NOT FOR PUBLICATION
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`
`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`DIEGO APARECIDO NUNES ARAUJO;
`JULIA GRACIELIA GOMES CAJADO;
`V.C.N.A,
`
` Petitioners,
`
` v.
`
`PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
`
` Respondent.
` No. 23-4239
`Agency Nos.
`A216-909-438
`A216-909-439
`A216-909-440
`
`MEMORANDUM*
`
`On Petition for Review of an Order of the
`Board of Immigration Appeals
`
`Submitted July 11, 2025**
`Seattle, Washington
`
`Before: PAEZ and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and SELNA, District Judge.***
`
`Diego Aparecido Nunes Araujo, his wife Julia Graciela Gomes Cajado, and
`their minor daughter, V.C.N.A., (collectively, “Petitioners”), natives and citizens
`
`* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
`except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
`
`** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
`without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
`
`*** The Honorable James V. Selna, United States District Judge for the
`Central District of California, sitting by designation.
`FILED
`
`JUL 15 2025
`
`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
`
`
`
`
`
`
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` 2 23-4239
`of Brazil, seek review of a decision denying their claims for asylum, withholding
`of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 The Board
`of Immigration Appeals summarily affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
`decision without opinion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4). Accordingly, we
`review “the IJ’s decision as we would that of the Board.” Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389
`F.3d 917, 925 (9th Cir. 2004). “We review factual findings for substantial
`evidence and legal questions de novo.” Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626,
`632 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Under the substantial evidence standard, we
`uphold the agency’s factual findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable
`adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Salguero Sosa v.
`Garland, 55 F.4th 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). We have
`jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
`1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Petitioners’
`asylum and withholding of removal applications because they have not
`demonstrated that the single threat Nunes Araujo experienced amounts to past
`persecution or establishes a well-founded fear of future persecution. Persecution is
`an “extreme concept, marked by the infliction of suffering or harm . . . in a way
`regarded as offensive.” Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
`
`1 Nunes Araujo is the lead petitioner. His wife and daughter each filed their own
`applications for asylum and related relief based on Nunes Araujo’s claims and
`were listed as derivative beneficiaries on his asylum application.
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` 3 23-4239
`banc) (cleaned up). When the basis of claimed harm is a threat, the agency is
`required to consider “whether the group making the threat has the will or the
`ability to carry it out.” Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2021)
`(quoting Kaiser v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2004)). Threats
`“constitute ‘persecution in only a small category of cases,’” such as “‘when the
`threats are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm,’” or where
`“threats are repeated, specific, and ‘combined with confrontation or other
`mistreatment.’” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019)
`(quoting Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000)).
`Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that the single threat by
`two unknown individuals did not rise to the level of past persecution. Nunes
`Araujo testified that the threat was made for the sole purpose of extorting him, and
`the two individuals did not say that they would harm him or his family. See id.
`(“[C]ases with threats alone, particularly anonymous or vague ones, rarely
`constitute persecution.”). The IJ reasonably found that Nunes Araujo’s assertion
`that these individuals were drug dealers capable of carrying out their threat was
`unsubstantiated. Nunes Araujo testified that he did not recognize who they were
`and that their motivation was solely monetary. He did not see the individuals again
`and was not threatened further. The record does not compel the conclusion that the
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` 4 23-4239
`threat Nunes Araujo experienced amounted to past persecution.2
`Petitioners have also not shown a well-founded fear of future persecution
`because the evidence establishes that they can reasonably relocate within Brazil.
`See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii); Kaiser, 390 F.3d at 659 (stating that an applicant
`is ineligible for asylum if relocation is reasonable under all the circumstances).
`The IJ found that such relocation would “significantly mitigate any possible risk of
`harm” and it would be safe and “reasonable to expect” Petitioners to do so.
`Petitioners develop no argument challenging this conclusion in their petition for
`review. Nunes Araujo was not physically harmed in Brazil and merely testified
`that he believed the men could find him. Accordingly, substantial evidence
`supports the denial of Petitioners’ applications for asylum and withholding of
`removal. See Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2020) (“An applicant
`who fails to satisfy the lower standard for asylum necessarily fails to satisfy the
`more demanding standard for withholding of removal . . . .”).
`2. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of Petitioners’
`applications for CAT relief. The single threat directed at Nunes Araujo does not
`amount to torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2) (defining torture as “an extreme
`
`2 Our holding does not depend on the standard of review. See Flores Molina, 37
`F.4th at 633 n.2 (observing that we have been inconsistent in what standard of
`review applies to whether acts rise to the level of persecution). We would reach the
`same result reviewing de novo the agency’s past persecution determination.
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` 5 23-4239
`form of cruel and inhuman treatment”). Petitioners identify no evidence indicating
`that they are likely to be tortured upon their return to Brazil. Instead, they argue
`only that “black Brazilians” are more likely to experience harsher treatment by
`police and private actors than non-black Brazilians. Moreover, Petitioners’
`country conditions evidence, consisting of reports discussing increased general and
`drug-related violence, establishes neither a particularized risk of torture nor that the
`government would acquiesce in Petitioners’ torture. See Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th
`965, 980 (9th Cir. 2023) (“The record must show that it is more likely than not that
`the petitioner will face a particularized and non-speculative risk of torture.”
`(emphasis in original)); B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 845 (9th Cir. 2020)
`(“Generalized evidence of violence in a country is itself insufficient to establish
`that anyone in the government would acquiesce to a petitioner’s torture.”).
`PETITIONS DENIED.3
`
`3 The temporary stay of removal shall remain in place until the mandate issues.
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