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FILED IN THE
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

Jul 07, 2020

SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

13 Plaintiff,

14 v.

15 LI XIAOYU (a/k/a “Oro0lxy”) and
16 DONG JIAZHI,

17 Defendants.

4:20-CR-6019-SMJ

18 INDICTMENT

19 Vio.: 18 U.S.C. §§ 371,
1030(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),
(a)(5)(A)
Conspiracy to Access Without
Authorization and Damage
Computers (Count 1)

20 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1-3),
21 1832(a)(5)
22 Conspiracy to Commit Theft of
23 Trade Secrets (Count 2)

24 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B),
25 (a)(2)(C), (b), (c)(2)(B)(i-iii)
26 Unauthorized Access to
Computers (Count 3)

27 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1343,
28 Conspiracy to Commit Wire
Fraud (Count 4)

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18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A, 2
Aggravated Identity Theft
(Counts 5-11)

Criminal Forfeiture Allegations
18 U.S.C. §§ 982(a)(2)(B),
1030(i)(1)

The Grand Jury charges:

At all times relevant to this Indictment, unless otherwise stated:

INTRODUCTION

1. Beginning no later than September 2009 and continuing until at least
the date of this Indictment, together, Defendants LI XIAOYU (a/k/a “Oro0lxy”)
(hereinafter “LI” and/or “LI XIAOYU”) and DONG JIAZHI (hereinafter “DONG”
and/or “DONG JIAZHI”) and collectively the “Defendants,” each a hacker in the
People’s Republic of China (“China” or “PRC”), gained unauthorized access to
computers around the world and stole terabytes of data.

2. LI and DONG, former classmates at an electrical engineering college
in Chengdu, China, used their technical training to hack the computer networks of
a wide variety of victims, such as companies engaged in high tech manufacturing;
civil, industrial, and medical device engineering; business, educational, and
gaming software development; solar energy; and pharmaceuticals. More recently,
they researched vulnerabilities in the networks of biotech and other firms publicly
known for work on COVID-19 vaccines, treatments, and testing technology. Their
victim companies were located all across the world, including among other places
the United States, Australia, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

1 3. The Defendants stole hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of trade
2 secrets, intellectual property, and other valuable business information. At least
3 once, they returned to a victim from which they had stolen valuable source code to
4 attempt an extortion—threatening to publish on the internet, and thereby destroy
5 the value of, the victim's intellectual property unless a ransom was paid.

6 4. LI and DONG did not just hack for themselves. While in some
7 instances they were stealing business and other information for their own profit, in
8 others they were stealing information of obvious interest to the PRC Government's
9 Ministry of State Security ("MSS"). LI and DONG worked with, were assisted by,
10 and operated with the acquiescence of the MSS, including MSS Officer 1, known
11 to the Grand Jury, who was assigned to the Guangdong regional division of the
12 MSS (the Guangdong State Security Department, "GSSD").

14 5. When stealing information of interest to the MSS, LI and DONG in
15 most instances obtained that data through computer fraud against corporations and
16 research institutions. For example, from victims including defense contractors in
17 the U.S. and abroad, LI and DONG stole information regarding military satellite
18 programs; military wireless networks and communications systems; high powered
19 microwave and laser systems; a counter-chemical weapons system; and ship-to-
20 helicopter integration systems.

21 6. In other instances, the Defendants provided the MSS with personal
22 data, such as the passwords for personal email accounts belonging to individual
23 Chinese dissidents. For example, they provided the MSS with email accounts and
24 passwords belonging to a Hong Kong community organizer, the pastor of a
25 Christian church in Xi'an, and a dissident and former Tiananmen Square protestor.
26 The Defendants also stole email account contents of obvious interest to the PRC
27 Government, such as emails between that same dissident and the office of the
28 Dalai Lama; emails belonging to a Chinese Christian "house" (i.e., not PRC

1 Government-approved) pastor in Chengdu, who was later arrested by the PRC
2 government; and emails from a U.S. professor and organizer, and two Canadian
3 residents, who advocated for freedom and democracy in Hong Kong. In some
4 instances the Defendants reacted quickly to the PRC government's perceived
5 desires, targeting the above-mentioned Chengdu house pastor just days after the
6 provincial government banned his church, and conducting reconnaissance on a
7 webmail service and a messaging app when those were used by Hong Kong
8 citizens protesting the PRC government's recent steps to curtail freedoms there.
9

10 7. MSS Officer 1 assisted LI and other hackers. For example, when LI
11 encountered difficulty compromising the mail server of a Burmese human rights
12 group, MSS Officer 1 provided him with malware—a computer program designed
13 to compromise a victim computer system—to exploit a popular internet browser.
14 As LI had requested, MSS Officer 1 provided him “0day” malware, *i.e.* malware
15 unknown to the software vendor and to security researchers.

16 8. MSS Officer 1 and other MSS officers known to the Grand Jury
17 purported to be researchers at the “Guangdong Province International Affairs
18 Research Center.” In fact, they were intelligence officers working for the GSSD at
19 Number 5, 6th Crossroad, Upper Nonglin Road, Yuexiu District, in Guangzhou, at
20 the facility depicted in in these images:
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