 472.005(11) defines a “monument” as “an artificial or nat-
`ural object that is permanent or semipermanent and used
`or presumed to occupy . . . any point on a boundary line, or
`any reference point or other point to be used for horizontal
`or vertical control.” A rail line meets the definition of an
`artificial monument under Florida law.
`Many other jurisdictions—very much the predominant
`number among those whose law has been cited to us—have
`applied the centerline presumption to railroad rights-of-
`way. See Asmussen v. United States, 304 P.3d 552, 558
`(Colo. 2013) (finding that a majority of jurisdictions have
`“held that the centerline presumption applies to a convey-
`ance of property abutting a railroad right-of-way”); Boyles
`v. Missouri Friends of the Wabash Trace Nature Trail, Inc.,
`981 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (applying center-
`line presumption to railroad right-of-way); Pebsworth v.
`Behringer, 551 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)
`(same); Church v. Stiles, 10 A. 674, 675 (Vt. 1887) (same);
`see also Whitman et al., The Law of Property § 11.2 at 719
`(“A similar rule making the center line the boundary is ap-
`plied to railroad and other rights of way.”). But see, e.g.,
`Stuart v. Fox, 152 A. 413, 418–19 (Me. 1930) (finding “no
`reason . . . because of analogy to extend the [centerline pre-
`sumption, as applied to highways,] to railroad rights of
`way”).
`We conclude that, under Florida law, the centerline
`presumption applies to the railroad right-of-way context of
`the present case.
`
`B
`In its summary-judgment opinion, the trial court con-
`cluded that the Zena Gardens and Princess Park Manor
`plats each contain a clear expression of an intent to reserve
`a reversionary interest in the FEC right-of-way in the sub-
`division grantors—an expression that suffices to rebut the
`
`
`
`Case: 19-1158 Document: 78 Page: 17 Filed: 02/20/2020
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`CASTILLO v. UNITED STATES
`
`17
`
`centerline presumption. SJ Op., 138 Fed. Cl. at 738–42.
`For Zena Gardens, the trial court relied on the plat’s refer-
`ence to “excepting therefrom a strip of land off the westerly
`side which is the right of way,” id. at 739–40 (citing J.A.
`759), and for Princess Park Manor, the trial court relied on
`the plat’s references to the land conveyed being “East of the
`[FEC] Right-of-Way” and “less the [FEC] Right-of-Way,” id.
`at 741 (citing J.A. 757). The landowners argue that under
`Florida law, the plats do not clearly express the intent re-
`quired to avoid application of the centerline presumption.
`We agree.
`The centerline presumption is said “to be based on the
`supposed intention of the parties, and the improbability of
`the grantor desiring or intending to reserve his interest in
`the street” when passing title to the adjoining land. Fla.
`Southern Ry., 1 So. at 513–14. Thus, a party may rebut the
`centerline presumption by “present[ing] evidence of the
`grantor’s intent not to convey to the centerline” of the rail-
`way. Bischoff, 107 So. 3d