`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
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`FRANKIE JOHNSON,
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` Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`JEFFERSON S. DUNN, et al.,
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` Defendants.
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`Case No.: 2:21-cv-1701-AMM
`SANCTIONS ORDER
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` This case is before the court because incarcerated Plaintiff Frankie Johnson
`accused Defendant Jefferson Dunn, the former Commissioner of the Alabama
`Department of Corrections, of fabricating citations to legal authorities in two
`motions. Docs. 187, 193. Three attorneys for Defendant Dunn (Matthew B. Reeves,
`William J. Cranford, and William R. Lunsford) confirmed in writing and at a hearing
`that the citations were hallucinations of a popular generative artificial intelligence
`(“AI”) application, ChatGPT. See Docs. 194, 200. In simpler terms, the citations
`were completely made up.
`The court must determine an appropriate sanction. Fabricating legal authority
`is serious misconduct that demands a serious sanction. In the court’s view, it
`demands substantially greater accountability than the reprimands and modest fines
`that have become common as courts confront this form of AI misuse. As a practical
`FILED
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` 2025 Jul-23 PM 03:03
`U.S. DISTRICT COURT
`N.D. OF ALABAMA
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`matter, time is telling us – quickly and loudly – that those sanctions are insufficient
`deterrents. In principle, they do not account for the danger that fake citations pose
`for the fair administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial system. And in
`any event, they have little effect when the lawyer’s client ( here, an Alabama
`government agency) learns of the attorney’s misconduct and continues to retain him.
`An appropriate and reasonable sanction must (1) have sufficient deterrent
`force to make this misuse of AI unprofitable for lawyers and litigants, (2) correspond
`to the extrem e dereliction of professional responsibility that sham citations reflect
`(whether generated by artificial or human intelligence), and (3) effectively
`communicate that made-up authorities have no place in a court of law.
`For the reasons explained below, the court PUBLICLY REPRIMANDS Mr.
`Reeves, Mr. Cranford, and Mr. Lunsford for making false statements to the court;
`ORDERS publication of this order to effectuate that reprimand; DISQUALIFIES
`them from further participation in this case; and REFERS this matter to the Alabama
`State Bar and other applicable licensing authorities.
`In the light of the results of the independent investigation commissioned by
`the attorneys’ law firm, the court exercises its discretion not to suspend them from
`practice in the Northern District of Alabama. The court RELEASES WITHOUT
`SANCTION attorneys Daniel J. Chism and Lynette E. Potter, and the law firm
`Butler Snow LLP (“Butler Snow”) from disciplinary proceedings.
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`I. BACKGROUND
`A. Procedural Background
`On May 7, 2025, Defendant Dunn filed a motion for leave to take the
`deposition of an incarcerated person under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
`30(a)(2)(B), which is required to depose any incarcerated person. Doc. 174. The
`signature block of that motion contained the names of four attorneys from the Butler
`Snow law firm: William J. Cranford, William R. Lunsford, Matthew B. Reeves, and
`Daniel J. Chism. Id. at 4. Mr. Cranford electronically filed the motion with his filing
`credentials. Plaintiff Johnson, the incarcerated person at issue, objected to being
`deposed prior to receipt of certain documents from the Alabama Department of
`Corrections that were the subject of a motion to compel by him. Doc. 186 at 2; see
`also Doc. 169. All parties agreed that Plaintiff Johnson was due to be deposed; the
`dispute was simply about when (Defendant Dunn wanted to conduct the deposition
`the week of June 3 rd and Plaintiff Johnson wanted sometime later , after receipt of
`the documents at issue in his motion to compel).
`On May 8, 2025, Defendant Dunn sought leave of court to file a motion to
`compel interrogatory answers and document production from Plaintiff Johnson.
`Doc. 178. The next day, the court granted that leave. Doc. 179. At 11:21 a.m.
`1 on
`May 12, 2025, Defendant Dunn filed an unopposed motion for excess pages as to
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`1 All times noted in this order are in Central Daylight Time.
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`the forthcoming motion to compel. Doc. 180. The court granted the motion for
`excess pages at 12:39 p.m. Doc. 181. Then, at 4:21 p.m. on May 12, 2025, Defendant
`Dunn filed his motion to compel. Doc. 182. Four Butler Snow attorneys appeared
`on the signature block of that motion: Mr. Cranford, Mr. Lunsford, Mr. Reeves, and
`Ms. Potter. Id. at 20. Ms. Potter has not entered a notice of appearance in this case.
`Plaintiff Johnson’s motion to compel became fully briefed on May 12, 2025.
`See Doc. 183. On May 14, 2025, the court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff
`Johnson’s motion to compel. Doc. 184.
`The next day, Plaintiff Johnson filed a response to the motion for leave to
`depose him. Doc. 186. Plaintiff Johnson objected to a deposition the week of June
`3rd on several grounds, including that counsel for Defendant Dunn appeared to have
`fabricated citations to legal authority in his motion for leave and motion to compel,
`“possibly through the use of generative artificial intelligence.” Id. at 1.
`In total, there were five problematic citations across two motions:
`• Defendant Dunn cited “United States v. Baker, 53 9 F. App’x 937, 943
`(11th Cir 2013)” as “confirming broad discovery rights under Rules 26 and
`30.” Doc. 174 at 2. As Plaintiff Johnson pointed out, “[w]hile United States v.
`Baker, 529 Fed. Appx. 987 (11th Cir. 2013) is an actual case, it is an appeal
`challenging a criminal’s sentencing enhancement.” Doc. 186 at 2. And the
`case found in the Federal Appendix numbers cited by Defendant Dunn does
`not discuss discovery. See Williams v. Morahan, 539 F. App’x 937 (11th Cir.
`2013).
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`• Defendant Dunn cited “ Kel ley v. City of Birmingham , 2021 WL
`1118031, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 24, 2021)” for the proposition that the district
`court “refus [ed] to delay deposition based on unrelated discovery issues.”
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`Doc. 174 at 2. The only case with that style which Plaintiff Johnson (and the
`court) could find was an Alabama Court of Appeals case from 1939 that dealt
`with a traffic offense. Doc. 186 at 3; see Kelley v. City of Birmingham, 28 Ala.
`App. 644, 189 So. 921 (Ala. Ct. App. 1939).
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`• Defendant Dunn cited “ Gr eer v. Warden, FCC Coleman I , 2020 WL
`3060362, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 9, 2020)” as “rejecting inmate’s request to
`delay deposition until additional discovery was completed.” Doc. 174 at 2.
`This case does not exist, nor does a case exist with a similar citation for that
`proposition of law. See Doc. 186 at 3.
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`• Defendant Dunn cited “ Wil son v. Jackson , 2006 WL 8438651, at *2
`(N.D. Ala. Feb. 27, 2006)” with the parenthetical that it was an opinion
`“granting [a] Rule 30(a)(2)(B) motion and finding no good cause to delay
`deposition of incarcerated plaintiff.” Doc. 174 at 2. There is no such case, and
`that Westlaw number directs to a maritime personal injury case that does not
`discuss discovery. See Douglas v. Ingram Barge Co., No. CV 3:04-0383, 2006
`WL 8438651 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 15, 2006); see also Doc. 186 at 4.
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`• Defendant Dunn cited “Williams v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. , N o.
`3:05-cv-479, 2006 WL 3343787, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2006)” to support
`the statement that, “General objections are not useful and will not be
`considered by the Court. Objections should be specific and supported by a
`detailed explanation.” Doc. 182 at 13. Though a case with that style exists, no
`case with that combination of style and proposition exists. See Williams v.
`Asplundh Tree Expert Co. , No. 3:05-cv -00479-VMC-MCR (M.D. Fla. July
`23, 2013); see also Doc. 186 at 4.
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`At 12:
`14 p.m. on Friday, May 16, 2025, the court issued a show cause order
`noting that “[i]n the light of the seriousness of the accusation, the court ha[d]
`conducted independent searches for each allegedly fabricated citation, to no avail,”
`and ordering the signatories of Defendant Dunn’s motion for leave, and the Butler
`Snow law firm, “to show good cause, if there be any, why they should not be
`sanctioned under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the court’s inherent authority,
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`Local Rule 83.1(f), and/or Alabama Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 for making
`false statements of fact or law to the court, not later than 3:00 PM Central Daylight
`Time on Monday, M ay 19, 2025.” Doc. 187 at 1–2 (emphasis omitted). The court
`also set a show cause hearing for 9:00 a.m. Central Daylight Time on Wednesday,
`May 21, 2025 at the Hugo Black United States Courthouse. Id. at 2.
`Three hours after the order to show cause issued, Mr. Lunsford and Mr. Chism
`filed a motion to be excused from the show cause hearing. Doc. 188. Mr. Chism and
`Mr. Lunsford represented that “[n]either [of them] participated in any way in the
`drafting or filing of the Motion for Leave to Depose Incarcerated Persons,” and that
`Mr. Lunsford “must be in Macon, Georgia to [] prepare for and attend a previously
`set evidentiary hearing before the U.S. District Judge Marc Treadwell in the United
`States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.” Id. at 2.
`The court denied their requested excuse at 6:39 p.m. that same day:
`The hearing before Judge Treadwell is set for Thursday, May 22, 2025,
`at 9:00 AM Eastern Standard Time—twenty-three hours after the show
`cause hearing in this case. See Rica rdo Daughtry, et al. v. Shawn
`Emmons, et al. , No. 5:15 -cv-00041-MTT (M.D. Ga. filed Feb. 12,
`2015). The May 21, 2025 show cause hearing will last no longer than
`an hour. Accordingly, Mr. Lunsford will have ample time to travel to
`Georgia in advance of his hearing the next day, and the motion to
`excuse as to Mr. Lunsford and Mr. Chism is DENIED.
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`Doc. 190 at 2. Several attorneys representing other parties sought and received
`excuses from the show cause hearing. Docs. 189–92, 196–97.
`On Monday, May 19, 2025, the court issued a supplemental show cause order:
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`Out of an abundance of caution, the court CLAIRIFIES its show cause
`order to the extent that (1) Defendant Dunn’s motion to compel is also
`the subject of that show cause order and will be discussed at the hearing
`set for Wednesday, May 21, 2025 at 9:30 AM Central Daylight Time,
`and (2) in addition to the four attorneys on the motion for leave, Ms.
`Lynette E. Potter is ORDERED to show good cause, if there be any,
`why she should not be sanctioned under Federal Rule of Civil
`Procedure 11, the court’s inherent authority, Local Rule 83.1(f), and/or
`Alabama Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 for making false statements
`of fact or law to the court.
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`Doc. 193 at 2–3.
`Later that day, Mr. Lunsford, Mr. Reeves, Mr. Cranford, and Mr. Chism filed
`their response to the show cause orders, admitting that the citations were
`hallucinated by ChatGPT: “In short, attorney Matt Reeves used ChatGPT to obtain
`case citations in support of two arguments made in the motions at issue without
`verifying their accuracy, and those citations proved to be false.” Doc. 194 at 1. The
`response included declarations from each attorney. See Docs. 194-1–4.
`Butler Snow then filed its response , called the events “unacceptable,” and
`requested that “that any sanctions be proportionate to the wrong and commensurate
`with each attorney’s role in these events,” “that its client not be sanctioned, and for
`counsel to have the opportunity to file an amended motion with correct citations.”
`Doc. 195 at 1 –2. Ms. Potter later filed her response, Doc. 198, and a declaration,
`Doc. 198-1.
`The court held the show cause hearing on May 21, 202 5. Doc. 200. Counsel
`of record who were not previously excused, representatives from Butler Snow, and
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`a representative from the Alabama Attorney General’s Office appeared.
`Following the show cause hearing, the court allowed “supplemental responses
`to the order to show cause and briefs from anyone else who wishe[d] to file [one].”
`Doc. 199. Additionally, the court granted leave for Defendant Dunn to file corrected
`versions of the motions at issue, which he later filed. See Docs. 201–02. Butler Snow
`filed a supplemental response to the show cause orders on June 2, 2025. Doc. 203.
`B. The Attorneys
`Mr. Lunsford, Mr. Reeves, Mr. Cranford, Mr. Chism, and Ms. Potter spoke at
`the show cause hearing and filed supplemental declarations. Docs. 200, 203-3–7.
`1. William J. Cranford
`Mr. Cranford is of counsel at Butler Snow. Doc. 194- 3 ¶ 2. As to the motion
`for leave to depose, Mr. Cranford stated in his initial declaration that: (1) he “drafted
`the initial version of Dunn’s Motion for Leave to Depose Incarcerated Persons”; (2)
`he “submitted the draft Motion for Leave for review to [his] direct supervisors, Matt
`Reeves, and Bill Lunsford” while copying Mr. Chism; (3) “[o]n May 7, 2025, Matt
`Reeves returned revisions to the draft Motion for Leave to [him]” and that “[t]he
`revisions included the string citation at issue . . . in paragraph two of the Motion for
`Leave”; (4) although he “reviewed [the edits] for grammatical and typographical
`issues, [he] did not conduct an independent review of the legal authorities added”
`and “incorporated the . . . revisions into a final draft of the Motion for Leave for
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`filing with the Court” ; (5) “[u]pon approval from Matt Reeves, [he] electronically
`signed and filed the Motion for Leave on May 7, 2025” ; and (6) he “possessed no
`knowledge that Matt Reeves utilized generative artificial intelligence to generate
`these citations when [he] filed the Motion.” Id. ¶¶ 4–9.
`As to the motion to compel, Mr. Cranford stated in his initial declaration that:
`(1) he “drafted the initial version of the Motion to Compel”; (2) “[o]n May 10, 2025,
`[he] submitted the draft Motion to Compel for review to [his] direct supervisors,
`Matt Reeves, and Bill Lunsford, and copied Daniel Chism”; (3) “[o]n May 11, 2025,
`Matt Reeves returned revisions to the draft Motion to Compel to [him]” and
`“included the block citations located on page thirteen of the Motion to Compel”; (4)
`that same day, “after receiving the revisions, [he] reviewed them for grammatical
`and typographical issues,” but “did not conduct an independent review of the legal
`authorities added” and “incorporated the . . . revisions into a final draft of the Motion
`to Compel”; (5) he “submitted the revised Motion to Compel to Matt Reeves and
`Bill Lunsford for final approval on May 11, 2025, and received no further revisions”;
`(6) he “electronically signed and filed the Motion to Compel on May 12, 2025”; (7)
`“at the time of filing, [he] lacked any knowledge that Matt Reeves utilized generative
`artificial intelligence to generate the[ problematic] citations” ; and (8) he
`“erroneously included Lynette Potter in the signature block of the Motion to Compel
`for the Butler Snow attorneys of record in the case.” Id. ¶¶ 12–14, 17–21.
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`At the show cause hearing, Mr. Cranford apologized and “accept[ted] full
`responsibility.” Doc. 200 at 18. He described his understanding of that
`responsibility: “I signed these motions. I understand that by signing these motions,
`I was verifying and accepting responsibility for the contents of those motions. And
`I take full responsibility for that. There’s no excuse for not verifying these citations
`. . .” Id. at 18–19. He also described his practice for edits from supervisors:
`[I]n my normal practice, when I submit a draft to Mr. Reeves or Mr.
`Lunsford, if I recei ve revisions back, my typical practice is to
`incorporate those revisions, make sure they are factually accurate for
`the case since I usually have a more detailed understanding of the facts
`and the history, background of the case, and check for typographical or
`grammatical errors. In my normal practice, I do not typically check
`citations that are added from Mr. Lunsford or Mr. Reeves.
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`Id. at 19. Mr. Cranford represented that when he received the edits from Mr. Reeves,
`the edits in the motion for leave to depose were in redline and the edits in the motion
`to compel were in plain text. Id. at 19 –20. He further represented that he was
`“unaware of any other instances of lawyers with [his] group using ChatGPT or an
`outside AI source for legal research or drafting of a legal document” besides
`Westlaw’s CoCounsel product. Id. at 20.
`In a supplemental declaration, Mr. Cranford stated that he has “never used any
`publicly accessible, generative artificial intelligence chatbot, such as OpenAI’s
`ChatGPT, to generate legal or other authority citations for submission to any court.”
`Doc. 203-5 ¶ 2.
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`Mr. Cranford did not have a “specific position” on an appropriate sanction
`other than to say that it is “within [the court’s] discretion” and that he “accept[s]
`whatever the Court deems to be appropriate in this instance.” Doc. 200 at 20–21.
`2. Matthew B. Reeves
`Mr. Reeves is a partner and assistant practice group leader in Butler Snow’s
`constitutional and c ivil rights litigation group. Doc. 195 at 2. He s tated in his
`declaration that: (1) he was “responsible for revising Paragraph 2 of the Motion for
`Leave and Page 13 of the Motion to Compel, including the legal authorities cited
`therein”; (2) he “performed a search [on ChatGPT] to identify supporting case law
`for the proposition that discovery may proceed even during the pendency of other
`discovery issues, as to the Motion for Leave, and that general or boilerplate
`objections are not effective, as to the Motion to Compel”; (3) he “failed to verify the
`case citations returned by ChatGPT through independent review in Westlaw or
`PACER before including them in the Motion for Leave and Motion to Compel”; and
`(4) that the citations at issue are inaccurate or do not exist. Doc. 194- 2 ¶¶ 3–5. Mr.
`Reeves further stated that this “was a serious error in judgment, and contrary to the
`requirements of Butler Snow LLP and [his] obligations to this Court.” Id. ¶ 6.
`At the show cause hearing, Mr. Reeves stated that has “had limited use” “with
`various AI products” “since approximately March of 2024.” Doc. 200 at 21. Besides
`Westlaw’s CoCounsel product, Mr. Reeves stated that he used ChatGPT. Id. at 21–
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`22. He “initially used [ChatGPT] for persona l reasons, to look up things related to
`dietary-related matters,” “to look up things when [his family went] on trips,” “an d
`when [his] youngest son started looking at colleges, doing some research on that for
`colleges and universities.” Id. Then, he began using ChatGPT professionally. Id. at
`22. Mr. Reeves gave examples of “basic” tasks such as “a general search of any sort
`of background, history kind of stuff” for “a witness that was going to be deposed”
`or “to go get a survey of what was out there publicly available . . . to get an idea of
`what the body of policies in the corrections world looked like.” Id. He also stated
`that he “was aware of the limitation on use [of artificial intelligence products at
`Butler Snow]; and in this instance . . . [he] did not comply with the [firm’s] policy,”
`and that these are “the two instances” in which he used artificial intelligence and
`“did not verify the citations.” Id. at 23.
`In a supplemental declaration, Mr. Reeves stated that “[e]xcept in the motions
`already subject to the Court’s Order to Show Cause,” he has “never used any publicly
`accessible, generative artificial intelligence chatbot, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT, to
`generate legal or other authority citations for submission to any court.” Doc. 203- 4
`¶ 2. In addition, Mr. Reeves stated that he is working with Anil Mujumdar, counsel
`for Plaintiff Johnson and a professor at the University of Alabama School of Law,
`to develop “an informative program to educate law students regarding the risks of
`AI.” Id. ¶¶ 3–4. Mr. Reeves “intend[s] to pursue this program and a similar program
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`at Samford University’s Cumberland School of Law and Faulkner University’s
`Thomas Goode Jones School of Law regardless of whether the Court orders it as
`relief in this case.” Id. ¶ 5.
`Mr. Reeves’s position on sanctions “is that [he] understand[s] it is well within
`[the court’s] discretion to provide whatever sanction [the court] deem[s]
`appropriate,” and because he is “the one responsible for the error,” he hopes that the
`court “would not punish [his] colleagues for that.” Doc. 200 at 24.
`3. William R. Lunsford
`Mr. Lunsford is a partner and practice group leader of the constitutional and
`civil rights litigation group at Butler Snow. Doc. 194-1 ¶ 3. Mr. Lunsford began his
`initial declaration by “apologiz[ing] to the Court, to all parties, to opposing counsel
`and to the State of Alabama for the terrible decisions that led to an erroneous filing.”
`Id. ¶ 2. He also stated that “[u]pon receipt of the Court’s [show cause] Order (Doc.
`No. 187), [he] promptly contacted the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of
`Corrections, the General Counsel for the Department of Corrections and the Chief
`Counsel for the Attorney General to inform them of the Court’s Order.” Id. ¶ 5.
`At the show cause hearing, the court asked about Mr. Lunsford’s motion to be
`excused:
`THE COURT: . . . When you filed your motion to be excused, I think a
`few hours had elapsed since I had issued the show cause order.
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`Had you at the time you filed the motion to be excused performed any
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`work to understand the extent or nature of the hallucinated citations or
`whether there might be any other such citations in this case or in others?
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`MR. LUNSFORD: The short answer is no, Your Honor. It was filed
`quickly in haste on a Friday afternoon when I did not appreciate the full
`context of the Court’s order.
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`Doc. 200 at 25.
`In his declaration, Mr. Lunsford also described his role in representing the
`Alabama Department of Corrections and the State of Alabama:
`I have had the honor of representing the Alabama Department of
`Corr
`ections and its officials in various capacities ( i.e. as directly
`retained counsel or counsel retained by third party contractors under
`indemnity obligations) over more than twenty (20) years. My name and
`signature appear on all of the current public contracts for professional
`services provided by outside legal counsel to the State of Alabama (the
`“State”) on a limited number of matters for which the State elects to
`hire outside counsel. As such, I am the principal responsible attorney
`for all matters currently assigned to the firm regarding the Alabama
`Department of Corrections (“ ADOC”). As a general matter, we have
`been retained to represent the State in systemic reform litigation
`brought against ADOC as well as a small number of individual plaintiff
`cases with a factual nexus to our pending systemic reform matters. I,
`along with my partner Matt Reeves, routinely monitor the assignment
`of attorneys within our firm to our matters for the State and its
`Department of C orrections in effort to effectively manage the
`representation of the State in each assigned matter.
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`For purposes of representing current and former ADOC officials in the
`indiv
`idual plaintiff classes, such as the Johnson matter, we routinely
`assign one or two younger attorneys to the matter with Matt Reeves and
`I providing supervisory coverage. Due to the nature of our cases and
`work, Matt Reeves provides more of the day- to-day oversight,
`supervision and direction on the individual plaintiff ’s cases filed
`against current and/or former ADOC officials; however, I also provide
`supervision – particularly in times when the demands of our other cases
`or clients or personal events render Matt unavailable. Dan Chism and
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`Will Cranford have been primarily assigned to represent ADOC and its
`current and former officials in the individual plaintiff ca ses since they
`began working with us more than two (2) years ago.
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`Doc. 194-1 ¶¶ 7–8; see also Doc. 200 at 25–26 (show cause hearing transcript).
`As to the motion for leave to depose, Mr. Lunsford state d that he did not
`review the draft due to other work obligations. Doc. 194-1 ¶ 9. Mr. Lunsford stated
`that he did review the motion to compel:
`As with the Motion for Leave, Will Cranford drafted the initial Motion
`to Compel and he transmitted the draft to Matt Reeves for review at
`11:43 a.m. on Saturday, May 10, 2025. Matt responded with revisions
`to the original draft at approximately 2:45 a.m. on Sunday, May 11,
`2025. Will recirculated another draft of the Motion to Compel
`incorporating the revisions of Matt Reeves at 7:29 p.m. on Sunday, May
`18, 2025. I briefly scanned the document on Sunday night and
`responded to Will via email within approximately fifteen minutes,
`indicating that I did not have any changes. My brief review focused
`more on the facts outlined as the basis for the motion to compel and the
`bolded headings of the legal arguments. I did not conduct any detailed
`or substantive review of the legal authorities. Given that the document
`had already undergone a review by Matt Reeves, I did not conduct any
`level of detailed review. I certainly did not conduct the level of detailed
`review that I would otherwise conduct if I was the sole reviewing
`attorney. Moreover, from my personal experiences with Will Cranford
`over the last two years, he has consistently demonstrated proficiency in
`promptly incorporating written feedback from his supervising attorneys
`and, as such, I did not have significant concerns about Will’s
`incorporation of the changes provided by Matt Reeves.
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`Id. ¶ 10.
`Mr. Lunsford described Mr. Reeves adding legal citations as a supervisory
`attorney to be “atypical” and “rare” in their group practice. Id. ¶ 11. He further stated:
`[O]ur historical process creates an expectation and mutual
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`understanding that the attorney crafting and adding legal authorities
`ensures their accuracy and, as such, I would not have expected Will
`Cranford to conduct such a review of a senior, supervisory attorney’s
`additional legal arguments or authorities. Finally, this is the only
`instance in over a decade of working with Matt Reeves when I have
`ever encountered an instance when he added a citation that he failed to
`validate.
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`Id.
`At the show cause hearing, when the court asked Mr. Lunsford to provide the
`“basis for [his] expectation that Mr. Cranford would have affixed his signature to the
`motions without reviewing the additional citations,” Mr. Lunsford stated that “much
`of the law” and “much of the precedent” between the cases he oversees are “the
`same” “so there are a lot of occasions when Matt [Reeves] or [he] will see authority
`and/or see a place where authority might be missing and go pull from [their] other
`available resources and plug that into the document.” Doc. 200 at 27. “And so the
`practice, the cadence that’s developed over [almost fifteen years] is most of
`everything [Mr. Reeves or Mr. Lunsford] pull is from another brief or another
`previous writing where [they] know other authority exists.” Id.
`In his declaration, Mr. Lunsford described Butler Snow’s “proactive”
`approach to artificial intelligence:
`[Butler Snow] has been proactive in investigating, warning against and
`attempting to establish firm guidance on the use of the ever -evolving
`availability of products generated utilizing artificial intelligence. Under
`firm policy, the use of ChatGPT for legal research r equires written
`approval from a practice group leader. I have yet to receive or approve
`any such request. I can state with certainty that our Firm has made the
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`limitations upon the use of artificial intelligence abundantly clear to all
`of our attorneys. The conduct reported in this instance flies in the face
`of known Firm policy, which the Firm will handle internally. Moreover,
`I was not aware of any of our attorneys relying upon artificial
`intelligence of any kind to prepare any of our legal filings and I can
`assure this Court that I along with the leadership of the Firm are
`revisiting this issue to evaluate ways that we can ensure that these
`instances do not occur again.
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`Doc. 194-1 ¶ 12. In addition, at the show cause hearing, Mr. Lunsford stated that his
`team had discussions about Westlaw’s artificial intelligence program, CoCounsel,
`and “a discussion when [their] vendor for court reporting transcripts began providing
`[them], free of charge for a period of time, AI summaries of a deposition.” Doc. 200
`at 28–29. Mr. Lunsford recalled that “there was equal parts amazement and
`concern,” with “an immediate clear recognition that those [deposition] summaries
`could never be relied upon in drafting any documents.” Id. at 29.
`Mr. Lunsford represented at the show cause hearing that he “spent probably a
`collective four hours going through emails and reviewing redlines of drafts that Mr.
`Reeves had circulated,” and did not find any additional problems like the ones at
`issue here. Id. at 30– 31. That review included “three mediation statements,” “a
`response to a court-monitoring report,” “some smaller motions for leave,” and “some
`summary judgment motions ,” but he also represented that “the firm’s response to
`this is not complete yet.” Id. at 30–33.
`In a supplemental declaration, Mr. Lunsford stated that he has “never used
`any publicly accessible, generative artificial intelligence chatbot, such as OpenAI’s
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`ChatGPT, to generate legal or other authority citations for submission to any court.”
`Doc. 203-3 ¶ 2.
`Mr. Lunsford did not have a position on appropriate sanctions that differed
`from that of Butler Snow. Doc. 200 at 33.
`4. Daniel J. Chism
`Mr. Chism is an associate at Butler Snow. Doc. 194-4 ¶ 2. In his declaration,
`he stated that although he “was copied on emails circulating drafts,” he “did not
`draft, revise, or review the Motions [at issue].” Id. ¶ 4. Mr. Chism reaffirmed th at
`statement at the show cause hearing. Doc. 200 at 17 –18. In a supplemental
`declaration, he stated that he has “never used any publicly accessible, generative
`artificial intelligence chatbot, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT, to generate legal or other
`authority citations for submission to any court.” Doc. 203-6 ¶ 2.
`5. Lynette E. Potter
`Ms. Potter is an attorney at Butler Snow. Doc. 198-1 ¶ 2. In her declaration,
`she stated that she “did not draft, edit, review, supervise, or approve the Motions or
`any drafts of the Motions,” and “possessed no knowledge related to the preparation
`or filing of the Motions or any of their contents until May 16, 2025, when the Court
`entered its Show Cause Order.” Id. ¶ 5. Ms. Potter reaffirmed those statements at the
`show cause hearing. Doc. 200 at 17– 18. In a supplemental declaration, she stated
`that she has “never used any publicly accessible, generative artificial intelligence
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`chatbot, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT, to generate legal or other authority citations
`for submission to any court.” Doc. 203-7 ¶ 2.
`C. Butler Snow
`Butler Snow filed an initial response, a supplem