Case: 21-139 Document: 33 Page: 1 Filed: 06/30/2021
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`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`IN RE: SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., LG
`ELECTRONICS INC., LG ELECTRONICS USA, INC.,
`Petitioners
`______________________
`
`2021-139, 2021-140
`______________________
`
`On Petitions for Writs of Mandamus to the United
`States District Court for the Western District of Texas in
`Nos. 6:20-cv-00257-ADA, 6:20-cv-00259-ADA, Judge Alan
`D. Albright.
`
`______________________
`
`ON PETITION
`______________________
`
`BRADLEY GARCIA, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washing-
`ton, DC, for petitioners. Also represented by DAVID
`ALMELING, DANIEL SILVERMAN, DARIN W. SNYDER, San
`Francisco, CA; NICHOLAS WHILT, Los Angeles, CA.
`
` KARL RUPP, Nix Patterson, LLP, Dallas, TX, for re-
`spondents Ikorongo Texas LLC, Ikorongo Technology LLC.
`Also represented by DEREK TOD GILLILAND, Sorey Law
`Firm, Longview, TX; HOWARD N. WISNIA, Wisnia PC, San
`Diego, CA.
`
` JOSHUA S. LANDAU, Computer & Communications In-
`dustry Association, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae
`Computer & Communications Industry Association.
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`IN RE: SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.
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`______________________
`
`Before LOURIE, DYK, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
`DYK, Circuit Judge.
`
`O R D E R
`In these patent infringement suits, which have been
`
`consolidated for purposes of these mandamus petitions,
`Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. et al. (collectively, “Sam-
`sung”) and LG Electronics Inc. et al. (collectively, “LG”)
`seek writs of mandamus ordering the United States Dis-
`trict Court for the Western District of Texas to transfer the
`underlying actions to the United States District Court for
`the Northern District of California. For the following rea-
`sons, we grant the writs of mandamus.
`BACKGROUND
`A.
`Ikorongo Texas LLC (“Ikorongo Texas”) filed the initial
`complaints in these cases against Samsung and LG in the
`Western District of Texas on March 31, 2020—a month af-
`ter Ikorongo Texas was formed as a Texas limited liability
`company. Although Ikorongo Texas claims to be unrelated
`to Ikorongo Technology LLC (“Ikorongo Tech”), a North
`Carolina limited liability company, the operative com-
`plaints indicate that Ikorongo Texas and Ikorongo Tech are
`run out of the same Chapel Hill, North Carolina office. Ad-
`ditionally, as of March 20, 2020, the same five individuals
`“own[ed] all of the issued and outstanding membership in-
`terests” in both Ikorongo entities. Assignments of Patent
`Rights at 4, Ikorongo Texas LLC v. LG Elecs. Inc., No. 6:20-
`cv-00257-ADA (W.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2021), ECF Nos. 57-4, 57-
`5 (exhibits to Ikorongo entities’ brief in opposition to LG’s
`motion to transfer).
`Ikorongo Tech owns the four patents that are asserted
`in the suits. Approximately ten days before the initial
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`complaints were filed in these cases, Ikorongo Tech as-
`signed to Ikorongo Texas exclusive rights to sue for in-
`fringement and collect past and future damages for those
`patents within certain specified parts of the state of Texas,
`including certain counties in the Western District of Texas,
`while retaining the rights to the patents in the rest of coun-
`try.
`The day after the initial complaints were filed, Ikor-
`ongo Texas and Ikorongo Tech filed first amended com-
`plaints, this time naming both Ikorongo Tech and Ikorongo
`Texas as co-plaintiffs, noting that “[t]ogether Ikorongo TX
`and Ikorongo Tech own the entire right, title and interest
`in the Asserted Patents, including the right to sue for past,
`present and future infringement and damages thereof,
`throughout the entire United States and world.”
`The amended complaints assert generally that Sam-
`sung and LG had infringed at least one claim of the as-
`serted patents by making, using, testing, selling, offering
`for sale, or importing into the United States devices that
`perform certain functionality. The complaints do not dis-
`tinguish between infringement in the Western District of
`Texas and infringement elsewhere in the United States. It
`appears undisputed that Ikorongo Texas and Ikorongo
`Tech’s infringement contentions are directed at functional-
`ity in third-party applications (Google Maps, Google+,
`Google Play Music, YouTube Music, and AT&T Secure
`Family) that run on the accused mobile products sold by
`Samsung and LG.
`
`B.
`In September 2020, Samsung and LG separately
`moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the suits to the
`Northern District of California. They argued that three of
`the five accused third-party applications were developed in
`Northern California where those third parties conduct sig-
`nificant business activities and that no application was de-
`veloped or researched in Western Texas. Samsung and LG
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`further argued that potential witnesses and sources of
`proof were in the Northern District of California, including
`two of the named inventors, and that no source of proof or
`potential witness was in the Western District of Texas.
`On March 1, 2021, the district court denied LG’s and
`Samsung’s motions. The court first concluded that LG and
`Samsung failed to establish the threshold requirement
`that the complaints “might have been brought” in the
`Northern District of California. § 1404(a). The court
`acknowledged that there was no dispute that the defend-
`ants would be subject to venue in the Northern District of
`California based on Ikorongo Tech’s allegations. However,
`because Ikorongo Texas’s rights under the asserted patents
`could not have been infringed in the Northern District of
`California, the court held that venue over the entirety of
`the actions was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
`Alternatively, the court analyzed the traditional pub-
`lic- and private-interest factors. As to the private-interest
`factors, the district court acknowledged that “the location
`of the documents relevant in [these] case[s] tilts [the
`sources of proof] factor towards transfer,” citing LG and
`Samsung’s argument that “the greatest volume of evidence
`is with key third parties located in the Northern District of
`California,” including “technical documents and source
`code,” and that Ikorongo Texas and Ikorongo Tech failed to
`identify any sources of proof in the Western District of
`Texas.
`With regard to potential witnesses, the district court
`noted that Samsung and LG had identified potential wit-
`nesses in Northern California and no potential witness in
`or near the Western District of Texas. However, the dis-
`trict court weighed the willing witness factor “only very
`slightly in favor of transfer” and the compulsory process
`factor “neutral.” The court explained that it “gives the con-
`venience of party witnesses little weight” generally. And
`while recognizing that “the Northern District of California
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`is the more convenient forum for a high percentage” of
`third-party employees “who may be relevant witnesses,”
`the court stated generally its view that “only a few party
`witnesses and even fewer non-party witnesses will likely
`testify at trial,” and weighed against transfer plaintiffs’
`willingness to cover the expenses of third parties.
`As to the local interest factor, the district court noted
`and rejected Samsung and LG’s argument that the North-
`ern District of California had a greater local interest in this
`case because the third-party applications were developed
`there, at least LG integrated the accused applications in
`the proposed transferee district, and no party had any
`meaningful connection to the Western District of Texas.
`The district court explained that “it is generally a fiction
`that patent cases give rise to local controversy or interest”
`and “Ikorongo Texas’s claims do specifically relate to in-
`fringement in this District.”
`The district court weighed the “practical problems” fac-
`tor against transfer. The court noted that Ikorongo Texas
`and Ikorongo Tech had separately filed suit against Bum-
`ble Trading, LLC in the Western District of Texas “for in-
`fringing on patents asserted in this action, and Bumble
`withdrew its motion to transfer.” The court explained that
`“judicial economy and the possibility of inconsistent rulings
`causes the Court to find this factor weighs against transfer,
`given that at least one of the co-pending cases will remain
`in this District.” In addition, the court added that it could
`likely hold a trial sooner than the Northern District of Cal-
`ifornia, citing in part its patent-specific Order Governing
`Proceedings that “ensures efficient administration[.]” The
`court therefore concluded that defendants had not met
`their burden to demonstrate cause for transfer.
`These petitions followed, which were consolidated in
`our court, and raise the same two challenges: First,
`whether the district court erred in concluding that venue
`in the Northern District of California under § 1400(b) is
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`IN RE: SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.
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`improper; and second, whether the district court clearly
`erred in its assessment of the traditional transfer factors
`and in its ultimate conclusion that the transferee venue
`was not clearly more convenient for trial.
`DISCUSSION
` We “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
`of [our] jurisdiction[] and agreeable to the usages and prin-
`ciples of law” under the All Writs Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
`Three conditions must be met before a writ may issue:
`(1) the petitioner “[must] have no other adequate means to
`attain . . . relief,” (2) the petitioner must show that the
`right to mandamus is “clear and indisputable,” and (3) the
`court “must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under
`the circumstances.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542
`U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004) (first alteration in original) (inter-
`nal quotation marks and citations omitted).
` We apply the law of the regional circuit—in this case
`the Fifth Circuit—in mandamus review of a district court’s
`ruling on a motion to transfer pursuant to § 1404(a). In re
`Apple, Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing In
`re Barnes & Noble, Inc., 743 F.3d 1381, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
`2014)). We thus review a district court’s decision to deny
`transfer for an abuse of discretion. See In re TS Tech USA
`Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (applying Fifth
`Circuit law). “A district court would necessarily abuse its
`discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the
`law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”
`Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).
`Errors of judgment in weighing relevant factors are also a
`ground for finding an abuse of discretion. See TS Tech, 551
`F.3d at 1320. We may grant mandamus when the denial
`of transfer was a clear abuse of discretion under governing
`legal standards. See In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338,
`1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (also applying Fifth Circuit law); TS
`Tech, 551 F.3d at 1318–19.
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`A.
` Under § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of parties and
`witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
`transfer any civil action to any other district or division
`where it might have been brought or to any district or divi-
`sion to which all parties have consented.” A case may be
`transferred under § 1404(a) only to a court that has venue
`over the civil action. See In re SK hynix Inc., 847 F. App’x
`847 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Whether the two cases could be trans-
`ferred under § 1404(a) turns on whether venue in the
`Northern District of California would have been proper un-
`der § 1400(b) had these cases been filed in that district.
`That statutory provision provides, in relevant part, that
`“[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be brought
`. . . where the defendant has committed acts of infringe-
`ment and has a regular and established place of business.”1
`As an initial matter, we reject Ikorongo Texas and Ikor-
`ongo Tech’s argument that the initial complaint filed only
`by Ikorongo Texas governs this inquiry. Once the respond-
`ents filed their amended complaints, the original com-
`plaints were “dead letter[s]” and “no longer perform[ed]
`any function in the case[s].” ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg,
`522 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
`and citations omitted). That understanding has been
`
`1 There is no dispute here that the “established place
`of business” requirement is satisfied in both cases. LG
`Electronics U.S.A, Inc. has offices in Santa Clara and San
`Francisco, California, where it has about 120 employees.
`Samsung Electronics America, Inc. has offices in the
`Northern District of California from which more than 300
`employees work. And Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and
`LG Electronics Inc. are also subject to venue in Northern
`California given their status as foreign corporations. See
`In re HTC Corp., 889 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (for-
`eign corporations are subject to venue in any district).
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`uniformly applied in a variety of contexts, including for
`purposes of venue. See, e.g., Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600,
`603 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The amended complaint . . . super-
`sede[s] the original complaint[.]”); Fawzy v. Wauquiez
`Boats SNC, 873 F.3d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 2017); Fullerton v.
`Maynard, 943 F.2d 57, 1991 WL 166400, at *2 (10th Cir.
`Aug. 29, 1991) (“Because the amended complaint super-
`sedes the original complaint, proper venue . . . must be es-
`tablished from facts alleged in the amended complaint.”).
`Contrary to Ikorongo Texas and Ikorongo Tech’s con-
`tention, Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), does not
`support a different rule for transfer under § 1404(a). Hoff-
`man indicated that the “where it might have been brought”
`language of § 1404(a) “directs the attention of the judge
`who is considering a transfer to the situation which existed
`when suit was instituted,” but it did so in the context of
`holding a defendant could not expand jurisdiction through
`acts of waiver. Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks and
`citation omitted). The Court interpreted the statute to bar
`a defendant from creating venue in a new district “between
`the bringing of the action and the filing of a motion to
`transfer it”—for example, by moving residence or begin-
`ning to transact business. Id. at 342. Hoffman did not in-
`volve the circumstances here, and did not involve or
`address the filing of an amended complaint. We are una-
`ware of any instance, and none has been called to our at-
`tention, in which a court has denied transfer based on the
`original complaint despite an amended complaint estab-
`lishing proper venue.
`We therefore look to the amended complaints to deter-
`mine whether venue would have been proper had these
`suits initially been filed in Northern California. Although
`the district court correctly focused on those complaints, it
`erred when analyzing whether venue was proper.
`The district court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ agree-
`ment “allows Ikorongo Texas to protect its rights to the
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`patent within the prescribed geographic region,” including
`the right to sue for infringement. The district court further
`explained that the proper inquiry was “where [defendants]
`committed any alleged acts of infringement as to Ikorongo
`Texas,” because “[a]ny alleged infringement by Samsung
`[and LG] could have only occurred within the geographic
`locations described in the specialized part.” Because “Ikor-
`ongo Texas’s current action could [not] have initially been
`brought in the Northern District of California,” the court
`found that the transfer motions had to be denied. This con-
`clusion was erroneous because the district court disre-
`garded the pre-litigation acts by Ikorongo Tech and
`Ikorongo Texas aimed at manipulating venue.
`Typically, “venue must be proper for each claim,” Beat-
`tie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing
`15 Charles Alan Wright, Alan R. Miller & Edward H.
`Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3808 (1976)). On
`the face of the complaint, the Northern District of Califor-
`nia could not be a proper venue for Ikorongo Texas’s claims
`because no act of infringement of Ikorongo Texas’s rights
`took place there. But in ascertaining proper venue, we are
`not bound by a plaintiff’s efforts to manipulate venue.
`In the context of jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1359 pro-
`vides: “A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil
`action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has
`been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the
`jurisdiction of such court.” Under this statute (and its pre-
`decessors), in cases similar to this one, the Supreme Court
`and other courts have rejected litigants’ attempts to ma-
`nipulate
`jurisdiction, disregarding property transfers
`among entities under common ownership designed to cre-
`ate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
`77, 97 (2010) (urging courts to disregard a party’s “at-
`tempts at manipulation” of jurisdiction); Kramer v. Carib-
`bean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 824, 827–28 (1969) (rejecting
`diversity jurisdiction predicated on a pretextual, collusive
`transfer of an agreement, because the transferee had been
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`previously unconnected to the matter and simultaneously
`reassigned 95% of his interest in the cause of action back
`to the transferor); Miller & Lux, Inc. v. E. Side Canal &
`Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1908) (holding that a
`California corporation could not “collusively” create federal
`diversity jurisdiction by forming a new Nevada corporation
`and transferring thereto the property at issue in the litiga-
`tion); Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 339–
`40 (1895) (holding that a Virginia corporation could not cre-
`ate diversity jurisdiction by organizing a Pennsylvania cor-
`poration for no other purpose than to receive the lands at
`issue and create a federal case); McSparran v. Weist, 402
`F.2d 867, 875–76 (3d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (expounding
`plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that a transaction pur-
`portedly creating diversity jurisdiction is “real,” with “sig-
`nificance beyond establishment of diversity jurisdiction”);
`Greater Dev. Co. of Conn., Inc. v. Amelung, 471 F.2d 338,
`339 (1st Cir. 1973) (limiting diversity jurisdiction based on
`a transfer of corporate citizenship to cases in which “a cor-
`poration conducting an on-going business transfers all its
`assets and its business to another corporation, and the
`transferor is dissolved”); see also O’Brien v. AVCO Corp.,
`425 F.2d 1030, 1033–34 (2d Cir. 1969).
`Although there is not an analogous statute for venue,
`in similar situations, the Supreme Court and this court
`have repeatedly assessed the propriety of venue by disre-
`garding manipulative activities of the parties. In Van
`Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), for example, the Su-
`preme Court addressed whether § 1404(a) allowed “parties
`opposed to transfer, by means of their own acts or omis-
`sions, to prevent a transfer otherwise proper and war-
`ranted by convenience and justice.” Id. at 623. The Court
`rejected that interpretation and explained as follows:
`§ 1404(a) should be construed to prevent parties
`who are opposed to a change of venue from defeat-
`ing a transfer which, but for their own deliberate
`acts or omissions, would be proper, convenient and
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`just. The power to defeat a transfer to the conven-
`ient federal forum should derive from rights and
`privileges conferred by federal law and not from the
`deliberate conduct of a party favoring trial in an in-
`convenient forum.
`Id. at 624.
`We have similarly rejected parties’ attempts to manip-
`ulate venue. In In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361 (Fed.
`Cir. 2011), the plaintiff, a Texas corporation, maintained
`an office in the Eastern District of Texas, where it kept its
`documents. While the plaintiff operated from the United
`Kingdom and had no employees anywhere in the United
`States, it pointed to its presence in Texas to argue that the
`Eastern District of Texas would be a convenient forum. Id.
`at 1362–64. We disagreed, holding that the plaintiff’s in-
`corporation, office, and documents in Texas “were recent,
`ephemeral, and a construct for litigation and appeared to
`exist for no other purpose than to manipulate venue . . . in
`anticipation of litigation.” Id. at 1365; see also In re Zim-
`mer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
`(citation omitted) (finding that transfer of documents to a
`Texas office space was “recent, ephemeral, and an artifact
`of litigation,” and therefore “entitled to no weight in the
`court’s venue analysis”); In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587
`F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (characterizing pre-litiga-
`tion transfer of documents as “a fiction which appears to
`have been created to manipulate the propriety of venue”
`and concluding that the denial of transfer “ha[d] no legally
`rational basis” as a result).
`Although our previous cases addressing venue manip-
`ulation by plaintiffs involved “the convenience of parties
`and witnesses, in the interest of justice” factor, longstand-
`ing principles against manipulation are no less applicable
`to the requirement that an action “might have been
`brought” in the transferee district.
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`These cases present just such a manipulation under
`§ 1404(a). Ikorongo Texas was created and assigned its
`targeted geographic rights in counties in the Western Dis-
`trict of Texas in the month leading up to these suits. The
`same group of five individuals owns all membership inter-
`ests in both Ikorongo entities. Ikorongo Texas and Ikor-
`ongo Tech share the same office in North Carolina, and the
`same person signed the relevant agreement documents on
`behalf of both companies. Nothing would prevent the Ikor-
`ongo entities from undoing the assignment if they so de-
`sired. Moreover, it does not appear that Ikorongo Texas
`conducts any other business—rather, it seems to exist for
`the sole purpose of limiting venue to the Western District
`of Texas.
`This case is quite similar to Miller & Lux, a jurisdiction
`case arising under the version of 28 U.S.C. § 1359 then in
`force. There, a California corporation sought to sue an-
`other California corporation. See 211 U.S. at 298. To cre-
`ate diversity
`jurisdiction,
`the plaintiff California
`corporation organized an eponymous Nevada corporation;
`the two corporations had the same directors, and all of the
`stock in the Nevada corporation was issued to its California
`counterpart. Id. at 299–300. The California corporation
`transferred to the Nevada corporation “the property rights
`which the California corporation had asserted,” on which
`basis the Nevada corporation invoked diversity jurisdiction
`in the Southern District of California. Id. at 296, 306. The
`California transferor, meanwhile, was never dissolved, and
`could therefore control the Nevada corporation’s suit and
`reacquire any potential gains awarded in the litigation. Id.
`at 300, 305. The Supreme Court rejected this attempt to
`“collusively” create jurisdiction. Id. at 306.
`Thus—here as in Miller & Lux—the presence of Ikor-
`ongo Texas is plainly recent, ephemeral, and artificial—
`just the sort of maneuver in anticipation of litigation that
`has been routinely rejected. In the venue analysis, there-
`fore, we need not consider separately Ikorongo Texas’s
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`geographically bounded claims. And disregarding this ma-
`nipulation, Ikorongo Tech could have filed suit in the
`Northern District of California.
`Under the proper construction of § 1404(a), then, these
`cases “might have been brought” in the Northern District
`of California.
`
`B.
` We now turn to Samsung and LG’s arguments concern-
`ing the merits of their transfer motions. In general, we give
`substantial deference to how a district court balances con-
`veniences and fairness factors that favor transfer against
`practical and public concerns if the cases were transferred.
`However, we have explained that “a clear abuse of discre-
`tion in balancing convenience against judicial economy un-
`der § 1404 is not outside the scope of correctible error on
`mandamus review.” In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342,
`1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Google Inc., No. 2017-107, 2017
`WL 977038 at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23, 2017); In re Apple, Inc.,
`581 F. App’x 886, 889–90 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Here, we find
`that the court’s conclusions were such an abuse.
`To begin with, the district court here clearly assigned
`too little weight to the relative convenience of the Northern
`District of California. Given the relevant events and cir-
`cumstances giving rise to these infringement claims, it is
`unsurprising that many identified sources of proof and
`likely witnesses are in Northern California and none in the
`Western District of Texas. Indeed, petitioners submitted
`undisputed affidavits identifying over a dozen third-party
`individuals with relevant and material information as re-
`siding in Northern California. Moreover, at least two of the
`inventors also reside in Northern California. In addition,
`LG indicated that its relevant party witnesses also reside
`in the Northern District of California. By contrast, not a
`single witness has been identified as residing in or near the
`Western District of Texas.
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`In weighing the willing witness factor only slightly fa-
`
`voring transfer to the Northern District of California, the
`district court provided no sound basis to diminish these
`conveniences. It gave no weight to the presence of possible
`party witnesses in Northern California despite this court
`holding that the district court must consider those individ-
`uals. See In re Apple Inc., 818 F. App’x 1001, 1003 (Fed.
`Cir. 2020). The court also erroneously discounted the con-
`venience of third-party witnesses by presuming that “only
`a few . . . non-party witnesses will likely testify at trial.”
`Even if not all witnesses testify, with nothing on the other
`side of the ledger, the factor strongly favors transfer. More-
`over, because these potential witnesses reside in Northern
`California, transfer ensures that the transferee court could
`compel these individuals to appear.
`At the same time, the district court overstated the con-
`cern about waste of judicial resources and risk of incon-
`sistent results in light of plaintiffs’ separate infringement
`suit against Bumble in the Western District of Texas. Only
`two of the patents in these cases overlap with those in the
`action brought against Bumble. In addition, the Bumble
`case involves an entirely different underlying application.
`Accordingly, it is “likely that these cases will result in sig-
`nificantly different discovery, evidence, proceedings, and
`trial.” See In re Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1382. And im-
`portantly, to the extent that there are remaining overlap-
`ping invalidity or infringement issues, “the MultiDistrict
`Litigation Procedures exist to effectuate this sort of effi-
`ciency.” In re EMC Corp., 501 F. App’x 973, 976 (Fed. Cir.
`2013). Thus, the incremental gains in keeping these cases
`in the Western District of Texas simply are not sufficient
`to justify overriding the inconvenience to the parties and
`witnesses.
`Moreover, other public interest factors favor transfer.
`The Supreme Court has long held that there is “a local in-
`terest in having localized controversies decided at home.”
`Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947). The
`
`

`

`Case: 21-139 Document: 33 Page: 15 Filed: 06/30/2021
`
`IN RE: SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.
`
` 15
`
`district court, however, declares that “it is generally a fic-
`tion that patent cases give rise to local controversy or in-
`terest, particularly without record evidence suggesting
`otherwise.” Local interests are not a fiction, and the record
`evidence here shows a substantial local interest.
`The relevant events leading to the infringement claims
`here took place largely in Northern California, and not at
`all in the Western District of Texas. Both petitioners are
`accused of infringing the asserted patents based on third-
`party applications running on LG’s and Samsung’s accused
`products. It is undisputed that those third parties re-
`searched, designed, and developed most of those applica-
`tions in Northern California. These are significant factors
`that give the Northern District of California a legitimate
`interest in adjudicating the cases “at home.” See In re Ap-
`ple Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“This fac-
`tor most notably regards not merely the parties’ significant
`connections to each forum writ large, but rather the ‘signif-
`icant connections between a particular venue and the
`events that gave rise to a suit.’” (quoting In re Acer Am.
`Corp, 626 F.3d 1252, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (emphasis omit-
`ted)).
`
`The district court’s weighing of the local interest factor
`as neutral on the ground that “Ikorongo Texas’s claims do
`specifically relate to infringement in this District . . . re-
`gardless of when the entity formed” is error. The fact that
`infringement is alleged in the Western District of Texas
`gives that venue no more of a local interest than the North-
`ern District of California or any other venue. See Hoff-
`mann-La Roche, 587 F.3d at 1338 (concluding that “the
`sale of an accused product offered nationwide does not give
`rise to a substantial interest in any single venue”); In re
`TOA Techs., Inc., 543 F. App’x 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
`(stating that “in cases where there is a significant connec-
`tion between a particular venue and a suit[,] the sale of a
`product in the plaintiff's preferred forum should not negate
`this factor being weighed in favor of transfer”). The facts
`
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`

`Case: 21-139 Document: 33 Page: 16 Filed: 06/30/2021
`
`16
`
`
`
`IN RE: SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.
`
`of this case indicate that the local interest factor weighs in
`favor of Samsung and LG.
`
`Ikorongo Texas and Ikorongo Tech urge that the dis-
`trict court’s conclusions can be upheld on the court conges-
`tion factor. But we cannot say that the prospective speed
`with which this case might be brought to trial is of partic-
`ular significance in these cases. The district court found
`that this factor weighed against transfer in part based on
`considerations that have no bearing on whether the North-
`ern District of California has a more congested docket. See
`Apple, 979 F.3d at 1344 (“We have previously explained
`that a court’s general ability to set a fast-paced schedule is
`not particularly relevant to this factor.”). And even if the
`court’s speculation is accurate that it could more quickly
`resolve these cases based on the transferee venue’s more
`congested docket, neither respondents nor the district
`court pointed to any reason that a more rapid disposition
`of the case that might be available in the Western District
`of Texas would be important enough to be assigned signif-
`icant weight in the transfer analysis here.
`
`Accordingly,
`
`IT IS ORDERED THAT:
`
`The petitions for writs of mandamus are granted. The
`district court’s March 1, 2021 orders denying transfer are
`vacated, and the district court is directed to grant Sam-
`sung’s and LG’s motions to the extent that