throbber
Case: 20-17377, 01/19/2021, ID: 11968818, DktEntry: 9, Page 1 of 8
`
`NO. 20-17377
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`ELIZABETH MAISEL,
`INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SITUATED,
`
`Plaintiff-Appellant,
`v.
`
`DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TOOTSIE ROLL INDUSTRIES, LLC,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Defendant-Appellee
`
`
`
`ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
`THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S RESPONSE TO
`ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
`
`Ryan J. Clarkson (257074)
`Matthew T. Theriault (244037)
`Bahar Sodaify (289730)
`CLARKSON LAW FIRM, P.C.
`9255 Sunset Blvd., Suite 804
`Los Angeles, CA 90069
`Tel. (213) 788-4050
`Fax. (213) 788-4070
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Elizabeth Maisel
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case: 20-17377, 01/19/2021, ID: 11968818, DktEntry: 9, Page 2 of 8
`
`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`Plaintiff-Appellant Elizabeth Maisel (“Plaintiff-Appellant”) submits this
`
`response to the Court’s December 28, 2020 Order to Show Cause (“OSC”), and
`
`respectfully requests that the Court discharge the OSC and allow Plaintiff-
`
`Appellant’s appeal of United States District Court, Northern District of California,
`
`Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim’s November 30, 2020 Order that resulted in the denial
`
`of Plaintiff-Appellant’s motion to remand and request for attorneys’ fees.
`
`II.
`
`Facts
`
`Plaintiff-Appellant filed a class action lawsuit in the Superior Court of
`
`California, County of Alameda, on May 29, 2020 alleging that Defendant-Appellee
`
`Tootsie Roll Industries, LLC (“Defendant-Appellee”) deceptively packaged its
`
`opaque theater box Junior Mints and Sugar Babies candy products (the “Products”)
`
`in oversized packages containing nonfunctional empty space, or “slack-fill,” in
`
`violation of California and federal consumer protection statutes and packaging
`
`laws.
`
`On July 29, 2020, Defendant-Appellee removed to the Northern District of
`
`California, claiming that the amount in controversy meets CAFA’s $5 million
`
`threshold because wholesale sales of the Products in California exceed $6 million
`
`during the class period. However, Defendant-Appellee falsely claimed Plaintiff
`
`was seeking $6 million. Plaintiff-Appellant argued that the amount in controversy
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case: 20-17377, 01/19/2021, ID: 11968818, DktEntry: 9, Page 3 of 8
`
`is $1.6 million (or $2.8 million retail), based on a conservative application of a
`
`26% price premium, far below the required $5 million to meet CAFA.
`
`Accordingly, on August 28, 2020, Plaintiff-Appellant moved to remand, but
`
`the court denied Plaintiff-Appellant’s motion because it ignored Plaintiff-
`
`Appellant’s damages allegations which only included a partial refund based on a
`
`price premia analysis. On December 4, 2020, Plaintiff-Appellant timely filed a
`
`notice of appeal the court’s order denying remand and attorneys’ fees. On
`
`December 7, the appellate case number was assigned (Dkt. 1). A week later,
`
`Plaintiff-Appellant filed her mediation questionnaire (Dkt. 3).
`
`On December 28, 2020, the Court issued an order stating that Plaintiff-
`
`Appellant failed to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) 5
`
`(Dkt. 5).
`
`Plaintiff-Appellant submits this response to the Court’s December 28, 2020
`
`Order to Show Cause, and respectfully requests that the Court discharge the OSC
`
`and allow Plaintiff-Appellant’s appeal to proceed.
`
`III. Argument
`
`A.
`
`Based On The Plain Language Of 28 U.S.C. § 1453, Plaintiff-
`
`Appellant’s Appeal Was Proper and Timely
`
`When determining the meaning of a statute, courts look to the plain language
`
`of the statute. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (the court’s
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case: 20-17377, 01/19/2021, ID: 11968818, DktEntry: 9, Page 4 of 8
`
`analysis begins with the “plain language of the statute.”); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
`
`486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, [a]
`
`court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language
`
`and design of the statute as a whole.”); United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174
`
`(9th Cir. 1999) (“The plain meaning of the statute controls, and courts will look no
`
`further, unless its application leads to unreasonable or impracticable results. If the
`
`statute is ambiguous -- and only then -- courts may look to its legislative history for
`
`evidence of congressional intent.”); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Cantine Rallo, S.P.A.,
`
`430 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1073-74 (E.D. Cal. 2005). The first step in ascertaining
`
`congressional intent is to look to the plain language of the statute. Knapp v.
`
`Carmax Auto Superstores Cal., LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159722 at *13 (C.D.
`
`Cal. 2014); Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc., 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1102 (Cal.
`
`2007) (When interpreting a statute, courts must first look to its plain language
`
`“because [it] generally provide[s] the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.”)
`
`The statute governing review of remand orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c), states
`
`that “a court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a district court
`
`granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the State court from
`
`which it was removed if application is made to the court of appeals not more than
`
`10 days after entry of the order.” 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). The plain language of the
`
`statute does not contain any language or indication that a plaintiff must first seek
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case: 20-17377, 01/19/2021, ID: 11968818, DktEntry: 9, Page 5 of 8
`
`permission from the court pursuant to FRAP 5 before appealing a remand order. In
`
`the seminal Ninth Circuit case of Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309v.
`
`Laidlaw Transit Servs. (“Amalgamated”), 435 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006), the
`
`court acknowledged that, “Neither § 1453(c)(1) nor the rules of appellate
`
`procedure specifically state whether we should apply FRAP 5 to the initiation of an
`
`appeal under § 1453(c)(1).” See also Murphy, 40 Cal. 4th at 1102; Jimenez, 555
`
`U.S. at 118. Accordingly, relying on the plain language of Section 1453, Plaintiff-
`
`Appellant properly and timely filed her notice of appeal on December 4, 2020.
`
`B.
`
`The Court Should Exercise Its Authority Under FRAP 2 To Suspend
`
`The Requirements Of FRAP 5 In Order To Avoid Unfairness And
`
`Potential Violation Of Due Process
`
`Under FRAP 2, the Court is authorized to allow the appeal to proceed for
`
`good cause, including, preserving judicial economy, avoiding unfairness, and
`
`preventing violation of due process. Fed. R. App. Proc. 2 (“On its own or a party’s
`
`motion, a court of appeals may—to expedite its decision or for other good cause—
`
`suspend any provision of these rules in a particular case and order proceedings as it
`
`directs [.]”); see Blausey v. United States Tr., 552 F.3d 1124, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
`
`2009) (exercising discretion under Fed. R. App. Proc. 2 to suspend the
`
`requirements of Fed. R. App. Proc. 5 for good cause where Plaintiff filed the notice
`
`of appeal); United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1122 (9th Cir. 2001)
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case: 20-17377, 01/19/2021, ID: 11968818, DktEntry: 9, Page 6 of 8
`
`(exercising discretion under Fed. R. App. Proc. 2 to allow Plaintiff to proceed with
`
`his appeal for reasons of judicial economy).
`
` Amalgamated is instructive. In that case, the court was faced with a motion
`
`to dismiss an appeal because the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the
`
`requirements of FRAP 5. Amalgamated, 435 F.3d at 1143. The plaintiffs did not
`
`file a petition to appeal in the Ninth Circuit, pursuant to FRAP 5, but instead filed a
`
`notice of appeal in the district court. Id. Only after defendants moved to dismiss
`
`the appeal did plaintiffs file the petition in the Ninth Circuit. Id. The court looked
`
`to the language of Section 1453 to determine whether FRAP 5 was mentioned and
`
`found that the statute did not state that FRAP 5 is required to initiate an appeal
`
`under 1453(c)(1). Id. Therefore, “[b]ecause the language of the statute was deemed
`
`ambiguous, the court looked to the legislative history to try to discern Congress’
`
`intent.” Id. However, the court stated “[t]he record is [] silent on whether Congress
`
`specifically intended FRAP 5 to govern the initiation of these discretionary
`
`appeals, and there are, in fact, statements that suggest the opposite.” Id. at 1144.
`
`Although the court ultimately believed Congress intended FRAP 5 to govern
`
`initiation of an appeal under Section 1453, the court decided that in order to avoid
`
`the “unfairness and potential due process violation that applying [such] holdings”
`
`might raise, it needed to exercise its authority under FRAP 2 to suspend for good
`
`cause the requirements of FRAP 5, and thus construed plaintiffs’ timely notice of
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case: 20-17377, 01/19/2021, ID: 11968818, DktEntry: 9, Page 7 of 8
`
`appeal and untimely petition for permission to appeal as constituting a single and
`
`timely petition for permission to appeal. Id. at 1146-47.
`
`This Court should follow Amalgamated. Indeed, instead of dismissing
`
`plaintiff’s appeal outright for not satisfying FRAP 5, the Amalgamated court
`
`correctly recognized that there is no clear language or indication in Section 1453
`
`that plaintiffs are required to satisfy FRAP 5 before initiating an appeal and
`
`therefore, it exercised its discretion under FRAP 2 to allow the appeal to proceed in
`
`order to prevent unfairness and due process violations. Plaintiff-Appellant likewise
`
`requests that this Court exercise its authority under FRAP 2 to suspend for good
`
`cause the requirement of FRAP 5 in order to prevent any unfairness and due
`
`process violations Plaintiff-Appellant would certainly experience should the Court
`
`dismiss the appeal.
`
`C.
`
`In The Alternative, Plaintiff-Appellant Seeks Leave To File A Petition
`
`To Appeal To Ensure This Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction
`
`Over The Appeal
`
`Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to appeal the Federal court’s order denying remand
`
`because the Federal court does not have proper subject matter jurisdiction over this
`
`case due to Defendant-Appellee’s failure to satisfy the $5M jurisdictional
`
`minimum. The issue of whether the Federal court has subject matter jurisdiction is
`
`significant and crucial to the proper adjudication of this case, and therefore,
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case: 20-17377, 01/19/2021, ID: 11968818, DktEntry: 9, Page 8 of 8
`
`requires this Court’s review and opinion to ensure the case is litigated in the proper
`
`court. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (courts “strictly
`
`construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” so “[f]ederal
`
`jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt” about jurisdiction.); Demarest v.
`
`United States, 718 F.2d 964, 965 (9th Cir. 1983) (federal courts are courts of
`
`limited jurisdiction).
`
`If the Court is not inclined to exercise its authority under FRAP 2 to forgo
`
`the FRAP 5 requirement, Plaintiff-Appellant, in the alternative, requests
`
`permission to file a petition to appeal pursuant to FRAP 5 to ensure that this Court
`
`has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff-Appellant’s appeal.
`
`IV. Conclusion
`
`Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that the Court discharge the OSC
`
`and allow Plaintiff-Appellant’s appeal to proceed.
`
`Dated: January 19, 2021
`
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/Matthew T. Theriault
`Matthew T. Theriault
`Ryan J. Clarkson
`Bahar Sodaify
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Elizabeth Maisel
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket