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`Case: 19-1818 Document: 00117769775 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/30/2021 Entry ID: 6437419
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`
`No. 19-1818
`IN THE
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
`STATE OF RHODE ISLAND,
`Plaintiff-Appellee,
`v.
`SHELL OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY, LLC; CHEVRON CORP.; CHEVRON
`USA, INC.; EXXONMOBIL CORP.; BP, PLC; BP AMERICA, INC.; BP
`PRODUCTS NORTH AMERICA, INC.; ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC;
`MOTIVA ENTERPRISES, LLC; CITGO PETROLEUM CORP.;
`CONOCOPHILLIPS; CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY; PHILLIPS 66;
`MARATHON OIL COMPANY; MARATHON OIL CORPORATION;
`MARATHON PETROLEUM CORP.; MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY,
`LP; SPEEDWAY, LLC; HESS CORP.; LUKOIL PAN AMERICAS LLC; DOES
`1-100,
`Defendants-Appellants,
`GETTY PETROLEUM MARKETING, INC.,
`Defendant.
`On Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the District of Rhode Island, No. 18-cv-395-WES,
`(Hon. William E. Smith)
` SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE CHAMBER OF
`COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
`IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS AND REVERSAL
` Andrew R. Varcoe
`William M. Jay
`Stephanie A. Maloney
`Andrew Kim
`U.S. CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER
`GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
`1615 H Street, N.W.
`1900 N Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20062
`Washington, D.C. 20036
`(202) 463-5337
`(202) 346-4000
`
`wjay@goodwinlaw.com
`
`
`
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae
`
`the Chamber of Commerce of the
`July 28, 2021
`United States of America
`
`

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`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`
`In accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, the Chamber of
`
`
`
`Commerce of the United States of America states that it is a non-profit, tax-exempt
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`organization incorporated in the District of Columbia. The Chamber has no parent
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`corporation, and no publicly held company has 10% or greater ownership in the
`
`Chamber.
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`i
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ................................................................. 1
`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................ 1
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 2
`Federal courts have original jurisdiction over a claim that can be based
`
`only on federal common law. .......................................................................... 2
`The well-pleaded complaint rule does not allow courts to ignore the
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`inherently federal basis of a claim. ............................................................... 2
`Removal of federal common law claims, however they are labeled, is
`wholly consistent with the policies underlying the well-pleaded
`complaint rule. ................................................................................................... 5
`The artful pleading doctrine applies here to make Rhode Island’s claims
`removable. ....................................................................................................... 9
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 11
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`ii
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` PAGE(S)
`
`CASES
`Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut,
`564 U.S. 410 (2011) .......................................................................................... 8, 9
`
`BIW Deceived v. Local S6, Indus. Union of
`Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of Am.,
`132 F.3d 824 (1st Cir. 1997) ................................................................................. 4
`Boyle v. United Techs. Corp.,
`487 U.S. 500 (1988) .............................................................................................. 6
`Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,
`482 U.S. 386 (1987) .............................................................................................. 2
`City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
`451 U.S. 304 (1981) ........................................................................................ 6, 10
`City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,
`993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) ......................................................................... 7, 8, 10
`
`Franchise Tax Bd. of the State of Cal. v.
`Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal.,
`463 U.S. 1 (1983) .................................................................................................. 3
`Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs.,
`137 S. Ct. 743 (2017) ........................................................................................ 3, 4
`Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, p.l.c.,
`817 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. Tex. 1993) ..................................................................... 7
`Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
`304 U.S. 92 (1938) ................................................................................................ 5
`Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,
`535 U.S. 826 (2002) ...................................................................................... 6, 7, 8
`Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
`406 U.S. 91 (1972) ................................................................................................ 5
`
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`iii
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`Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
`479 U.S. 481 (1987) .............................................................................................. 6
`Lopez-Munoz v. Triple-S Salud, Inc.,
`754 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) ..................................................................................... 3
`New SD, Inc. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.,
`79 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................. 4
`North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
`615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) .............................................................................. 11
`OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs,
`577 U.S. 27 (2015) ................................................................................................ 3
`In re Otter Tail Power Co.,
`116 F.3d 1207 (8th Cir. 1997) .............................................................................. 4
`R.I. Fishermen’s Alliance, Inc. v. R.I. Dep’t of Envt’l Mgmt.,
`585 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2009) ................................................................................... 7
`Rodriguez v. FDIC,
`140 S. Ct. 713 (2020) ............................................................................................ 7
`Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc.,
`117 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................ 4
`Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
`451 U.S. 630 (1981) ...................................................................................... 5, 7, 9
`Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
`373 U.S. 647 (1963) .............................................................................................. 7
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`14C Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3722.1 (4th ed.) .......................... 3
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`iv
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`INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
`
`The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America reaffirms the
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`statement of identity and interest set forth in its December 19, 2019 brief filed in this
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`Court. The Chamber has filed a motion for leave to file this supplemental amicus
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`brief. No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no entity
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`or person, aside from amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, made any monetary
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`contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
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`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`The well-pleaded complaint rule makes a plaintiff the master of its complaint,
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`but the rule does not let plaintiffs escape the jurisdictional consequences of the
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`claims they choose to assert. Federal claims are removable to federal court, and that
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`rule holds true even if the plaintiff fails to acknowledge—or tries to obscure—the
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`federal nature of its claims. Where the distinctly federal nature of a claim is apparent
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`from the plaintiff’s allegations—such as allegations that present a cross-border claim
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`for contributions to global climate change, which can arise only under federal
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`common law—the plaintiff’s artful refusal to attach the label “federal common law”
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`to its cause of action does not matter. If the gravamen of the complaint reveals that
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`the claim can only be federal, then it arises under federal law.
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`Treating inherently federal claims as federal is entirely consistent with the
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`well-pleaded complaint rule. That rule respects a plaintiff’s deliberate choice to
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`1
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`

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`present a state-law claim in state court, but there is no such choice available where
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`there is no state-law claim. In the narrow, discrete, and easily identifiable subset of
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`areas where federal common law governs, a state common law cause of action
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`cannot exist.
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`Rhode Island’s claims regarding the harm arising from the effects of global
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`climate change are exactly the sort of interstate and international claims that require
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`the application of federal common law. The State may assert a localized harm, but
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`the alleged cause of that harm is anything but local—an inherently global
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`phenomenon that is caused by parties and activities not only in every state in the
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`United States, but in every country on the planet. Claims seeking to impose liability
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`in a U.S. court for causing such cross-border harms are inherently federal and belong
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`in federal court.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`
`
`Federal courts have original jurisdiction over a claim that can be based
`only on federal common law.
`
`
`
`The well-pleaded complaint rule does not allow courts to ignore
`the inherently federal basis of a claim.
`Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “federal jurisdiction exists only when
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`a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded
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`complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). But an
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`“independent corollary” of the rule is that “a plaintiff may not defeat removal by
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`2
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`omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint.” Franchise Tax Bd. of
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`the State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983)
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`(citation omitted). Thus, a plaintiff may be the “master of his complaint” and
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`ordinarily may choose to bring a state-law claim in state court, but he cannot
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`deliberately disguise an “inherently federal cause of action.” 14C Wright & Miller,
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`Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3722.1 (4th ed.). Where a plaintiff obscures the inherently
`
`federal nature of his claim, the plaintiff’s case is removable to federal court. Lopez-
`
`Munoz v. Triple-S Salud, Inc., 754 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[T]he artful pleading
`
`doctrine allows a federal court to peer beneath the local-law veneer of a plaintiff’s
`
`complaint in order to glean the true nature of the claims presented.”).
`
`In other jurisdictional contexts, courts look to the “gravamen” of the
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`complaint, not just to the label the plaintiff attaches, to determine whether the
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`complaint invokes federal jurisdiction. OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S.
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`27, 36 (2015) (looking not just at how the plaintiff “recast[s]” her negligence claims,
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`and instead at the “‘essentials’ of her suit,” to determine whether jurisdiction existed
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`under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (citation omitted)); see also Fry v.
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`Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 755 (2017) (holding that courts must look to
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`the “gravamen” of the plaintiff’s complaint and “set[] aside any attempts at artful
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`pleading” to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim requires exhaustion under
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`federal law). What matters is “substance, not surface”: “[t]he use (or non-use) of
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`3
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`particular labels and terms is not what matters.” Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 755. Focusing
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`on the “gravamen” of a complaint, rather than whether a plaintiff used or avoided
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`the right “magic words,” ensures that a plaintiff cannot manipulate federal
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`jurisdiction “through artful pleading.” Id. (citation omitted).
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`The rule is no different in the narrow but important circumstances where a
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`claim is “inherently federal”; in those situations, casting the claim in different
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`language does not make it arise under different law. One such inherently federal
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`claim is a common law cause of action governed by a uniform federal decisional
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`standard.1 Where the claim arises in an area that is governed exclusively by federal
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`law, “a plaintiff may not, by the expedient of artful pleading, defeat a defendant’s
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`legitimate right to a federal forum.” BIW Deceived v. Local S6, Indus. Union of
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`Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of Am., 132 F.3d 824, 831 (1st Cir. 1997). Thus, a
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`federal common law claim may be readily apparent from the “essentials” of a
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`complaint if the allegations involve matters such as “air and water in their ambient
`
`
`1 Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[I]f
`the cause of action arises under federal common law principles, jurisdiction may be
`asserted.”); In re Otter Tail Power Co., 116 F.3d 1207, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1997)
`(holding that a case presented a federal question because it “raise[d] important
`questions of federal law,” including “the federal common law of inherent tribal
`sovereignty”); New SD, Inc. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 79 F.3d 953, 954-55 (9th Cir.
`1996) (noting that, “on government contract matters having to do with national
`security, state law is totally displaced by federal common law,” and “[w]hen federal
`law applies . . . it follows that the question arises under federal law, and federal
`question jurisdiction exists”).
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`4
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`or interstate aspects,” Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972)
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`(Milwaukee I), or other “especial federal concerns to which federal common law
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`applies,” such as “the rights and obligations of the United States,” or “the conflicting
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`rights of States or our relations with foreign nations.” Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
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`Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 & n.13 (1981); e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River
`
`& Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (“[W]hether the water of an
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`interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of ‘federal
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`common law’ upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can
`
`be conclusive.” (citations omitted)). In those areas where “especial federal
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`concern[s]” are implicated, the only claim that can be pleaded is a federal one, as
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`federal common law governs where the nature of the claim “makes it inappropriate
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`for state law to control.” Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 641 & n.13. That claim can be
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`governed only by the laws of the United States and thus is properly brought in federal
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`court.
`
`
`
`Removal of federal common law claims, however they are labeled,
`is wholly consistent with the policies underlying the well-pleaded
`complaint rule.
`Three “longstanding policies” justify the ordinary application of the well-
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`pleaded complaint rule: (1) respect for the plaintiff’s deliberate choice to “eschew[]
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`claims based on federal law, . . . to have the cause heard in state court”; (2) avoiding
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`the radical expansion of “the class of removable cases, contrary to the ‘[d]ue regard
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`5
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`

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`for the rightful independence of state governments’”; and (3) preventing the
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`“undermin[ing] [of] the clarity and ease of administration of the well-pleaded
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`complaint doctrine, which serves as a ‘quick rule of thumb’ for resolving
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`jurisdictional conflicts.” Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,
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`535 U.S. 826, 831-32 (2002) (citation omitted). Each of those policies is completely
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`consistent with upholding the removal of federal common law claims, including
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`federal common law claims set forth in an artfully pleaded complaint that attempts
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`to recast such claims as state-law claims.
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`First, the usual respect accorded to a plaintiff’s choice of law and forum do
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`not apply when the plaintiff alleges a common-law claim that is inherently federal;
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`where federal common law applies, there can be no state-law claim. One of the main
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`purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule is to honor the plaintiff’s choice of
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`bringing a claim “in state court under state law.” Id. at 832. But where federal
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`common law governs, the “implicit corollary” is that there is no state law to apply.
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`Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 488 (1987); see also Boyle v. United
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`Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (where federal common law applies, “state
`
`law is . . . replaced”); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 n.7 (1981)
`
`(Milwaukee II) (“If state law can be applied, there is no need for federal common
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`law; if federal common law exists, it is because state law cannot be used.”). That
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`corollary is best demonstrated in cases where federal common law necessarily
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`
`
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`6
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`

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`governs because the claim is interstate and international in nature; transboundary
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`issues cannot be resolved by a patchwork of state courts applying local law in an
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`uncoordinated manner. E.g., City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81, 85-
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`86 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Global warming presents a uniquely international problem of
`
`national concern. It is therefore not well-suited to the application of state law.”);
`
`Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, p.l.c., 817 F. Supp. 1338, 1356 (E.D. Tex.
`
`1993) (“International relations are not such that both the states and the federal
`
`government can be said to have an interest; the states have little interest because the
`
`problems involved [in international relations] are uniquely federal.” (citation omitted
`
`and internal quotation marks)).
`
`Second, there is no risk of flooding federal courts with a new wave of removal
`
`cases premised on federal common law. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 832; R.I. Fishermen’s
`
`Alliance, Inc. v. R.I. Dep’t of Envt’l Mgmt., 585 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2009) (federal
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`jurisdiction must be “consistent with congressional judgment about the sound
`
`division of labor between state and federal courts” (citation and internal quotation
`
`marks omitted)). Federal common law plays “a necessarily modest role,” Rodriguez
`
`v. FDIC, 140 S. Ct. 713, 717 (2020), and thus the “instances where [federal courts]
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`have created federal common law are few and restricted.” Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
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`U.S. 647, 651 (1963); see Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 641 (federal common law exists
`
`only in “narrow areas”). In those few areas where federal common law applies, there
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`
`
`7
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`

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`is little risk of intruding upon the “independence of state governments,” as those
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`areas necessarily fall outside state authority. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 832 (citation
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`omitted).
`
`Conversely, failing to recognize federal common law claims for what they are,
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`just because the plaintiff refuses to acknowledge it, risks allowing state courts and
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`state law to intrude upon federal priorities. As the Second Circuit has warned,
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`attempting to apply state law in an area where federal common law should apply
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`risks “upsetting the careful balance” of federal prerogatives. New York, 993 F.3d at
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`93. In a case very similar to this one that presented claims for relief based on climate
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`change, the Supreme Court made clear that “[e]nvironmental protection” is one such
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`area that is “undoubtedly . . . within national legislative power, one in which federal
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`courts may fill in statutory interstices and, if necessary, even fashion federal law.”
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`Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 421 (2011) (emphasis added,
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`citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see id. (quoting Milwaukee I, 406
`
`U.S. at 103); id. at 422 (noting not only that the subject of tort law claims based on
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`climate change “is meet for federal law governance,” but that “borrowing the law of
`
`a particular State would be inappropriate” for federal common law claims based on
`
`climate change).2
`
`
`2 Congress can also enact a statute that displaces federal common law, but whether
`Congress has done so here is a question that is not currently presented to this Court.
`Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at 423; New York, 993 F.3d at 95.
`
`8
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`

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`Finally, using the artful pleading doctrine to recognize federal jurisdiction in
`
`cases presenting federal common law claims does not make the well-pleaded
`
`complaint rule any more complicated to apply. It is not difficult to identify the few
`
`narrow areas of the law that raise the sort of “especial federal concerns to which
`
`federal common law applies.” Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 641 n.13; e.g., id. at 641
`
`(identifying several “narrow areas” in which federal common law applies). The
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`subject of “air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects,” Am. Elec. Power
`
`Co., 564 U.S. at 421 (quoting Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103), is one such narrow
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`category, and a claim of harm resulting from global climate change fits squarely into
`
`it.
`
`
`
`The artful pleading doctrine applies here to make Rhode Island’s claims
`removable.
`
`Rhode Island’s claims are about the inherently global problem of climate
`
`change. It alleges that Defendants have caused harm to “the State’s manmade
`
`infrastructure, its roads, bridges, railroads, dams, homes, businesses, and electric
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`grid”—not by local conduct, but by “extract[ing], advertis[ing], and s[elling]
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`. . . fossil fuels burned globally since the 1960s.” J.A. 421 (emphasis added). The
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`inherently global phenomenon of climate change—both its causes and its
`
`consequences—is the key issue that makes Rhode Island’s cause of action inherently
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`federal in nature. As the Second Circuit explained in New York, artful pleading
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`cannot turn “a suit over global greenhouse gas emissions” into a “local spat,” simply
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`
`
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`9
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`by focusing on Rhode Island’s sliver of the alleged global environmental harm; the
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`alleged “global greenhouse gas emissions” are “the singular source of . . . harm,”
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`and thus must be adjudged by federal common law standards, not by state common
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`law. 993 F.3d at 91.
`
`Rhode Island’s claims regarding cross-boundary emissions are of such an
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`interstate and international character that the governing law can only be federal
`
`common law. “[A] mostly unbroken string of cases has applied federal law to
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`disputes involving interstate air or water pollution.” Id. Rhode Island may be
`
`asserting a localized harm (or rather a localized manifestation of harms that occur
`
`everywhere), but the alleged harm flows entirely from interstate and international
`
`conduct, i.e., when Defendants allegedly contribute to global emissions. Id. (federal
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`common law applies to claims of “harms caused by global greenhouse gas
`
`emissions”).
`
`The conclusion that federal common law necessarily governs Rhode Island’s
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`claims is reinforced by the fact that any individual state’s common law of nuisance
`
`is ill-equipped to deal with cross-border pollution issues. The Supreme Court has
`
`recognized that “vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts” are a poor fit for
`
`addressing interstate environmental issues. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317. As one
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`federal court has recognized, applying “vague public nuisance standards” offered
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`under different states’ laws to balance “the need for energy production and the need
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`
`
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`10
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`for clean air” would result in “a confused patchwork of standards, to the detriment
`
`of industry and the environment alike.” North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn.
`
`Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 296, 302, 306 (4th Cir. 2010). This is all the more true
`
`when the phenomenon in question is attributable not just to sources of emissions on
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`the other side of a particular state or national border, but to millions (if not billions)
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`of sources of emissions originating in every country in the world.
`
`If Rhode Island has a common law cause of action to assert its claims for relief
`
`based on global climate change, that cause of action can arise only under federal
`
`common law. Rhode Island’s case was removable from state court even if it failed
`
`to utter the words “federal common law” in its complaint.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`The district court’s remand order should be vacated, and this case should be
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`remanded for further proceedings.
`
`Dated: July 28, 2021
`
`
`Andrew R. Varcoe
`Stephanie A. Maloney
`U.S. CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER
`1615 H Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20062
`(202) 463-5337
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ William M. Jay
`William M. Jay
`Andrew Kim
`GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
`1900 N Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20036
`(202) 346-4000
`wjay@goodwinlaw.com
`
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae
`the Chamber of Commerce of the United
`States of America
`11
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`Case: 19-1818 Document: 00117769775 Page: 17 Date Filed: 07/30/2021 Entry ID: 6437419
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`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
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`This brief complies with the type volume limitations of Federal Rules of
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`Appellate Procedure 29(a)(5) and 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 2,711 words,
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`excluding the parts exempted by Rule 32(f).
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`This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of
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`Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6)
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`because it appears in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14-
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`point Times New Roman font.
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`Dated: July 28, 2021
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`/s/ William M. Jay
`William M. Jay
`GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
`1900 N Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20036
`(202) 346-4000
`wjay@goodwinlaw.com
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`Counsel for Amicus Curiae
`the Chamber of Commerce of the
`United States of America
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`Case: 19-1818 Document: 00117769775 Page: 18 Date Filed: 07/30/2021 Entry ID: 6437419
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the
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`Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit by using the
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`appellate CM/ECF system on July 28, 2021.
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`I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that
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`service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.
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`Dated: July 28, 2021
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`/s/ William M. Jay
`William M. Jay
`GOODWIN PROCTER LLP
`1900 N Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20036
`(202) 346-4000
`wjay@goodwinlaw.com
`
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae
`Chamber of Commerce of the United
`States of America
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