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`Case: 22-15103, 06/10/2022, ID: 12468606, DktEntry: 27, Page 1 of 43
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`Nos. 22-15103 & 22-15104
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`JOHN DOE #1, et al.,
`Plaintiffs-Appellees,
`
`v.
`TWITTER, INC.,
`Defendant-Appellant.
`
`
`
`On Appeal From the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of California
`Case No. 21-cv-485 (Hon. Joseph C. Spero)
`
` BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE CHAMBER OF PROGRESS AND
`NETCHOICE LLC IN SUPPORT OF TWITTER INC.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Andrew J. Pincus
`MAYER BROWN LLP
`1999 K Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20006
`(202) 263-3000
`apincus@mayerbrown.com
`
`Avi M. Kupfer
`MAYER BROWN LLP
`71 South Wacker Drive
`Chicago, IL 60606
`(312) 782-0600
`akupfer@mayerbrown.com
`
`
`Counsel for Amici Curiae
`
`
`
`

`

`Case: 22-15103, 06/10/2022, ID: 12468606, DktEntry: 27, Page 2 of 43
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`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`
`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, each amicus
`
`curiae certifies that no parent corporation or publicly held corporation
`
`owns 10% or more of its stock.
`
`
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ........................................... i
`TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................... ii
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................... iii
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .............................................................. 1
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................. 2
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................ 6
`I.
`The District Court Incorrectly Held That The Section 230
`Immunity Exemption Applies To Does’ Claim. .............................. 6
`A.
`The Relevant Statutory Provisions. ....................................... 8
`B.
`The Sex-Trafficking Exception To Section 230
`Immunity Applies Only When The Defendant’s Own
`Conduct Violates 18 U.S.C. § 1591. ..................................... 10
`1.
`Text .............................................................................. 11
`2.
`Statutory context ........................................................ 18
`Evolution of the statutory text ............................ 18
`a.
`Legislative purpose ............................................. 24
`b.
`II. Does Do Not Plausibly Allege That Twitter Participated In A
`Sex-Trafficking Venture With The Alleged Traffickers. .............. 30
`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 34
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

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`
`
`
`Cases
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`A.D. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.,
`No. 4:19-CV-120, 2020 WL 8674205
`(E.D. Va. July 22, 2020) ...................................................................... 33
`
`Abramski v. United States,
`573 U.S. 169 (2014) ............................................................................. 18
`
`Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,
`570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) ......................................................... 6, 24
`
`Bennett v. Google, LLC,
`882 F.3d 1163 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ..................................................... 24, 26
`
`Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,
`339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................. 25
`
`Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.,
`21 F.4th 714 (11th Cir. 2021) ................................................. 31, 32, 34
`
`Doe v. Kik Interactive, Inc.,
`482 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1249 (S.D. Fla. 2020) .................... 13, 19, 22, 24
`
`Eldred v. Ashcroft,
`537 U.S. 186 (2003) ............................................................................. 24
`
`Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media,
`139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019) ......................................................................... 31
`
`G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc.,
`No. 20-cv-2335, 2022 WL 1541408
`(N.D. Ill. May 16, 2022) .......................................................... 15, 23, 31
`
`Gonzalez v. Google LLC,
`2 F.4th 871 (9th Cir. 2021) ............................................................. 7, 25
`
`iii
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`

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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Cases (continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`Gundy v. United States,
`139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) ......................................................................... 13
`
`Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.,
`137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017) ......................................................................... 14
`
`Hepp v. Facebook,
`14 F.4th 204 (3d Cir. 2021) ................................................................. 29
`
`J.B. v. G6 Hosp., LLC,
`No. 19-CV-07848, 2021 WL 4079207
`(N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2021) .................................. 13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 28
`
`Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC,
`755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014) ............................................................... 27
`
`King v. Burwell,
`576 U.S. 473 (2015) ............................................................................. 13
`
`Pinter v. Dahl,
`486 U.S. 622 (1988) ............................................................................. 28
`
`Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co.,
`26 F.4th 1029 (9th Cir. 2022) ............................................................. 30
`
`Reves v. Ernst & Young,
`507 U.S. 170 (1993) ............................................................................. 31
`
`Rosemond v. United States,
`572 U.S. 65 (2014) ............................................................................... 32
`
`TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
`141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) ......................................................................... 16
`
`United States v. Afyare,
`632 F. App’x 272 (6th Cir. 2016) ......................................................... 34
`
`Statutes and court rules
`
`18 U.S.C. § 1591 ...................................................................... 3, 10, 14, 30
`
`iv
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`

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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`States and court rules (continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) ............................................................................ 8, 9
`
`18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) .......................................................................... 9, 19
`
`18 U.S.C. § 1591(e) .................................................................................. 31
`
`18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3) .............................................................................. 25
`
`18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) ................................................................ 2, 3, 8, 13, 30
`
`18 U.S.C. § 1595(d) ............................................................................ 10, 16
`
`18 U.S.C. § 2421A .............................................................................. 10, 14
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230 .......................................................................................... 3
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(b) ................................................................................ 6, 29
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).................................................................................. 2
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5).................................................................................. 2
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) ............................................................................ 7, 26
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)-(2) .......................................................................... 12
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) ........................................................................... 26
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)-(2) ............................................................................ 9
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) ................................................................................ 12
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A) ....................................................... 2, 3, 10, 11, 30
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(B)-(C) ............................................................... 10, 14
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) .................................................................................. 1
`
`Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking
`Act, Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) .................................. 9
`
`v
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`

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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`States and court rules (continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
`Tit. V, 110 Stat. 133 .............................................................................. 6
`
`Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E) ........................................................................ 1
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ....................................................................................... 15
`
`Fed. R. Crim. P. 3 .................................................................................... 15
`
`Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1) ............................................................................ 15
`
`Other authorities
`
`164 Cong. Rec. S1849 (Mar. 21, 2018) .................................................... 22
`
`Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ............................................ 15, 31
`
`Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) .............................................. 31, 32
`
`H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (Jan. 20, 2018) .................................................. 23
`
`H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (Apr. 3, 2017) .................................................... 23
`
`H.R. Rep. No. 115-583 (2018). ................................................................. 23
`
`Hearing on S. 1693, The Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of
`2017 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
`Transp., 115th Cong. (2017) ................................................... 20, 21, 29
`
`Karen Gullo & David Greene, Elec. Frontier Found., With
`FOSTA Already Leading To Censorship, Plaintiffs Are
`Seeking Reinstatement Of Their Lawsuit Challenging The
`Law’s Constitutionality (Mar. 1, 2019) ............................................... 26
`
`New Oxford American Dictionary (2d ed. 2005) ..................................... 32
`
`Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule,
`131 Harv. L. Rev. 2027 (2018) ............................................................ 27
`
`vi
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`

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`Case: 22-15103, 06/10/2022, ID: 12468606, DktEntry: 27, Page 8 of 43
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Other authorities (continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`S. 1693, 115th Cong. (Jan. 10, 2018) ................................................ 18, 22
`
`S. 1693, 115th Cong. (Aug. 1, 2017) ........................................................ 20
`
`S. Rep. No. 115-199 (2018) ........................................................... 19, 27-29
`
`Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002)...................... 31, 32
`
`vii
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`
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
`
`Chamber of Progress is a technology industry coalition that
`
`advocates in favor of public policies that will produce a fair, inclusive
`
`country in which all people benefit from technological advances. Its work
`
`is supported by corporate partners many of whom are “interactive
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`computer services” within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).2 It has a
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`substantial interest in ensuring that consumers have access to a healthy
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`online environment where they can work, play, learn, shop, connect, and
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`communicate without harassment, disinformation, and incendiary
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`content.
`
`NetChoice LLC is a national trade association of online businesses
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`that share the goal of promoting free speech and free enterprise on the
`
`Internet. For more than two decades, NetChoice has worked to promote
`
`online commerce and speech, and to increase consumer access and
`
`
`1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
`entity or person, aside from amici curiae, their members, and their
`counsel, made any monetary contribution intended to fund the
`preparation or submission of this brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E).
`All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
`listed at
`2 Chamber
`of Progress’s partner
`companies are
`progresschamber.org. Partner companies do not sit on the Chamber’s
`board of directors and have no vote on, or veto power over, its positions.
`
` 1
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`

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`options through the Internet, while minimizing burdens on making the
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`Internet more accessible and useful for businesses.
`
`The district court’s broad interpretations of 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A)
`
`and 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) pose a direct threat to the safe online
`
`communities that Amici and their partners strive to build. The success
`
`of those communities depends on the careful balance Congress struck in
`
`Section 230 between preserving “the vibrant and competitive free market
`
`that presently exists for the Internet,” and deterring and punishing those
`
`who “traffic[] in obscenity.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2), (5). Amici therefore
`
`have a substantial interest in the outcome of this case, which will impact
`
`the ability of their partners to offer and improve—and of consumers to
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`access and contribute to—safe online platforms.
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`
`
`I. Sex trafficking and child sexual exploitation are serious societal
`
`issues. Enforcing laws against, and taking action to curtail, these
`
`offenses are critically important to protect children. This case presents
`
`extremely important questions about the circumstances in which an
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`interactive computer service may be held liable based on harmful
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`material posted on its platform by someone else.
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` 2
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`The Communications Decency Act of 1996 generally immunizes
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`interactive computer services from liability for online content posted by
`
`their users. 47 U.S.C. § 230. In 2018, Congress enacted a narrow
`
`immunity exception, id. § 230(e)(5)(A), for certain private actions arising
`
`under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
`
`Section 1595(a) creates a civil action for sex-trafficking victims
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`against perpetrators of that crime and anyone who knowingly benefits
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`from participation in a venture that they should have known was
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`engaging in sex trafficking. The 2018 law, in Section 230(e)(5)(A),
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`establishes an immunity exception for Section 1595(a) claims against an
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`interactive computer service “if the conduct underlying the claim
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`constitutes a violation of” the criminal sex-trafficking provision, 18
`
`U.S.C. § 1591.
`
`The district court erred in holding that the Section 230 immunity
`
`exception applies even if Twitter did not violate Section 1591 and the
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`Section 1595 claim is based on a crime committed by a third party. The
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`provision’s elimination of immunity when “the conduct underlying the
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`claim constitutes a violation of” Section 1591 requires conduct by the
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`interactive computer service that constitutes a crime under Section 1591.
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` 3
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`The entire focus of Section 230 is the service’s conduct. It would not
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`make sense for a statute whose sole focus is the conduct of interactive
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`computer services to use the word “conduct” to encompass third-party
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`conduct. If Congress had meant to write a broader exception, it would
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`have used different language.
`
`In addition, other exclusions from Section 230 immunity enacted at
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`the same time as Section 230(e)(5)(A) plainly use “conduct underlying” to
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`mean only a service’s conduct. The district court’s reading of Section
`
`230(e)(5)(A) would give private plaintiffs authority more expansive than
`
`that of state attorneys general, which would be nonsensical given the
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`importance of government enforcement in this area.
`
`The legislative history and purpose of the immunity exception also
`
`support the narrower reading. The committee report that introduced the
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`“conduct underlying” language makes clear that Congress’s intent was to
`
`target interactive computer services that themselves violate Section
`
`1591.
`
`Further, the district court’s expansive reading of the exception
`
`would undermine a central purpose of the Communications Decency Act:
`
`to encourage interactive computer services to moderate harmful user
`
` 4
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`

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`content posted to their platforms. Services’ failures to address particular
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`instances of misuse of their platforms could be used against them if
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`liability could be premised on the criminal acts of third parties, rather
`
`than only on the service’s criminal conduct—which would create a
`
`significant disincentive for services to engage in content moderation
`
`activities. Congress therefore balanced the relevant policy goals by
`
`enacting a narrow exception.
`
`The district
`
`court’s approach also would prevent
`
`the
`
`Communications Decency Act from accomplishing its goal of promoting,
`
`and not chilling, legitimate speech. The potential for broad tort liability
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`based on content posted to online platforms by millions of people would
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`force interactive computer services to adopt broad restrictions on users
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`to avoid potential liability and litigation expense. Those restrictions
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`would sweep in content protected by the First Amendment, not just
`
`conduct violative of Section 1591, undermining the Act’s success in
`
`making interactive computer services robust forums for expression.
`
`II. Even under the district court’s reading of the immunity
`
`exception, Does still fail to state a Section 1595(a) claim because they do
`
`not allege that Twitter participated in a sex-trafficking venture with the
`
` 5
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`

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`alleged traffickers. The plain meaning of “participation in a venture”
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`under Section 1595(a) is to actively take part in a commercial enterprise.
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`Does allege no connection at all between Twitter and an alleged
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`trafficker, and Does’ allegations that Twitter took nine days to remove
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`illegal content posted by a third party are insufficient because the mere
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`failure to stop a posting—even if the posting could constitute a Section
`
`1591 offense—is not the active engagement necessary to establish
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`participation in a Section 1595(a) venture.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I.
`
`The District Court Incorrectly Held That The Section 230
`Immunity Exemption Applies To Does’ Claim.
`
`Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA),
`
`Pub. L. No. 104-104, Tit. V, 110 Stat. 133, to advance “two parallel goals,”
`
`Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009). First,
`
`promoting “the continued development of the Internet” and its “vibrant
`
`and competitive
`
`free market”; and, second, “encourag[ing] the
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`development of” user-control technologies. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b). Congress
`
`also sought to encourage interactive computer services to take steps to
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`moderate user-posted content by removing the risk that those actions
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`could result in liability. Id.
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` 6
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`“To avoid chilling speech, Congress made a policy choice not to deter
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`harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort
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`liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’
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`potentially injurious messages.” Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871,
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`886 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).
`
`The operative provision of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), states
`
`that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
`
`treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
`
`another information content provider.” It broadly “protects websites
`
`from liability for material posted on the website by someone else.”
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`Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 886-87.
`
`Congress recently amended the CDA to create an exception to
`
`Section 230 immunity for sex-trafficking conduct. This case requires the
`
`Court to interpret that exception. This brief first discusses the relevant
`
`statutory background. It then explains why the immunity exception at
`
`issue subjects interactive computer services to civil liability only if they
`
`engage in conduct that constitutes a federal sex-trafficking crime but
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`continues to protect services against civil liability for sex-trafficking
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`crimes committed by those who use their platforms.
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` 7
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`A. The Relevant Statutory Provisions.
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`Federal Private Action for Sex Trafficking. Chapter 77 of
`
`Title 18 of the U.S. Code contains criminal offenses related to peonage,
`
`slavery, and human trafficking. Section 1595(a) creates a civil cause of
`
`action for victims of violations of Chapter 77.
`
`Section 1595(a) specifies two different categories of defendants
`
`subject to civil liability: (1) “the perpetrator” of “a violation of” Chapter
`
`77; and (2) “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving
`
`anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew
`
`or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of” Chapter 77.
`
`18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
`
`Sex trafficking is one of the Chapter 77 offenses for which Section
`
`1595(a) creates civil liability—based on the criminal offense established
`
`in Section 1591 of Title 18. That provision criminalizes knowingly
`
`“recruit[ing],
`
`entic[ing], harbor[ing],
`
`transport[ing], provid[ing],
`
`obtain[ing], advertis[ing], maintain[ing], patroniz[ing], or solicit[ing] by
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`any means a person” knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that
`
`the person will be forced to engage in a commercial sex act. 18 U.S.C.
`
`§ 1591(a)(1). It also prohibits knowingly “benefit[ing], financially or by
`
` 8
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`receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has
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`engaged in an act described in violation of” Section 1591(a)(1) knowing,
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`or acting in reckless disregard of, the fact that an individual would be
`
`forced to engage in a commercial sex act. Id. § 1591(a)(2). As the district
`
`court recognized (ER12), the mens rea requirement for criminal liability
`
`on a “beneficiary” theory is significantly more demanding than the
`
`mental state required for Section 1595(a) civil liability on that theory.
`
`Limitation on Section 230 Immunity. As originally enacted,
`
`Section 230 contained several exemptions to its immunity provisions—
`
`stating that the statutory immunity should not be construed to impair
`
`the enforcement of federal criminal statutes, limit intellectual property
`
`laws, or limit the application of certain communications-privacy laws. 47
`
`U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)-(2), (4).
`
`In 2018, Congress added an additional immunity exception relating
`
`to sex trafficking by enacting the Allow States and Victims to Fight
`
`Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253.
`
`Two of the added provisions state that Section 230 does not limit state-
`
`law criminal charges “if the conduct underlying the charge would
`
`constitute a violation” of Section 1591 or, in certain circumstances, 18
`
` 9
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`
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`U.S.C. § 2421A. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(B)-(C). FOSTA also authorizes a
`
`state attorney general to “bring a civil action against” “any person who
`
`violates” Section 1591 if there is “reason to believe that an interest of the
`
`residents of that State has been or is threatened or adversely affected by”
`
`that person. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(d).
`
`A third provision is the one at issue in this case. It states that
`
`Section 230 does not limit civil claims brought under Section 1595(a) “if
`
`the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a violation of Section 1591.”
`
`47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A).
`
`B. The Sex-Trafficking Exception To Section 230
`Immunity Applies Only When The Defendant’s Own
`Conduct Violates 18 U.S.C. § 1591.
`
`Section 1595(a) subjects two different categories of defendants to
`
`civil liability—someone who engages in conduct constituting a crime
`
`under Section 1591 and whoever knowingly benefits from participating
`
`in a venture that engaged in such a criminal violation. The district court
`
`held that the exception to Section 230 immunity applies even if the
`
`interactive computer service did not violate Section 1591, and the Section
`
`1595(a) claim is based on a third party’s criminal conduct. ER40-43.
`
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`10
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`The district court erred in reaching that conclusion. The text and
`
`context of Section 230, as well as FOSTA’s legislative history and
`
`purpose, make clear that the immunity exception applies only when the
`
`interactive computer service’s conduct violates Section 1591—which is
`
`the conclusion reached by the majority of district courts. See Twitter Br.
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`21-22.
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`1.
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`Text
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`a. Section 230(e)(5)(A) states that the exception to immunity
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`applies only “if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a violation
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`of section 1591.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A). The “conduct underlying the
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`claim” means the conduct of the “interactive computer service” that
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`otherwise is protected from liability by Section 230. In other words, the
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`service’s own conduct must violate Section 1591.
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`To begin with, Section 230’s entire focus is the conduct of the
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`“interactive computer service.” The immunity provision states that
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`actions by an interactive computer service cannot be “treated as . . .
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`publish[ing] or speak[ing]” third-party content, and that a service is not
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`liable for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith” to restrict access to
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`objectionable content or “any action taken” to enable customers to control
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`the content they see. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)-(2). Section 230 obligates
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`interactive computer services to “notify” customers about parental
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`controls that limit access to material that is harmful to minors. Id.
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`§ 230(d).
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`Thus, the only “conduct” discussed in Section 230 is the conduct of
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`the interactive computer service—no other party’s conduct is mentioned
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`in the subsections preceding the FOSTA exemptions. It would not make
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`sense for a statute whose sole focus is the “conduct” of interactive
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`computer services to use the word “conduct” to include third-party
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`conduct.
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`If Congress had meant to write a broader immunity exception—and
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`impose liability when the interactive computer service’s own conduct did
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`not violate Section 1591—it would have used different language. For
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`example, Congress could have followed the approach of the pre-existing
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`Section 230 exceptions, such as the exception stating that “[n]othing in
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`this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to
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`intellectual property,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2), by providing that nothing in
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`Section 230 “shall be construed to limit or expand any federal law
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`pertaining to sex trafficking.” It also “could have said ‘if the claim arises
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`out of a violation of section 1591,’ or ‘if the plaintiff is a victim of a
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`violation of section 1591.’” J.B. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, No. 19-CV-07848, 2021
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`WL 4079207, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2021); see Doe v. Kik Interactive,
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`Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1249 (S.D. Fla. 2020).
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`These formulations would encompass both types of Section 1595(a)
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`actions—not just claims against the “perpetrator” of a Section 1591
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`crime, but also those against an interactive computer service that
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`“knowingly benefits . . . from participation in a venture which that
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`[service] knew or should have known has” violated Section 1591. 18
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`U.S.C. § 1595(a). Instead, Congress chose to focus the exception on the
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`conduct of the interactive computer service.
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`b. The other provisions of FOSTA creating exemptions from Section
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`230 immunity, enacted at the same time as Section 230(e)(5)(A), strongly
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`support that construction based on the plain language. It is a
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`fundamental principle of statutory construction that “the words of a
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`statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the
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`overall statutory scheme.” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126
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`(2019). That is because courts “construe statutes, not isolated
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`provisions.” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015).
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`Two FOSTA provisions state that Section 230 does not limit state-
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`law criminal charges “if the conduct underlying the charge would
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`constitute a violation of” two federal criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591
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`and 2421A. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(B)-(C). The phrase “conduct underlying
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`the charge” in these provisions “necessarily refers to the conduct of the
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`criminal defendant.” J.B., 2021 WL 4079207, at *6.
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`The very same “conduct underlying” phrase in Section 230(e)(5)(A)
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`therefore must refer to the conduct of the civil defendant. Generally,
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`“identical words used in different parts of the same statute carry the
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`same meaning.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct.
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`1718, 1723 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). The presumption
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`of consistent usage carries even greater force here where the phrase at
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`issue, “conduct underlying,” is repeated across three neighboring
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`provisions, two of which refer to the same criminal statute, 18 U.S.C.
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`§ 1591. That “strongly suggests” Congress “intended to give the ‘conduct
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`underlying’ phrases the same meaning.” J.B., 2021 WL 4079207, at *6;
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`see G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., No. 20-cv-2335, 2022 WL 1541408, at *9
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`(N.D. Ill. May 16, 2022).3
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`Indeed, interpreting the “conduct underlying” phrase as Does
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`suggest would create a bizarre anomaly, giving states broader criminal
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`authority than the federal government. The federal government’s
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`criminal authority is limited to persons who violate Section 1591, but
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`Does’ construction, by expanding “conduct underlying” beyond the
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`defendant’s own conduct, would allow states to impose criminal penalties
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`for violating a state statute with the same elements as Section 1595 in
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`which someone other than the defendant is the alleged trafficker. While
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`Congress sought to ensure state enforcement was not blocked by Section
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`3 That Section 230(e)(5)(A) refers to the “conduct underlying the claim”
`and Sections 230(e)(5)(B) and (C) refer to the “conduct underlying the
`charge” does not undermine that conclusion. “Claim” and “charge” have
`the same basic meaning: the allegations that initiate a judicial
`proceeding. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (discussing “claim for relief”); Fed.
`R. Crim. P. 3, 7(c)(1) (discussing the “offense charged”); Black’s Law
`Dictionary 291 (11th ed. 2019) (“charge” means the “formal accusation of
`an offense as a preliminary step to prosecution”); id. at 311 (“claim”
`means “the part of a complaint in a civil action specifying what relief the
`plaintiff asks for”). The meaning of the “conduct underlying” phrase
`therefore cannot vary based on Congress’s use of different technical
`terms appropriate for the civil and criminal contexts.
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`230, it did not intend FOSTA to authorize broader criminal liability for
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`interactive computer services under state law than federal law.
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`A third relevant FOSTA provision provides still more support for
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`that construction. FOSTA amended Section 1595 to authorize a state
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`attorney general to “bring a civil action” against “any person who
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`violates” Section 1591 if there is “reason to believe that an interest of the
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`residents of that State has been or is threatened or adversely affected by
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`[that] person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(d). An attorney general thus may sue
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`an interactive computer service only if the service itself “violates section
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`159