`
`NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`DANY ROJAS-VEGA,
`Plaintiff-Appellant
`
`v.
`
`UNITED STATES,
`Defendant-Appellee
`______________________
`
`2019-1475
`______________________
`
`Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
`in No. 1:18-cv-01520-NBF, Senior Judge Nancy B. Fire-
`stone.
`
`______________________
`
`Decided: August 8, 2019
`______________________
`
`DANY ROJAS-VEGA, Cocal, Puntarenas, Costa Rica, pro
`se.
`
` ANN MOTTO, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Divi-
`sion, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
`DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JOSEPH H.
`HUNT, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR., LOREN MISHA
`PREHEIM.
` ______________________
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`ROJAS-VEGA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Before WALLACH, CLEVENGER, and TARANTO, Circuit
`Judges.
`
`PER CURIAM.
`Appellant Dany Rojas-Vega sued Appellee United
`States (“Government”) in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
`S.A. 1–6 (Complaint).1 Mr. Rojas-Vega alleges that, in Au-
`gust 2001, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
`vice (“INS”) improperly initiated deportation proceedings
`against him, breaching an October 1995 plea agreement
`that Mr. Rojas-Vega had entered into in state court.
`S.A. 3–5. Mr. Rojas-Vega seeks monetary and punitive
`damages against the U.S. Department of Homeland Secu-
`rity (“DHS”) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforce-
`ment (“ICE”) (as the successor to INS), S.A. 2, 5, claiming:
`(1) Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
`(2012), violations; (2) “due process and equal protection” vi-
`olations; and, (3) breach of contract, S.A. 2–5. Mr. Rojas-
`Vega filed a motion for leave to file electronically. S.A. 8–
`13. The Court of Federal Claims denied Mr. Rojas-Vega’s
`motion to file electronically, Rojas-Vega v. United States,
`No. 1:18-cv-01520-NBF (Fed. Cl. Oct. 29, 2018) (Order)
`(S.A. 16), and dismissed his Complaint for lack of subject-
`matter jurisdiction, Rojas-Vega v. United States, No. 1:18-
`cv-01520-NBF (Fed. Cl. Nov. 30, 2018) (Order of Dismissal)
`(S.A. 26–29); see Rojas-Vega v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-
`01520-NBF (Fed. Cl. Nov. 30, 2018) (Judgment) (S.A. 30).
`Mr. Rojas-Vega appeals the Court of Federal Claims’ denial
`of his motion to file electronically. He does not appeal the
`Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of his Complaint for
`lack of jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
`U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). We affirm.
`
`
`1 S.A. refers to the Government’s Supplemental Ap-
`pendix attached to its response brief.
`
`
`
`ROJAS-VEGA v. UNITED STATES
`
`3
`
`“We review the Court of Federal Claims’ decision to dis-
`miss a case for lack of subject[-]matter jurisdiction de
`novo.” Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed.
`Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Pursuant to the Tucker Act,
`the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over “any
`claim against the United States founded either upon the
`Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of
`an executive department, or upon any express or implied
`contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
`unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”
`28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act “does not create a
`substantive cause of action,” but instead requires the plain-
`tiff to identify a “money-mandating” source of law, i.e., “a
`separate source of substantive law that creates the right to
`money damages.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167,
`1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in relevant part). For a
`source of substantive law to be money-mandating, it must
`be “reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a
`right of recovery in damages” against the Government.
`United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S.
`465, 473 (2003). Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1500 divests the
`Court of Federal Claims of Tucker Act jurisdiction if, at the
`time the plaintiff files a complaint with the Court of Fed-
`eral Claims, the plaintiff also “has pending in any other
`court any suit or process against the United States” that is
`“for or in respect to” the same claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1500; see
`Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993)
`(holding that § 1500 jurisdiction “depends upon the state of
`things at the time of the action brought” (internal quota-
`tion marks and citation omitted)). We generally interpret
`the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally. See Durr v. Ni-
`cholson, 400 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`The Court of Federal Claims did not err in dismissing
`Mr. Rojas-Vega’s Complaint for lack of subject-matter ju-
`risdiction. First, the Court of Federal Claims did not have
`jurisdiction over Mr. Rojas-Vega’s FTCA claims because, by
`the plain language of the Tucker Act, the Court of Federal
`
`
`
`4
`
`ROJAS-VEGA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Claims does not have jurisdiction over torts. See 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1491(a)(1) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims
`shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
`against the United States . . . not sounding in tort.”); Rick’s
`Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343
`(Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that “[t]he plain language of
`the Tucker Act excludes” tort claims from the jurisdiction
`of the Court of Federal Claims). Second, the Court of Fed-
`eral Claims did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Rojas-Vega’s
`constitutional due process and equal protection claims be-
`cause neither the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause nor
`the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Pro-
`tection clauses are money-mandating. See LeBlanc v.
`United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding
`that “the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
`Amendments” and “the Equal Protection Clause of the
`Fourteenth Amendment” are not “a sufficient basis for ju-
`risdiction” under the Tucker Act “because they do not man-
`date payment of money by the government”). Third, the
`Court of Federal Claims did not have jurisdiction over
`Mr. Rojas-Vega’s breach of contract claims because, at the
`time he filed his Complaint with the Court of Federal
`Claims, Mr. Rojas-Vega had a complaint “based on sub-
`stantially the same operative facts” pending before the U.S.
`District Court for the Southern District of California. See
`United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307,
`317 (2011) (explaining that “two suits are for or in respect
`to the same claim, precluding jurisdiction in the [Court of
`Federal Claims], if they are based on substantially the
`same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in each
`suit”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1500.2 The Court of Federal
`
`2 Mr. Rojas-Vega does not dispute that he had “iden-
`tical claims . . . pending” in the U.S. District Court for the
`Southern District of California when he filed his Complaint
`in the Court of Federal Claims. Appellant’s Supp. Br. 2;
`see Rojas-Vega v. United States, 2018 WL 4680136, at *1
`
`
`
`ROJAS-VEGA v. UNITED STATES
`
`5
`
`Claims did not err in dismissing Mr. Rojas-Vega’s Com-
`plaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.3
`On appeal, Mr. Rojas-Vega seeks reversal of the Court
`of Federal Claims’ denial of his motion to file electronically.
`Appellant’s Br. 1–2. Where, as here, the lower court does
`not have subject-matter jurisdiction, we “have jurisdiction
`on appeal, not of the merits, but merely for the purpose of
`correcting [any] error of the [lower court] in entertaining
`suit.” See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.
`83, 95 (1998) (quoting United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S.
`435, 440 (1936)). Perceiving no such error in the Court of
`
`
`(S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2018) (order dismissing plaintiff’s first
`amended complaint without prejudice) (summarizing Mr.
`Rojas-Vega’s September 11, 2018 Complaint as alleging
`breach of contract against DHS, ICE, and INS based on his
`1995 plea agreement).
`3 Contrary to Mr. Rojas-Vega’s arguments, see Ap-
`pellant’s Supp. Br. 2–3, he could not cure this jurisdictional
`deficiency by seeking subsequent dismissal of his non-
`Court of Federal Claims suit, nor could the Court of Fed-
`eral Claims cure it for him through Rule 60 of the U.S.
`Court of Federal Claims (Relief from Judgement or Order),
`Keene, 508 U.S. at 207 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1500 juris-
`diction “depends upon the state of things at the time of the
`action brought” and that “once the lines are drawn” limita-
`tions such as § 1500 “must be neither disregarded nor
`evaded” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
`While we may interpret the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff
`liberally, see Durr, 400 F.3d at 1380, we may not relieve
`them of jurisdictional requirements, Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S.
`Dep’t of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (ex-
`plaining that, while “leniency with respect to mere formal-
`ities should be extended to a pro se party,” a court “may not
`similarly take a liberal view of . . . jurisdictional require-
`ment[s] and set a different rule for pro se litigants only”).
`
`
`
`6
`
`ROJAS-VEGA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Federal Claims’ determination, we do not reach the ques-
`tion of Mr. Rojas-Vega’s motion to file electronically. See
`Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Chinese
`Univ. of Hong Kong, 860 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
`(explaining that “the activities in the [lower] court are a
`nullity when the [lower] court lacks subject[-]matter juris-
`diction”).4
`
`CONCLUSION
`We have considered Mr. Rojas-Vega’s remaining argu-
`ments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Judg-
`ment of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims is
`AFFIRMED
`COSTS
`
`No costs.
`
`
`4 Similarly, we do not reach Mr. Rojas-Vega’s Motion
`for Other Relief, Mot. For Other Relief, ECF No. 45 (re-
`questing we instruct the Court of Federal Claims to initiate
`discovery in his case), as the Court of Federal Claims does
`not have jurisdiction, see Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 95.
`
`