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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
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`No. 20-7730
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`LORENZO LIWAYNE BARNES, a/k/a L.B.,
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`Plaintiff - Appellee,
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`v.
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`Defendant - Appellant.
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`Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
`Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (2:18-cr-00150-RGD-RJK-3)
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`Submitted: December 13, 2021
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`Decided: January 18, 2022
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`Before NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, KEENAN and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judges.
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`Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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`Lorenzo Liwayne Barnes, Appellant Pro Se.
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`Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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`PER CURIAM:
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`Lorenzo Liwayne Barnes appeals the district court’s order denying his renewed
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`motion for compassionate release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by
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`the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. Barnes
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`argued that he was particularly susceptible to severe illness or death from COVID-19 due
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`to his preexisting conditions and had a heightened risk of contracting the virus within his
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`facility. Without ordering a response from the Government, the district court denied relief
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`because Barnes had failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies and, even if he had
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`satisfied the exhaustion requirement, he had not demonstrated extraordinary and
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`compelling reasons for his early release.1 We conclude that the district court improperly
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`denied relief on the ground that Barnes had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies,
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`and we remand for further proceedings so that the court may consider Barnes’ motion in
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`light of his current condition and circumstances.
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`We review a district court’s ruling on a compassionate-release motion for abuse of
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`discretion. United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
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`142 S. Ct. 383 (2021). “A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or
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`irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of
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`discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.”
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`1 The district court correctly determined that it lacked the authority to release Barnes
`to home confinement. See United States v. Saunders, 986 F.3d 1076, 1078 (7th Cir. 2021).
`But Barnes’ motion is also fairly construed as a motion for a sentence reduction under the
`compassionate-release statute, which the court had the authority to grant.
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`United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
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`omitted).
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`Upon a defendant’s motion, a district court may reduce a term of imprisonment if
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`the defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies and “extraordinary and
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`compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). “[D]istrict
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`courts are empowered to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that
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`a defendant might raise.” United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020)
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`(cleaned up). “[I]f a court finds that a defendant has demonstrated extraordinary and
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`compelling reasons, it is still not required to grant the defendant’s motion for a sentence
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`reduction.” United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 186 (4th Cir. 2021). Instead, the court
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`“must consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) sentencing factors to the extent that they are
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`applicable in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to reduce the defendant’s term of
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`imprisonment.” Id. (cleaned up).
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`Initially, we conclude that the district court improperly raised the exhaustion issue
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`sua sponte. But that is because it did not have the benefit of our decision in United States
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`v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126 (4th Cir. 2021), where we held that the exhaustion requirement
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`is “non-jurisdictional, and thus waived if it is not timely raised.” Id. at 129. In Muhammad,
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`we also held that a defendant may satisfy the exhaustion requirement by “wait[ing] 30 days
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`from the date of [his] initial request to file a motion in the district court.” Id. at 131. And
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`Barnes satisfied that requirement here by waiting more than 30 days from the denial of his
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`initial request to file his compassionate-release motion.
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`3
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`We decline to consider whether the district court abused its discretion in denying
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`Barnes’ motion on the ground that he had failed to demonstrate an extraordinary and
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`compelling reason for his early release. Barnes’ condition and circumstances have changed
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`materially since the court denied his motion. Although the court may still determine that
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`Barnes is ineligible for compassionate release or that the § 3553(a) factors do not warrant
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`his release, we conclude that Barnes should have the opportunity to argue why he is entitled
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`to compassionate release based on his current condition and circumstances. Accordingly,
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`we remand to the district court for further proceedings and deny Barnes’ motion for
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`compassionate release filed in this court.2
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`We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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`adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
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`decisional process.
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`REMANDED
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`2 By this disposition, we express no view on the merits of Barnes’ motion filed in
`the district court.
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`4
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