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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
`AT SEATTLE
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`CASE NO. C20-1048 MJP
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
`MOTION FOR DEFAULT
`JUDGMENT
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`AMAZON CONTENT SERVICES
`LLC, et al.,
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`v.
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`Plaintiffs,
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`KISS LIBRARY, RODION
`VYNNYCHENKO, ARTEM
`BESSHAPOCHNY, JACK BROWN,
`DOES 1-10,
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`
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`Defendants.
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`
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`This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment. (Dkt. No.
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`39). Having reviewed the Motion, all supporting materials, and the relevant portions of the
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`record, the Court GRANTS the Motion and ENTERS DEFAULT JUDGMENT against
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`Defendants Kiss Library, Rodion Vynnychenko, and Artem Besshapochny (“Defendants”) and
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`ENTERS a PERMANENT INJUNCTION against Defendants on the terms set forth in this
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`Order. This Order does not apply to Jack Brown because Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their
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`claims against him. (See Dkt. No. 37.)
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 1
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 2 of 16
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`BACKGROUND
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`Plaintiffs are a group of publishers and authors who allege that Defendants illegally
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`copied, distributed, and sold Plaintiffs’ copyrighted literary works. (Complaint ¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 1).)
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`The authors include Lee Child, Sylvia Day, John Grisham, C.J. Lyons, Doug Preston, Jim
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`Rasenberger, T.J. Stiles, R.L. Stine, Monique Truong, Scott Turow, Nicholas Weinstock, and
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`Stuart Woods (“Authors”). (Id.) The publishers are Penguin Random House LLC and Amazon
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`Content Services LLC (“Publishers”). (Id.) Plaintiffs sued Defendants to recover damages and
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`put an end to the illegal trade of their literary works.
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`Defendants Vynnychenko and Besshapochny are both Ukrainian nationals who created
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`and operated Kiss Library through a variety of websites to offer pirated copies of the Authors’
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`works without paying the Authors or Publishers royalties for the sales. (Id. ¶¶ 5-7, 23-25.)
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`Defendants used a series of ruses to hide their identities and avoid both detection and
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`accountability. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 38, 46-49; Declaration of John Goldmark ¶¶ 5-13 (Dkt. No. 40).)
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`Plaintiffs have identified at least 52 different copyrighted literary works that Defendants illegally
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`distributed and sold through their websites. (Id. ¶¶ 41-42; Goldmark Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiffs
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`have suffered economic losses through lost royalties and claim to have suffered non-economic
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`damages in the form of lost customers, damaged goodwill, and disruption of distribution
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`licenses. (Compl. ¶¶ 50-52.)
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`Defendants have not participated in this lawsuit and have taken efforts to avoid
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`accountability. Despite being given a notice and opportunity to be heard, Defendants did not
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`respond to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (Dkt. Nos. 10, 13-14.) The Court
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`then converted the TRO into a motion for preliminary injunction, which it granted. (Dkt. No. 15.)
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`Defendant Vynnychenko twice refused to accept service and ultimately failed to appear at a
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 2
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 3 of 16
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`confirmation of service proceeding required under Ukrainian law. (See Status Report (Dkt. No.
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`31); Declaration of Artem Krykun-Trush ISO Status Report ¶ 4 (Dkt. No. 32).) Ultimately
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`Defendants were properly served in compliance with the Court’s Order on Service, the Hague
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`Convention, and local Ukrainian law. (Dkt. No. 10; Goldmark Decl. ¶¶ 14-16; Dkt. No. 31 at 2.)
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`After the Court issued the Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiffs and their Ukrainian investigator
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`uncovered further efforts Defendants have undertaken to hide their identities and destroy
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`evidence after the lawsuit was filed. (Goldmark Decl. ¶¶ 5-13.) In light of Defendants’ failure to
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`appear and defend against Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiffs moved for and obtained default against
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`Defendants. They now seek default judgment and a permanent injunction.
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`A.
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`Legal Standard
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`ANALYSIS
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`After entry of default, the Court may enter a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). This
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`determination is discretionary. See Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392
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`(9th Cir. 1988). “Factors which may be considered by courts in exercising discretion as to the
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`entry of a default judgment include: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits
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`of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at
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`stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the
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`default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of
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`Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th
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`Cir. 1986). In performing this analysis, “the general rule is that well-pled allegations in the
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`complaint regarding liability are deemed true.” Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906
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`(9th Cir. 2002) (quotation and citation omitted). And “[t]he district court is not required to make
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`detailed findings of fact.” Id.
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 3
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 4 of 16
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`B.
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`Jurisdiction
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`Before entering default judgment, the Court must assure itself that it has subject matter
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`jurisdiction.
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`There is little doubt that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.
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`Plaintiffs brings claims under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 501, which fall within the Court’s
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`original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
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`The Court further considers personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
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`defendant is “tested by a two-part analysis.” Chan v. Soc’y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1404
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`(9th Cir. 1994). First, the Court inquires whether the “exercise of jurisdiction . . . satisf[ies] the
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`requirements of the applicable state long-arm statute,” and, second, the Court determines
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`whether asserting personal jurisdiction “comport[s] with due process.” Id. Where there is no
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`applicable federal statute regarding personal jurisdiction, court looks instead to the law of the
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`forum state. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
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`Here, the Court considers Washington law, whose “long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the
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`limit of federal due process.” Chan, 39 F.3d at 1405. This collapses the two-part inquiry into one
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`question—does personal jurisdiction comply with federal due process. See id. Federal due
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`process requires that defendants “‘have certain minimum contacts’ with the forum state ‘such
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`that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
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`justice.’” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
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`Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). A nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum
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`contacts when: (1) the defendant “purposefully direct[s] his activities” at the forum; (2) the claim
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`“arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities”; and (3) the exercise of
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 4
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 5 of 16
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`jurisdiction is “reasonable.” CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th
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`Cir. 2011) (citation & internal quotation marks omitted).
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`The Court finds that all three elements of due process are satisfied. First, Defendants
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`purposefully directed their piracy scheme at Washington and its residents by targeting works
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`they knew or should have known were published by Plaintiff Amazon, which is headquartered in
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`Seattle, Washington. Defendants advertised and distributed the copyrighted works at issue to
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`Washington consumers in violation of the Copyright Act, duping consumers and interfering with
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`the Author Plaintiffs’ licensing relationship with Plaintiff Amazon who suffered a loss of sales in
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`Washington. (See Compl. ¶¶ 29, 50, 52.) This satisfies the purposeful direction prong. See
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`CollegeSource, 653 F.3d at 1077. Second, Plaintiffs’ copyright infringement arise from and
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`relate to Defendants’ forum-related activities, given that Defendants knowingly and intentionally
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`infringed on a Washington-based company’s copyrighted works and compete with the company
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`in Washington. Third, Defendants have not met their burden to show that the exercise of
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`personal jurisdiction is unreasonable. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223
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`F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that defendants bear the burden on this issue). The Court
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`therefore finds that it has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.
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`C.
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`Eitel Factors Favor Default Judgment
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`The seven Eitel factors weigh in favor of entry of default judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor.
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`1.
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`Factor One: Prejudice to Plaintiffs
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`Without entry of default judgment Plaintiffs will be prejudiced. Plaintiffs have attempted
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`to litigate this case and vindicate their rights under the Copyright Act against Defendants. But
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`Defendants have failed to appear or participate in this litigation. Plaintiffs face prejudice by not
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 5
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 6 of 16
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`being able to obtain complete relief on their claims against Defendants without a default
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`judgment. This factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment.
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`2.
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`Factors Two and Three: Merits of Plaintiffs’ Claims and Sufficiency of
`Complaint
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`Plaintiffs have demonstrated the merit of their claims and the sufficiency of their
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`allegations against Defendants. “To establish direct copyright infringement, the [plaintiff] must
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`(1) show ownership of the allegedly infringed material and (2) demonstrate that the alleged
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`infringers violate at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. §
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`106.” Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and
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`quotation omitted). Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations, which the Court accepts as true given
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`Defendants’ default, show that Plaintiffs own the 52 copyrights literary works at issue and that
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`Defendants willfully copied, displayed, and distributed these works without a license in violation
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`of 17 U.S.C. § 106. (See Compl. ¶¶ 8, 11-22, 32, 40-42, 54, 56; Goldmark Decl. ¶ 3.) This
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`satisfies these two Eitel factors, which weigh in favor of entry of default judgment.
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`3.
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`Factor Four: Sum of Money at Stake
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`The amount Plaintiffs seek to be entered in the default judgment gives the Court some
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`pause. Plaintiffs seek $7,800,000 in statutory damages, which is a substantial award and the
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`statutory maximum for each of the fifty-two infringed works. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). But
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`given the extent of the piracy scheme, Defendants’ efforts to fight or participate in this lawsuit,
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`and the seriousness of the misconduct, the Court finds that the requested damages are reasonable.
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`The Court finds that the amount requested does not disfavor entry of default judgment. The
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`Court discusses the specific amount of damages requested and awarded in Section D, below.
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 6
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 7 of 16
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`4.
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`Factor Five: Possibility of Dispute of Material Facts
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`The Court finds little likelihood of a dispute of material fact to remain. Consistent with
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`Ninth Circuit law, the Court deems the well-pleaded claims to be true. Fair Housing, 285 F.3d at
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`906. Plaintiffs have also provided evidence to further corroborate the complaint’s allegations.
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`(See, e.g., Compl. Exs A-D; Goldmark Decl. ¶¶ 2-13.) This factor weighs in favor of entry of
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`default judgment.
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`5.
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`Factor Six: Whether Default is Due to Excusable Neglect
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`The Court finds that the default was not entered due to excusable neglect. Defendants
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`were served with the complaint and summons in accordance with the Court’s Order on Service,
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`the Hague Convention, and Ukrainian law. (See Dkt. Nos. 10, 34.) Despite being given a
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`reasonable opportunity to appear, Defendants chose not to defend against the claims Plaintiffs
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`have made. There is no evidence that Defendants’ failure to oppose default is due to excusable
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`neglect and this factor favors entry of default judgment.
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`6.
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`Factor Seven; Strong Policy in Favor of Decision on the Merits
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`The Court maintains a strong policy preference in favor of resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims
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`on the merits. But Defendants decision not to appear in this case vitiates against this policy. This
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`factor weighs in favor of entry of default judgment.
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`*
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`*
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`*
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`Having considered and balanced the Eitel factors, the Court finds that entry of default
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`judgment is proper.
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 7
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 8 of 16
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`D.
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`Damages
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`Plaintiffs seek an award of $150,000 for each of the 52 works Defendants illegally sold
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`and distributed, which is the statutory maximum for willful copyright infringement. See 17
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`U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). The Court finds this request appropriate.
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`To obtain statutory damages for willful infringement, Plaintiffs “must show (1) that the
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`defendant was actually aware of the infringing activity, or (2) that the defendant’s actions were
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`the result of reckless disregard for, or willful blindness to, the copyright holder’s rights.”
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`Unicolors, Inc. v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation
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`omitted). There is a rebuttable presumption that the infringement is willful “if the violator, or a
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`person acting in concert with the violator, knowingly provided or knowingly caused to be
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`provided materially false contact information to a domain name registrar, domain name registry,
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`or other domain name registration authority[.]” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(3)(A).
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`Here, Plaintiffs’ complaint contains substantial allegations—deemed true—that
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`Defendants knew the works were copyrights and took efforts to disguise from customers that the
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`copyrighted works were illegally being distributed and sold. (Compl. ¶¶ 36-38, 44-47.) And
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`Plaintiffs have provided further evidence that Defendants engaged in substantial efforts to hide
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`the illegal nature of their conduct. (See Goldmark Decl. ¶¶ 5-13.) Plaintiffs also allege that
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`Defendants provided false information to a domain name registrar in setting up some of the
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`many websites at issue, which also satisfies the rebuttable presumption of willful infringement.
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`See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(3)(A). The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have shown Defendants
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`willfully violated the Copyright Act.
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`The Court has wide discretion in determining the amount of statutory damages to be
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`awarded within the ranges provided by 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)-(2). See Harris v. Emus Records
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 8
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 9 of 16
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`Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984). The court is guided by “what is just in the particular
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`case, considering the nature of the copyright, the circumstances of the infringement and the like.”
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`Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation and
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`quotation omitted). And “[b]ecause awards of statutory damages serve both compensatory and
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`punitive purposes, a plaintiff may recover statutory damages whether or not there is adequate
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`evidence of the actual damages suffered by plaintiff or of the profits reaped by defendant.” L.A.
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`News Serv. v. Reuters Television Intern., Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation and
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`quotation omitted). This is particularly true when the evidence of profit is within the infringers’
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`control and they have not appeared in the action. In the absence of a uniform set of criteria to
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`determine statutory damages for willful copyright infringement, courts generally consider four
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`factors: “(1) the infringer’s profits and expenses saved because of the infringement; (2) the
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`plaintiff's lost revenues; (3) the strong public interest in ensuring the integrity of copyright laws;
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`and (4) whether the infringer acted willfully.” Getty Images (U.S.), Inc. v. Virtual Clinics, No.
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`C13-0626JLR, 2014 WL 1116775, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 20, 2014). Generally, the first two
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`factors are given less weight than the final two. Id.
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`The Court finds that all four factors favor awarding the maximum statutory amount. The
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`first two factors weigh somewhat in favor of the statutory maximum. While there is no specific
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`evidence of Defendants’ profits or Plaintiffs’ lost revenues, that fact is not neither surprising nor
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`dispositive since the data is solely within the absent Defendants’ control. See Getty, 2014 WL
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`1116775, at *2. As to the third factor, the Court recognizes that public’s “compelling interest in
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`protecting copyright owners’ marketable rights to their work and the economic incentive to
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`continue creating” literary works. Disney, 869 F.3d at 867 (citation and quotation omitted). And
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`as to the fourth factor, there is substantial evidence that Defendants have acted willfully. On
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 9
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 10 of 16
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`balance, these four factors support an award of the maximum statutory damages. The Court
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`therefore AWARDS Plaintiffs’ the maximum statutory amount of $150,000 for each of the
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`following 52 copyrighted works (“Plaintiff Works”) as follows:
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`(a) $150,000 for willful infringement of Abducted;1
`(b) $150,000 for willful infringement of Afterburn;2
`(c) $150,000 for willful infringement of A Dark Mind;3
`(d) $150,000 for willful infringement of As Long As She Needs Me: A Novel;4
`(e) $150,000 for willful infringement of Blood on the Tracks;5
`(f) $150,000 for willful infringement of Fight Dirty;6
`(g) $150,000 for willful infringement of Jesse James: Last Rebel of the Civil War;7
`(h) $150,000 for willful infringement of My Sister’s Grave;8
`$150,000 for willful infringement of Persuader;9
`(i)
`$150,000 for willful infringement of Red Rain: A Novel;10
`(j)
`(k) $150,000 for willful infringement of Short Straw;11
`$150,000 for willful infringement of The Book of Salt;12
`(l)
`(m) $150,000 for willful infringement of The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and
`America’s Doomed Invasion of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs;13
`(n) $150,000 for willful infringement of The Burden of Proof;14
`(o) $150,000 for willful infringement of The Litigators;15
`(p) $150,000 for willful infringement of Tyrannosaur Canyon;16
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`
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`1 Registration No. TX0007670441.
`2 Registration No. TX0008280509.
`3 Registration No. TX0007728631.
`4 Registration No. TX0005380194.
`5 Registration No. TX0008334746.
`6 Registration No. TX0008076233.
`7 Registration No. TX0005703845.
`8 Registration No. TX0008009209.
`9 Registration No. TX0006919613.
`10 Registration No. TX0007603027.
`11 Registration No. TX0006465649.
`12 Registration No. TX0005745355.
`13 Registration No. TX0007373794.
`14 Registration No. TX0002844794.
`15 Registration No. TX0007494080.
`16 Registration No. TX0006206315.
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 10
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 11 of 16
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`(q) $150,000 for willful infringement of You Are Not Small;17
`(r) $150,000 for willful infringement of Custer’s Trials: A Life on the Frontier of a
`New America;18
`(s) $150,000 for willful infringement of The First Tycoon: The Epic Life of Cornelius
`Vanderbilt;19
`$150,000 for willful infringement of Hollow Bones;20
`(t)
`(u) $150,000 for willful infringement of Lucidity;21
`(v) $150,000 for willful infringement of One L: The Turbulent True Story of a First
`Year at Harvard Law School;22
`(w) $150,000 for willful infringement of Carnal Curiosity;23
`(x) $150,000 for willful infringement of Chiefs: A Novel;24
`(y) $150,000 for willful infringement of Collateral Damage;25
`(z) $150,000 for willful infringement of Cut and Thrust;26
`(aa) $150,000 for willful infringement of D.C. Dead;27
`(bb) $150,000 for willful infringement of Foreign Affairs;28
`(cc) $150,000 for willful infringement of Hothouse Orchid;29
`(dd) $150,000 for willful infringement of Insatiable Appetites;30
`(ee) $150,000 for willful infringement of Iron Orchid;31
`(ff) $150,000 for willful infringement of Orchid Beach;32
`(gg) $150,000 for willful infringement of Orchid Blues,33
`(hh) $150,000 for willful infringement of Palindrome;34
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`17 Registration Nos. TX0007970793; TX0007970795.
`18 Registration No. TX0008229466.
`19 Registration No. TX0006942463.
`20 Registration No. TX0007754956.
`21 Registration No. TX0007610805.
`22 Registration No. TX0002573137.
`23 Registration No. TX0007909225.
`24 Registration No. TX0000719822.
`25 Registration No. TX0007684917.
`26 Registration No. TX0007943843.
`27 Registration No. TX0007478430.
`28 Registration No. TX0008233410.
`29 Registration No. TX0007056077.
`30 Registration No. TX0008027684.
`31 Registration No. TX0006295537.
`32 Registration No. TX0004894963.
`33 Registration No. TX0005465649.
`34 Registration No. TX0003038167.
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 11
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 12 of 16
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`(ii) $150,000 for willful infringement of Santa Fe Dead;35
`(jj) $150,000 for willful infringement of Santa Fe Edge;36
`(kk) $150,000 for willful infringement of Santa Fe Rules;37
`(ll) $150,000 for willful infringement of Shoot Him If He Runs;38
`(mm) $150,000 for willful infringement of Two Dollar Bill;39
`(nn) $150,000 for willful infringement of Unintended Consequences;40
`(oo) $150,000 for willful infringement of Unnatural Acts;41
`(pp) $150,000 for willful infringement of Swimming to Catalina;42
`(qq) $150,000 for willful infringement of Dead eyes;43
`(rr) $150,000 for willful infringement of Dead in the Water: A Novel;44
`(ss) $150,000 for willful infringement of Bitter in the Mouth;45
`(tt) $150,000 for willful infringement of Gray Mountain: A Novel;46
`(uu) $150,000 for willful infringement of Rogue Lawyer;47
`(vv) $150,000 for willful infringement of Sycamore Row;48
`(ww) $150,000 for willful infringement of Theodore Boone: The Abduction;49
`(xx) $150,000 for willful infringement of Theodore Boone: The Accused;50
`(yy) $150,000 for willful infringement of Theodore Boone: The Fugitive;51 and
`(zz) $150,000 for willful infringement of Jennie.52
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`35 Registration No. TX0007172693.
`36 Registration No. TX0007328233.
`37 Registration No. TX0003367425.
`38 Registration No. TX0006903331.
`39 Registration No. TX0006164181.
`40 Registration No. TX0007739500.
`41 Registration No. TX0007529029.
`42 Registration No. TX0004751854.
`43 Registration No. TX0003864784.
`44 Registration No. TX0004579095.
`45 Registration No. TX0007299541.
`46 Registration No. TX0007964170.
`47 Registration No. TX0008229453.
`48 Registration Nos. TX0007791381; TX0007963390.
`49 Registration No. TX0007413142.
`50 Registration No. TX0007558149.
`51 Registration No. TX0008293865.
`52 Registration No. TX0003921292.
`
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 12
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 13 of 16
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`The Court directs the Clerk to enter Judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor in the amount of
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`$7,800,000 against the Defendants, jointly and severally.
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`E.
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`Injunctive Relief
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`The Court finds it appropriate to enter a permanent injunction against Defendants.
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`“As a general rule, a permanent injunction will be granted when liability has been
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`established and there is a threat of continuing violations.” MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer,
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`Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993). And under the Copyright Act the Court may “grant
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`temporary and final injunctions on such terms at it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain
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`infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). A plaintiff seeking permanent injunctive relief
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`must demonstrate: “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
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`law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
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`considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is
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`warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”
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`eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
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`The Court finds that all four eBay factors favor entry of a permanent injunction. First,
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`based on the admitted allegations in the Complaint, Defendants’ copyright infringement has
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`caused irreparable harm to Plaintiffs’ goodwill, reputation, and distribution efforts particularly
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`by disrupting Plaintiffs’ control over the sale of their works. Second, Plaintiffs have shown that
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`monetary damages alone will not prevent Defendants from engaging in further abusive conduct.
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`Given Defendants’ decision not to appear in this case and their pattern of deception and evasion,
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`there can be no assurances that Defendants will no longer engage in the conduct at issue in this
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`case. This satisfies the Court that monetary damages alone are insufficient. Third, the equities
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`favor Plaintiffs, who merely seek to enjoin Defendants from engaging in illegal conduct that
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 13
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 14 of 16
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`benefits only Defendants. This favors Plaintiffs and the requested injunction. Fourth, an
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`injunction prohibiting Defendants from engaging in further conduct that misleads and defrauds
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`consumers and infringes on the rights of copyright holders will serve the public interest. The
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`Court GRANTS the Motion and ENTERS the following PERMANENT INJUNCTION against
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`Defendants Kiss Library, Rodion Vynnychenko, and Artem Besshapochny, and their agents,53
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`servants, employees, confederates, and any persons acting in concert or participation with them
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`and hereby permanently ENJOINS AND RESTRAINS them from:
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`(a)
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`Directly infringing Plaintiffs’ works by reproducing, displaying, distributing,
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`offering for sale, or selling Plaintiffs’ Works;
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`(b)
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`Inducing, causing, or materially contributing to the infringement of Plaintiffs’
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`Works;
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`(c) Moving, destroying, or otherwise disposing of any items, merchandise, assets, or
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`other documents related to Defendants’ reproduction, distribution, or sale of Plaintiffs’
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`Works on any of Defendants’ Websites,54 including Defendants’ profits linked to sales
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`of copyrighted works through their associated websites or operations;
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`(d)
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`Removing, destroying or otherwise disposing of any computer files, electronic
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`files, business records, or documents relating to Defendants’ websites, assets, or
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`53 Defendants’ agents expressly include any person operating the email addresses roddiku@gmail.com,
`sofleadecen1987@mail.ru, kmytz@yandex.ru, redoxyzo@gmail.com, jjpetruninas@gmail.com,
`robert.teifeld@gmail.com, ikmytz@gmail.com, hellodorld@protonmail.com, nyakambinnickson@gmail.com,
`ravawebsite@gmail.com, tema@xpdf.bid, hgurm80@gmail.com, amankwavictoria11@gmail.com,
`besshapochnyy@mail.ru, and dmitriy.chernyay@gmail.com, in furtherance of the scheme.
`54 Defendants’ associated websites include Kisslibrary.com, Kisslibraryemails.com, Kisslibrary.net, Kissly.net,
`Wtffastspring.bid, Libly.net, Cheap-library.com, Books.coffee, Getebooks.net, Booksgreatchoice.com,
`Maximumbook.org, Bsebooks.com, Bookspc.com, Crucialbooks.com, Osebooks.com, Wordered.com,
`Thekissly.net, Kisslibraryemails.net, Quabook.com, Luckybooks.online, KissAnime.com, Torrentsmoviesfree.com,
`KissAnime.ru, KissManga.com, Xpdf.bid, Bookpdfs.com, 2pdfs.com, Smashbook.site, Cybook.club, Oregano.pro,
`Dexcom.pro, Lumeo.pro, Keyhunter.pro, Zenlibrary.top, and Lumintu.club.
`
`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 14
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 15 of 16
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`operations, which relate in any way to the reproduction, distribution, or sale of Plaintiffs’
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`copyrighted Works;
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`(e)
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`Registering, maintaining, servicing, hosting, or using any website domains or
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`mobile application programs in furtherance of a scheme to infringe Plaintiffs’ Works or
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`other copyrighted works; and
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`(f)
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`Knowingly and materially assisting any other person or business entity in
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`engaging in or performing any of the activities listed above.
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`The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this case for the purpose of enforcing this Order
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`and Permanent Injunction.
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`F.
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`Overlength Motion
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`Plaintiffs’ Motion of 24 pages exceeds the 6-page limit set by the Local Rules. See Local
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`Rule 7(e)(1). Although Plaintiffs failed to move for relief from the six-page limit, the Court
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`accepts the Motion and has considered its full content. The Court reminds Plaintiffs to carefully
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`review the Local Rules to ensure that any future filings comply with the page limits.
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`CONCLUSION
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`The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to an entry of default judgment and permanent
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`injunction in their favor. The Court therefore: (1) GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion; (2) ENTERS
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`DEFAULT JUDGMENT against Defendants in Plaintiffs’ favor; (3) AWARDS Plaintiffs
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`$7,800,000 in statutory damages against Defendants; and (4) ENTERS a PERMANENT
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`INJUNCTION against Defendants and their agents, etc. on the terms set forth above.
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`The Court directs the Clerk to enter Judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor in the amount of
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`$7,800,000 against the Defendants, jointly and severally. The Court further directs the Clerk to
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`return to Plaintiffs the bond posted to secure the Preliminary Injunction.
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 15
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`Case 2:20-cv-01048-MJP Document 41 Filed 12/17/21 Page 16 of 16
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`The Court directs Plaintiffs’ counsel to serve a copy of this Order and Default Judgment
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`on Defendants at the last email or physical address(es) they received service. And the Clerk is
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`ordered to provide copies of this Order to all counsel.
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`Dated December 17, 2021.
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`A
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`Marsha J. Pechman
`United States Senior District Judge
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`ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 16
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