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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
`AT SEATTLE
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`No.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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` DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`DEBORAH FRAME-WILSON and
`CHRISTIAN SABOL, on behalf of themselves
`and all others similarly situated,
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`AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware
`corporation,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`Defendant.
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`v.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`Case No.
`010888-11/1249081 V1
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`1301 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 2000, SEATTLE, WA 98101
`206.623.7292 206.623.0594 FAX
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`Case 2:20-cv-00424 Document 1 Filed 03/19/20 Page 2 of 53
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`TABLE CONTENTS
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`C. 
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`D. 
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`E. 
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`F. 
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`G. 
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - i
`Case No.
`010888-11/1249081 V1
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`1301 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 2000, SEATTLE, WA 98101
`206.623.7292 206.623.0594 FAX
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`I. 
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`II. 
`III. 
`IV. 
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`V. 
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`Page
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
`A. 
`Summary of Allegations ..........................................................................................1 
`B. 
`Identity of Class Products ......................................................................................11 
`C. 
`The Economic Impact of Amazon’s Anticompetitive Conduct .............................12 
`JURISDICTION ................................................................................................................14 
`VENUE ..............................................................................................................................15 
`PARTIES ...........................................................................................................................15 
`A. 
`Plaintiffs .................................................................................................................15 
`B. 
`Defendant ...............................................................................................................17 
`STATEMENT OF FACT ..................................................................................................17 
`A. 
`Background ............................................................................................................17 
`B. 
`Amazon’s two million third-party sellers agreed under Amazon’s
`former PMFN not to offer their products to U.S. customers at a
`lower price through any competing retail e-commerce channels. .........................27 
`Amazon’s two million third-party sellers agree under Amazon’s
`current “fair pricing” provision that selling at a lower price through
`competing retail e-commerce channels will subject them to costly
`penalties. ................................................................................................................28 
`Amazon’s former PMFN and current “fair pricing” provision
`reduce price competition and cause consumers to pay more. ................................28 
`Amazon has a monopoly in the retail e-commerce market or
`minimally in several categories of goods. ..............................................................32 
`Alternatively, Amazon has attempted to monopolize the general
`retail e-commerce market. .....................................................................................33 
`Amazon is the subject of a government investigation for possible
`antitrust violations, including whether it uses its relationship with
`its third-party sellers to harm competition. ............................................................33 
`INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE ...................................................................35 
`VI. 
`VII.  RELEVANT MARKET.....................................................................................................35 
`VIII.  CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ..................................................................................38 
`IX. 
`ANTITRUST INJURY ......................................................................................................41 
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`Case 2:20-cv-00424 Document 1 Filed 03/19/20 Page 3 of 53
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`X. 
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`CAUSES OF ACTION ......................................................................................................42 
`FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT
`(15 U.S.C. § 1) PER SE .........................................................................................42 
`SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT
`– MONOPOLIZATION (15 U.S.C. § 2) ...............................................................44 
`THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT –
`ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION (15 U.S.C. § 2) .........................................45 
`FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATIONS OF CONSUMER
`PROTECTION STATUTES ..................................................................................46 
`FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION UNJUST ENRICHMENT .................................................48 
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED .........................................................................................................49 
`PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................................49 
`
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - ii
`Case No.
`010888-11/1249081 V1
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`1301 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 2000, SEATTLE, WA 98101
`206.623.7292 206.623.0594 FAX
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`Case 2:20-cv-00424 Document 1 Filed 03/19/20 Page 4 of 53
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`Plaintiffs allege the following upon personal knowledge as to themselves and their own
`acts, and as to all other matters upon information and belief, based upon the investigation made
`by and through their attorneys.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION1
`
`A.
`
`Summary of Allegations
`1.
`Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) is “the world’s largest online retailer.”2 Sales on
`its website, through its app or voice control devices (collectively referred to as the “Amazon.com
`platform”) account for almost half of all retail e-commerce in the United States.3 Amazon’s nine
`closest competitors have a distant 1.1%-6.6% share of the retail e-commerce market.4 Amazon
`operates as retailer, selling directly to its customers. It also operates what economists call a “two-
`sided platform,” meaning that it provides services to two different groups (here third-party sellers
`and their customers) who both depend on the platform to intermediate between them.5As a retail
`seller, Amazon sells approximately 12 million products at the Amazon.com platform on a wide
`range of consumer goods.6 For a fee, Amazon also permits third parties to register with Amazon
`Marketplace to sell their products on the Amazon.com platform within the same categories of
`
`
`1 Plaintiffs are mindful of the severe impact of the corona virus pandemic on all aspects of
`society. In particular, they are aware of the burden this crisis places on small businesses and
`larger corporations alike, as well as the drain it imposes on scarce judicial resources. Plaintiffs
`are compelled, however, to file now to preserve their rights and those of the proposed class. To
`minimize the burden on the Court and to reasonably accommodate Amazon, Plaintiffs will work
`with Defendant to reach an agreeable schedule for its response to the complaint.
`2 Declaration of Ella Irwin, Director of Marketplace Abuse at Amazon (Jul. 13, 2018),
`Kangaroo Mfg., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Case No. 17-cv-1806SPL (D. Ariz.), Dkt. No. 75 (Irwin
`Decl.), ¶ 2.
`3 Amazon Now Has Nearly 50% of US Ecommerce Market, Emarketer (Jul. 16, 2018),
`https://www.emarketer.com/content/amazon-now-has-nearly-50-of-us-ecommerce-market.
`4 Id.
`5 See Ohio v. American Express Co., ___U.S.___ , 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2276-77 (2018).
`6 How many products does Amazon carry? 360pi (May 2016),
`https://0ca36445185fb449d582-
`f6ffa6baf5dd4144ff990b4132ba0c4d.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/IG_360piAmazon_9.13.16.pdf.;
`Amazon store directory, https://www.amazon.com/gp/site-
`directory?ref_=nav_em_T1_0_2_2_36__fullstore.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 1
`Case No.
`010888-11/1249081 V1
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`1301 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 2000, SEATTLE, WA 98101
`206.623.7292 206.623.0594 FAX
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`consumer goods that Amazon itself offers for sale.7 Nicholas Denissen, Amazon’s Vice President
`of Marketplace Business, describes the Amazon.com platform as “an online marketplace where
`millions of third-party sellers list products for sales, setting their own prices and describing their
`own products.”8 This arrangement gives sellers access to millions of buyers and buyers access to
`millions of sellers.9 He likens it to “an online mall where independent merchants display their
`products to people perusing the website.”10
`2.
`As a retailer, Amazon competes not only with the major online or mobile app
`retail rivals, like Costco, Wayfair, or Home Depot, but also with its two million third-party
`sellers, who are contractually authorized to sell their wares on the Amazon.com platform.11
`Eighty percent of Amazon’s third-party sellers also sell their products on other online retail
`websites that compete with the Amazon.com platform, most commonly on eBay, their own
`websites, or Walmart.12
`3.
`But selling on Amazon comes with certain restrictions. When a seller registers
`with Amazon Marketplace, “it agrees to the terms of the Amazon Services Business Solutions
`Agreement (BSA) and the policies incorporated in that agreement.13 The BSA establishes rules
`
`
`7 Irwin Decl., ¶ 5.
`8 Declaration of Nicholas Denissen, Amazon’s Vice President of Marketplace Business (Jun.
`30, 2017), Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Case No. 16-cv-1127MWB (M.D. Pa.), Dkt. No. 31
`(Denissen Decl.), ¶ 5.
`9 Id.
`10 Id.
`11 Jay Clement, Key metrics of Amazon.com marketplace sellers in the United States in 2019
`(Jan. 20, 2020), Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1086637/amazoncom-3p-seller-
`metrics-usa/.
`12 Rani Molla & Jason Del Rey, A fifth of professional Amazon merchants sell more than $1
`million a year — double the share from last year, Vox (May 23, 2018),
`https://www.vox.com/2018/5/23/17380088/amazon-sellers-survey-third-party-marketplace-
`walmart-ebay.
`13 Irwin Decl., ¶ 4.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 2
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`010888-11/1249081 V1
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`1301 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 2000, SEATTLE, WA 98101
`206.623.7292 206.623.0594 FAX
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`Case 2:20-cv-00424 Document 1 Filed 03/19/20 Page 6 of 53
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`for setting prices on the Amazon.com platform, and any seller holding an Amazon Seller
`Account must adhere to them.14
`4.
`Until very recently, the BSA included an express “price parity” (i.e., platform
`most favored nation or “PMFN”) provision.15 Amazon’s PMFN governed the price of products
`offered for sale on the seller or any of its affiliates’ other retail channels other than physical
`stores.16 It required that sellers:
`maintain parity between the products you offer through Your Sales
`Channels and the products you list on any Amazon Site by
`ensuring that … the purchase price and every other term of sale …
`is at least as favorable to Amazon Site users as the most favorable
`terms via Your Sales Channels (excluding consideration of
`Excluded Offers).[17]
`5.
`Last March, under threat of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation,
`Amazon officially withdrew its PMFN provision that directly prohibited third-party sellers on
`Amazon.com platform from selling their products at a lower price through competing retail e-
`commerce channels.18 But Amazon continues to enforce this policy under its “fair pricing”
`provision, which likewise severely penalizes sellers who offer lower prices outside the
`Amazon.com platform.19 Amazon’s “fair pricing” policy states that “Amazon regularly monitors
`the prices of items on our marketplaces,” and that if it sees “pricing practices” on the
`Amazon.com platform “that harm[] customer trust, Amazon can remove the Buy Box [i.e., the
`
`
`14 Amazon Pricing Policy, Feedadvisor, https://feedvisor.com/university/amazon-pricing-
`policy/.
`15 Irwin Decl., Ex. A at 18, section S-4 (Parity with Your Sales Channel).
`16 Id., Ex. A at 14 and 18.
`17 Id., Ex. A at 18.
`18 See, e.g., Greg Magana, Amazon is ending its restrictive pricing practice, Business Insider
`(Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-ends-restrictive-pricing-parity-2019-
`3.
`
`19 See, e.g., Guadalupe Gonzalez, You’re No Longer Required to Sell Products for Less on
`Amazon. The Problem? If You Don’t, You've Got Another Penalty Coming,
`https://www.inc.com/guadalupe-gonzalez/amazon-removes-price-parity-not-fair-price-rule-third-
`party-sellers-antitrust-violations.html.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 3
`Case No.
`010888-11/1249081 V1
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`1301 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 2000, SEATTLE, WA 98101
`206.623.7292 206.623.0594 FAX
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`coveted one-click-to-buy button20], remove the offer, suspend the ship option, or, in serious or
`repeated cases, suspend[] or terminat[e] selling privileges.”21 One of the pricing practices
`Amazon identifies as “harmful” to customer trust is “[s]etting a price on a product or service that
`is significantly higher than recent prices offered on or off Amazon.”22
`6.
`Under the “fair pricing” provision, “[a]ny single product or multiple products
`packages must have a price that is equal to or lower than the price of the same item being sold by
`the seller on other sites or virtual marketplaces.”23 The “fair pricing” provision “applies to both
`the individual product price as well as the collective price that the item or items are being sold
`for.”24 Fair pricing in substance is not significantly different from Amazon’s former PMFN.
`7.
`Almost half of Amazon’s third-party sellers, generate 81 to 100% of their
`revenues from sales on the Amazon.com platform.25 It costs less to sell on eBay or the sellers’
`own websites, but because of Amazon’s anticompetitive price policies, its third-party sellers are
`prevented from lowering their prices to online customers reached outside the Amazon.com
`platform.26 By contractually enforcing a price policy that preempts lower prices offered through
`any competing retail e-commerce channel—even when sellers retain the same level of profit at
`
`
`20 Infra ¶¶ 51-52.
`21 Amazon Marketplace Fair Pricing Policy, Amazon Seller Central,
`https://sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/help/external/G5TUVJKZHUVMN77V?language=en_US&r
`ef=efph_G5TUVJKZHUVMN77V_cont_521.
`22 Id. (emphasis added).
`23 Supra Amazon Pricing Policy, Feedadvisor, https://feedvisor.com/university/amazon-
`pricing-policy/.
`24 Id.
`25 J. Clement, Percentage of e-commerce revenue from Amazon sales according to Amazon
`marketplace sellers in 2018, Statista (May 4, 2019),
`https://www.statista.com/statistics/259782/third-party-seller-share-of-amazon-platform/.
`26 Max Godin, Selling on Amazon vs eBay – Discover Which is Better and Why, Crazylister
`(May 15, 2018), https://sellerengine.com/how-many-products-does-amazon-sell-amazon-
`marketplace-stats/; Molson Hart, How Amazon’s Business Practices Harm American
`Consumers: Why Amazon Needs a Competitor and Why Walmart Ain’t It, Medium,
`https://medium.com/swlh/amazon-needs-a-competitor-and-walmart-aint-it-5997977b77b2.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 4
`Case No.
`010888-11/1249081 V1
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`1301 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 2000, SEATTLE, WA 98101
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`the lower price, Amazon engages in a pricing scheme that broadly and anticompetively impacts
`virtually all products offered for sale in the U.S. retail e-commerce market.
`8.
`As a retailer, Amazon sells about 12 million products, whereas its two million
`third-party sellers sell around 600 million products on the Amazon.com platform.27 Collectively,
`sales on the Amazon.com platform accounted for 49.1% of the total U.S. retail e-commerce
`market in 2018.28 Third-party sellers accounted for 68% of the sales revenue on the Amazon.com
`platform, or one third of the revenue generated by the entire U.S. retail e-commerce market.29 By
`reaching a horizontal agreement on price with these retailers, Amazon impeded price
`competition in the U.S. retail e-commerce market.
`9.
`Plaintiffs and Class30 members purchased Class Products, i.e., they bought the
`same products offered by third-party sellers on the Amazon.com platform from competing retail
`e-commerce channels, e.g., competing retailer websites or apps, or social media platforms.
`Plaintiffs and Class members overpaid for Class Products because Amazon prevents its third-
`party sellers from competing on price outside the Amazon.com platform. Even when it costs the
`sellers less, e.g., when the seller sells directly to consumers on its own website or at a lower fee
`on eBay, sellers are contractually barred or severely penalized from passing on these savings to
`their customers.
`10.
`Amazon has engaged and continues to engage in horizontal price fixing with its
`two million third-party sellers with respect to Class Products. These sellers have agreed
`explicitly to comply with Amazon’s pricing policies, including its former PMFN and its current
`“fair pricing” provision. These pricing policies compel Amazon’s sellers to maintain
`supracompetitive prices for Class Products on competing retail e-commerce channels because
`any discounts sellers offer on another site must also be offered to Amazon buyers. Specifically,
`
`
`27 How Many Products Does Amazon Sell? – January 2018, ScrapeHero,
`https://www.scrapehero.com/many-products-amazon-sell-january-2018/.
`28 Supra Amazon Now Has Nearly 50% of US Ecommerce Market.
`29 Id.
`30 Infra ¶ 96.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 5
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`Amazon’s horizontal price-fixing agreement with its third-party sellers creates a price floor (i.e.,
`the price of the seller’s Amazon listing) for products sold through retail e-commerce channels
`other than the Amazon.com platform. Amazon’s horizontal price-fixing agreement with its two
`million sellers is a per se violation of antitrust law. It harms consumers by maintaining
`supracompetitive prices for goods sold on the internet and harms competition because it impedes
`two million sellers from competing on price. While it harms consumers and competition,
`Amazon’s horizontal price-fixing agreement benefits Amazon because it attracts more customers
`to the Amazon.com platform and because it avoids head-to-head competition between Amazon
`and its third-party sellers on competing retail e-commerce channels, where they would offer
`more competitive prices.
`11.
`Amazon’s conduct also demonstrates an abuse or attempted abuse of monopoly
`power in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Amazon’s dominance of the industry hurts
`consumers. Were it not for Amazon, the e-commerce market price for products sold by its third-
`party sellers would be substantially cheaper.
`12.
`The digital revolution has vastly transformed retail sales in the United States.
`Consumers can reach retailers in physical stores, connect with them directly through a retailer’s
`website or app, or indirectly through an internet search or other digital platforms, like social
`media.31 “Competition in retail is now a click or voice command away, which means [in theory]
`that retailers operate within the most competitive industry in the world.”32 But not all
`competitors are equal. Amazon controls not only the prices that its two million third-party sellers
`set for their products on websites, apps, or platforms that compete with the Amazon.com
`platform, it also exercises a significant level of control over the flow of available information to
`
`
`31 Retail Industry Leaders Association letter to the Federal Trade Commission re:
`Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century Hearings (Project Number P181201)
`(Jun. 30, 2019) (“RILA letter”), at 1,
`https://rila.my.salesforce.com/sfc/p/#61000000dOrP/a/4M000000DO0Z/H5c7IH2umW0ayLluM
`XZ0TsRBosaLIZAV9aTfcf9rs3o.
`32 Id.
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`consumers on the internet, including consumers’ “access to price information.”33 Competing
`online retailers, like Walmart and Target, recently expressed concerns to the FTC that they
`struggle to break through the “information bottleneck,” caused in large part because Amazon and
`Google collectively control the majority of internet searches for products.34 Lina Khan, a fellow
`on the Open Markets team at New America, a center-left think tank, describes Amazon “as
`serving almost as the essential infrastructure for the American economy at this point, when it
`comes to commerce,” which she says “affords Amazon a lot of power and control.”35 Alex
`Sheppard at the New Republic expressed a similar concern: “If Amazon now controls the pricing
`in the book industry, just imagine what it can do in the broader world of retail.”36
`13.
`The figures below show Amazon’s dominant position in the online retail market
`and how its policy decisions can affect the whole e-commerce sector.
`14.
`The U.S. e-commerce marketplace is dominated by Amazon, which accounts for
`roughly half of all online retail sales.37
`
`
`33 Id.
`34 Id. at 3; Who is winning the shopping search race — Amazon or Google?, Retail Wire
`(May 6, 2019), https://retailwire.com/discussion/who-is-winning-the-shopping-search-race-
`amazon-or-google/.
`35 Robinson Meyer, When Does Amazon Become a Monopoly?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Jun.
`16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/06/when-exactly-does-amazon-
`become-a-monopoly/530616/.
`36 Alex Sheppard, How Amazon Is Changing the Whole Concept of Monopoly, New Republic
`(Jun. 19, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/143376/amazon-changing-whole-concept-
`monopoly.
`37 J. Clement, Leading U.S. online marketplaces 2018, by GMV, Statista (Mar. 1, 12, 2019),
`https://www.statista.com/statistics/977262/top-us-online-marketplaces-by-gmv/.
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`15.
`Amazon’s market share has been increasing over the past five years, as shown by
`the growth of its sales.38
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`38 J. Clement, U.S. Amazon marketplace sales 2016-2019, Statista, Jun 12, 2019,
`https://www.statista.com/statistics/882919/amazon-marketplace-sales-usa/.
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`Case 2:20-cv-00424 Document 1 Filed 03/19/20 Page 12 of 53
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`Third-party sellers account for the majority of sales on the Amazon.com
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`16.
`platform39
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`17.
`The vast majority of active third-party sellers also sell on other online platforms.
`As of 2019, there were 1.1 million active sellers on the Amazon.com platform; 80% of them sell
`on other marketplaces, including other online platforms40:
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`
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`39 Laureen Thomas & Courtney Reagan, Watch out, retailers. This is just how big Amazon is
`becoming,CNBC, www.cnbc.com/2018/07/12/amazon-to-take-almost-50-percent-of-us-e-
`commerce-market-by-years-end.html.
`40 Catie Grasso, The State of the Amazon Marketplace 2019, Feedadvisor, (May 15, 2019),
`https://feedvisor.com/resources/amazon-trends/the-state-of-the-amazon-marketplace-2019/.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 9
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`1301 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 2000, SEATTLE, WA 98101
`206.623.7292 206.623.0594 FAX
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`Case 2:20-cv-00424 Document 1 Filed 03/19/20 Page 13 of 53
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`18.
`Amazon has obtained monopoly power in the U.S. retail e-commerce market, as
`demonstrated by its power to set the prevailing prices of the vast majority of consumer goods
`offered for sale on the internet and that it exercises extraordinary control over millions of its
`online retail competitors.
`19.
`In the alternative, Amazon has minimally obtained monopoly power in the U.S.
`online retail sub-markets for home improvement tools, men’s athletic shoes, skin care, batteries,
`golf, cleaning supplies, and kitchen and dining products, where it has the overwhelming majority
`share in each of these markets. Amazon has willfully acquired its monopoly power in the U.S.
`retail e-commerce market and/or these identified U.S. online retail sub-markets through
`anticompetitive conduct, including enforcement of its former PMFN and its current “fair pricing”
`provision. By enforcing these provisions, Amazon creates a price floor that its third-party sellers
`must adhere to in all retail e-commerce channels that compete with the Amazon.com platform,
`thereby causing supracompetitive prices for Class Products in the U.S. retail e-commerce market.
`Such conduct is an abuse or attempted abuse of monopoly power in violation of Section 2 of the
`Sherman Act.
`20.
`In the event that Amazon does not already have a monopoly in the U.S. retail e-
`commerce market, it has attempted to monopolize this market. Amazon exercises broad control
`over the online prices of virtually every consumer good by controlling the prices that its two
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 10
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`1301 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 2000, SEATTLE, WA 98101
`206.623.7292 206.623.0594 FAX
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`Case 2:20-cv-00424 Document 1 Filed 03/19/20 Page 14 of 53
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`million third-party sellers may offer through competing retail e-commerce channels. Amazon’s
`contractual pricing provisions further this goal and cause supracompetitive prices. If Amazon
`does not already have monopoly power in the e-commerce market, there is a dangerous
`probability that it will achieve one because sales on the Amazon.com platform account for nearly
`half of all retail e-commerce sales in the United States.
`21.
`Amazon’s anticompetitive conduct also violates multiple state consumer
`protection laws by causing consumers to overpay for consumer goods purchased online.
`22.
`Plaintiffs on their own behalf and that of similarly situated consumers, seek
`monetary recovery and injunctive relief for harm caused by Amazon’s violations of federal
`antitrust law and state consumer protection statutes—harm that persists and will not abate unless
`Amazon is stopped.
`B.
`Identity of Class Products
`23.
`Class Products encompass all products that were protected from price competition
`by floor prices sets by Amazon’s anti-competitive pricing policies. To qualify as a Class Product,
`the product must be sold through a retail e-commerce channel other than the Amazon.com
`platform, and the product must be concurrently offered by Amazon’s third-party sellers on the
`Amazon.com platform. For example, CaddiesShack is a third-party seller on Amazon, who sold
`Bridgestone Tour B330-S Golf Balls (12-pack) in March of this year on its own website, the
`Amazon.com platform, eBay, and Walmart.com.41 Other sellers, who offered the same product
`on eBay, Walmart.com or any other e-commerce platform, were spared the price competition
`that CaddiesShack and other Amazon sellers otherwise would have provided. Therefore, to
`qualify as a Class Product, it is not necessary that the product sold through a competing retail e-
`commerce channel be sold by an Amazon third-party seller.
`24.
`“Amazon regularly monitors the prices of items” its third-party sellers offer on the
`Amazon.com platform, “including shipping costs, and compares them with other prices available
`
`
`41 See supra ¶ 66.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 11
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`206.623.7292 206.623.0594 FAX
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`Case 2:20-cv-00424 Document 1 Filed 03/19/20 Page 15 of 53
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`to our customers . . . on or off Amazon” and penalizes violations.42 As a result of its price
`monitoring and enforcement of its pricing policies, Amazon is expected to maintain pricing data
`not only for products offered for sale on the Amazon.com platform, but also Class Products, i.e.
`the same products sold through competing retail e-commerce channels. Plaintiffs and Class
`members who paid more than the but-for price for online purchases of Class Products were
`therefore damaged
`C.
`The Economic Impact of Amazon’s Anticompetitive Conduct
`25. Without discovery, the exact number or a complete list of all products affected by
`Amazon’s former PMFN and current “fair pricing” policy is unknown at this time. Based on
`publicly available information, Plaintiffs estimate that Class Products consist of approximately
`600 million consumer products offered by Amazon’s third-party sellers.43 Amazon’s requirement
`that its third-party sellers offer their lowest price on the Amazon.com platform in combination
`with the high fees that Amazon charges them to sell on its platform, creates an anticompetitive
`floor price for purchases of Class Products in the U.S. e-commerce market. But for Amazon’s
`anticompetitive pricing policies, its third-party sellers would have offered their products on
`competing websites during the Class Period44 as low as 15% less than the prices they set to
`comply with Amazon’s pricing policies. In a competitive market, other e-commerce sellers
`would be expected to lower their prices accordingly. For example, Home Depot will match the
`“price on an identical, in-stock item from any other retailer.”45 Dell, Sam’s Club, Joann Fabrics
`(Joann.com), Hayneedle and YLiving also match prices of online competitors, regardless of
`
`
`42 Supra Amazon Marketplace Fair Pricing Policy.
`43 Supra How Many Products Does Amazon Sell? – January 2018, ScrapeHero,
`https://www.scrapehero.com/many-products-amazon-sell-january-2018/.
`44 Supra ¶ 96.
`45 Home Depot, Low Price Guarantee,
`https://www.homedepot.com/c/PM_New_Lower_Price.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 12
`Case No.
`010888-11/1249081 V1
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`1301 SECOND AVENUE, SUITE 2000, SEATTLE, WA 98101
`206.623.7292 206.623.0594 FAX
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`Case 2:20-cv-00424 Document 1 Filed 03/19/20 Page 16 of 53
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`size.46 And as a practical matter, because so many consumers use Google to compare prices,
`most major online retailers are likely to match the lowest online prices, regardless of the seller.47
`26.
`If Amazon’s two million sellers were allowed

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