`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`No. 23-973
`Agency Nos.
`A209-390-110
`A209-390-111
`ORDER AND
`AMENDED
`OPINION
`
`
`BRISEYDA MEZA
`DIAZ; GABRIELA SEGUNDO
`MEZA,
`
` Petitioners,
` v.
`
`PAMELA BONDI, Attorney
`General,
`
` Respondent.
`
`
`On Petition for Review of an Order of the
`Board of Immigration Appeals
`
`Submitted July 18, 2024*
`Pasadena, California
`Filed October 8, 2024
`Amended February 25, 2025
`Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Richard A. Paez, and
`Gabriel P. Sanchez, Circuit Judges.
`Order;
`Opinion by Judge Paez
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
`without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`SUMMARY**
`
`Immigration
`
`The panel filed (1) an order (a) amending the opinion
`filed on October 8, 2024; (b) denying as moot the
`government’s petition for panel rehearing; and (c) indicating
`that no further petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc
`will be allowed; and (2) an amended opinion granting
`Briseyda Meza Diaz’s petition for review of the Board of
`Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming the denial of
`asylum and withholding of removal.
`In the amended opinion, the panel held that the record
`evidence compelled
`the conclusion
`that Meza Diaz
`experienced harm committed by forces that Mexican
`authorities are either unable or unwilling to control and the
`BIA legally erred by failing to consider highly probative
`evidence regarding a nexus between the harm and a
`protected ground.
`The panel held that, in concluding that Meza Diaz failed
`to establish a nexus between the harm she suffered and her
`family status, the agency erred by failing to consider key
`evidence, including Meza Diaz’s attackers’ statements and
`additional evidence contained in a police report.
`Meza Diaz also presented compelling evidence
`indicating that the police were either unable or unwilling to
`control her attackers. First, contrary to the agency’s
`statements otherwise, Meza Diaz provided police with
`
`** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
`been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
`
`
`
`
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`
`
`3
`
`information regarding her attackers’ identities, including the
`history of the harm she and her family experienced that, at
`minimum, should have provided a starting point for an
`investigation. Moreover, although the police assisted Meza
`Diaz’s family and allowed her to file a report, the police
`official’s admonition that authorities could not ensure her
`safety and that she should therefore flee the country
`demonstrated that Mexican officials were, in fact, either
`unable or unwilling to protect her. Other record evidence
`also corroborated that Mexican officials are either unable or
`unwilling to protect their citizens from cartel violence.
`The panel remanded for the BIA to reconsider its
`determination on the nexus element of past persecution and,
`if appropriate, rule on whether the harm Meza Diaz
`experienced rose to the level of persecution. The panel also
`remanded for further proceedings on Meza Diaz’s claim of
`future persecution.
`
`
`
`COUNSEL
`
`Mardy M. Sproule, Law Offices of Mardy M. Sproule,
`Whittier, California, for Petitioners.
`Nancy Pham, Madeline Henley, and Sarah L. Martin, Trial
`Attorneys; Corey L. Farrell and Claire L. Workman, Senior
`Litigation Counsels; Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy
`Attorney General, Civil Division; Office of Immigration
`Litigation, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
`
`
`
`
`
`4
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`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`ORDER
`
`The opinion filed on October 8, 2024 (Dkt. 40) is
`amended by the Amended Opinion filed concurrently with
`this order. The government’s petition for panel rehearing
`(Dkt. 48) is denied as moot. No further petitions for
`rehearing or rehearing en banc will be allowed.
`
`
`
`OPINION
`
`
`PAEZ, Circuit Judge:
`
`Petitioner Briseyda Meza Diaz (“Meza Diaz”) and her
`minor daughter, Gabriela Segundo Meza (“GSM”), fled
`Mexico after suffering a home invasion by hooded, armed
`men who held a weapon to Meza Diaz’s head, told her that
`she was going to die, and then beat her unconscious. The
`home invasion followed years of death threats received by
`Meza Diaz after her brother was murdered and her husband
`was abducted. When Meza Diaz went to the local police to
`report the threats and beating, they told her that they could
`not protect her and encouraged her to flee the country, even
`offering her a ride to the airport. Meza Diaz and GSM fled
`Mexico the next day out of fear for their safety. They
`presented themselves to authorities at the United States
`border and sought asylum and other relief.
`When Meza Diaz and GSM sought asylum, withholding
`of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
`Torture (“CAT”), an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and the Board
`
`
`
`
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`
`
`5
`
`of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denied all forms of relief
`and ordered Meza Diaz and GSM removed.1
`Meza Diaz petitions for review of the BIA’s denial of her
`appeal of the IJ’s decision. We conclude that the record
`compels a finding that Meza Diaz experienced harm by
`forces that Mexican officials are either unable or unwilling
`to control. The BIA also committed legal error in its analysis
`of nexus. We grant the petition as to Meza Diaz’s asylum
`and withholding claims and remand for further proceedings
`consistent with this opinion.
`I. Factual and Procedural Background
`A. Experiences in Mexico
`Meza Diaz’s interactions with the cartel began when she
`was a minor. In 2000, Meza Diaz’s brother, Ismar Arreola
`Meza, and his grandmother were murdered by cartel
`members in the Mexican state of Michoacan. At the time,
`Meza Diaz was seventeen and living with her siblings and
`mother in Magueyes, Turicato, a town in Michoacan.
`Following an
`investigation, authorities
`in Michoacan
`charged four individuals with their murders. The individuals
`were ultimately sentenced to fourteen years in prison for the
`murders.
`Meza Diaz and her family received death threats by
`phone and by mail following her brother’s murder. Meza
`Diaz’s mother initially reported the threats to the police. The
`police occasionally patrolled the neighborhood for a time,
`but the threats did not stop. In several conversations, the
`
`1 Meza Diaz included GSM as a derivative beneficiary of her asylum
`application. GSM did not file a separate application for relief. We
`accordingly remand GSM’s claims as a beneficiary of Meza Diaz’s
`application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A).
`
`
`
`6
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`callers warned Meza Diaz’s family that they knew that the
`family had reported the threats to the police. The callers
`repeatedly threatened to harm Meza Diaz and her two
`surviving siblings.
`In 2002, as the death threats continued, Meza Diaz and
`her surviving siblings fled Mexico for the United States out
`of fear for their safety. Meza Diaz’s mother remained in
`Mexico.
`Meza Diaz’s mother stopped receiving death threats in
`approximately 2005. As a result, Meza Diaz returned to
`Turicato with her common-law husband, Juan Segundo
`Villasenor (“Segundo Villasenor”),2 and their daughters.
`A few years after the family returned to Turicato,
`Segundo Villasenor was abducted and held for two weeks,
`during which time he was beaten and tortured. Meza Diaz
`received calls from Segundo Villasenor’s abductors
`demanding that she pay them approximately 250,000 pesos
`or else they would kill her husband. The callers referred to
`Meza Diaz by name and threatened her with death. One of
`her husband’s captors warned her, “We already know that
`you are Is[]mar’s sister. So, give us the money if you don’t
`want the same that happened to him to happen to you.” The
`abductors also told Meza Diaz that they would kill her
`husband and kidnap one of her daughters if she reported the
`abduction to the police. Meza Diaz eventually paid the
`ransom amount and Segundo Villasenor was released. Meza
`Diaz found him on the side of the road, with a hood over his
`head, beaten and unconscious.
`
`
`2 Meza Diaz and Segundo Villasenor are not legally married but refer to
`each other as husband and wife.
`
`
`
`
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`
`
`7
`
`The abductors continued to threaten the family with
`death after Segundo Villasenor’s release. One caller told
`her, “We are the one[s] that ordered the murder of your []
`brother.” Meza Diaz testified that she did not report the
`abduction or the death threats because the abductors had
`threatened to harm Segundo Villasenor and her daughters if
`she went to the police for help.
`A few months after the abduction, Segundo Villasenor
`fled Mexico for the United States out of fear for his safety.
`After Segundo Villasenor left, Meza Diaz continued to
`receive threats from his abductors. She testified that the
`callers were particularly angry because one cartel member
`had been detained by police. Fearing for her daughters’
`safety, Meza Diaz sent her eldest two daughters, who are
`both U.S. citizens, to live with Segundo Villasenor in the
`United States. Her youngest daughter, GSM, is a Mexican
`citizen and thus remained with Meza Diaz in Michoacan.
`On September 5, 2016, Meza Diaz and GSM were at
`home when a group of armed and hooded individuals
`suddenly entered their home. One of the men placed a
`weapon to Meza Diaz’s head and told her “your time has
`come” and that she was going to die. She was then beaten
`unconscious. The attackers informed her that she had three
`days to pay them one million pesos or they would kill her
`and her daughter. The attackers also hid GSM from Meza
`Diaz in the home.
`Meza Diaz tried to file a police report immediately after
`the attack. The police took her report but informed her that
`they could not guarantee her safety and recommended that
`she flee Mexico. Meza Diaz testified that the police feared
`that the same people who had threatened and attacked her
`would return if she did not leave. The police drove Meza
`
`
`
`8
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`Diaz and GSM to the airport in a patrol car the following
`day.
`Meza Diaz and GSM entered the United States on
`September 9, 2016, at the port of entry in San Ysidro,
`California. Upon arrival, she presented the police report that
`she had filed days earlier to the border patrol authorities.
`They were placed in removal proceedings on February 6,
`2017. Meza Diaz applied for asylum, withholding of
`removal, and CAT relief in May 2017. As noted above,
`GSM was listed as a beneficiary of her mother’s asylum
`application. Since arriving in the United States, Meza Diaz
`has resided in Southern California with Segundo Villasenor
`and their daughters.
`B. Administrative Proceedings
`Meza Diaz testified before an IJ in July 2019, where the
`IJ considered the merits of her application for asylum,
`withholding of removal, and protection under CAT. Meza
`Diaz sought asylum and withholding of removal because she
`claimed that she suffered persecution on account of her
`membership in several particular social groups (“PSG”),
`including “immediate family of Ismar Arreola Meza” and
`“member[s] of the Meza family from Magueyes, Turicato.”
`Meza Diaz was the only witness who testified at the hearing.
`At the end of the hearing, the IJ issued an oral decision
`denying Meza Diaz’s application for asylum, withholding of
`removal, and CAT relief, and ordering her and GSM
`removed to Mexico.
`The IJ found Meza Diaz credible but determined that the
`2016 home invasion and death threats did not rise to the level
`of past persecution. The IJ also found that the home invasion
`was an isolated incident that was not related to her family’s
`history with the cartel.
`
`
`
`
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`
`
`9
`
`Next, the IJ determined that Meza Diaz had not
`demonstrated that her past harm had been inflicted by forces
`the Mexican government was unable or unwilling to control.
`The IJ noted that Michoacan authorities successfully
`prosecuted her brother’s murderers in 2000, and police
`officials took some action when her mother reported death
`threats. The IJ concluded that because Segundo Villasenor’s
`kidnapping was never reported to police, it was impossible
`to determine whether the government would have assisted in
`an investigation. Finally, the IJ determined that the police
`responded reasonably to Meza Diaz’s attempt to report the
`home invasion because she provided no evidence of the
`assailants’ identities.
`Meza Diaz timely but unsuccessfully appealed the IJ’s
`decision to the BIA. The BIA agreed with the IJ’s
`determination that Meza Diaz was not entitled to asylum,
`withholding of removal, or CAT relief. The BIA affirmed
`the IJ’s determination that Meza Diaz did not establish all of
`the requirements for past persecution and did not establish a
`well-founded fear of future persecution. It held that she had
`not presented sufficient evidence tying her attack in 2016 to
`the murder of her brother and abduction of her partner. The
`BIA further held that Meza Diaz failed to demonstrate that
`the mistreatment occurred on account of a protected ground
`and by forces that Mexican officials were either unable or
`unwilling to control. The BIA noted that “the police’s
`actions following the [] 2016 attack by hooded individuals
`are insufficient to satisfy [Meza Diaz’s] burden of proof”
`because “[a]uthorities are not required to solve all crimes for
`the government to be considered able and willing to control
`the persecutors.”
`Meza Diaz timely petitioned for review.
`
`
`
`10
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review
`“Where the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence
`and law, rather than adopting the IJ’s decision, our review is
`limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent the IJ’s
`opinion is expressly adopted.” Rodriguez v. Holder, 683
`F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and quotation
`marks omitted). Because the BIA here dismissed Meza
`Diaz’s appeal, agreeing with the IJ’s findings and added its
`own reasoning, we review both the BIA’s decision and the
`portions of the IJ’s decision adopted by the BIA. Id.
`“We review factual findings for substantial evidence and
`legal questions de novo.” Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 911
`(9th Cir. 2020). Where the BIA does not consider all the
`evidence before it, either by “misstating the record [or]
`failing to mention highly probative or potentially dispositive
`evidence,” its decision is legal error and “cannot stand.”
`Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 2011).
`III. Discussion
`A. Asylum
`To be statutorily eligible for asylum, Meza Diaz must
`show that she is a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A refugee
`is one who is “unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself
`of the protection of [her native] country because of
`persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
`of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
`social group, or political opinion.” Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). An
`applicant alleging past persecution bears the burden to
`establish that: “(1) h[er] treatment rises to the level of
`persecution; (2) the persecution was on account of one or
`more protected grounds; and (3) the persecution was
`committed by the government, or by forces that the
`
`
`
`
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`
`
`11
`
`to control.”
`government was unable or unwilling
`Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir.
`2010). “Persecution is defined as ‘the infliction of suffering
`or harm . . . in a way regarded as offensive.’” Mendoza-
`Pablo v. Holder, 667 F.3d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 2012)
`(quoting Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004)
`(en banc)). “Either past persecution or a well-founded fear
`of future persecution provides eligibility for a discretionary
`grant of asylum.” Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 994 (9th
`Cir. 1998). An individual “who establishes past persecution
`is presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution.” Id.
`(citation omitted).
`
`1. Nexus
`Because the BIA did not address whether the harm Meza
`Diaz experienced rose to the level of past persecution, we
`first address the agency’s nexus determination—that is,
`whether Meza Diaz’s persecution was “on account of race,
`religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
`group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The
`IJ and BIA determined that Meza Diaz did not suffer harm
`on account of her membership in the cognizable PSGs of
`“immediate family of Ismar Arreola Meza” and “member[s]
`of the Meza family from Magueyes, Turicato.” 3 In so
`concluding, the agency committed legal error by failing to
`consider record evidence of a nexus between Meza Diaz’s
`past harm and her family status.
`
`
`3 Because we agree with the BIA that Meza Diaz’s proposed PSGs of
`“immediate family of Ismar Arreola Meza” and “member[s] of the Meza
`family from Magueyes, Turicato” are cognizable, we do not address
`Meza Diaz’s other proposed PSGs or her imputed political opinion
`claim.
`
`
`
`12
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`The BIA determined that Meza Diaz “did not present
`evidence tying her attack in 2016 to the prior events that
`occurred 8 and 16 years earlier, respectively.” The BIA
`agreed with the IJ’s determination that “the 2016 attack on
`[Meza Diaz and GSM] was not related to their familial
`relationship with [Meza Diaz’s] brother” and that “the
`evidence demonstrates that despite having been threatened
`for many years, [Meza Diaz and GSM] have never been
`harmed by anyone involved in the murder of [Meza Diaz’s]
`brother.”
`In making that determination, the IJ and the BIA ignored
`key record evidence: the police record of the report that
`Meza Diaz made immediately after the home invasion and
`attack. The report contained the attackers’ statement to
`Meza Diaz that “your time has come” and that she was going
`to die. The attackers’ statement that Meza Diaz’s “time
`ha[d] come” links the home invasion and attack to the
`numerous death threats Meza Diaz received after her
`brother’s murder and husband’s kidnapping. Several of
`those death threats were made by callers who told Meza Diaz
`that they knew she was Ismar’s sister and that she did not
`want to meet his fate—namely, being murdered. The police
`report also notes that Ismar’s murderers were recently
`released from prison. And the report summarizes Meza
`Diaz’s family history, including her brother’s murder, her
`husband’s kidnapping, and the death threats and extortion
`attempts that Meza Diaz suffered after both events.
`Although Meza Diaz properly submitted this evidence to
`the agency, it failed to give reasoned consideration to that
`evidence. Meza Diaz included the attackers’ “your time has
`come” statement and presented the original and translated
`versions of the police report in support of her asylum
`application. But the police report was barely discussed at
`
`
`
`
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`
`
`13
`
`Meza Diaz’s hearing, the BIA’s decision did not mention it,
`and the IJ’s oral decision made one passing reference to it—
`that Meza Diaz had reported her brother’s death to the
`police. The IJ’s oral decision does contain boilerplate
`language that “[a]ll of the evidence in the record have [sic]
`been considered whether or not specifically mentioned in
`this oral decision, and given the appropriate weight in the
`rendering of the Courts [sic] decision in these matters.” But
`given the record in this case, we do not attach any
`significance to that statement. See Cole, 659 F.3d at 771–72
`(“[W]here there is any indication that the BIA did not
`consider all of the evidence before it, a catchall phrase does
`not suffice . . . .”). In concluding that Meza Diaz had not
`presented any evidence of a link between the home invasion
`and her family history, the agency failed to consider the
`attackers’ statement or the additional evidence presented in
`the police report in making its nexus determination.
`This was legal error. “Where the BIA fails to consider
`highly probative record evidence, its ‘decision cannot
`stand.’” Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 638 (9th
`Cir. 2022) (quoting Cole, 659 F.3d at 771–72); see also
`Castillo v. Barr, 980 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 2020). While
`the agency is “not require[d] . . . to discuss every piece of
`evidence” in its discussion of past persecution and nexus,
`Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006),
`remand is required “where there is any indication that the
`BIA did not consider all of the evidence before it.” Cole,
`659 F.3d at 771–72. “Such indications include misstating
`the record and failing to mention highly probative or
`potentially dispositive evidence.” Id. at 772. Here, the
`agency’s assertions that there was no evidence connecting
`the home invasion to Meza Diaz’s family history and death
`threats shows that it failed to consider the report in making
`
`
`
`14
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`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`its nexus determination. Thus, its decision cannot stand. See
`Castillo, 980 F.3d at 1284.
`Because the BIA failed to consider record evidence when
`it concluded that Meza Diaz did not suffer past persecution
`on account of her family status, we grant the petition and
`remand for the agency to consider this evidence in its
`reconsideration of her application
`for asylum and
`withholding of removal. See id. at 1283–84; see also
`Sumolang v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1080, 1083–84 (9th Cir.
`2013).
`
`2. Unable or Unwilling
`The IJ and BIA determined that Meza Diaz had not met
`her burden of establishing that her past harm was on account
`of forces that the Mexican government was either unable or
`unwilling to control. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). In
`“instances of police failure to respond to a report of
`persecution, we have held that a petitioner need not provide
`evidence that a government is ‘unable or unwilling to control
`persecution on a countrywide basis.’” Bringas-Rodriguez v.
`Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
`(international quotation marks and brackets omitted)
`(quoting Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir.
`2004)). “Instead, an asylum applicant may meet her burden
`with evidence that the government was unable or unwilling
`to control the persecution in the applicant’s home city or
`area.” Mashiri, 383 F.3d at 1122. Meza Diaz presented
`compelling evidence demonstrating
`that government
`officials are unable or unwilling to control her persecutors.
`We therefore conclude that this determination is not
`supported by substantial evidence.
`The day after the home invasion and attack, Meza Diaz
`went to the police station for assistance. The police allowed
`
`
`
`
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`
`
`15
`
`her to file a report but told her that they could not further
`assist her and could not guarantee her safety. Officers
`recommended that Meza Diaz flee Mexico to the United
`States and offered to drive her to the airport. An officer then
`drove Meza Diaz and GSM to the airport in a patrol car. The
`police gave her a copy of the police report to present to U.S.
`immigration authorities. The report reflects that Meza Diaz
`is fleeing Mexico “to safeguard the physical integrity of her
`family.” The end of the report includes a direct message to
`U.S. immigration authorities from the issuing police officer,
`who wrote: “This instance of the municipal government, I
`address the immigration authorities of the U.S. [to]
`respectfully to seek assistance and support for the family in
`question.”
`that Meza Diaz had not
`The BIA concluded
`demonstrated that her past harm was committed by forces
`that the Mexican government is unable or unwilling to
`control because she provided no information regarding the
`attackers’ identities. The BIA agreed with the IJ’s
`determination that, “according to the evidence, there is no
`information as to who these individuals were, what their
`identities were. And so, it is unclear what more the
`authorities in Mexico could have done, but at the very least
`they did take the report.” The BIA added that “[a]uthorities
`are not required to solve all crimes for the government to be
`considered able and willing to control the persecutors.”
`But Meza Diaz did, in fact, provide police with
`information about her attackers’ identities—she told them
`about all of the harms that she and her family had
`experienced. The police report recounts Meza Diaz’s
`brother’s murder and her husband’s kidnapping, and notes
`that her brother’s murderers were released from prison just
`five months before the home invasion. The report states that
`
`
`
`16
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`Meza Diaz received targeted “death threats and harassment”
`after both her brother’s murder and her husband’s
`kidnapping. And, as discussed above, the report reflects that
`Meza Diaz informed the police about her attackers’ “your
`time has come” statement during the home invasion.
`This information that Meza Diaz gave to the police, as
`documented in the police report, provided them with—at a
`minimum—a place to begin their investigation. But
`although Meza Diaz provided the police with significant
`information regarding who might have a motive to harm her,
`the police explicitly told her that they could not guarantee
`her safety and recommended that she flee the country.
`Meza Diaz presented compelling evidence indicating
`that the police were either unable or unwilling to control her
`persecutors. The BIA made much of the fact that the police
`allowed her to file a report, of which they provided her a
`copy, and drove her to the airport in a patrol car. But a copy
`of a police report and a ride to the airport after urging a
`citizen to flee the country falls far short of a willingness or
`ability to control that citizen’s persecutors. “Some official
`responsiveness to complaints of violence, although relevant,
`does not automatically equate to governmental ability and
`willingness.” J.R. v. Barr, 975 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2020).
`Our precedent makes clear that “‘[e]ven if an applicant’s
`ability to file a police report suggests that the police were
`willing to protect [her], that says little if anything about
`whether they were able to do so.’” Id. (emphasis in original)
`(brackets omitted) (quoting Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924,
`931 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds by Bringas-
`Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1070).
`The explicit admission by the police that they could not
`ensure Meza Diaz’s safety must be given substantial weight
`
`
`
`
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`
`
`17
`
`because “the question on this step is whether the government
`both ‘could and would provide protection.’” Id. (quoting
`Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 923 (9th Cir. 2010));
`see also Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1069 (“[O]ur law is
`clear that the agency . . . must examine all the evidence in
`the record that bears on the question of whether the
`government is unable or unwilling to control a private
`persecutor.”). Even though the police assisted Meza Diaz’s
`family in 2000 and allowed her to file a report in 2016, the
`police official’s admonition that authorities could not ensure
`her safety and that she should therefore flee the country
`demonstrates that Mexican officials were, in fact, either
`unable or unwilling to protect Meza Diaz. See J.R., 975 F.3d
`at 783–84.
`that Mexican
`Other record evidence corroborates
`officials are either unable or unwilling to protect their
`citizens from cartel violence. Country conditions reports
`reflect that police departments in Mexico, particularly at the
`state and local level, have failed to combat organized crime,
`and are in some cases working in concert with cartels to
`protect cartel members involved in deadly violence. The
`state of Michoacan has been particularly unable to stem
`violence perpetrated by organized crime, and the state
`suffers from high rates of kidnapping, extortion, and
`violence against women, including sexual torture.
`Thus, “[t]he undisputed factual record that was before
`the IJ and BIA reflects actual deadly violence that the
`government was, during certain periods, unable to control,
`and threats of additional deadly violence that the government
`was entirely unwilling to control . . . .” Id. at 784; see also
`Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2020).
`And “[o]ur law does not require applicants to wait until gang
`members carry out their deadly threats before they are
`
`
`
`18
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`eligible for asylum.” J.R., 975 F.3d at 784. Significant
`evidence in the record thus “calls into doubt the Mexican
`government’s ability to control” Meza Diaz’s persecutors.
`Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 2013).
`In sum, applying our caselaw to the record evidence, we
`conclude
`that any reasonable adjudicator would be
`compelled to conclude that Meza Diaz suffered harm by
`forces that the Mexican government is either unable or
`unwilling to control. See Flores Molina, 37 F.4th at 637. On
`remand, the BIA must reconsider its determination on the
`nexus element of past persecution and, if appropriate, rule
`on whether the harm she experienced rose to the level of
`persecution. If Meza Diaz establishes harm rising to the
`level of persecution and a nexus with statutorily protected
`grounds, “‘a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear
`arises, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1), and the burden then shifts to
`the government to demonstrate that there has been a
`fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant
`no longer has a well-founded fear.’” Id. (brackets omitted)
`(quoting Tawadrus v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th
`Cir. 2004)).
`
`3. Fear of Future Persecution
`Meza Diaz also challenges the BIA’s determination that
`she failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
`persecution. The agency concluded that Meza Diaz and
`GSM had not shown “a reasonable possibility that they will
`be persecuted in Mexico based on their membership in their
`family.”
`The BIA was “required to evaluate all relevant evidence
`in the record” to determine whether Meza Diaz carried her
`burden of establishing a well-founded fear of future
`persecution. Davila, 968 F.3d at 1143 (citation omitted). As
`
`
`
`
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`
`
`19
`
`to consider and
`failed
`the BIA
`discussed above,
`meaningfully address key record evidence relevant to nexus,
`and erroneously concluded that Meza Diaz had not
`demonstrated that her harm was committed by forces that the
`Mexican government is unable or unwilling to control. See
`Madrigal, 716 F.3d at 508. We accordingly grant the
`petition and remand for further proceedings on Meza Diaz’s
`claim of future persecution. Id.; see also Flores Molina, 37
`F.4th at 638.
`
`B. Withholding of Removal
`An applicant is entitled to withholding of removal if her
`“life or freedom would be threatened in [her home] country
`because of [her] race, religion, nationality, membership in a
`particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.
`§ 1231(b)(3)(A). The BIA denied Meza Diaz’s claim for
`withholding of removal because it determined she “could not
`satisfy the requirements for asylum.” Because the BIA erred
`in its denial of asylum, we remand Meza Diaz’s withholding
`of removal claim for further consideration. Flores Molina,
`37 F.4th at 638; Madrigal, 716 F.3d at 508.
`Moreover, if the BIA determines that Meza Diaz has
`carried her burden as to nexus and harm rising to the level of
`past persecution, the agency must credit Meza Diaz with a
`rebuttable presumption of eligibility for withholding of
`removal. 8 C.F.R § 1208.16(b)(l)(i); Ahmed v. Keisler, 504
`F.3d 1183, 1199 (9th Cir. 2007). Finally, even if the BIA
`determines that Meza Diaz is not entitled to a presumption
`of eligibility for withholding of removal, it must consider all
`probative evidence related to her fear of future persecution.
`See supra Discussion § III(4).
`
`
`
`20
`
`MEZA DIAZ V. BONDI
`
`IV. Conclusion
`In sum, we grant the petition and hold that (1) the record
`evidence compels
`the conclusion
`that Meza Diaz
`experienced harm committed by forces that Mexican
`authorities are either unable or unwilling to control, (2) the
`BIA legally erred by failing to consider highly probative
`evidence of nexus; and, thus, (3) the BIA’s denials of asylum
`and withholding of removal are remanded for further
`
`consideration.4
`Petitioner shall recover her costs on appeal.
`PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED.
`
`
`4 Because Meza Diaz did not raise her CAT claim in her opening brief,
`we deem that



