

The Honorable Richard A. Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

DEBORAH FRAME-WILSON, CHRISTIAN
SABOL, SAMANTHIA RUSSELL, ARTHUR
SCHAREIN, LIONEL KEROS, NATHAN
CHANEY, CHRIS GULLEY, SHERYL
TAYLOR-HOLLY, ANTHONY COURTNEY,
DAVE WESTROPE, STACY DUTILL,
SARAH ARRINGTON, MARY ELLIOT,
HEATHER GEESEY, STEVE MORTILLARO,
CHAUNDA LEWIS, ADRIAN HENNEN,
GLENDA R. HILL, GAIL MURPHY,
PHYLLIS HUSTER, and GERRY
KOCHENDORFER, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware
corporation,

Defendant.

No. 20-cv-00424-RAJ

SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION
COMPLAINT

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

TABLE CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Summary of Allegations	1
1. Amazon’s MFN agreements improperly restrains competition.	4
2. Through their MFN agreements, Amazon and its third-party sellers combine to confer Amazon Marketplace’s monopoly power.	18
B. Identity of Class Products	23
C. The Economic Impact of Amazon’s Anticompetitive Conduct.....	24
II. JURISDICTION	27
III. VENUE	27
IV. PARTIES	27
A. Plaintiffs	27
1. Virginia	27
2. California	28
3. Alabama	29
4. Arizona.....	30
5. Arkansas.....	31
6. Florida	32
7. Illinois	32
8. Iowa.....	33
9. Maine	33
10. Nevada	34
11. New Hampshire	35
12. Pennsylvania	35
13. Tennessee.....	36
14. Texas	37
15. Utah.....	38

1	16.	Vermont	38
2	17.	Washington	39
3	18.	Wisconsin.....	40
4	B.	Defendant.....	41
5	V.	STATEMENT OF FACT	41
6	A.	Background.....	41
7	1.	Amazon competes with its third-party sellers in the sale of	
8		retail goods.....	42
9	2.	The MFN agreements are <i>per se</i> violations because they are	
10		agreements between horizontal competitors that restrain	
11		competition and raise prices in the online retail market in	
12		which Amazon and its third-party sellers compete.....	46
13	3.	German competition authorities found that Amazon's Price	
14		Parity restricted competition both as a horizontal price	
15		fixing agreement with its third-party sellers and by erecting	
16		a barrier to competition with Amazon Marketplace from	
17		other online retail marketplaces.	49
18	4.	Amazon charges high seller fees that raise online prices of	
19		consumer goods on and off Amazon Marketplace.	51
20	5.	Amazon knowingly manipulates online prices through its	
21		MFN agreements despite warnings from antitrust regulators	
22		about their anticompetitive effect.	57
23	6.	Amazon and its third-party sellers also directly cause	
24		consumers to overpay for goods purchased from non-	
25		conspirators at prices inflated by Amazon's MFN	
26		agreements.	59
27	B.	Amazon's two million third-party sellers agreed under Amazon's	
28		former Price Parity not to offer their products to U.S. customers at	
		a lower price through any competing retail e-commerce channels.....	62
	C.	Amazon's two million third-party sellers agree under Amazon's	
		current Fair Pricing provision that selling at a lower price through	
		competing retail e-commerce channels will subject them to costly	
		penalties.	63
	D.	Amazon's MFN agreements reduce price competition and cause	
		consumers to pay more.	63
	E.	Through combination or conspiracy with its third-party sellers,	
		Amazon has a monopoly in the relevant markets.	67
	F.	Alternatively, Amazon has attempted to monopolize the relevant	
		markets through its MFN agreements with its third-party sellers.....	72

1	G.	Amazon is the subject of a government investigation for possible antitrust violations, including whether it uses its relationship with its third-party sellers to harm competition.	73
2			
3	VI.	INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE	76
4	VII.	RELEVANT MARKETS	76
5	1.	U.S. retail ecommerce market and Identified Submarkets are relevant markets to assess Amazon’s anticompetitive MFNs.	76
6			
7	2.	The two-sided Online Retail Marketplace Market is another relevant market to assess whether Amazon’s MFN agreements have had an anticompetitive impact.	84
8			
9	VIII.	CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS	90
10	IX.	ANTITRUST INJURY	94
11	X.	CAUSES OF ACTION	95
12		FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT (15 U.S.C. § 1) <i>PER SE</i>	95
13			
14		SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1 (ALTERNATIVE TO <i>PER SE</i>)	97
15			
16		THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT – MONOPOLIZATION (15 U.S.C. § 2)	99
17			
18		FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT – ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION (15 U.S.C. § 2)	100
19			
20		FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT – CONSPIRACY TO MONOPOLIZE (15 U.S.C. § 2)	100
21			
22		SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S CARTWRIGHT ACT, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16700, ET SEQ. (<i>PER SE</i> VIOLATION ON BEHALF OF THE CALIFORNIA CLASS)	102
23			
24		JURY TRIAL DEMANDED	103
25			
26		PRAYER FOR RELIEF	103
27			
28			

1 Plaintiffs allege the following upon personal knowledge as to themselves and their own
2 acts, and as to all other matters upon information and belief, based upon the investigation made by
3 and through their attorneys and experts in the field of antitrust economics.

4 I. INTRODUCTION

5 A. Summary of Allegations

6 1. The Court denied Amazon.com, Inc.’s (“Amazon”) motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
7 monopoly claims asserted under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Plaintiffs’ rule-of-reason-
8 price-fixing claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court dismissed all other claims with
9 leave to amend. Plaintiffs’ amendments made to address the Court’s concerns consist of the
10 following:

11 2. *First*, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) addresses the deficiencies
12 the Court identified in Plaintiffs’ horizontal price-fixing claim. Specifically, the SAC makes
13 clear how Amazon’s most favored nations agreements (“MFN agreements” or “MFNs”) with its
14 third-party sellers govern the way that Amazon and its third-party sellers “compete with one
15 another in online sales” and how by challenging these agreements Plaintiffs are “challenging
16 Amazon’s conduct as a competitor to its third-party sellers.”¹ The SAC demonstrates that the
17 MFN agreements are agreements between competitors to increase their prices across online retail
18 sales. As online retailers, Amazon and its third-party sellers compete not only against each other
19 on Amazon’s online retail platform, “Amazon Marketplace”—which includes sales made
20 through Amazon’s website, app, and voice-controlled devices—but also more broadly against
21 other online offers available to Amazon customers through competing ecommerce channels. By
22 agreeing that the third-party sellers will not undercut Amazon Marketplace prices when selling
23 on other ecommerce channels, even though it would be profitable for third-party sellers to do so,
24 these MFN agreements raise the prices of third-party seller goods *off* Amazon Marketplace and,
25 as a result, also raise Amazon’s own retail prices *on* Amazon Marketplace; Amazon, as a first-
26 party seller is spared from having to compete with retail prices that—absent the MFN

27
28 ¹ *Frame-Wilson v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. 2:20-cv-00424-RAJ, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44109, at *18 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2022).

Explore Litigation Insights

Docket Alarm provides insights to develop a more informed litigation strategy and the peace of mind of knowing you're on top of things.

Real-Time Litigation Alerts



Keep your litigation team up-to-date with **real-time alerts** and advanced team management tools built for the enterprise, all while greatly reducing PACER spend.

Our comprehensive service means we can handle Federal, State, and Administrative courts across the country.

Advanced Docket Research



With over 230 million records, Docket Alarm's cloud-native docket research platform finds what other services can't. Coverage includes Federal, State, plus PTAB, TTAB, ITC and NLRB decisions, all in one place.

Identify arguments that have been successful in the past with full text, pinpoint searching. Link to case law cited within any court document via Fastcase.

Analytics At Your Fingertips



Learn what happened the last time a particular judge, opposing counsel or company faced cases similar to yours.

Advanced out-of-the-box PTAB and TTAB analytics are always at your fingertips.

API

Docket Alarm offers a powerful API (application programming interface) to developers that want to integrate case filings into their apps.

LAW FIRMS

Build custom dashboards for your attorneys and clients with live data direct from the court.

Automate many repetitive legal tasks like conflict checks, document management, and marketing.

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Litigation and bankruptcy checks for companies and debtors.

E-DISCOVERY AND LEGAL VENDORS

Sync your system to PACER to automate legal marketing.