`No. 22-15961
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL.,
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`Plaintiffs-Appellants,
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`v.
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`TWITTER, INC., ET AL.,
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`Defendants-Appellees.
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`On Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of California
`No. 3:21-cv-0837-JD
`Hon. James Donato
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`APPELLEES’ RESPONSE TO CERTAIN
`APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
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`PATRICK J. CAROME
`ARI HOLTZBLATT
`SUSAN M. PELLETIER
`ALLISON M. SCHULTZ
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
`Washington, D.C. 20006
`Telephone: (202) 663-6000
`patrick.carome@wilmerhale.com
`
`Counsel for Defendants-Appellees
`Twitter, Inc. and Jack Dorsey
`
`
`
`FELICIA H. ELLSWORTH
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`60 State Street
`Boston, MA 02109
`Telephone: (617) 526-6000
`
`EMILY BARNET
`RISHITA APSANI
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`7 World Trade Center
`New York, NY 10007
`Telephone: (212) 937-7294
`November 25, 2022
`
`
`
`
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`
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`Case: 22-15961, 11/25/2022, ID: 12595957, DktEntry: 42, Page 2 of 10
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`The motion of six of the Appellants—Donald Trump, the American
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`Conservative Union, Rafael Barbosa, Linda Cuadros, Dominick Latella, and Wayne
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`Allyn Root (the “Moving Plaintiffs”)—is an abuse of the Federal Rules of Civil
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`Procedure and the Rules of Evidence. In this appeal from the dismissal of all
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`Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, the question before the Court is whether that
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`“complaint … contain[ed] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
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`to relief that is plausible on its face.” Perez v. Mortgage Electronic Registration
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`Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 334, 337 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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`The Moving Plaintiffs now attempt an end run around that well-established standard
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`by, in effect, seeking to amend their complaint on appeal with hundreds of pages of
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`new factual allegations. This is procedurally improper. These materials could and
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`should have been presented to the district court in the first instance either by
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`inclusion in a second amended complaint—an option all Plaintiffs waived—or
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`through a request for an indicative ruling on a motion for relief from judgment. The
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`motion also violates the Rules of Evidence because it seeks judicial notice of
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`materials not simply “to indicate what was in the public realm at the time” but to
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`establish that their contents—and inferences that supposedly might be drawn
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`therefrom—“were in fact true.” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at
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`Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010). The motion should be denied for these
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`reasons.
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`1
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`Case: 22-15961, 11/25/2022, ID: 12595957, DktEntry: 42, Page 3 of 10
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`Even if the Moving Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice were proper, the
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`newly submitted documents would not change the soundness of the district court’s
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`dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants’ merits brief will address the substantive
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`reasons why the newly proffered documents have no bearing on the validity of the
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`dismissed claims, and here address only the procedural and evidentiary defects in
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`the motion.
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`I.
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`THE MOVING PLAINTIFFS ARE IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTING TO AMEND
`THEIR COMPLAINT ON APPEAL
`This Court “rarely take[s] judicial notice of facts presented for the first time
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`on appeal.” Reina-Rodriguez v. United States, 655 F.3d 1182, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011).
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`Extra-record materials may be considered on appeal only when “necessary to
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`prevent ‘a miscarriage of justice.’” Foskaris v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 808 F.
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`App’x 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (quoting Bolker v. Commissioner of
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`Internal Revenue, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985)). The Moving Plaintiffs have
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`not and could not make that showing. They do not seek notice of just one or two
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`discrete facts but of nearly 200 pages of material cited approximately 50 times
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`throughout their opening brief. This is no ordinary request for judicial notice, but
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`rather an untimely and improper attempt to amend the complaint and augment the
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`record on appeal. Having foregone opportunities to properly put these materials
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`before the district court, the Moving Plaintiffs cannot now belatedly append them to
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`a closed appellate record.
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`2
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`Case: 22-15961, 11/25/2022, ID: 12595957, DktEntry: 42, Page 4 of 10
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`First, the Moving Plaintiffs cannot now seek judicial notice of material that
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`could have been timely included in a second amended complaint. The purpose of a
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`motion to dismiss is to “test[] the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Conservation Force
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`v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation
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`omitted). Where a complaint’s factual allegations are found insufficient, plaintiffs
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`ordinarily are given the opportunity to cure any defects through amendment. Here,
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`all Plaintiffs were given just that opportunity; the District Court’s May 6, 2022 order
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`dismissing the first amended complaint gave them until May 27, 2022 to file a
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`second amended complaint. 1-ER-20. All Plaintiffs, however, “advised the Court
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`that they ha[d] elected not to file an amended complaint,” and so the district court
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`entered judgment. 1-ER-2. Given their express decision to forgo amendment, the
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`Moving Plaintiffs may not now “circumvent th[e] process” for proper review of a
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`motion to dismiss “by asking [an appellate court] to amend the complaint,
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`effectively, through the vehicle of judicial notice.” In re Omnicare, Inc. Secs. Litig.,
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`769 F.3d 455, 467 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiff’s request for judicial notice
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`was “forfeited” where plaintiff did not challenge district court’s denial of request to
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`amend the complaint). For this reason, the Moving Plaintiffs’ motion should be
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`denied at least as to all proffered documents that were publicly available on or before
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`May 27, 2022, which was the last day they could have filed a second amended
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`3
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`Case: 22-15961, 11/25/2022, ID: 12595957, DktEntry: 42, Page 5 of 10
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`complaint in the district court. This includes, at least, Exhibits 1-10 and 17-28, all
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`of which are public documents dated between April 12, 2019, and May 25, 2022.
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`Second, with respect to any information that they were able to obtain only
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`after they decided not to amend their complaint, the Moving Plaintiffs could have
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`sought relief through proper channels established in the Federal Rules of Civil and
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`Appellate Procedure. Having chosen not to, their request to now augment the record
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`on appeal is improper. Where newly discovered evidence calls a judgment into
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`question, a party may seek relief through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Of
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`course, while an appeal is pending a district court has no jurisdiction to revisit the
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`order being appealed. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1, however, provides an
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`avenue for relief: A litigant may seek an “indicative ruling” from the district court
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`as to whether it would grant a motion, such as a Rule 60(b) motion, over which it no
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`longer has jurisdiction “because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending.”
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1. If the district court were to indicate that it would grant such a
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`motion or that the motion raised a substantial issue, the movant could then notify the
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`clerk for the court of appeals under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1. The
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`court of appeals could then remand for further proceedings in the district court. See
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.1(b).
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`The Moving Plaintiffs are undoubtedly aware of these procedures. Their co-
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`plaintiff, Naomi Wolf, filed a motion for indicative ruling in the district court
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`4
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`Case: 22-15961, 11/25/2022, ID: 12595957, DktEntry: 42, Page 6 of 10
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`seeking relief from judgment based on the same set of documents included in
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`Exhibits 13-16 of the instant motion. See Declaration of Scott J. Street, Trump v.
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`Twitter, Case No. 3:21-cv-08378-JD, Dkt. 177 (Aug. 26, 2022); Supplemental
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`Declaration of Scott J. Street, Trump v. Twitter, Case No. 3:21-cv-08378-JD, Dkt.
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`180 (Sept. 8, 2022). Inexplicably, having elected not to join Wolf’s motion or
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`otherwise seek relief in the district court, the Moving Plaintiffs now seek to put these
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`same documents directly before this Court through a request for judicial notice. This
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`Court should not condone such abuse of the rules of civil procedure and should deny
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`the Moving Plaintiffs’ motion.
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`II. THE MOVING PLAINTIFFS IMPROPERLY SEEK JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE
`TRUTH OF MATTERS ASSERTED IN AND INFERENCES DRAWN FROM THE
`MATERIALS SUBMITTED
`In addition to being procedurally improper, the motion also abuses the Rules
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`of Evidence. The Rules of Evidence distinguish between the existence of a
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`document, which is “susceptible to judicial notice,” and the “assertion[s] of fact
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`within that document,” which are not. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899
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`F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018). Moreover, statements the meaning or import of which
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`are “subject to varying interpretations,” are particularly inappropriate for judicial
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`notice. Id. at 1000 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (holding that while a
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`transcript was a source whose accuracy could not reasonably be questioned, facts
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`contained in the transcript did “not qualify for judicial notice”). Courts, therefore,
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`5
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`Case: 22-15961, 11/25/2022, ID: 12595957, DktEntry: 42, Page 7 of 10
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`may take judicial notice of the existence of a public document, but “may not, on the
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`basis of [such documents], draw inferences” or take notice of the truth of the matters
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`asserted. United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011);
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`accord Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (similar).
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`Here, the Moving Plaintiffs impermissibly seek notice not of the existence of
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`the many documents attached to their motion, but of debatable inferences drawn
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`from those documents and the truth of the dubious assertions they contain. Most
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`egregious, perhaps, are Exhibits 20 and 21, online articles of unknown provenance
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`of which the Moving Plaintiffs seek notice for the facts they contain about
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`“[i]nvestors’ and voters’ reactions to information in the public realm about
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`government coercion and suppression of disfavored content.” MJN at 9. This turns
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`the mechanism of judicial notice on its head. Judicial notice of news articles is
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`appropriate only “to indicate what was in the public realm at the time,” Von Saher,
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`592 F.3d at 960—not subjective reactions to such information. But the Moving
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`Plaintiffs seek notice of these articles to establish how one individual “interpret[ed]
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`… statements [from legislators] to pressure social media,” Br. 41 (citing MJN Ex.
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`20), and that, according to one poll, “awareness of the Hunter Biden scandal would
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`have led 9.4% of Biden voters to abandon the Democratic candidate,” Br. 3-4 (citing
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`MJN Ex. 21). Because the truth of such “facts” cannot be “determined from sources
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`whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2), they
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`6
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`Case: 22-15961, 11/25/2022, ID: 12595957, DktEntry: 42, Page 8 of 10
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`may not be established by means of judicial notice.
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`The Moving Plaintiffs’ other requests are similarly inappropriate. They seek
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`notice of various written communications and hearing transcripts to establish not
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`their existence but the truth of inferences drawn from their contents—specifically,
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`that “Members of Congress and senior officials in the Executive Branch specifically
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`threatened … legal penalties if Defendants did not censor speakers and content
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`disfavored by those officials,” MJN 9 (referencing Exhibits 1-10, 18-19, 22-25, and
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`27), and that “government officials … have worked directly, but covertly, with
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`Defendants and other social media companies to identify and censor disfavored
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`content on social media,” MJN 9 (referencing Exhibits 11-16).1 Rule 201 cannot be
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`stretched in this way. As this Court has held, “[i]t is improper to judicially notice a
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`transcript where the substance of that transcript is subject to varying interpretations”
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`because in such circumstances “there is no fact established by the transcript” the
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`1 In one instance, the Moving Plaintiffs seek notice not of communications between
`government officials and social media companies, but of a news article reporting on
`a statement by the Attorney Generals of Missouri and Louisiana characterizing what
`they believed communications produced in litigation showed. See MJN 76 (Ex. 13).
`According to the Moving Plaintiffs, this article establishes, by means of judicial
`notice, that government actors “regularly coordinate with social media platforms
`about suppressing speech that disagrees with the government’s preferred narratives.”
`Br. 14 citing MJN 76-68). That is not a fact “capable of accurate and ready
`determination by resort to” an article reporting on litigants’ biased interpretation of
`certain documents, Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
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`7
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`Case: 22-15961, 11/25/2022, ID: 12595957, DktEntry: 42, Page 9 of 10
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`accuracy of which can be readily determined. Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1000 (quotation
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`marks and citation omitted); accord United States v. Raygoza-Garcia, 902 F.3d 994,
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`1001-1002 (9th Cir. 2018) (the Rules of Evidence do not permit this Court to “draw
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`inferences from the [information] contained” in extra-record material by means of
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`judicial notice). Because the meaning and import of the statements included in these
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`documents are subject to interpretation, they are not proper subjects of judicial
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`notice.
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`CONCLUSION
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`The motion for judicial notice should be denied.
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`FELICIA H. ELLSWORTH
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`60 State Street
`Boston, MA 02109
`Telephone: (617) 526-6000
`
`EMILY BARNET
`RISHITA APSANI
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`7 World Trade Center
`New York, NY 10007
`Telephone: (212) 937-7294
`
`November 25, 2022
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`
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`/s/ Patrick J. Carome
`PATRICK J. CAROME
`ARI HOLTZBLATT
`SUSAN M. PELLETIER
`ALLISON M. SCHULTZ
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
` HALE AND DORR LLP
`1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
`Washington, D.C. 20006
`Telephone: (202) 663-6000
`patrick.carome@wilmerhale.com
`
`Counsel for Defendants-Appellees
`Twitter, Inc. and Jack Dorsey
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`8
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`Case: 22-15961, 11/25/2022, ID: 12595957, DktEntry: 42, Page 10 of 10
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on this 25th day of November, 2022, I electronically
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`filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of
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`Appeals for the Ninth Circuit using the appellate CM/ECF system. Counsel for all
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`parties to the case are registered CM/ECF users and will be served by the appellate
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`CM/ECF system.
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`/s/ Patrick J. Carome
`PATRICK J. CAROME
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