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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`JOE DONALD MANGRUM,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`ALABAMA MEDICAID AGENCY and
`COMMISSIONER OF THE ALABAMA )
`MEDICAID AGENCY,
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`CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:06cv952-MEF
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`))
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`))
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`))
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`)
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`Defendants.
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`RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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`Liberally construing his complaint as the court is required to do, the court concludes
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`that pro se Joe Donald Mangrum (“Mangrum”) brings this action pursuant to Title II of the
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`Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, alleging that he has been
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`discriminated against because of his disability. Specifically, Mangrum claims that the
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`defendants have refused to pay for his prescription medication from December 23, 1993 until
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`January 17, 2002. Mangrum names the Alabama Medicaid Agency and the Commissioner
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`of the Alabama Medicaid Agency as defendants in this action. The court has jurisdiction of
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`the plaintiff’s claims pursuant to its federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the
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`jurisdictional grant in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
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` 42 U.S.C. § 12132 provides as follows:
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`ubject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall,
`by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
`the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
`any such entity.
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`Case 3:06-cv-00952-MEF-CSC Document 12 Filed 01/08/07 Page 2 of 6
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`This action is presently before the court on the motion to dismiss filed by the
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`defendants on November 14, 2006. (Doc. # 9). The plaintiff has filed a response to the
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`motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 11). The plaintiff’s response contains numerous references to
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`cases and statutes that appear to have little to do with this litigation. After careful review
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`of the motion and the plaintiff’s response, the court concludes that the defendants’ motion
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`to dismiss is due to be granted.
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`DISCUSSION
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`The defendants assert that the plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from
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`bringing this claim because the claim and defendants in this action is identical to those in a
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`case which was previously dismissed by this court. To the extent that the plaintiff’s claim
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`in this action alleges a different time period, the defendants assert that the claim could have
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`been brought in the previous lawsuit. The court agrees that this matter is barred by the
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`doctrine of res judicata.
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`In I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson National Bank, 793 F.2d 1541 (11 Cir. 1986), the
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`Court summarized the doctrine of res judicata as follows:
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`Res judicata or claim preclusion refers to the preclusive effect of a judgment
`in foreclosing relitigation of matters that were litigated or could have been
`litigated in an earlier suit. ... In order for the doctrine of res judicata to bar a
`subsequent suit, four elements must be present: (1) there must be a final
`judgment on the merits; (2) the decision must be rendered by a court of
`competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them, must be
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` For example, the plaintiff refers to Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) and Bounds v. Smith, 430
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`U.S. 817 (1977), as well as the Consumer Protection Act of 1974, the Federal Old Age and Survivors
`Insurance, and the Trust Fund Act of 1970.
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`Case 3:06-cv-00952-MEF-CSC Document 12 Filed 01/08/07 Page 3 of 6
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`identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action must be involved in
`both cases.
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`I.A. Durbin, 793 F.2d at 1549 (citations omitted).
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`(1)
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`A Final Judgment by a Court of Competent Jurisdiction
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`In Mangrum v. Alabama Medicaid Agency, et al., Civ. Act. No. 3:01cv1467-ID (M.D.
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`Ala. 2002), the plaintiff sued the Alabama Medicaid Agency and the Commissioner for
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`failing to pay for his prescription medications from 1994 through September 2001. On July
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`12, 2002, the Court ordered that final judgment be entered in accordance with the
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`Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, and dismissed the case with prejudice. See Doc.
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`34. A review of that Recommendation shows that the dismissal was on the merits. Thus,
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`it is clear that the court’s dismissal of the case was a final judgment on the merits and that
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`the decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
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`(2)
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`Identical Parties
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`Parties are “identical” for purposes of res judicata when they are the same or in privity
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`with one another. NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1561 (11 Cir. 1990). In Mangrum v.
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`Alabama Medicaid Agency, et al., Civ. Act. No. 3:01cv1467-ID (M.D. Ala. 2002), the
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`plaintiff named the Alabama Medicaid Agency and Michael Lewis, the then-Commissioner
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`of the Alabama Medicaid Agency. In the present lawsuit, the plaintiff names the Alabama
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`Medicaid Agency and the Commissioner of the Alabama Medicaid Agency. Thus, the
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`The court concluded that Mangrum failed to establish the first element of a claim under 42 U.S.C.
`§ 12132, that he is a qualified individual with a disability. The court concluded that Mangrum did not
`demonstrate he met the essential eligibility requirements for participation in an applicable Medicaid program.
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`Case 3:06-cv-00952-MEF-CSC Document 12 Filed 01/08/07 Page 4 of 6
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`defendants in the present lawsuit are the same as, or in privity with, the defendants in the
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`previous case.
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`(3)
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`The Same Cause of Action
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`In Manning v. City of Auburn, the Court summarized the law regarding when a cause
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`of action is the same for purposes of res judicata as follows:
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`In this circuit, the determination of whether the causes of action in two
`proceedings are the same is governed by whether the primary right and duty
`are the same. Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1561 (quoting Kemp v. Birmingham News
`Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5 Cir. 1979)); I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat'l
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`Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1549 (11 Cir. 1986). The test is one of substance, not
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`form. I.A. Durbin, 793 F.2d at 1549. Res judicata applies "not only to the
`precise legal theory presented in the previous litigation, but to all legal theories
`and claims arising out of the same 'operative nucleus of fact.' " Hunt, 891 F.2d
`at 1561 (despite variations in legal theories used and remedies sought, second
`suit barred because wrongful act in both cases was flying Confederate flag
`atop state capitol) (quoting Olmstead v. Amoco Oil Co., 725 F.2d 627, 632
`(11 Cir. 1984)); Jaffree v. Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461, 1468 (11 Cir. 1988)
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`(second suit barred because "[b]oth cases raised first amendment (free exercise
`and establishment clause) challenges to use of textbooks and teachings on
`various subjects"); Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 560 (5 Cir.
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`1983) (section 1983 action against city that refused to hire plaintiff as
`firefighter due to her sex precluded by earlier Title VII action on same facts).
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`953 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (11 Cir. 1992).
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`The plaintiff specifically asserts that the defendants failed to pay for his prescription
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`medication from “December 23, 1993 on back to this dated (sic) January 17, 2002.” (Compl.
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`at 1). On January 17, 2002, the plaintiff submitted exhibits and other evidence in support of
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`his complaint referencing the defendants’ failure to pay for his prescription medication. “Res
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`judicata acts as a bar ‘not only to the precise legal theory presented in the previous litigation,
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`Case 3:06-cv-00952-MEF-CSC Document 12 Filed 01/08/07 Page 5 of 6
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`but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same operative nucleus of fact.’”
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`Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.2d 1354, 1356 (11 Cir. 1998).
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`More importantly, the issue in the prior litigation is identical to the issue raised in this
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`lawsuit. The court therefore concludes that the plaintiff’s claims concerning the defendants’
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`failure to pay for his prescription medication in the present action are barred by the doctrine
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`of res judicata and should be dismissed. It is further
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`ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said Recommendation on
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`or before January 21, 2007. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in
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`the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party objects. Frivolous, conclusive
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`or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised
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`that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.
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`Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the
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`Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District
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`Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual
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`findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain
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`error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein
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`v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of
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`Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the
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`decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on
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`September 30, 1981.
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`Case 3:06-cv-00952-MEF-CSC Document 12 Filed 01/08/07 Page 6 of 6
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`Done this 8 day of January, 2007.
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` /s/Charles S. Coody
`CHARLES S. COODY
`CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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