`
`No. 18-9507
`__________________________________________
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
`___________________________________________
`
`SIERRA CLUB,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al.,
`Respondents,
`
`____________________________________________
`STATE OF UTAH’S PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING OR
`REHEARING EN BANC
`_____________________________________________
`
`SEAN D. REYES (7969)
`Utah Attorney General
`CHRISTIAN C. STEPHENS (9068)
`MARINA V. THOMAS (11251)
`Assistant Utah Attorneys General
`Utah Attorney General’s Office
`195 North 1950 West, P.O. Box 140873
`Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0873
`Telephone: (801) 536-0290
`Counsel for Intervenor State of Utah
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`Appellate Case: 18-9507 Document: 010110411686 Date Filed: 09/22/2020 Page: 2
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`Table of Contents
`FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 35(B) STATEMENT ............... 1
`
`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 2
`
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................ 4
`
`I.
`
`The Opinion Directly Conflicts with the Fifth Circuit’s Decision
`Interpreting the Same EPA Order and will Spur Additional
`Conflicting Decisions ........................................................................................ 5
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
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`The Opinion and the Fifth Circuit Decision Conflict in
`Several Fundamental Ways ................................................................... 5
`
`The Opinion’s Plain Meaning Analysis Failed to Consider
`the Impact on Utah’s SIP and Fails to Give Effect to all
`Relevant Provisions of the CAA .......................................................... 8
`
`The Opinion Will Likely Result in Conflicting Federal and
`State Judicial Decisions ....................................................................... 11
`
`The Opinion Imposes Unworkable Burdens on the State
`Permitting Agency ................................................................................ 12
`
`II.
`
`Panel Rehearing is Necessary Because the Opinion
`Misapprehended the Requirements of Utah’s SIP ..................................... 14
`
`CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 16
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`ii
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`Table of Authorities
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`Cases
`Corley v. United States,
` 556 U.S. 303 (2009) .............................................................................................................. 9
`
`Env’t Integrity Project v. U.S. EPA,
` 960 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. May 29, 2020), superseded, 969 F.3d 529..................................... 4
`
`Env't Integrity Project v. U.S. EPA,
` 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2020) ..................................................................... passim
`
`Jake’s Fireworks Inc. v. Acosta,
` 893 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2018) .......................................................................................... 9
`
`Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,
` 491 U.S. 440 (1989) ....................................................................................................... 9, 12
`
`Sierra Club v. EPA,
` Case No. 18-9507 (10th Cir. Feb. 6, 2018) ....................................................................... 4
`
`Sierra Club v. Leavitt,
` 368 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2004) .......................................................................................... 6
`
`Sierra Club v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.,
` 816 F.3d 666 (10th Cir. 2016) ........................................................................................... 12
`
`U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA,
` 830 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................................ 6
`
`U.S. v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.,
` 727 F.3d 274 (3rd Cir. 2013) ............................................................................................... 6
`
`US Magnesium, LLC v. U.S. EPA,
` 690 F.3d 1157 (10th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................ 10
`
`Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
` 573 U.S. 302 (2014) .............................................................................................................. 6
`Federal Statutes
`42 U.S.C. § 7409 ........................................................................................................................ 2
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`42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) ............................................................................................................... 2
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`iii
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`42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(C) ......................................................................................................... 2
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`42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) .................................................................................................................... 2
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`42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) ............................................................................................................. 11
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`42 U.S.C. § 7661 ........................................................................................................................ 2
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`42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(5)(B) ....................................................................................................... 2
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`42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a) .................................................................................................................. 2
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`42 U.S.C. § 7661d(a) .................................................................................................................. 2
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`42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(1) ............................................................................................................ 3
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`42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2) ..................................................................................................... 3, 14
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`42 U.S.C. § 7661d(c)................................................................................................................ 13
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`42 U.S.C. § 7661f ....................................................................................................................... 2
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`Federal Regulations
`40 C.F.R. § 51.166(a)(1)-(2) ...................................................................................................... 2
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`40 C.F.R. § 51.166(a)(7) ............................................................................................................ 2
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`40 C.F.R. § 70.1(b)..................................................................................................................... 6
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`Rules
`10th Cir. R. 40.1(A) ................................................................................................................. 14
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`Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(1)(B) ................................................................................................. 1, 5
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`Fed. R. App. P. 40 ..................................................................................................................... 1
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`Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(2) .......................................................................................................... 14
`State Statutes
`Utah Code § 19-1-301.5 ............................................................................................................ 2
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`Utah Code § 63-46b-14 (1997) .............................................................................................. 10
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`Utah Code §63-46b-16 (1997) ............................................................................................... 10
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`State Regulations
`Utah Admin. Code R305-7 ...................................................................................................... 2
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`Utah Admin. Code R307-1-2.5.1(a) (1992) ......................................................................... 10
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`Utah Admin. Code R307-401-6(2)........................................................................................ 13
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`Utah Admin. Code R307-401-6(3)........................................................................................ 13
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`Federal Register
`59 Fed. Reg. 35,036 (July 8, 1994) ........................................................................................ 10
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`60 Fed. Reg. 30,192 (June 8, 1995) ......................................................................................... 2
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`v
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`FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 35(B) STATEMENT
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`This proceeding presents questions of exceptional importance because the July
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`2, 2020 panel decision (Opinion) conflicts with authoritative decisions of other United
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`States Courts of Appeals and invalidates provisions in Utah’s EPA-approved state
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`implementation plan (SIP) by allowing untimely challenges not contemplated by the
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`Clean Air Act (CAA). The Opinion conflicts directly with the Fifth Circuit’s decision
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`in Environmental Integrity Project v. United States EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. Aug. 13,
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`2020), which interpreted the same EPA order at issue in this case, and more broadly
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`with decisions of other circuits. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(1)(B) (establishing standard
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`for en banc review). Because the Opinion permits substantive re-reviews of previous
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`permitting decisions, Utah now must defend a permit approval decided 23 years ago
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`and will be saddled with similar challenges for which neither the CAA Title V nor the
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`Opinion provide any guidance.
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`Further, the panel misapprehended how Utah’s SIP must be integrated with
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`Title I and Title V of the CAA, and what Utah’s SIP requires. Specifically, the
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`Opinion overlooked the difference between the extensive procedures Title I requires
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`through Utah’s SIP for major New Source Review and the much more limited review
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`and timeline provided under Title V. See Fed. R. App. P. 40 (establishing standard for
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`panel rehearing).
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`1
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`INTRODUCTION
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`The CAA’s Title I New Source Review (NSR) program requires states to enact
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`a program for new sources of air pollution to apply for state preconstruction permits.
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`42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(C). Upon EPA approval, the preconstruction permit program
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`becomes part of the state’s SIP—the state plan that provides a roadmap for
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`complying with the federal air quality standards. Id.; see also id. §§ 7409, 7410(a)(1).
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`According to Title I and EPA regulations, new or modified sources below
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`certain emissions thresholds will be considered minor and those above those
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`thresholds will be considered major. See id. § 7479(1); 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.166(a)(7),
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`51.166(a)(1)-(2). In Utah, Title I NSR permitting decisions are subject to public notice
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`and comment, administrative appeals, and state judicial review. Utah Code § 19-1-
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`301.5; Utah Admin. Code R305-7.
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`In 1990 Congress enacted Title V, which established an “operating permit”
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`program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-61f. An operating permit compiles in one document all
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`the “applicable requirements” for that facility. Id. § 7661c(a). These include applicable
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`SIP requirements and federal regulations, and the applicable requirements of all CAA
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`preconstruction permits already obtained under the NSR program. Id. Title V permits
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`must be renewed every five years. See id. § 7661a(b)(5)(B).
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`Utah has an EPA-approved Title V program. See 60 Fed. Reg. 30,192 (June 8,
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`1995) (approval of Utah program). Under this program Utah submits the proposed
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`permit to EPA, Id. § 7661d(a), and EPA has 45 days to object to the permit, id. §
`2
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`7661d(b)(1). If EPA objects, the state must address the objection. Id. § 7661d(b)(1).
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`Lack of EPA objection triggers a new 60-day period in which anyone may petition the
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`Administrator to object based upon issues raised during the state’s legally required
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`public comment process. Id. § 7661d(b)(2). The EPA Administrator has 60 days to
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`grant or deny a petition. Id.
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`During the state comment period for the Hunter Title V permit renewal in
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`2015, Sierra Club contended for the first time1 that Utah improperly issued a minor
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`source NSR permit to PacifiCorp’s Hunter Plant in 1997 rather than a major source
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`permit. See JA006-7. Utah responded that Title V permitting is not the appropriate
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`place to address previous NSR permitting actions where those issues could have been
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`addressed at the time. See JA008. Utah submitted the 2015 Title V permit renewal to
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`EPA on January 11, 2016, and EPA did not object. See JA006-7. Sierra Club then
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`sought EPA’s objection, raising the same 1997 NSR preconstruction permitting
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`allegations. See id.
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`On October 16, 2017, EPA issued an order2 (Hunter Order) denying Sierra
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`Club’s petition. JA001-038. On February 6, 2018, Petitioner Sierra Club filed a
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`petition for review in this Court. See Sierra Club v. EPA, Case No. 18-9507 (10th Cir.
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`1 There is no evidence that Sierra Club contested the minor source NSR permit in
`1997, nor the original Title V permit issued in 1998.
`2 In the Matter of PacifiCorp Energy Hunter Power Plant, Order on Petition No.
`VIII-2016-4 (Oct. 16, 2017), (JA001-038), notice of which was published at 82 Fed.
`Reg. 58,196 (Dec. 11, 2017).
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`
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`3
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`Feb. 6, 2018). After briefing and oral argument, but before the panel’s decision issued
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`on March 29, 2020, the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion in Environmental Integrity Project,
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`969 F.3d at 534, which also interpreted the Hunter Order in a challenge regarding a
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`Texas ExxonMobil plant Title V permit.3 Granting Skidmore deference, the Fifth
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`Circuit concluded that the EPA’s reasoning in the Hunter Order was persuasive. Id.,
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`969 F.3d at 540. On June 1, 2020 Utah and PacifiCorp submitted the Fifth Circuit
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`decision to the panel in this case as supplemental authority. EPA submitted the same
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`decision as supplemental authority on June 2, 2020. However, on July 2, 2020, the
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`panel rejected EPA’s reasoning and the Fifth Circuit’s holding, vacated the Hunter
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`Order, and remanded the matter to EPA.
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`Contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the panel concluded that the issue of
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`what Title I requirements apply to a source under 40 C.F.R. § 70.2 (Section 70.2) “is
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`not ambiguous” and “unmistakably requires that each Title V permit include all
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`requirements in the state implementation plan, including Utah’s requirement for
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`major NSR.” Opinion at 16.
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`ARGUMENT
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`Rehearing en banc in this case is warranted because the case presents a
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`question of exceptional importance. The Opinion conflicts with the Fifth Circuit’s
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`3 The Fifth Circuit issued its original opinion on May 29, 2020, see Env’t Integrity Project
`v. U.S. EPA, 960 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. May 29, 2020), superseded, 969 F.3d 529, and a
`slightly revised opinion on August 13, 2020, see Env’t Integrity Project, 969 F.3d 529.
`4
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`decision interpreting the same EPA order on the same issue and will lead to
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`conflicting state and federal appellate decisions. The panel’s analysis also did not
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`consider the impact its judgment would have on Utah’s obligations under the CAA.
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`Alternatively, panel rehearing should be granted because the Opinion misapprehends
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`the language of Section 70.2 and the application of major NSR.
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`I.
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`The Opinion Directly Conflicts with the Fifth Circuit’s Decision
`Interpreting the Same EPA Order and will Spur Additional
`Conflicting Decisions
`A conflict with authoritative decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals
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`is an issue of exceptional importance. Fed. R. App. P. 35(b)(1)(B). The Opinion here
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`conflicts with a recent Fifth Circuit decision that interpreted the same EPA order and
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`was persuaded by EPA’s position that “Title V permitting is not the appropriate
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`vehicle for reexamining the substantive validity of underlying Title I preconstruction
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`permits.” Env’t Integrity Project, 969 F.3d at 546.
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`A.
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`The Opinion and the Fifth Circuit Decision Conflict in Several
`Fundamental Ways
`The question before the Tenth and the Fifth Circuits was the same as presented
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`by the Hunter Order itself: does the Title V permit process allow a person to contest
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`previous substantive preconstruction permitting decisions made under the Title I
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`program? See Hunter Order at JA008 (the “fundamental issue [is] whether decisions
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`made during previous preconstruction permitting . . . should be reconsidered when
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`issuing or renewing a title V operating permit”); see also Env’t Integrity Project, 969 F.3d
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`5
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`at 541 (“we inquire into the persuasiveness of EPA’s current view that the Title V
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`permitting process does not require substantive reevaluation of the underlying Title I
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`preconstruction permits applicable to a pollution source”). The Opinion instead relies
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`heavily on the panel’s interpretation of Section 70.2. See Opinion at 2 (“This petition
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`involves interpretation of an environmental regulation addressing the renewal of
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`permits under Title V of the Clean Air Act.”).
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`As a threshold matter, the United States Supreme Court has said, “Title V
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`generally does not impose any substantive pollution-control requirements.” Utility Air
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`Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 309 (2014). EPA’s own regulations also
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`recognize that “title V does not impose substantive new requirements.” 40 C.F.R. §
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`70.1(b). Other federal circuits also interpreted Title V this way. See, e.g., Sierra Club v.
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`Leavitt, 368 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2004); U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579,
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`597 (D.C. Cir. 2016); U.S. v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274, 280 (3rd
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`Cir. 2013).
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`Consistent with this understanding of Title V’s purpose, in Environmental
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`Integrity Project the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation that Title V does not
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`require substantive reexamination of Title I NSR permits because: (1) “Title V lacks a
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`specific textual mandate requiring the agency to revisit the Title I adequacy of
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`preconstruction permits,” 969 F.3d at 541; (2) Title V’s timelines are incompatible
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`with review of preconstruction permitting, see id. at 543-44; (3) Title I “gave EPA
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`oversight authority over preconstruction permitting only in specific ways, to do
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`specific things,” but Congress “granted no such authority” to EPA under Title V, id.
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`at 545; (4) Title I’s “permitting decisions follow state appeals or enforcement actions
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`authorized by other provisions of the Act” while “Title V contains none of the
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`procedures that would guide those challenges,” id. at 545-46; and (5) “EPA’s
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`construction of Title V ‘respects the finality’ of state preconstruction permitting
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`decisions,” id. at 546 (quoting Hunter Order at JA018).
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`The Opinion gives little consideration, if any, to these points, and tries to
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`justify this oversight by arguing that the Fifth Circuit was interpreting 42 U.S.C. §
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`7661c(a) rather than Section 70.2. Opinion at 29. However, even under the revised
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`opinion issued after denying petitions for rehearing, the Fifth Circuit stated that it
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`properly reviewed the Hunter Order on the basis of Title V, Title I, and the CAA “as
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`a whole.” See, e.g., Env’t Integrity Project, 969 F.3d at 541 (court’s inquiry is “whether
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`EPA’s interpretation of Title V in the Hunter Order is persuasive”); id. at 541 n.7
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`(notwithstanding the Hunter Order’s primary focus on the interpretation of Section
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`70.2, the court analyzed “the Hunter Order as a construction of Title V and the Act as
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`a whole”). Thus, the Fifth Circuit correctly evaluated all relevant provisions of the
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`CAA in reaching its conclusion, and indeed, the Fifth Circuit could not have found the
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`Hunter Order persuasive without reviewing EPA’s interpretation of Section 70.2.
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`As explained below, the Opinion did not follow an analytical process that
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`construes Title V and the CAA as whole, apparently based on a claim that it was
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`restricting its review to the basis that EPA itself invoked, which the panel framed as
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`only an interpretation of “applicable requirements” as defined by Section 70.2.
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`Opinion at 28-30. However, the Hunter Order itself shows that EPA did not restrict
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`its interpretation to Section 70.2; instead, it appropriately interpreted this regulation
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`together with other relevant provisions of the CAA. See JA001-5; 008-11; 013-21
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`(EPA’s review of statutory provisions of Titles I and V, 40 C.F.R. § 70.2 and its
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`regulatory history, and Utah’s SIP and Title V program). Thus, the Opinion cannot
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`reconcile its claim that EPA merely relied on Section 70.2, when the Hunter Order
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`itself exhaustively evaluates the entire statutory and regulatory scheme as support for
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`its conclusions and the Opinion does not. Accordingly, the Opinion conflicts with the
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`Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the same order within the context of the CAA as well
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`as EPA’s stated basis for the Hunter Order.
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`B. The Opinion’s Plain Meaning Analysis Failed to Consider the
`Impact on Utah’s SIP and Fails to Give Effect to all Relevant
`Provisions of the CAA
`The principal difference between Environmental Integrity Project and the Opinion
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`is that the Fifth Circuit, like EPA, properly evaluated all the relevant CAA provisions
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`bearing on the issue while the Opinion failed to reconcile the CAA with its near-
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`exclusive focus on Section 70.2. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
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`when determining whether statutory or regulatory language is plain and unambiguous,
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`it must consider whether “the literal reading of a statutory term would compel an odd
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`result,” and if it were to compel such odd result, “search for other evidence of
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`8
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`congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope.” Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of
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`Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 441 (1989) (quotations and citations omitted).
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`This Court recently stated that “when interpreting federal regulations, we apply
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`the same rules we use to interpret statutes.” Jake’s Fireworks Inc. v. Acosta, 893 F.3d
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`1248, 1261 (10th Cir. 2018) (quotation and citation omitted). This Court also has said
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`that “the plainness or ambiguity of [regulatory] language is determined by reference to
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`the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader
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`context of the [regulation] as a whole.” Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
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`The analytical rule derived from these cases is that when a court construes the
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`meaning of a statute or regulation, whether the provision at issue is plain or
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`ambiguous is inextricably linked to its place in the related statutory and regulatory
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`scheme, and the meaning cannot be plain and unambiguous if the “literal reading . . .
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`would compel an odd result.” Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 441 (quotation and citations
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`omitted).
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`The Opinion purports to employ this analysis: “[t]o assess ambiguity, we use
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`the traditional tools of construction, such as the regulatory “‘text, structure, history,
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`and purpose.”’ Opinion at 16 (quotation and citation omitted). But any application of
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`this principle must be consistent with the companion principle that the meaning of
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`one provision of the CAA cannot be plain and unambiguous if it invalidates another
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`provision or renders it superfluous or ineffective. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S.
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`303, 314 (2009) (statutory interpretation must give effect to “all [the] provisions, so
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`that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant”) (emphasis added)
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`(quotation and citation omitted).
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`The Opinion voids Utah’s SIP requirements for administrative appeal by
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`allowing them to be ignored without consequence. However, provisions of an EPA-
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`approved SIP are federal law. See US Magnesium, LLC v. U.S. EPA, 690 F.3d 1157,
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`1159 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[a]pproved SIPs are enforceable as federal law and may be
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`enforced by the state, the EPA, or individuals under the CAA citizen-suit provision”).
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`Utah’s approved SIP required anyone contesting the Hunter Plant’s 1997 permit to
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`timely appeal the permit through administrative procedures and then appeal a final
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`administrative decision in state court. See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. 35,036, 35,036 (July 8,
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`1994) (EPA approval of administrative procedures governing permit appeals); Utah
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`Admin. Code R307-1-2.5.1(a) (1992) (regulations governing permit appeals); Utah
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`Code §§ 63-46b-14, 63-46b-16 (1997) (judicial review of final agency adjudications).
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`When approving these administrative appeal procedures in Utah’s SIP, EPA
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`clearly did not contemplate that those same provisions would be merely optional for
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`those who prefer to wait to contest the terms of a Title I permit under Title V at some
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`unknown future date. Because a regulation’s meaning can be unambiguous only if it is
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`consistent with other related provisions of the CAA, regulations promulgated under
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`the CAA, and the SIPs required by and developed under those CAA provisions,
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`Section 70.2’s meaning cannot be plain if it leads to the odd result of allowing
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`unlimited Title I contests through Title V.
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`The Opinion leaves no room for Utah’s SIP provisions to co-exist with Title V.
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`The Fifth Circuit recognized this problem, finding that the Hunter Order’s
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`interpretation not only respected the internal structure of Title V and “the Act as a
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`whole,” Env’t Integrity Project, 969 F.3d at 542, but also “the finality of state
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`preconstruction permitting decisions”, id. at 546 (quotation and citation omitted). For
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`at least these reasons, en banc review is necessary to address the conflict between the
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`Opinion and the Fifth Circuit’s decision.
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`C. The Opinion Will Likely Result in Conflicting Federal and State
`Judicial Decisions
`The Opinion also creates the likelihood of conflicting state and federal
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`decisions. Under the Opinion, a person who loses a challenge to an NSR permit
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`under Utah’s approved administrative tribunals and in state appellate courts can still
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`raise the exact same facts and claims at some unknown and unlimited time later in a
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`Title V petition to object, resulting in the possibility of conflicting and irreconcilable
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`decisions.
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`Review of EPA’s decision on a petition to object occurs in the appropriate
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`federal court of appeals. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Consequently, state and federal courts
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`could review the same claims and reach different conclusions. Given the conflict
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`between the Tenth and Fifth Circuits, two conflicting lines of cases will likely evolve
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`in the federal circuits as well. The closest the Opinion came to considering these
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`potential outcomes was an acknowledgement that “Sierra Club’s petition could be
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`11
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`viewed as a collateral attack on Utah’s permitting decision in 1997,” but the panel
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`justified such attacks by claiming that even this odd result “cannot override
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`unambiguous regulatory language.” Opinion at 35. However, as the United States
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`Supreme Court has explained, the very fact that the language produces such an “odd
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`result” demonstrates it is not as unambiguous as the panel claims. See Public Citizen,
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`491 U.S. at 441.
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`But beyond collateral attacks, as in this case, a person could ignore the state
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`NSR permitting process altogether, and under the Opinion be rewarded for such
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`complacency with another opportunity some unlimited time later to bring claims for
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`the first time as an objection to the Title V permit. Again, a regulation cannot be plain
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`if it allows an unlimited time to contest NSR decisions, particularly where this Court
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`has already held that a five-year statute of limitations applies to NSR citizen
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`enforcement actions. See Sierra Club v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 816 F.3d 666, 671
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`(10th Cir. 2016) (applying default statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 to CAA
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`citizen suit under the NSR Prevention of Significant Deterioration program).
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`D. The Opinion Imposes Unworkable Burdens on the State
`Permitting Agency
`If EPA remands a Title V permit to Utah based on older NSR decisions, like
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`Title V itself, the Opinion offers no guidance on how to perform the expected review.
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`Again, having reviewed the Opinion, the Fifth Circuit recognized this problem and
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`determined that “Title V lacks a specific textual mandate requiring the agency to
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`Appellate Case: 18-9507 Document: 010110411686 Date Filed: 09/22/2020 Page: 18
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`revisit the Title I adequacy of preconstruction permits. Our own review of Title V
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`confirms that it contains no such explicit requirement, nor any language guiding the agency
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`on how to perform a review of that nature.” Env’t Integrity Project, 969 F.3d at 541 (emphasis
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`added).
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`Federal statute requires that upon remand either by EPA or by EPA upon
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`granting a petition to object, the state must resolve Title V permit issues within 90
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`days. 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(c). Lacking any express guidance in Title V, Utah assumes but
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`does not concede that any remand would first follow Utah’s NSR process. But this
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`approach shows the unworkability of the Opinion’s interpretation of Section 70.2.
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`Specifically, any resolution of NSR claims raised under Title V would presumably first
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`require new state NSR permitting to resolve the underlying NSR provisions, and Utah
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`law gives the state agency only 90 days to either approve or disapprove an NSR
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`permit application. Utah Admin. Code R307-401-6(2). Although the agency may
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`extend that period up to another 90 days, see id. R307-401-6(3), that 90-day clock
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`begins only when an application is deemed complete, see id. R307-401-6(2).
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`Because the federal 90-day period is fixed in federal statute, it is simply
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`unreasonable to provide only 90 or even 180 days to accommodate the permittee’s
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`preparation of a new application, agency review and preparation of a draft permit,
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`public notice and comment, review of comments, any additional agency review, and
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`issuance of a new NSR permit whose terms will be incorporated into a new Title V
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`permit to cure the alleged NSR defects. And the fixed federal 90-day period does not
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`Appellate Case: 18-9507 Document: 010110411686 Date Filed: 09/22/2020 Page: 19
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`account for possible appeals of permitting decisions under Utah law. The Fifth Circuit
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`agreed with EPA that the timelines imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2) are
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`“‘inconsistent with an in-depth and searching review of every’ permitting decision
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`regarding a given source.” Env’t Integrity Project, 969 F.3d at 544 (quoting Hunter Order
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`at JA016). The Opinion also implicitly assumes that the agency has access to the
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`records and staff from the previous NSR review, which becomes increasingly difficult
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`for decisions made many years ago. The Opinion considered none of these odd
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`results, all of which clearly demonstrate that Section 70.2 cannot be unambiguous.
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`The only sensible answer is that Section 70.2 cannot be interpreted to impose on Utah
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`this procedural, technical, and legal morass.
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`Consequently, the existence of these conflicts presents a question of
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`exceptional importance that justifies en banc rehearing.
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`II.
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`Panel Rehearing is Necessary Because the Opinion Misapprehended
`the Requirements of Utah’s SIP
`Under Rule 40 of the Federal Rul