Case 2:21-cv-00516-DAO Document 2 Filed 08/31/21 PageID.2 Page 1 of 16
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`Brian S. King, #4610
`Brent J. Newton, #6950
`Samuel M. Hall, #16066
`BRIAN S. KING, P.C.
`420 East South Temple, Suite 420
`Salt Lake City, UT 84111
`Telephone: (801) 532-1739
`Facsimile: (801) 532-1936
`brian@briansking.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs
`
`THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
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`C.S., individually and on behalf of J.S., a
`minor
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`COMPLAINT
`
`Plaintiffs,
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`Case No. 2:21-cv-00516-DAO
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`vs.
`
`BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF RHODE
`ISLAND and BEACON HEALTH OPTIONS
`
`Defendants.
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`Plaintiff C.S., individually and on behalf of J.S. a minor, through his undersigned
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`counsel, complains and alleges against Defendants Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rhode Island
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`(“BCBSRI”), and Beacon Health Options (“Beacon”) as follows:
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`PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`1. C.S. and J.S. are natural persons residing in Fulton County, Georgia. C.S. is J.S.’s father.
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`2. BCBSRI is an insurance company headquartered in Providence, Rhode Island and was
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`the third-party claims administrator for the insurance plan providing coverage for the
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`Plaintiffs (“the Plan”) duing the treatment at issue. BCBSRI acted as the claims
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`administrator, as well as the fiduciary, under ERISA for the Plan during the treatment at
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`issue in this case.
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`3. BCBSRI delegated many of its appeal processing duties to Beacon, an insurance
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`company focused on behavioral health claims headquarted in Boston, Massachusetts.
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`4. The Plan is a fully insured employee welfare benefits plan under 29 U.S.C. §1001 et.
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`seq., the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). C.S. was a
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`participant in the Plan and J.S. was a beneficiary of the Plan at all relevant times. C.S.
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`and J.S. continue to be participants and beneficiaries of the Plan.
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`5. J.S. received medical care and treatment at Change Academy at Lake of the Ozarks
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`(“CALO”) from September 14, 2018 to October 21, 2019. CALO is a licensed treatment
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`facility located in Camden County, Missouri, which provides sub-acute inpatient
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`treatment to adolescents with mental health, behavioral, and/or substance abuse
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`problems.
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`6. BCBSRI, acting in its own capacity or through its affiliate Beacon, denied claims for
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`payment of J.S.’s medical expenses in connection with her treatment at CALO.
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`7. This Court has jurisdiction over this case under 29 U.S.C. §1132(e)(1) and 28 U.S.C.
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`§1331.
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`8. Venue is appropriate under 29 U.S.C. §1132(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. §1391(c) based on
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`ERISA’s nationwide service of process and venue provisions, because the Defendants do
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`business in Utah and across the United States. In addition, venue in Utah will save the
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`Plaintiffs costs in litigating this case. Finally, in light of the sensitive nature of the
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`medical treatment at issue, it is the Plaintiffs’ desire that the case be resolved in the State
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`of Utah where it is more likely their privacy will be preserved.
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`9. The remedies the Plaintiffs seek under the terms of ERISA and under the Plan are for the
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`benefits due under the terms of the Plan, and pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B), for
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`appropriate equitable relief under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(3) based on the Defendants’
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`violation of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (“MHPAEA”),
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`an award of prejudgment interest, and an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to 29
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`U.S.C. §1132(g).
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`BACKGROUND FACTS
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`J.S.’s Developmental History and Medical Background
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`10. J.S. was born in China and lived in a state-run orphanage for her first 11 months. J.S.
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`received very little interaction or care during these months because there was only one
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`caregiver for many children. It is believed that J.S. was severely neglected except for
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`basic physical needs during this time.
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`11. In August of 2005, J.S. was adopted and moved to Georgia. During her first two years
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`she developed normally, at least physically, but other milestones such as when she started
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`talking were delayed.
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`12. When J.S. did start to speak, she only spoke to her family and showed severe anxiety and
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`extreme shyness when addressing others.
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`13. She had a hard time falling asleep as a child and required her mother to lie with her in
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`order to fall asleep and refused to move her own bed from her parents’ room.
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`14. She would cry every night as a child. J.S. was also hyper-vigilant and would wake up
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`regularly to see if her parents were still there.
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`15. J.S.’s parents took her to several developmental pediatricians, occupational therapists,
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`and other paractioners to try and diagnose her challenges. These doctors diagnosed her
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`with mild Autism and Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD).
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`16. J.S. attended a private school starting in 2009. She was scared to go to preschool and
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`cried a lot, but eventually settled in. J.S.’s “normal” was to be continually anxious about
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`attending school.
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`17. When J.S attended kindergarten, things became harder. J.S. had such intense anxiety that
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`she decided she didn’t want to “walk” for her kindergarten graduation because she didn’t
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`want so many people to look at her. She also did not want to play organized sports, but
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`finally agreed to play as long as her parents and family didn’t watch. J.S. eventually quit
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`organized sports all together.
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`18. When J.S. entered first grade, both she and her sister began attending the same public
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`school. J.S. was very attached and reliant on her sister and tried to make her “represent”
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`her and do any sort of talking for her.
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`19. As J.S. got older, she started to exhibit irrational fears that she continues to present, such
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`as doctors, dentists, or haircuts. At one point, J.S.’s parents tried to get her a haircut
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`because her hair had grown all the way down her back and J.S. physically fought to get
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`out of the salon.
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`20. J.S.’s behaviors became more resistant as she got older. Her doctor had to come to the car
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`to see her for appointments.
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`21. By the time J.S. was in fourth grade, she developed a strong motivation to be perfect in
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`school. J.S. started crying every day and disrupting class. She would sometimes spend
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`whole days in the counselor’s office. In November of 2014, J.S. starting to see a
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`psychiatrist again and was taken out of school.
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`22. The psychiatrist prescribed a few medications but ultimately could not get J.S. to talk and
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`a few months later J.S. switched to another psychiatrist.
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`23. Over the years, J.S.’s two psychiatrists prescribed many different medications but nothing
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`helped.
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`24. Between fourth and seventh grade, J.S. attended nine different schools. In November of
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`2016, after J.S. had a severe breakdown at a private school, her parents enrolled her at a
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`therapeutic school called the Cottage School. J.S. still had issues but having trained
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`therapists on staff helped her significantly.
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`25. Although J.S. continued to struggle with staying in a school, she developed strong
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`aspirations to attend an Ivy League college. Her desire to be perfect intensified which
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`increased her anxiety dramatically.
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`26. Eventually, J.S. started wearing the same clothes every day and resisting self-care such as
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`brushing her hair and showering. Upon the advice of J.S.’s psychiatrist and therapist, her
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`parents began to research residential treatment options for J.S.
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`27. After five years of switching schools, throwing tantrums where she would refuse to leave
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`her room for days at a time, hiding under a blanket, experiencing severe anxiety attacks,
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`trying countless medications that never worked, working with psychiatrists and
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`therapists, and speaking about hating her life, J.S.’s parents and doctors decided that she
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`must attend a residential treatment program to assist her in getting the assistance she so
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`clearly needed. Her parents researched facilities for nearly half a year before making the
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`decision to send J.S. to CALO.
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`CALO
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`28. J.S. was admitted to CALO on September 14, 2018.
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`29. On March 19, 2019, Beacon sent J.S. a denial letter for services at CALO from
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`September 14, 2018 forward. This denial letter states,
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`“Based upon the information provided, a Beacon doctor has decided that
`the treatment requested for residential mental health treatment, revenue
`code 1001, from 9.14.18 to 2/28/19, does not meet our guidelines for
`coverage, therefore we are unable to approve this request for coverage…
`You are a 14 year old female who was admitted to residential mental
`health treatment on 9/14/18, due to exhibiting controlling behaviors that
`were affecting your education and relationships. You were anxious about
`school and experiencing mood swings. You were not exhibiting any
`behavioral concerns that required 24 hour a day support. Therefore, as of
`9/14/18, it was not medically necessary to manage your condition with
`residential mental health treatment with 24 hour a day supervision. Your
`care could have been safely and effectively addressed with intensive
`outpatient mental health treatment which typically meets 3 days a week,
`for 3 hours each time, while residing with your family” (emphasis in
`original).
`
`30. On September 4, 2019, C.S. submitted a level one appeal to Beacon with attention to
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`BCBSRI.
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`31. C.S. quoted ERISA, stating that BCBSRI was obligated to provide C.S. with certain
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`rights, such as:
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`[p]rovid[ing] a review that takes into account all comments, documents, records,
`and other information submitted by the claimant related to the claim, without
`regard to whether such information was submitted or considered in the initial
`benefit determination.
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`C.S. stated that,
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`It is imperative that you comply with this regulation as it is the only way you can
`fully understand the complexities of [J.S.]’s mental illnesses and need for
`treatment.
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`32. C.S. went on to talk about J.S.’ previous mental health history as noted in the
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`“Background” section of this complaint.
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`33. C.S. stated that it was because of the advice of J.S.’s psychiatrist and therapist that he
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`looked into residential t reatment options in the first place. In a letter dated July 24, 2019,
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`Dr. Hanevold Ph.D. states,
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`Outpatient treatment in combination with a school program designed for
`youngsters with special needs was not an effective intervention program.
`Placement in an Intensive Attachment focused residential treatment program was
`recommended as a medical necessity to help this youngster move to healing and
`reach her optimal potential. Referral to Intensive Level Attachment Focused
`Treatment residential treatment centers was recommended for the next stage of
`treatment. (Programs such as CALO).
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`34. C.S. stated that he saw a dramatic change in his daughter’s behavior and mood during her
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`treatment at CALO. C.S. argued that it was clear J.S.’s treatment was effective, as she
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`was allowed on a home visit and did not have any significant breakdowns, violence,
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`property damage, or any similar behaviors that he was seeing prior to J.S.’s treatment at
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`CALO.
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`35. In addition, C.S. was able to ask J.S. to go to the orthodontist on another home visit. J.S.
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`went in for the consult and then had braces put on all in one visit. This is something C.S.
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`was amazed by and held up as as an example of how imperative the treatment at CALO
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`was to J.S.
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`36. The appeal quoted a therapy note from September 17, 2018, early on in J.S.’s time at
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`CALO.
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`The session focused primarily on engaging in co-regulation with [J.S]. Staff have
`reported she has cried all weekend wanting calls with her parents. TH provided
`safe touch, utilizing empathy, playfulness and acceptance. [J.S.] was able to stop
`cying and engage in dialog with TH – she did ask pertinent questions.
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`37. The appeal included documentation from a psychiatrist appointment on October 16,
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`2018, where it is stated that J.S.’s symptoms are, “Difficulty staying asleep, Irritability,
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`Anxiety, anxiety attacks (one since her enrollment,) Closes left eye a lot, Taps her fingers
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`Case 2:21-cv-00516-DAO Document 2 Filed 08/31/21 PageID.9 Page 8 of 16
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`against her opposite hand quite often.” And that her behaviors and risk factors were,
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`“social isolation, defiance, disorded eating, difficulty making eye contact, consistent
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`crying.”
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`38. C.S. included J.S.’s medical records from September 14, 2018 through August 28, 2019
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`and letters of medical necessity in the appeal.
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`39. On September 16, 2019, Beacon sent J.S. another denial letter which stated nearly the
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`exact same denial rational as before, but only addressed treatment dates from September
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`14, 2018 to February 28, 2019. However, C.S.’s level one appeal addressed dates of
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`service from September 14, 2018 forward.
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`40. This second denial letter prompted C.S. to submit a level two appeal on October 24,
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`2019, addressing J.S.’s full dates of service from September 14, 2018 through October
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`21, 2019.
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`41. In C.S.’s Level two appeal, he included the entirety of his Level 1 appeal, and also over
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`one thousand pages of J.S.’s medical records from her time at CALO, and a
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`psychoeducational evaluation dated September 5, 2019 completed by Russel Hyken,
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`PhD, EdSp, MA, LPC, LCMHC, NCC.
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`42. In a daily note from September 9, 2019 CALO staff wrote, “Self-Care: [J.S.] did display
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`issues with food for this shift. Refused to eat [sic.] [J.S.] did display issues with her
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`hygiene. Refused to shower, Refused to wash hair” sic.
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`43. Notes from an individual therapy session from September 11, 2019 state,
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`Today’s session focused primarily on discussion of discharge wrap up activities,
`learning emotion regulation skills that will help her at home and her commitment
`to engaging in those activities. [J.S.] was engaged, and participated in more
`dyadic dialog with TH than in sessions past. We did discuss possible concerning
`scenarios when she gets home, she engaged and was able to answer the questions.
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`44. J.S. was still struggling after almost a year at CALO, but C.S. argued that she was
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`progressing.
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`45. A treatment plan update on August 31, 2019 stated,
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`[J.S.] has shown less resistance to therapy and engaged a bit more verbally during
`her sessions…We have talked a bit more candidly regarding her social
`interactions with peers and her ability to be a positive influence with peers and her
`team. [J.S.] continues to have an unrealistic sense of self, often at times and
`inflated sense of who she is and how she presents herself with others…
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`On-Going Discharge Planning – Continued focus on short term goals as we
`progress to long term goals. Currently [J.S.] continues to demonstrate behaviors
`that require the safety and structure of residential care.
`• Continued emotional dysregulation – extreme tearfulness and
`unresponsiveness to staff who try and co-regulate with her, this has
`lessened in frequency…
`• Unhealthy hypervigilance on academic achievement as well as academic
`complaints
`• Difficulty with social relationships appropriate to her age and
`developmental level
`• Extreme variability in her cognitive functioning
`• Emotional construction and blunted effect
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`46. C.S. pointed out that CALO was consistently monitoring J.S.’ progress and checking in
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`on her ability to discharge.
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`47. On November 7, 2019, Beacon sent a denial letter for September 14, 2018 through
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`February 28, 2019, stating that,
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`revenue code 1001, cannot be certified from 09/14/2018 to 02/28/2019…At the
`time of admission, you were experiencing anxiety regarding attending school and
`at times not attending school along with symptoms of depression in which you
`would isolate yourself from others. You were not exhibiting any behavioral or
`verbal outbursts that required 24 hour support. Therefore, as of 09/14/19, it was
`not medically necessary to manage your symptoms with residential mental health
`treatment… This decision is based on Beacon Health Options Clincial Criteria for
`NMNC 2.202.04 Residential Treatment Services (RTS) Residiental Treatment
`Service, and the terms of the member’s plan as outlined in the Suscriber
`Agreement/benefit booklet.
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`48. Beacon sent another letter on November 15, 2019, denying J.S.’s treatment at CALO
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`from February 28, 2019 through October 21, 2019. The denial rational from Beacon was,
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`a Beacon doctor has decided that the treatment requested for Residential mental
`health treatment, revenue code 1001, from 02/28/2019 to 10/21/2019, does not
`meet our guidelines for coverage, therefore we are unable to approve this request
`for coverage… You did not have any medical or mental health concerns that
`required 24 hour support. Therefore, as of 02/28/2019, it was not medically
`necessary to manage your symptoms with residental mental health treatment
`(emphasis in original).
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`49. On February 17, 2020 Plaintiffs submitted an additional level one appeal addressing
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`service from February 28, 2019 through October 21, 2019. In this appeal C.S. stated how
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`Beacon violated ERISA and MHPAEA and showed Beacon that J.S.’s treatment was
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`medically necessary. C.S., again, included over one thousand pages of medical records in
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`the appeal.
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`50. On March 5, 2020 Beacon sent Plaintiffs another denial letter again reusing the same
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`denial reason as previous letters.
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`51. On March 27, 2020 C.S. submitted a level two Appeal for treatment from February 28,
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`2019 through October 21, 2019. This appeal included all of the three previous appeals,
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`making the case as clear as C.S. could that J.S.’s treatment was medically necessary and
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`that Beacon and BCBSRI violated the terms of the Plan, ERISA and MHPAEA.
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`52. The Plaintiffs exhausted their pre-litigation appeal obligations under the terms of the Plan
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`and ERISA.
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`53. The denial of benefits for J.S.’s treatment was a breach of contract and caused C.S. to
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`incur medical expenses that should have been paid by the Plan in an amount totaling over
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`$239,000.
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`54. Defendants failed to produce a copy of the medical necessity criteria for mental health
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`and substance use disorder treatment and for skilled nursing or rehabilitation facilities in
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`spite of C.S.’s request.
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`FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
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`(Claim for Recovery of Benefits Under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B))
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`55. ERISA imposes higher-than-marketplace quality standards on insurers and plan
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`administrators. It sets forth a special standard of care upon plan fiduciaries such as
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`BCBSRI and Beacon, acting as agents of the Plan, to “discharge [its] duties in respect to
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`claims processing solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries” of the Plan.
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`29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1).
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`56. Defendants failed to provide coverage for J.S.’s treatment in violation of the express
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`terms of the Plan, which promise benefits to employees and their dependents for
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`medically necessary treatment of mental health and substance use disorders.
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`57. ERISA also underscores the particular importance of accurate claims processing and
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`evaluation by requiring that administrators provide a “full and fair review” of claim
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`denials and to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the Plaintiffs in the pre-litigation
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`appeal process. 29 U.S.C. §1133(2).
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`58. The denial letters produced by Beacon do little to elucidate whether defendants
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`conducted a meaningful analysis of the Plaintiffs’ appeals or whether it provided them
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`with the “full and fair review” to which they are entitled. Defendants failed to
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`substantively respond to the issues presented in C.S.’s appeals and did not meaningfully
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`address the arguments or concerns that the Plaintiffs raised during the appeals process.
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`//
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`59. In fact, Beacon’s denial letters rely on formulaic recitations and do not address the
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`arguments raised by C.S. in any capacity.
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`60. Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to J.S. when they failed to comply with their
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`obligations under 29 U.S.C. §1104 and 29 U.S.C. §1133 to act solely in J.S.’s interest and
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`for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to ERISA participants and beneficiaries,
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`to produce copies of relevant documents and information to claimants upon request, and
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`to provide a full and fair review of J.S.’s claims.
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`61. The actions of defendants in failing to provide coverage for J.S.’s medically necessary
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`treatment are a violation of the terms of the Plan and its medical necessity criteria.
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`SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
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`(Claim for Violation of MHPAEA Under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(3))
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`62. MHPAEA is incorporated into ERISA and is enforceable by ERISA participants and
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`beneficiaries as a requirement of both ERISA and MHPAEA. The obligation to comply
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`with both ERISA and MHPAEA is part of Defendants’ fiduciary duties.
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`63. Generally speaking, MHPAEA requires ERISA plans to provide no less generous
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`coverage for treatment of mental health and substance use disorders than they provide for
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`treatment of medical/surgical disorders.
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`64. MHPAEA prohibits ERISA plans from imposing treatment limitations on mental health
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`or substance use disorder benefits that are more restrictive than the predominant
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`treatment limitations applied to substantially all medical and surgical benefits and also
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`makes illegal separate treatment limitations that are applicable only with respect to
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`mental health or substance use disorder benefits. 29 U.S.C.§1185a(a)(3)(A)(ii).
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`65. Impermissible nonquantitative treatment limitations under MHPAEA include, but are not
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`limited to, medical management standards limiting or excluding benefits based on
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`medical necessity; refusal to pay for higher-cost treatment until it can be shown that a
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`lower-cost treatment is not effective; and restrictions based on geographic location,
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`facility type, provider specialty, or other criteria that limit the scope or duration of
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`benefits for mental health or substance use disorder treatment. 29 C.F.R.
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`§2590.712(c)(4)(ii)(A), (F), and (H).
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`66. The explicit language of the SPD, one of the governing plan documents, state that the
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`Defendants “are appropriate with regard to generally accepted standards of medical
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`practice within the medical community or scientific evidence” when evaluating the
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`medical necessity of treatment for purposes of evaluating coverage under the Plan of
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`mental health claims.
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`67. The medical necessity criteria used by Defendants for the intermediate level mental
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`health treatment benefits at issue in this case are more stringent or restrictive than the
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`medical necessity criteria the Plan applies to analogous intermediate levels of medical or
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`surgical benefits.
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`68. In addition, the level of care applied by Defendants failed to take into consideration
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`J.S.’s previous history of being in her home environment, as well as the risk of decline
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`or relapse if less intensive care than what was medically necessary was provided.
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`Generally accepted standards of medical practice for medical and surgical rehabilitation
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`under the Plan take into consideration safety issues and considerations of preventing
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`decline or relapse when admission into an intermediate care facility, such as a skilled
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`nursing or rehabilitation facility, is approved.
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`69. Comparable benefits offered by the Plan for medical/surgical treatment analogous to the
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`benefits the Plan excluded for J.S.’s treatment include sub-acute inpatient treatment
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`settings such as skilled nursing facilities, inpatient hospice care, and rehabilitation
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`facilities. For none of these types of treatment does BCBSRI exclude or restrict coverage
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`of medical/surgical conditions by imposing restrictions such as an acute care requirement
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`for a sub-acute level of care because doing so would violate not only the terms of the
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`insurance contract, but also generally accepted standards of medical practice.
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`70. When Defendants receive claims for intermediate level treatment of medical and surgical
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`conditions, they provide benefits and pay the claims as outlined in the terms of the Plan
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`based on generally accepted standards of medical practice. Defendants evaluated J.S.’s
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`mental health claims using medical necessity criteria that deviate from generally accepted
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`standards of medical practice. This process resulted in a disparity because the Plan denied
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`coverage for mental health benefits when the analogous levels of medical or surgical
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`benefits would have been paid.
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`71. As another example of the Plan’s improper application of its criteria to evaluate the
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`treatment J.S. received, the Defendants relied on assertions such as “your care could have
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`been safely addressed with outpatient mental health treatment that included individual
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`and family therapy, along with medication management” as a justification to deny
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`treatment. In fact, J.S. had tried outpatient treatment and medication for many years prior
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`to her admission to CALO which serves as an indicator rather than a contra-indicator of
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`the medical necessity of treatment in a non-acute residential setting.
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`72. In this manner, the Defendants violate 29 C.F.R. §2590.712(c)(4)(i) because the terms of
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`the Plan and the medical necessity criteria utilized by Defendants, as written or in
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`Case 2:21-cv-00516-DAO Document 2 Filed 08/31/21 PageID.16 Page 15 of 16
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`operation, use processes, strategies, evidentiary standards, or other factors to limit
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`coverage for mental health or substance use disorder treatment in a way that is
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`inconsistent with, and more stringently applied, than the processes, strategies, standards
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`or other factors used to limit coverage for medical/surgical treatment in the same
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`classification.
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`73. Defendants did not produce the documents the Plaintiffs requested to evaluate medical
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`necessity and MHPAEA compliance, nor did they address in any substantive capacity the
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`Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were not in compliance with MHPAEA.
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`74. The violations of MHPAEA by Defendants are breaches of fiduciary duty and also give
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`the Plaintiffs the right to obtain appropriate equitable remedies as provided under 29
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`U.S.C. §1132(a)(3) including, but not limited to:
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`(a) A declaration that the actions of the Defendants violate MHPAEA;
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`(b) An injunction ordering the Defendants to cease violating MHPAEA and requiring
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`compliance with the statute;
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`(c) An order requiring the reformation of the terms of the Plan and the medical necessity
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`criteria utilized by the Defendants to interpret and apply the terms of the Plan to
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`ensure compliance with MHPAEA;
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`(d) An order requiring disgorgement of funds obtained by or retained by the Defendants
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`as a result of their violations of MHPAEA;
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`(e) An order requiring an accounting by the Defendants of the funds wrongly withheld by
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`each Defendant from participants and beneficiaries of the Plan as a result of the
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`Defendants’ violations of MHPAEA;
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`15
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`Case 2:21-cv-00516-DAO Document 2 Filed 08/31/21 PageID.17 Page 16 of 16
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`(f) An order based on the equitable remedy of surcharge requiring the Defendants to
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`provide payment to the Plaintiffs as make-whole relief for their loss;
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`(g) An order equitably estopping the Defendants from denying the Plaintiffs’ claims in
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`violation of MHPAEA; and
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`(h) An order providing restitution from the Defendants to the Plaintiffs for their loss
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`arising out of the Defendants’ violation of MHPAEA.
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`75. In addition, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of prejudgment interest pursuant to U.C.A.
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`§15-1-1, and attorney fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)
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`WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs seek relief as follows:
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`1.
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`Judgment in the total amount that is owed for J.S.’s medically necessary treatment at
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`CALO under the terms of the Plan, plus pre and post-judgment interest to the date of
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`payment;
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`Appropriate equitable relief under 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(3) as outlined in Plaintiffs’
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`Second Cause of Action;
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`Attorney fees and costs incurred pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132(g); and
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`For such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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`DATED this 31st day of August, 2021.
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`By s/ Brian S. King
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`Brian S. King
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`Attorney for Plaintiffs
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`County of Plaintiffs’ Residence:
`Fulton County, Georgia
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`16
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