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`UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL
`on
`MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
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`IN RE: DIGITAL ADVERTISING ANTITRUST LITIGATION MDL No. 3010
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`TRANSFER ORDER
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`Before the Panel: Defendants Google LLC, Alphabet Inc., and YouTube, LLC (together,
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`“Google”) move under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to centralize this antitrust litigation in the Northern
`District of California. The litigation currently consists of 19 actions pending in 16 districts,
`as listed on Schedule A.1 The actions concern Google’s alleged monopolization and suppression
`of competition in online display advertising – essentially, the marketplace for the placement of
`digital display ads on websites and mobile apps. The parties describe the principal participants in
`online display advertising as advertisers seeking to place ads on the internet, online content
`providers such as news sites offering ad space alongside digital content, and high-speed electronic
`trading venues called “exchanges” that advertisers and online publishers use to manage the buying
`and selling of ad space. The actions allege that Google runs the largest ad exchange and has
`engaged in unlawful acts to suppress competition, causing injuries to advertisers and publishers
`that participate in its exchange by imposing supracompetitive pricing and depriving them of
`revenue. Plaintiffs in all actions seek declaratory and equitable relief under federal or state antitrust
`laws to stop the alleged conduct and damages. The parties refer to the actions by the type of
`plaintiff involved – namely, the advertiser actions (three actions), the publisher actions (sixteen
`actions), and the state attorneys general action filed by 15 states in the Eastern District of Texas
`(“State of Texas” or “State Action”).2
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`1 Google’s motion lists 20 actions for centralization. After the motion was filed, one action
`(Organic Panaceas) was closed following consolidation for all purposes with another action in the
`Northern District of California. Since the filing of Google’s motion, the Panel also has been
`notified of one potential tag-along action.
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` The 15 state plaintiffs are Texas, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky,
`Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, and Utah.
`Two other states – Louisiana and South Carolina – have moved to intervene as additional plaintiffs.
`The state plaintiffs recently submitted a supplemental brief stating that they have filed a motion
`for leave to file a second amended complaint in the underlying court that, if granted, would
`eliminate their request for damages under federal antitrust law, along with adding the putative
`intervenors as plaintiffs. The proposed amended complaint makes the same factual allegations
`and asserts the same federal antitrust violations under the Sherman Act as the operative first
`amended complaint. Google filed a response to the supplemental information stating that
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`Case 3:21-cv-00077 Document 26 Filed 08/10/21 Page 2 of 58 PageID #: 1579
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`I.
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`Defendant Facebook supports centralization of all actions in the Northern District of
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`California or, alternatively, the Southern District of New York. On the plaintiffs’ side, there are
`varying positions on the threshold issue of whether centralization of these actions is warranted and
`the appropriate transferee district. As to plaintiffs in the advertiser actions, plaintiff in one
`Northern District of California action (SPX Total Body Fitness) supports centralization of all
`actions in the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs in the Northern District of California
`In re Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litigation action oppose centralization. And plaintiffs
`in the District of Columbia Cliffy Care action oppose inclusion of their action in any MDL.
`As to plaintiffs in the publisher actions, all request that the State of Texas action be excluded from
`any MDL to ensure its expeditious resolution. Beyond that, however, their positions vary
`significantly. Plaintiffs in the Northern District of California In re Google Digital Publisher
`Antitrust Litigation oppose centralization and, alternatively, request their district as the transferee
`forum. Plaintiffs in 13 regional newspaper actions oppose centralization of their actions and,
`alternatively, request the Eastern District of Texas, the Southern District of New York, or the
`District of the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs in the Southern District of New York Associated
`Newspapers action stated at oral argument that they oppose centralization and, in the alternative,
`assert that the actions should proceed in three separate districts – specifically, the Southern District
`of New York for the 15 publisher actions; the Northern District of California for the three
`advertiser actions; and the Eastern District of Texas, where the State of Texas action would proceed
`in its original forum independently from any MDL.3 The state plaintiffs oppose inclusion of
`State of Texas in any MDL and take no position on centralization of the other actions; alternatively,
`they request that all actions be centralized in the Eastern District of Texas. Lastly, two non-party
`trade organizations representing news entities and other online content providers – News Media
`Alliance and Digital Content Next (“DCN”) – filed interested party briefs supporting a separate
`publisher MDL in the Southern District of New York and requesting exclusion of State of Texas
`from any MDL. DCN also suggested the Eastern District of Texas in its oral argument notice.
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`On the basis of the papers filed and the hearing session held,4 we find that these actions
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`involve common questions of fact, and that centralization in the Southern District of New York
`will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct
`of this litigation. All actions present common factual questions concerning the allegation that
`Google has monopolized or suppressed competition in online display advertising services in
`violation of federal antitrust law, whether that market is described singly as all display advertising
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`Google has reserved its right to oppose the amendment and arguing that centralization remains
`appropriate. We have considered these post-hearing submissions, along with two supplemental
`briefs submitted by plaintiffs in the private actions, in deciding the motion for centralization.
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` 3
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` In the Panel briefing and their oral argument notice, plaintiffs in Associated Newspapers
`supported centralization in the first instance, proposing the three groupings described above.
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` 4
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` In light of the concerns about the spread of COVID-19 virus (coronavirus), the Panel heard oral
`argument by videoconference at its hearing session of July 29, 2021. See Suppl. Notice of Hearing
`Session, MDL No. 3010 (J.P.M.L. July 12, 2021), ECF No. 103.
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`services, as components of display advertising, or as some larger spectrum of digital advertising.
`Common factual issues in all actions include: (1) defining the relevant market for online display
`advertising services; (2) identifying the competitors in the market and their market shares; (3) the
`design and operation of Google’s ad tech products and services, including alleged barriers to
`interoperability with competitors’ products; (4) assessing the alleged anticompetitive effects of
`Google’s conduct on market participants; and (5) Google’s response to a competitive threat to its
`ad exchange known as “header bidding,” which allegedly enabled publishers to use non-Google
`exchanges more effectively.5 Moreover, the 17 actions asserting Section 2 monopolization claims
`raise additional common factual questions, principally (1) Google’s acquisitions of other digital
`ad tech companies, such as DoubleClick, and the competitive impacts of those acquisitions; 6 and
`(2) alleged tying arrangements between, inter alia, Google’s publisher ad server and Google’s ad
`exchange. Sixteen of the 19 actions additionally assert that Google and alleged competitor
`Facebook entered into a secret agreement in 2018 to suppress the alleged “header bidding” threat
`to Google’s market position.
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`Centralization will promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation by eliminating
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`duplicative discovery and avoiding the risk of inconsistent rulings on pretrial matters, particularly
`on discovery disputes, Daubert issues, and dispositive motions. All actions, whether brought as
`putative class actions, individual actions, or governmental actions, will require common discovery
`from Google, which is the principal and common defendant. In addition, all cases will require
`discovery from Facebook because of the questions surrounding Facebook’s status as a competitor;
`in at least 16 actions, discovery also will cover the Google-Facebook agreement. Third-party
`discovery will be significant, as the record indicates that there will be discovery concerning other
`alleged competitors, such as Amazon, as well as federal, state, and international investigations into
`Google’s online display advertising practices. Few of the actions have commenced discovery, and
`those that have done so remain at a preliminary stage, making now an optimal time to structure the
`litigation to maximize efficiencies.
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`In opposition to centralization, plaintiffs primarily argue that (1) factual differences among
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`the actions undermine Google’s motion or at least warrant separate MDLs; (2) informal
`coordination and transfer under Section 1404 are practicable alternatives to centralization; and
`(3) exclusion of the State of Texas action is warranted because of the important governmental
`interests pursued by the states and the corresponding need for expeditious resolution of the action.
`After careful review of the record, we have determined that centralization of all 19 actions on the
`motion is warranted, despite the objections of the parties.
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` The assertion by plaintiffs in Cliffy Care and the 13 local newspaper actions that their
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`antitrust claims concerning the Google-Facebook agreement are not appropriate for centralization
`is unpersuasive. The factual allegations concerning the agreement are substantially similar in all
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`5 Header bidding allegedly involves code that publishers insert into the header section of their
`webpages that allows them to obtain bids from non-Google exchanges.
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` The actions allege that DoubleClick was the leading provider of publisher ad server tools in 2008,
`and that its acquisition by Google marked an important point in Google’s dominance in online
`display advertising.
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` 6
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`Case 3:21-cv-00077 Document 26 Filed 08/10/21 Page 4 of 58 PageID #: 1581
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`16 actions that assert claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act based on that agreement.
`Additionally, the absence of a Section 2 monopoly claim from some actions, like Cliffy Care, is
`not significant because the actions arise from a common factual core – Google’s alleged
`suppression of competition in display advertising services. Indeed, the alleged “header bidding”
`threat to Google’s ad exchange that the Google-Facebook agreement allegedly neutralized is at
`issue in all 19 actions. Lastly, the Cliffy Care plaintiffs’ contention that relevant market issues are
`raised by the monopoly cases, but not by Cliffy Care, is an issue that remains to be determined in
`the litigation. Although plaintiffs assert that the agreement is a per se violation of Section 1 that
`requires no inquiry into the relevant market, defendants assert that recent Supreme Court precedent
`on Section 1 requires defining the relevant market to assess anticompetitive impacts, citing Ohio
`v. American Express, 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).7
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`Separate MDLs for advertisers and publishers are not warranted. Many of the core factual
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`issues in the publisher and advertiser actions overlap significantly, as discussed above – most
`importantly, defining the relevant market; assessing how Google’s conduct affected the alleged
`components of the market; and how to calculate and apportion any damages between publishers
`and advertisers. Although advertiser and publisher actions also raise different issues – for
`example, Google’s practices specific to ad tech tools for publishers versus tools for advertisers –
`“the transferee court may account, at his discretion, for any differences among the actions by using
`appropriate pretrial devices, such as separate tracks for discovery or motion practice.” See In re
`Valsartan Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 3d 1349, 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2019).
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`Informal coordination is not a practicable and efficient alternative to centralization. The
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`actions are pending in 16 districts, and involve seven distinct groups of plaintiffs’ counsel.
`Third-party discovery will pose a further obstacle to informal coordination. Moreover, informal
`coordination appears inadequate to address the risk of inconsistent rulings in this factually and
`legally complex litigation. The possibility of transfer under Section 1404 also is not an efficient
`alternative given the number of involved districts. There are no pending Section 1404 motions,
`and none of the plaintiffs has indicated they would agree to transfer to a different district; rather,
`the record suggests that the vast majority will seek to stay in their chosen venues. In the one action
`in which Google moved for Section 1404 transfer, the motion was denied. See State of Texas v.
`Google LLC, C.A. No. 20-0957, 2021 WL 2043184 (E.D. Tex. May 20, 2021). We pause to
`observe here that the factors governing centralization under Section 1407 differ from those
`governing transfer under Section 1404; thus, the order in State of Texas is not dispositive of our
`ruling on centralization. Moreover, the record before us is significantly different from the record
`in State of Texas – in particular, there are many more actions and districts at issue, as well as
`additional parties.
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`We further find that inclusion of the State of Texas action in this MDL is appropriate.
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`The State Action raises the same factual questions as all the private actions concerning Google’s
`alleged monopoly and the alleged Google-Facebook agreement to suppress competition. The
`states make no attempt to argue otherwise. Rather, they oppose transfer based largely on
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`7 Moreover, the complaints allege that the agreement harms advertisers because Google and
`Facebook are the dominant players in display advertising, an allegation that on its own appears to
`raise market definition questions.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00077 Document 26 Filed 08/10/21 Page 5 of 58 PageID #: 1582
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`considerations relating to the relief requested, efficiency, and their sovereign status – primarily (1)
`they have decided not to pursue federal antitrust damages, as shown in their proposed second
`amended complaint, thus eliminating the overlapping federal damages issues raised by their action;
`(2) their action is more procedurally advanced, as it builds on an 18-month presuit state
`investigation that included voluminous discovery, whereas the other actions are in their infancy;
`(3) their sovereign enforcement action will not involve, and will be delayed by, the class
`certification proceedings in the class actions on the motion; and (4) as sovereigns, their choice of
`venue to vindicate the rights of their citizens and protect the public welfare should not be disturbed.
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`We are not persuaded that the asserted exclusion of federal antitrust damages from the State
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`Action or the discovery posture disfavors transfer. Our decision to centralize is based on the
`common factual core shared by all actions, including the State Action – that Google has
`monopolized and suppressed competition in online display advertising services, including through
`the alleged 2018 agreement with Facebook.8 Eliminating one component of the request for
`damages9 does not alter that common factual core, which will require inquiry into complex
`fundamental issues such as defining the relevant market, identifying competitors, and assessing
`Google’s alleged market power. Additionally, the State Action seeks relief that overlaps with the
`other actions in important ways even absent a request for damages under federal antitrust law –
`most importantly, declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the alleged unlawful practices by
`Google and Facebook, and structural relief that potentially could overlap with the structural relief
`sought by several publisher plaintiffs with respect to divestiture of one or more lines of Google’s
`business.
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`The difference in the discovery posture of the State Action also does not weigh against
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`transfer. The scheduling order in the action was entered only two months ago, and provides for a
`discovery period running through at least late 2022.10 That discovery, which is likely to be
`voluminous and complex, will overlap substantially with the discovery in the other actions on the
`motion, given that all actions raise the same core factual questions. Additionally, pretrial motions
`will address key issues affecting all actions like defining the relevant market – a matter that raises
`novel issues concerning the existence of a “two-sided” market, as well as differing proposed
`definitions by plaintiffs; thus, consistency in judicial rulings on these and other common issues
`will be important. Centralization will enhance the overall convenience of the parties, the
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`8 The proposed second amended complaint in State of Texas makes the same factual allegations
`and asserts the same federal antitrust violations under the Sherman Act as the operative first
`amended complaint. Compare Proposed Second Am. Compl. at pages 10 to 119 with First Am.
`Compl. at pages 10 to 119.
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` The state plaintiffs still seek damages for violation of state antitrust and consumer protection
`laws.
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`10 At oral argument, counsel for Google represented that no depositions have been noticed in the
`State Action.
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`Case 3:21-cv-00077 Document 26 Filed 08/10/21 Page 6 of 58 PageID #: 1583
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`witnesses, and the courts through coordinated proceedings on both discovery and motions in this
`MDL.11
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`We recognize the states’ concerns regarding potential delay from centralization with
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`putative class actions. But these are essentially case management concerns appropriate to raise
`with the transferee court for resolution. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. DPS6 PowerShift
`Transmission Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2018) (observing that
`concerns about “litigation delays” in the MDL were essentially case management concerns and
`“[i]t is incumbent upon the parties to bring their concerns to the attention of the transferee court
`and to propose ways to resolve them”). In the Panel briefing, Google has suggested that potential
`discovery delays from class certification proceedings could be managed by first scheduling a
`common discovery period, and then having the class claims proceed to class certification while the
`non-class claims proceed to dispositive motions.12 We encourage the parties to collaborate on
`these and other proposals to streamline pretrial proceedings and to bring their proposals to the
`attention of the transferee court. As with any MDL, the degree of consolidation or coordination is
`a matter soundly dedicated to the discretion of the transferee judge. See In re Hyundai and Kia
`Fuel Economy Litig., 923 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1365 (J.P.M.L. 2013).
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`The state plaintiffs’ status as sovereigns does not weigh against inclusion of their action.
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`The Panel regularly has transferred state enforcement actions to antitrust MDLs (and to other types
`of MDLs), based on the traditional Section 1407(a) criteria, rejecting the same kinds of arguments
`the state plaintiffs are making in this docket. See, e.g., In re Generic Pharmaceuticals Pricing
`Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2724, 2017 WL 4582710 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 3, 2017) (“the Panel has
`transferred state enforcement actions to MDLs involving cases brought by private litigants with
`some regularity”); In re Auto Body Shop Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2557, Doc. No. 306, at
`(J.P.M.L. Dec. 12, 2014), ECF No. 306, at 1-2 (“[The State of Louisiana] argues that its
`enforcement action should proceed separately from the private actions. This argument is
`unconvincing, as we often have transferred state enforcement actions to MDLs that involved cases
`brought by private litigants.”). Putting aside our past decisions centralizing state actions with
`private actions, inclusion of the State of Texas action is especially compelling here in light of the
`substantial overlap in the alleged Google conduct, plaintiffs’ overlapping but different proposed
`relevant markets, and the involvement of third-party discovery. Additionally, the states’
`arguments to exclude their action rely in large part on proposed legislation that, if enacted, would
`effectuate that desired outcome.13 However, we must apply the law currently in effect, without
`speculating about what future legislation might be passed.
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`11 See In re Watson Fentanyl Patch Prods. Liab. Litig., 883 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1351-52 (J.P.M.L.
`2012) (“in deciding issues of transfer under Section 1407, we look to the overall convenience of
`the parties and witnesses, not just those of a single plaintiff or defendant in isolation”).
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`12 See Google Reply Br., Doc. No. 89, at 3 (J.P.M.L. June 2, 2021).
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`13 See State Antitrust Enforcement Venue Act of 2021, H.R. 3460 and S. 1787, 117th Cong. (2021).
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`II.
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`As to State of Texas, Google also requests that we order transfer of the action for trial under
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`Section 1407(h), which authorizes the Panel to transfer “for both pretrial purposes and for trial,
`any action brought under section 4C of the Clayton Act” – i.e., State parens patriae actions seeking
`monetary relief for federal antitrust violations. Google’s request remains live, notwithstanding the
`states’ proposed second amended complaint dropping their request for damages under Section 4C,
`because the operative complaint currently in effect asserts Section 4C as a basis for jurisdiction
`and relief.14 However, we have determined that the record does not contain adequate information
`to enable us to evaluate whether transfer for trial is warranted. In this litigation, we believe that
`the determination of transfer for trial is better made after the issues in the actions are more fully
`developed, presumably after threshold motions have been resolved and core common discovery
`completed. Furthermore, we anticipate that the transferee court, with the benefit of those
`proceedings and briefing by the parties, will make a suggestion on whether conducting the trial of
`the State Action in the transferee district would serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses
`and promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.15 The states’ recent filing of a motion
`for leave to file a second amended complaint that, if granted, would delete reliance on Section 4C,
`only underscores the need for further development of the issues in these actions before a decision
`on transfer for trial can be made. Accordingly, we deny without prejudice Google’s request to
`transfer the State Action for trial under Section 1407(h).
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`III.
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`We conclude that the Southern District of New York is an appropriate transferee district
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`for this litigation. The record indicates that the advertising and publishing industry around which
`these actions revolve have a strong presence in New York, where the Associated Newspapers
`action is pending. Two organizations representing news entities and other online content providers
`filed amicus briefs supporting centralization of the private actions in the Southern District of New
`York, and plaintiffs in 14 actions request this district in the event that centralization is granted over
`their objection. Facebook indicated at oral argument that the Southern District of New York is an
`appropriate alternative to its preferred California forum. Moreover, the record indicates that
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`14 Google recently advised the Panel that it has reserved its right to oppose the amendment and
`continues to seek transfer of the State of Texas action for trial under Section 1407(h). See Google’s
`Response to Supplemental Information, Doc. No. 117 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 6, 2021).
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`15 We anticipate that transfer of State of Texas for trial, if appropriate, would take place through
`remand to its originating court under Section 1407(a) and simultaneous transfer back to the
`transferee court under Section 1407(h) for trial. See In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig.,
`MDL No. 1030, Doc. No. 81, Order Remanding Actions under 28 U.S.C. 1407(a) and Transferring
`Actions under 28 U.S.C. 1407(h) (J.P.M.L. Dec. 1, 1998). Thus, the party seeking transfer of the
`action for trial should first file a motion with the transferee court seeking a suggestion of remand
`and simultaneous transfer for trial under Section 1407(h), consistent with our rules. See Panel
`Rules 10.2 and 10.3. In the event that that transferee judge declines such a request, any party to
`the State of Texas action may file directly with the Panel a motion seeking remand and
`simultaneous transfer for trial under Section 1407(h).
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`Case 3:21-cv-00077 Document 26 Filed 08/10/21 Page 8 of 58 PageID #: 1585
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` PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
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` _________________________________________
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` Karen K. Caldwell
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` Chair
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`significant Google operations concerning the issues in this litigation are located in New York and
`that much of the common evidence is there as well.
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`We believe that assignment of this MDL to an experienced transferee judge is needed,
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`considering the complexity of the factual and legal issues, the anticipated breadth of third-party
`discovery, and the parties’ concerns over case management efficiencies in litigation of this scope.
`Judge P. Kevin Castel, to whom we assign this litigation, has presided over three MDLs, and has
`the willingness and ability to manage this litigation efficiently. We are confident he will steer this
`litigation on a prudent course.
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`IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the actions listed on Schedule A and pending outside
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`the Southern District of New York are transferred to the Southern District of New York and, with
`the consent of that court, assigned to the Honorable P. Kevin Castel for coordinated or consolidated
`pretrial proceedings.
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`IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that MDL No. 3010 is renamed In re: Google Digital
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`Advertising Antitrust Litigation.
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`Catherine D. Perry
`Matthew F. Kennelly
`Roger T. Benitez
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`Nathaniel M. Gorton
`David C. Norton
`Dale A. Kimball
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`IN RE: DIGITAL ADVERTISING ANTITRUST LITIGATION MDL No. 3010
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`SCHEDULE A
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`Northern District of California
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`SPX TOTAL BODY FITNESS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC, C.A. No. 4:21−00801
`IN RE GOOGLE DIGITAL ADVERTISING ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
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`C.A. No. 5:20−03556
`IN RE GOOGLE DIGITAL PUBLISHER ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
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`C.A. No. 5:20−08984
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`District of Delaware
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`COASTAL POINT LLC v. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL., C.A. No. 1:21−00554
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`District of District of Columbia
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`CLIFFY CARE LANDSCAPING LLC v. FACEBOOK, INC., ET AL.,
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`C.A. No. 1:21−00360
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`Southern District of Indiana
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`AIM MEDIA INDIANA OPERATING, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL.,
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`C.A. No. 1:21−00951
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`District of Maryland
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`FLAG PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL., C.A. No. 1:21−00965
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`Northern District of Mississippi
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`JOURNAL, INC. v. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL., C.A. No. 1:21−00072
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`Southern District of Mississippi
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`EMMERICH NEWSPAPERS, INCORPORATED, ET AL. v. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL.,
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`C.A. No. 3:21−00274
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`District of New Jersey
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`GALE FORCE MEDIA, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL., C.A. No. 2:21−09716
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`Southern District of New York
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`ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS LTD., ET AL. v. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL.,
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`C.A. No. 1:21−03446
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`Southern District of Ohio
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`AIM MEDIA MIDWEST OPERATING, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL.,
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`C.A. No. 2:21−01915
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`Western District of Pennsylvania
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`EAGLE PRINTING COMPANY v. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL., C.A. No. 2:21−00518
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`Eastern District of Texas
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`STATE OF TEXAS, ET AL. v. GOOGLE LLC, C.A. No. 4:20−00957
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`Southern District of Texas
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`AIM MEDIA TEXAS OPERATING, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL.,
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`C.A. No. 7:21−00150
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`Northern District of West Virginia
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`CLARKSBURG PUBLISHING COMPANY v. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL.,
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`C.A. No. 1:21−00051
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`Southern District of West Virginia
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`HD MEDIA COMPANY, LLC v. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL., C.A. No. 3:21−00077
`ECENT CORPORATION v. GOOGLE LLC, C.A. No. 5:21−00251
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`Eastern District of Wisconsin
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`BROWN COUNTY PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., ET AL. v. GOOGLE LLC,
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`ET AL., C.A. No. 1:21−00498
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`Case 3:21-cv-00077 Document 26 Filed 08/10/21 Page 11 of 58 PageID #: 1588
`
`This is an automatic e-mail message generated by the CM/ECF system. Please DO NOT RESPOND to
`this e-mail because the mail box is unattended.
`
`United States
`
`United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
`
`Notice of Electronic Filing
`
`The following transaction was entered on 8/10/2021 at 12:15 PM EDT and filed on 8/10/2021
`Case Name:
`Google Digital Advertising Antitrust Litigation
`Case Number:
`MDL No. 3010
`Filer:
`Document Number:No document attached
`
`Docket Text:
`***TEXT ONLY ENTRY***
`
`MINUTE ORDER -- TO THE TRANSFEROR JUDGES/CLERKS OF THE ASSOCIATED
`CASES:
`
`This transmittal is for informational purposes only. No action is required at this time.
`
`A transfer order has been filed today in this litigation. Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Procedure
`of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, states...An order to transfer or remand
`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1407 shall be effective only upon its filing with the clerk of the
`transferee district court.
`
`You will receive a certified copy of this order from the transferee court along with
`notification of the newly assigned case number(s) in that district. With the advent of
`electronic filing, Rule 9.1 of the Panel Rules shall be satisfied upon transmittal of the
`portion of the file deemed necessary and requested by the transferee court.
`
`Signed by Clerk of the Panel John W. Nichols on 8/10/2021.
`
`Associated Cases: MDL No. 3010, CAN/4:21-cv-00801, CAN/5:20-cv-03556, CAN/5:20-cv-
`08984, DC/1:21-cv-00360, DE/1:21-cv-00554, INS/1:21-cv-00951, MD/1:21-cv-00965,
`MSN/1:21-cv-00072, MSS/3:21-cv-00274, NJ/2:21-cv-09716, OHS/2:21-cv-01915,
`PAW/2:21-cv-00518, TXE/4:20-cv-00957, TXS/7:21-cv-00150, WIE/1:21-cv-00498,
`WVN/1:21-cv-00051, WVS/3:21-cv-00077, WVS/5:21-cv-00251 (JC)
`
`Case Name:
`Case Number:
`Filer:
`Document Number:No document attached
`
`CLIFFY CARE LANDSCAPING LLC v. FACEBOOK INC. et al
`DC/1:21-cv-00360
`
`Docket Text:
`***TEXT ONLY ENTRY***
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-00077 Document 26 Filed 08/10/21 Page 12 of 58 PageID #: 1589
`
`MINUTE ORDER -- TO THE TRANSFEROR JUDGES/CLERKS OF THE ASSOCIATED
`CASES:
`
`This transmittal is for informational purposes only. No action is required at this time.
`
`A transfer order has been filed today in this litigation. Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Procedure
`of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, states...An order to transfer or remand
`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1407 shall be effective only upon its filing with the clerk of the
`transferee district court.
`
`You will receive a certified copy of this order from the transferee court along with
`notification of the newly assigned case number(s) in that district. With the advent of
`electronic filing, Rule 9.1 of the Panel Rules shall be satisfied upon transmittal of the
`portion of the file dee