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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

REX – REAL ESTATE EXCHANGE, INC..

Plaintiff,

v.

ZILLOW, INC.; ZILLOW GROUP, INC.; ZILLOW HOMES, INC.; ZILLOW LISTING SERVICES, INC.; TRULIA, LLC; and THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS,

Defendants.

C21-312 TSZ

ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the motion to dismiss, docket no. 115, filed by Counterclaim-Defendant REX – Real Estate Exchange, Inc. ("REX"). Having reviewed all papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the motion, the Court enters the following Order.

Background

On January 27, 2022, the National Association of REALTORS® ("NAR") filed its responsive pleading, docket no. 114. In its responsive pleading, NAR raises a counterclaim against REX for false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Countercl. at ¶¶ 68–75 (docket no. 114). NAR alleges that REX has made numerous "false and misleading statements of fact in commercial advertisements about



REX's products, services and commercial activities." *Id.* at ¶ 69. NAR challenges a number of statements posted on REX's website, www.rexhomes.com, concerning whether REX's clients pay buyer-agent commission fees and whether REX's technology is innovative, as well as statements alleging that NAR has enacted anticompetitive policies that artificially inflate fees in real estate transactions. *See id.* at ¶¶ 7–50. NAR alleges that REX's statements have harmed NAR's goodwill and reputation with its own members and consumers. *Id.* at ¶ 63. REX now moves to dismiss NAR's counterclaim on grounds that NAR: (i) lacks Article III standing, (ii) lacks statutory standing under the Lanham Act, and (iii) cannot use the Lanham Act to chill REX's constitutional right to challenge conduct it believes harms consumers. *See generally* Mot. to Dismiss (docket no. 115).

Discussion

1. Article III Standing

"[L]ack of Article III standing requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)." *Maya v. Centex Corp.*, 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). In its motion to dismiss NAR's counterclaim, REX presents a facial, rather than a factual, jurisdictional challenge. A facial attack asserts that the allegations of the pleading are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. *See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer*, 373 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2004). With respect to a facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff is entitled to the same safeguards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. *See Friends of Roeding Park v. City of Fresno*, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1159 (E.D. Cal. 2012).



The allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true, *id.*, and the Court may not consider matters outside the pleading without converting the motion into one for summary judgment, *see White v. Lee*, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).

To bring suit in federal court, a plaintiff must have suffered sufficient injury to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution. *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). Three elements are required to establish the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing." *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Id. at 560–61 (internal citations and quotations omitted). A plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating every element of standing. *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). "At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

An organization can bring suit in federal court under two theories of standing:

(i) by suing on its own behalf, or (ii) by suing on behalf of its members. In this case,

NAR brings the counterclaim on its own behalf. *See* Countercl. at ¶ 53 (claiming that



NAR has been narmed by REA's allegedly false advertisements). Like any individual, to
sue on its own behalf, an organization must demonstrate that it suffered an injury in fact.
La Asociación de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083,
1088 (9th Cir. 2010). "An organization suing on its own behalf can establish an injury
when it suffered 'both a diversion of its resources and a frustration of its mission." <i>Id</i> .
(quoting Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2002)).1 REX
contends that NAR's counterclaim must be dismissed because NAR did not plead
sufficient facts to establish that it suffered an injury in fact. NAR does not dispute that it
failed to plead facts demonstrating a frustration of its organizational mission and a
diversion of its resources. Rather, NAR argues that it pleaded sufficient facts to establish
that it suffered a reputational injury. In <i>TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez</i> , 141 S. Ct. 2190,
(2021), the Supreme Court explained that "various intangible harms," such as
reputational harm, can qualify as concrete injuries for standing purposes. <i>Id.</i> at 2204; see
also Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 479 n.14 (1987) ("[T]he risk of this reputational
harm, as we have held earlier in this opinion, is sufficient to establish appellee's standing
to litigate the claim on the merits.").
NAR cites Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2001), and
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989), for the
proposition that an organization's allegations of reputational injury, standing alone, are
¹ See also Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2004); Am. Diabetes Ass'n v U.S. Dep't of the Army, 938 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2019); Rodriguez v. City of San Jose, 930 F.3d



sufficient to establish injury in fact. These cases, however, do not support NAR's argument. Unlike in Walker, in which the organization was not paid for its services for several months, was the subject of a performance complaint to a third party, lost staff time responding to retaliatory activities, and lost other contracts, see 272 F.3d at 1124, in this matter, NAR fails to allege anything more than generalized reputational harm.² The organization in Walker also alleged that it "suffered injury in its ability to carry out its purposes" Id. at 1124. Likewise, in *Presbyterian Church*, the Ninth Circuit found that various church plaintiffs sufficiently alleged injury analogous to reputational or professional harm that "interfered with the churches' ability to carry out their religious mission." 870 F.2d at 522–23. The churches alleged that government surveillance efforts occurring in the churches "impaired the churches' ability to carry out their religious missions" by deterring members from attending religious observances. *Id.* at 521–23. The churches also alleged that "clergy time [was] diverted from regular pastoral duties" as a direct result of the challenged conduct. *Id.* at 522. Unlike the organizations in Walker and Presbyterian Church, NAR does not allege a frustration of its mission or a diversion of its resources.

In this case, NAR contends that REX has harmed NAR through the following allegedly false claims: (i) REX offers low commissions and has superior technology,

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² In *Walker*, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a district court order concerning summary judgment. 272 F.3d at 1124 ("Because this case is at the summary judgment stage, the [organization] must support [its] allegations with 'specific facts.'" (citing *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 561)). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit used a different legal standard than the standard applicable to this Court's consideration of REX's motion to dismiss.



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