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`NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`FILED
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`JUL 10 2025
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`MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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`MARIA CAMILA CASTRO RUBIO, et al.,
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` Petitioners,
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` v.
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`PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
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` Respondent.
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` No. 24-4421
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`Agency Nos.
`A241-743-177
`A241-743-178
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`MEMORANDUM*
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`On Petition for Review of an Order of the
`Board of Immigration Appeals
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`Submitted July 7, 2025**
`Seattle, Washington
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`Before: HAWKINS, BEA, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
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`Petitioner Maria Camila Castro-Rubio (“Maria”) and her minor daughter
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`V.N.P.C. (together, “Petitioners”), both natives and citizens of Colombia, seek
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`review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals
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`(“BIA”) dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision that
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`denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
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`*
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`This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
`except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
`**
`The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
`without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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`the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
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`Petitioners illegally entered the United States in August 2022, and the U.S.
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`Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against them in
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`October 2022. Conceding removability, Petitioners applied for asylum, withholding
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`of removal, and CAT protection, claiming that they feared persecution on account
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`of their membership in the particular social group of the family members of Juan
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`Pablo Porras-Lengurque (“Porras”), Maria’s partner and V.N.P.C.’s father.
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`We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Our “review is limited to the
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`BIA’s decision except where the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” 1 Plancarte
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`Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022). And we review the agency’s
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`factual findings for substantial evidence and reverse them “only where ‘any
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`reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Hussain
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`v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 641–42 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
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`For the reasons set forth below, we grant the petition for review and remand.
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`Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we recount them only as relevant to
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`our decision.
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`1.
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`Asylum and withholding of removal are unavailable if Petitioners can
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`safely and reasonably relocate within Colombia. Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654,
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`659 (9th Cir. 2019). The agency “must conduct a reasoned analysis with respect to
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`1 We refer to the BIA and the IJ collectively as “the agency.”
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`2
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`24-4421
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`[Petitioners’] individualized situation.” 2 Id. at 661. In this case, the agency
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`determined that Petitioners could safely and reasonably relocate to Cucuta,
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`Colombia, or elsewhere in Colombia.3 In so determining, the agency misstated the
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`record as to the safety of Cucuta and failed to evaluate whether Porras could
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`reasonably return to Colombia and, if not, whether Petitioners could reasonably
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`relocate within Colombia without Porras’s company.
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`Specifically, the agency found that Petitioners could avoid future persecution
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`by relocating to Cucuta because they had “already relocated once to [Cucuta] and,
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`while [they were] there, no one came to look for them.” This finding misstates the
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`record because Maria credibly testified that “la guerrilla” gave Porras a threatening
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`phone call while Petitioners lived in Cucuta, and that “la guerrilla” then went to
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`Cucuta and left a threatening letter at Porras’s aunt’s house in Cucuta.
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`The agency also reasoned that Petitioners could avoid future persecution by
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`relocating to other places in Colombia because Maria “is young, educated, has
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`proven employment history, and has a family support network.” The agency seems
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`2
`Petitioners bear the burden of establishing that it would be unreasonable for
`them to relocate within Colombia because they failed to prove past persecution. 8
`C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(3)(i), 1208.16(b)(3)(i).
`3
`The IJ also opined that, upon removal to Colombia, Petitioners could safely
`and reasonably live with Maria’s parents in Bucaramanga, Colombia, because “none
`of [her parents had] suffered any direct threats or harm.” The BIA did not seem to
`have adopted this finding. In any event, this finding conflicts with Maria’s credible
`testimony that “la guerrilla” broke the windows of her parents’ house and left a
`threatening note.
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`3
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`24-4421
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`to have assumed—without much analysis—that Porras could reasonably return to
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`Colombia alongside Petitioners. But that assumption appears to be at odds with the
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`agency’s own passing assessment that Porras might risk future persecution upon
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`removal to Colombia. Given this risk assessment, it might not be reasonable for
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`Porras to return to Colombia. And without Porras’s company, it might not be
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`reasonable for Petitioners to return to Colombia and relocate therein. The agency
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`thus erred in failing to discuss adequately this highly probative and potentially
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`dispositive consideration in its relocation analysis. See Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320
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`F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003).
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`Therefore, we grant the petition and remand as to Petitioners’ applications for
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`asylum and withholding of removal.4 See Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771–72 (9th
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`Cir. 2011) (holding that a BIA decision “cannot stand” where it “misstat[es] the
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`record and fail[s] to mention highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence”).
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`2.
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`To be eligible for CAT protection, an alien must show “it is more likely
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`than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
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`removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). The torture must be “inflicted by, or at the
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`instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an
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`4
`Nothing in this disposition precludes the agency from denying Petitioners’
`applications for asylum and withholding of removal on other grounds. The agency
`may also deny Petitioners’ applications again on the relocation ground with a fuller
`discussion of the relevant considerations. We intimate no view as to whether Porras
`in fact has a reasonable fear of future persecution upon removal to Colombia.
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`4
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`official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(1).
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`In this case, the agency denied Petitioners’ CAT claim because they failed to
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`establish that the Colombian government would consent or acquiesce to any future
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`torture that Petitioners feared.
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`“A government does not [consent or] acquiesce to torture where the
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`government actively, albeit not entirely successfully, combats the illegal activities.”
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`Del Cid Marroquin v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (cleaned
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`up). Here, country conditions evidence suggests that the Colombian government
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`does investigate human right abuses and violent crimes by armed groups and
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`prosecute those responsible. Petitioners’ own experience in this case also does not
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`suggest otherwise.5
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`Therefore, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Petitioners’
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`CAT claim.
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`PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
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`PART; REMANDED.6
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`5
`It is unclear from the record whether the General Prosecutor’s Office
`investigated Porras’s case, as neither Porras nor Maria followed up with the General
`Prosecutor’s Office after Porras reported the extortion.
`6
`Petitioners’ motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 3) is GRANTED.
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`5
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`24-4421
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