Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 1 of 18 PageID #:
`32261
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` CASE NO. 5:22-CV-5059
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
`FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
`
`LONDON LUXURY, LLC PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT
`
`V.
`
`WALMART, INC.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Before the Court are the following:
`
`• Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant London Luxury, LLC’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees,
`Costs, and Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest (Doc. 472) and Brief in Support
`(Doc. 473); Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff Walmart,
`Inc.’s Response
`in
`Opposition (Doc. 497); and London Luxury’s Reply (Doc. 501);
`
`• Walmart’s Motion to Extend Stay of Execution and Approve Security (Doc. 492)
`and Brief in Support (Doc. 493); and
`
`• London Luxury’s Motion to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal (Doc. 503), Brief in
`Support (Doc. 504), Supplement (Doc, 510), and Addendum (Doc. 511).
`
`For the reasons stated herein, the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Pre- and
`
`Post-Judgment Interest is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; Walmart’s
`
`Motion to Extend Stay of Execution and Approve Security is GRANTED; and London
`
`Luxury’s Motion to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal is also GRANTED.
`
`I. ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, INTEREST, AND SANCTIONS
`
`Walmart and London Luxury sued one another for breach of contract, and Walmart
`
`separately sued London Luxury for tortious interference. Following an eleven-day trial,
`
`the jury returned its verdicts on April 9, 2024, siding with London Luxury on the contract
`
`claim and awarding it $101,218,680.00 in compensatory damages for Walmart’s breach.
`
`Separately, the jury awarded Walmart $350,000.00 for London Luxury’s tortious conduct
`
`during the performance of the contract. In post-trial motion practice, the Court denied
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 2 of 18 PageID #:
`32262
`
`Walmart’s Rule 50(b) and 59 requests. See Doc. 512. Accordingly, London Luxury is the
`
`prevailing party on its contract claim,1 and Arkansas Code § 16-22-308 permits the Court
`
`to award the company “a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court and
`
`collected as costs.” Whether and how much to award in fees are decisions that are left to
`
`the Court’s discretion. TCBY Sys., Inc. v. RSP Co., 33 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 1994); First
`
`United Bank v. Phase II, 347 Ark. 879, 901 (2002).
`
`To put into context the roles that various lawyers played in the course of this multi-
`
`year litigation, the Court sets forth the following timeline of events:
`
`• January 5, 2022: The complaint was filed in New York state court by London
`Luxury’s lawyers from the New York firm of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
`Sullivan, LLP.
`
`• January 24, 2022: Walmart removed the case to the U.S. District Court for
`the Southern District of New York.
`
`• March 28, 2022: All Quinn Emanuel lawyers withdrew and a new set of
`lawyers from the New York firm of Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP entered their
`appearances for London Luxury.
`
`• April 4, 2022: The Southern District of New York transferred the case to this
`district.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 Walmart makes a perfunctory argument that London Luxury should not be considered
`the prevailing party because it originally based its breach-of-contract claim, at least in
`part, on a document that was not a contract at all. Although Walmart is right about that, it
`omits the fact that only two months after the lawsuit was filed, London Luxury explicitly
`withdrew its reliance on this document as a basis for its breach-of-contract claim. London
`Luxury’s lawyers wrote a letter to the presiding judge at the time, the Honorable Cathy
`Seibel, United States District Judge for Southern District of New York, explaining their
`client’s position. See Doc. 51. In response, Judge Seibel issued a text-only order
`confirming her understanding that neither party would rely on this particular document to
`prove the existence of a contract. See Doc. 55. And they never did. Litigation continued
`for approximately two more years until a jury determined that Walmart breached the
`contract. This claim was at the heart of the parties’ dispute, and London Luxury claimed
`a multi-million-dollar victory. It is therefore clear that London Luxury meets the definition
`of a prevailing party under Arkansas law.
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 3 of 18 PageID #:
`32263
`
`• April 25, 2022: London Luxury hired local counsel McDaniel Wolff, PLLC,
`based in Little Rock, and lawyers from that firm entered their appearances.
`
`• June 1, 2022: The Court held a Rule 16 case management hearing by
`videoconference, which the McDaniel Wolff and Debevoise & Plimpton
`lawyers attended on behalf of London Luxury.
`
`• August 25, 2022: London Luxury advised the Court in a motion (Doc. 120)
`that its lawyers from Debevoise & Plimpton would soon be replaced by
`lawyers from a different firm.
`
`• Mid-September 2022: The Debevoise & Plimpton attorneys withdrew, and
`lawyers from the New York firm of Holwell Shuster & Goldberg, LLP (“HSG”)
`entered their appearances.
`
`• March 27, 2023: An attorney from the Washington, DC firm of Fairmark
`Partners, LLP entered his appearance in this case, pro hac vice. The
`attorney never filed anything more, nor did he appear for any court
`proceeding.
`
`• March 25–April 9, 2024: Attorneys from HSG and McDaniel Wolff
`represented London Luxury in an eleven-day jury trial. HSG attorneys
`Brendan DeMay and Priyanka Timblo presented all aspects of London
`Luxury’s case to the jury.
`
`Given the preceding timeline, the following chart summarizes the names, locations,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`and dates that law firms representing London Luxury appeared in this case:
`
`LAW FIRM
`
`LOCATION
`
`New York, NY
`
`DATE
`APPEARED
`1/5/22
`
`DATE
`WITHDRAWN
`3/28/22
`
`New York, NY
`
`3/28/22
`
`9/15/22
`
`Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
`Sullivan, LLP
`Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP
`
`
`CASE TRANSFERRED IN FROM SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, 4/4/22
`McDaniel, Wolff, PLLC
`Little Rock, AR
`4/25/22
`N/A
`
`Holwell Shuster &
`Goldberg, LLP (HSG)
`Fairmark Partners, LLP
`
`
`New York, NY
`
`Washington, DC
`
`9/27/22
`
`3/28/23
`
`N/A
`
`N/A
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 4 of 18 PageID #:
`32264
`
`A. HSG’s and McDaniel Wolff’s Fees and Costs
`
`As noted above, McDaniel Wolff’s
`
`lawyers entered
`
`their appearances
`
`approximately two years before the trial, at around the time the case was first transferred
`
`to this Court from the Southern District of New York. HSG’s attorneys became involved
`
`in the case about five months later and quickly took the lead in litigating this case,
`
`ultimately prevailing over Walmart at trial. London Luxury was awarded every penny it
`
`requested in damages.
`
`Counsel’s representation before and during trial was professional and organized;
`
`the issues were complex and vigorously contested; and the positive result London Luxury
`
`achieved is undeniable. Over the course of eighteen to twenty-four months, the Court
`
`became very familiar with the high-quality lawyering displayed by HSG and McDaniel
`
`Wolff.
`
`According to London Luxury’s Motion for Fees, HSG entered into a contingency
`
`fee arrangement in which London Luxury agreed to pay HSG 33.33% of all gross amounts
`
`recovered from Walmart. Assuming Walmart pays only the amount of the verdict,
`
`$101,218,680.00, London Luxury would be obligated to pay HSG $33,739,222.60.00 of
`
`the collected verdict as fees. London Luxury therefore asks the Court to award it an
`
`amount in fees that will entirely cover what it will owe to HSG under the contingency fee
`
`arrangement. According to London Luxury, it would be “inequitable” to award fees in a
`
`lesser amount. See Doc. 473, p. 13. The Court disagrees. Awarding London Luxury
`
`more than $33 million for HSG’s services would result in a windfall to London Luxury,
`
`which would, in itself, be inequitable and run counter to the intent of the Arkansas fee-
`
`shifting statute. Instead, the Court will begin its calculation a reasonable fee using the
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 5 of 18 PageID #:
`32265
`
`“lodestar,” which is “the number of hours [they] reasonably expended on the litigation
`
`multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
`
`“As a general rule, a reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate, that is,
`
`‘the ordinary rate for similar work in the community where the case has been
`
`litigated.’” Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 828 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Emery v.
`
`Hunt, 272 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 2001)). The Court also gives due consideration to the
`
`applicable factors set forth by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Chrisco v. Sun Industries,
`
`Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 229–30 (1990), and cited to with approval by the Eighth Circuit, see
`
`All-Ways Logistics, Inc. v. USA Truck, Inc., 583 F.3d 511, 521 (8th Cir. 2009), namely:
`
`the amount of time counsel invested in the lawsuit; the appropriateness of counsel’s rates,
`
`given the experience and ability of the attorneys; the time and labor required to perform
`
`the legal services properly; the amount potentially at issue in the case; the results
`
`obtained; the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved; and the prevailing rate
`
`customarily charged in this area for similar legal services.
`
`“While courts should be guided by [these] factors, there is no fixed formula in
`
`determining the reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees.” Phelps v. U.S. Credit
`
`Life Ins. Co., 340 Ark. 439, 442 (2000). And “when the trial judge is familiar with the case
`
`and the service done by the attorneys,” as is true here, “the fixing of a fee is within the
`
`discretion of the court.” Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Stewart Bros. Hardware Co.,
`
`285 Ark. 352, 354 (1985).
`
`HSG’s own lodestar calculation yields a fee award of $17,361,981.00. But that
`
`assumes the Court would consider approving partner billing rates of more than $1,200.00
`
`an hour—which it will not. Rather, the Court finds it appropriate to award HSG’s counsel
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 6 of 18 PageID #:
`32266
`
`the rate that a highly skilled, highly experienced litigator would charge in the Northwest
`
`Arkansas legal market for complex, specialty litigation. Based on HSG’s counsel’s
`
`experience, positive results, thorough trial preparation, management of voluminous
`
`amounts of electronic discovery and difficult privilege-log issues, and significant time and
`
`labor required to perform the legal services properly, the Court awards HSG and
`
`McDaniel Wolff a rate of $375.00 per hour for partners; $200.00 per hour for associates;
`
`and $75.00 per hour for paralegals. Both firms’ claimed hours are reasonable—given the
`
`complexity of the trial, amounts at issue, and quality of the attorneys’ legal services—and
`
`are approved.
`
` In total, London Luxury is awarded the following attorneys’ fees for the services of
`
`HSG and McDaniel Wolff:
`
`LAW FIRM
`
`
`HSG
`
`
`
`
`McDaniel Wolff
`
`
`
`
`
`
`McDaniel Wolff’s attorneys also submitted invoices documenting the costs they
`
`POSITION RATE/HR HOURS
`Partner
`$ 375
`7,011.2
`Associate
`$ 200 11,298.8
`Paralegal
`$ 75
`2,699.4
`
`
`
`
`Partner
`$ 375
`Associate
`$ 200
`Paralegal
`$ 75
`
`
`
`LODESTAR
`$ 2,629,200.00
`$ 2,259,760.00
`$ 202,455.00
`TOTAL $ 5,091,415.00
`
`
`$ 212,475.00
`$ 51,300.00
`$ 19,530.00
`TOTAL $ 283,305.00
`
`
`566.6
`256.5
`260.4
`
`expended on behalf of London Luxury in litigating this case. Federal Rule of Civil
`
`Procedure 54(d) provides that “costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to
`
`the prevailing party.” Taxable costs are set forth in detail at 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and include
`
`fees of the clerk and marshal, fees for printed and electronically recorded transcripts
`
`necessarily obtained for use in the case, fees and disbursements for printing and
`
`witnesses, fees for copies of any materials necessarily obtained for use in the case,
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 7 of 18 PageID #:
`32267
`
`docket fees, and compensation of court-appointed experts and interpreters. In addition to
`
`the taxable costs listed in § 1920, the prevailing party may recover as attorneys’ fees “out-
`
`of-pocket expenses of the kind normally charged to clients by attorneys.” Pinkham v.
`
`Camex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 294–95 (8th Cir. 1996).
`
`The Court has reviewed all of McDaniel Wolff’s
`
`line-item requests
`
`for
`
`reimbursement; the costs correspond to charges for court fees, transcripts, photocopies,
`
`postage, and reasonable travel expenses (airfare, lodging, mileage, and meals) to attend
`
`hearings related to this case. See Docs. 473-13 & 473-14. Accordingly, London Luxury is
`
`also awarded $7,633.60 in costs.
`
`B. Fees for Counsel from Fairmark Partners
`
`A careful review of the docket shows that on March 27, 2023, an attorney from
`
`McDaniel Wolff moved on behalf of a Fairmark attorney, Jamie Crooks, for permission for
`
`him to appear pro hac vice. See Doc. 149. However, the Court was not aware that anyone
`
`from Fairmark Partners performed work in this case until the Motion for Fees was filed.
`
`According to the declaration of London Luxury’s Chief Managing Officer, Gordon A.
`
`Lewis, it appears that the DC-based Fairmark firm “served as limited-purpose conflicts
`
`counsel to London Luxury from approximately March 2023 to August 2023,” specifically
`
`in connection with a third-party subpoena issued to HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Doc. 473-15,
`
`p. 3 & n.3).
`
`Three Fairmark invoices are attached to Mr. Lewis’s declaration, see Doc. 473-18,
`
`but neither the invoices nor the declaration provides the Court with information about the
`
`billing attorneys’ backgrounds, their years of experience, the specific rates they charged
`
`London Luxury, or the services they performed. The first Fairmark invoice, dated April 24,
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 8 of 18 PageID #:
`32268
`
`2023, requests a total of $15,884.00 in fees; however, none of the billers are identified—
`
`not even by their initials—and the billing rates range from $650.00 per hour on the low
`
`end to $850.00 per hour on the high end. Id. The same is true of the second Fairmark
`
`invoice dated July 17, 2023. Id. The third invoice dated October 2, 2023, is unlike the
`
`other two in that it does not even include a breakdown of the hours billed and rates
`
`charged. See id. The Court is skeptical that this set of attorneys is entitled to any fees for
`
`this litigation, but in any event, the Court has insufficient information from which to award
`
`a reasonable fee for Fairmark’s legal services and, thus, declines to award any fee.
`
`C. Fees for Counsel from Debevoise & Plimpton
`
`Attorneys from Debevoise & Plimpton were involved in the case from March 28 to
`
`September 25, 2022, approximately six months. When the case was transferred from the
`
`Southern District of New York to this Court, the attorneys from Debevoise & Plimpton did
`
`not enter their appearances as pro hac vice counsel until May 26, 2022. Those attorneys
`
`also appeared on London Luxury’s behalf by videoconference at the Court’s June 1 case
`
`management hearing. It seems that shortly after that, and certainly by late August 2022,
`
`London Luxury was looking to substitute Debevoise & Plimpton for HSG.
`
`In the brief period that Debevoise & Plimpton’s attorneys appeared in the case, the
`
`firm submitted a single invoice to London Luxury for $57,177.45 in fees, which were
`
`purportedly discounted by 70%. See Doc. 473-17.2 The only information provided about
`
`
`2 The bill also contains a line-item for “charges and disbursements” totaling $1,468.74.
`But the Court cannot tell what these charges and disbursements were for or whether they
`qualify as reimbursable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Accordingly, the Court declines to
`include this amount in its total fee and cost award.
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 9 of 18 PageID #:
`32269
`
`the attorneys and staff listed on the invoice is their names and titles (partner, associate,
`
`discovery/data manager, or managing attorney).
`
`Examining the New York billing rates charged by the Debevoise & Plimpton
`
`attorneys (before the 70% discount), it appears that two partners charged $1,950.00 per
`
`hour, three associates charged between $1,100.00 and $1,275.00 per hour, the
`
`“discovery/data manager” charged $475.00 per hour, and two “managing attorneys”—
`
`who, despite the title, are not likely to be licensed attorneys, given the rates they charge—
`
`billed at $520.00 per hour and $385.00 per hour. Must be nice to live and bill like a New
`
`Yorker, but this Court will not consider a fee award based on those rates in this case.
`
`No fees will be awarded for time billed by the “discovery/data manager” or the
`
`“managing attorneys.” The Court cannot tell whether the individuals with these titles were
`
`equivalent to paralegal, law students, docket clerks, or legal secretaries. Furthermore,
`
`based on the rates charged by the “managing attorneys”—which are the lowest rates on
`
`the bills—the Court doubts that they are performing skilled attorney work. As for the
`
`partners and associates, they appeared before this Court in a few filings and in one case
`
`management hearing, so their work is a known quantity. Therefore, the Court has
`
`calculated the lodestar for work performed by the partners and associates using low-end
`
`hourly rates for the Northwest Arkansas legal market, which results in the following award:
`
`LAW FIRM
`
`Debevoise &
`Plimpton
`
`
`POSITION
`Partner
`Associate
`
`
`RATE/HR HOURS
`$ 200
`21.8
`$ 100
`118.9
`
`
`
`
`LODESTAR
`$ 4,360.00
`$ 11,890.00
`TOTAL $ 16,250.00
`
`D. Fees for Counsel from Quinn Emanuel
`
`Unlike Debevoise & Plimpton’s lawyers, Quinn Emanuel’s lawyers never appeared
`
`before this Court in any respect, and the Court was not provided with specific information
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 10 of 18 PageID #:
`32270
`
`about the nature of the legal services provided by the lawyers in that firm, their respective
`
`backgrounds and years of experience, or their billing rates. The Court cannot evaluate
`
`the quality of their legal work or assess any of the Chrisco factors. As a result, London
`
`Luxury’s request for reimbursement of Quinn Emanuel’s legal fees is denied in its entirety.
`
`E. Pre-judgment Interest
`
`“Prejudgment interest is compensation for recoverable damages wrongfully
`
`withheld from the time of the loss until judgment.” Dorsett v. Buffington, 2013 Ark. 345, at
`
`*11 (2013). It “ensure[s] that an injured party is fully compensated for its loss,” City of
`
`Milwaukee v. Cement Div. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 195 (1995), by requiring that
`
`“[o]ne who has had the use of money owing to another . . . pay interest from the time
`
`payment should have been made,” Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 257–58 (1924).
`
`“State law governs whether a diversity litigant may recover pre-judgment interest.”
`
`Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. Edwards, 243 F.3d 457, 462 (8th Cir. 2001). In Arkansas,
`
`awarding pre-judgment interest is appropriate “if the amount of damages is definitely
`
`ascertainable by mathematical computation, or if the evidence furnishes data that make
`
`it possible to compute the amount without reliance on opinion or discretion.” Dorsett, 2013
`
`Ark. 345 at 11. A method must exist “for fixing the exact value of a cause of action at the
`
`time of the occurrence of the event that gives rise to the cause of action.” Yazdianpour v.
`
`Safeblood Techs., Inc., 779 F.3d 530, 539 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Sims v. Moser, 373
`
`Ark. 491, 509 (2008)). “If the damages are not by their nature capable of exact
`
`determination, both in time and amount, prejudgment interest is not an item of recovery.”
`
`Id. (brackets omitted).
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 11 of 18 PageID #:
`32271
`
`Walmart argues that pre-judgment interest is inappropriate here because the jury’s
`
`award of compensatory damages for breach of contract was not definitely ascertainable
`
`by mathematical determination on the date Walmart cancelled the contract—which both
`
`parties agree was October 22, 2021, the day Garrett Small of Walmart emailed London
`
`Luxury to stop producing gloves. See London Luxury Tr. Exhibit PX-0582.
`
`London Luxury responds that David Bones, its expert witness on damages, used
`
`a demonstrative exhibit to explain to the jury how a simple mathematical calculation of
`
`London Luxury’s actual and expected profits yielded the exact dollar amount of damages
`
`for breach of contract. The demonstrative exhibit was a series of slides, one featuring
`
`three columns. The first column showed the total profits that London Luxury would have
`
`made if Walmart had fully performed and purchased all 7.2 million cartons of nitrile gloves
`
`at $74.80 per carton. The second column showed the net profits that London Luxury
`
`realized from the sale of 400,000 cartons of gloves to Walmart (before Walmart cancelled
`
`the contract). And the third column showed the difference between the first column and
`
`the second column: the total expected profits that London Luxury would have netted if 6.8
`
`million cartons—the rest of the gloves in the total order—had been delivered to Walmart.
`
`The jury apparently agreed with Mr. Bones’s calculation because it awarded
`
`London Luxury the exact dollar amount of damages that Mr. Bones testified were owed
`
`for the remaining gloves. In Walmart’s view, however, his calculation depended on a
`
`figure he could not have known: London Luxury’s purchase price for the remaining 6.8
`
`million cartons of gloves. Walmart contends that at the time of the breach, there was no
`
`way of knowing that what price London Luxury would have paid for the remaining gloves,
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 12 of 18 PageID #:
`32272
`
`which means there was no way that Mr. Bones could have calculated with any degree of
`
`certainty the profits that London Luxury would have realized on those gloves.
`
`In the Court’s view, the price Mr. Bones used in his calculation, $60.00 per carton,
`
`was not the product of wild speculation but was instead a figure reasonably derived from
`
`the evidence in the trial record. London Luxury introduced into evidence a contract it
`
`negotiated in July 2021 with a glove distributor called CoShield. See PX-0868. The CFO
`
`of London Luxury, Gordon Lewis, testified that CoShield sourced gloves from two
`
`Walmart-approved factories, one in Malaysia called CareGlove and the other in Thailand
`
`called Mercator. See Doc. 475, pp. 224–25. Though London Luxury had relied on a
`
`distributor called MNA to package and ship gloves for Walmart before July 2021, when
`
`London Luxury signed its new contract with CoShield, the plan going forward, according
`
`to London Luxury’s CEO Marc Jason, was to discontinue product sourcing from MNA and
`
`move all production to CoShield’s factories, which had agreed to charge London Luxury
`
`$60.00 per carton. See Doc. 478, p. 67. Mr. Jason described the CoShield contract as “a
`
`game-changer for [London Luxury] to be working directly with probably two of the best
`
`factories in all of Southeast Asia for gloves and to be working direct with no one in the
`
`middle.” Id.
`
`It is undisputed that in September of 2021, London Luxury had pivoted away from
`
`MNA as a supplier and was shipping Walmart gloves that were produced in CoShield’s
`
`partner factories. Mr. Lewis testified that London Luxury expected that the flow from
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 13 of 18 PageID #:
`32273
`
`CoShield “was just going to ramp up,” id. at p. 243, but that Walmart cancelled the parties’
`
`contract in October, just as production was increasing.3
`
`In deciding whether to award pre-judgment interest to London Luxury, it is
`
`instructive to contrast the facts of this case with those in Simmons Foods, Inc. v. Industrial
`
`Risk Insurers, 863 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2017), where the Eighth Circuit held that pre-
`
`judgment interest was not readily calculable at the time of breach. Simmons involved
`
`damage to an industrial warehouse after a severe storm. The owner of the warehouse,
`
`Simmons, disagreed with its insurer over whether the building should be repaired or
`
`entirely rebuilt. See id. at 795. Simmons decided on its own to rebuild the structure as it
`
`saw fit, and the insurer reimbursed Simmons for only about half of its costs. Id. at 795–
`
`96. The jury sided with Simmons but did not award it the $3.5 million in damages its
`
`lawyers requested during closing argument; instead, the jury’s award was $2,817,380.11.
`
`Id. at 796. The peculiar and very specific award was the focus of the Eighth Circuit’s
`
`discussion when deciding whether Simmons was entitled to pre-judgment interest. The
`
`Court of Appeals noted that the jury “did not [ ] blindly accept every invoice Simmons
`
`offered into evidence” and, therefore, “had to use its discretion to ascertain which experts
`
`to believe, which expenses were covered under the policies, and whether the invoices
`
`reflected reliable and fair dollar amounts.” Id. at 800 (internal quotation and citation
`
`
`3 Mr. Lewis also testified that London Luxury had secured a back-up source of gloves in
`case CoShield could not supply the entire order Walmart needed for a year-long term.
`The back-up supplier was a company called Meditech, and, subject to Walmart’s
`approval, it had agreed to sell London Luxury two million cartons of gloves at $59.50 per
`carton—even lower than CoShield’s $60.00 price point. See PX-1997. The fact that
`London Luxury had secured a back-up supplier of similarly priced gloves undercuts
`Walmart’s argument that the trial evidence failed to prove that London Luxury was
`capable of supplying Walmart with the remaining 6.8 million cartons and could do so at a
`price of about $60.00 per carton.
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 14 of 18 PageID #:
`32274
`
`omitted). All this meant that the award of damages was not capable of exact mathematical
`
`determination “until the jury spoke,” and not before. Id.
`
`Unlike the jury in Simmons, the jury in the case at bar awarded exactly the amount
`
`that London Luxury sought. This award was calculated using a simple mathematical
`
`model developed by Mr. Bones that relied on the following trial evidence:
`
`•
`
`•
`
`•
`
`•
`
`•
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`the number of gloves that London Luxury delivered to Walmart prior to the
`breach;
`
`the profits that London Luxury realized on the gloves it delivered;
`
`the number of gloves that were yet to be delivered in light of Walmart’s total
`minimum purchase;
`
`the price-per-carton that London Luxury had negotiated with CoShield in an
`express agreement; and
`
`the price-per-carton that London Luxury had negotiated with Walmart in an
`express agreement.
`
`
`Accordingly, the Court finds that the amount of damages owed to London Luxury was
`
`“definitely ascertainable by mathematical computation” and that “the evidence furnishe[d],
`
`data that ma[de] it possible to compute the amount without reliance on opinion or
`
`discretion.” Dorsett, 2013 Ark. 345 at 11. Judging by the amount awarded to London
`
`Luxury, the jury must have agreed with Mr. Bones’s mathematical method “for fixing the
`
`exact value of [the] cause of action at the time of the occurrence of the event that gives
`
`rise to the cause of action.” Yazdianpour, 779 F.3d at 539. It is therefore clear to see how
`
`the jury calculated damages and equally clear that the jury did not rely on its discretion
`
`when doing so, as the figure was capable of exact determination at the time of breach.
`
`For all these reasons, the Court finds it appropriate to award pre-judgment interest
`
`to London Luxury. Per Arkansas Code § 16-65-114(a)(1)(A), pre-judgment interest is
`
`14
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 15 of 18 PageID #:
`32275
`
`calculated at the Federal Reserve primary credit rate, which was 5.5% per annum on the
`
`date of the jury’s verdict, plus 2%, resulting in a rate of 7.5%. There are 901 days between
`
`October 22, 2021, the day of breach, and April 10, 2024, the date of the jury’s verdict
`
`awarding London Luxury $101,218,680.00 for breach of contract. Accordingly, the daily
`
`rate of pre-judgment interest is $20,798.36.4 London Luxury is entitled to $18,739,321.40
`
`in pre-judgment interest.5
`
`F. Post-judgment Interest
`
`Federal law governs the availability of post-judgment interest. See Travelers Prop.
`
`Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat’l Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 735 F.3d 993, 1007 (8th
`
`Cir. 2013). An award of such interest is mandatory and “shall be calculated from the date
`
`of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant
`
`maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
`
`System, for the calendar week preceding[ ] the date of judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a)
`
`(footnote omitted).
`
`The jury verdict in London Luxury’s favor, totaling $101,218,680.00, was reduced
`
`to a paper judgment on April 10, 2024. See Doc. 460. Post-judgment interest on that
`
`amount began accruing as of that date. Subsequent to the entry of this Order, the Court
`
`will file an amended judgment that incorporates additional awards of pre-judgment
`
`interest and attorneys’ fees and costs. Post-judgment interest on the value of the
`
`amended judgment will accrue on the date of entry and continue accruing until fully paid.
`
`
`4 ($101,218,680.00 x 0.075)/365 = $20,798.36.
`
` 5
`
` $20,798.36 x 901 = $18,739,321.40.
`
`15
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 16 of 18 PageID #:
`32276
`
`G. Sanctions
`
`London Luxury separately asks the Court to impose sanctions on Walmart for
`
`discovery abuses. London Luxury made this request during trial, and the Court declined
`
`to impose sanctions. The Court’s opinion on the matter has not changed.
`
`The privilege-log issues that the parties and the Court grappled with both prior to
`
`and during trial were extremely complex and time-consuming due to the nature of
`
`electronic discovery and the facts of the case. The Court was required to parse its
`
`discovery rulings to account for various nuances and issued ten separate privilege-log
`
`orders as more and more documents were submitted for in camera inspection. In sum,
`
`the Court finds that Walmart’s behavior with respect to discovery was not in bad faith, and
`
`the request for sanctions is denied.
`
`II. STAYING EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENT AND APPROVING SECURITY
`
`Walmart requests a stay of execution on the judgment against it while it appeals
`
`the jury’s verdict. In support of this request, Walmart has produced a letter of credit in the
`
`amount of $105,000,000.00 issued by Wells Fargo & Company. Rule 62(b) provides that
`
`a party may obtain a stay pending appeal “by providing a bond or other security.” London
`
`Luxury does not object to Walmart’s proposed security, and the Court further finds that
`
`there is no danger of Walmart being unable to pay the amount of the judgment following
`
`the appeal, plus interest.
`
`The Court finds that both the type and amount of security proposed by Walmart
`
`are sufficient to secure the amount of the judgment during the pendency of the appeal.
`
`Once the amended judgment is entered, execution will be stayed pending the conclusion
`
`16
`
`

`

`Case 5:22-cv-05059-TLB Document 513 Filed 03/31/25 Page 17 of 18 PageID #:
`32277
`
`of the expected appeal, and Walmart will be required to submit its letter of credit to the
`
`Clerk as security.
`
`London Luxury originally requested a stay of execution on Walmart’s judgment
`
`against it because London Luxury filed for bankruptcy. However, it appears that in
`
`October 2024, the bankruptcy case was resolved and the automatic stay lifted. See Doc.
`
`510. London Luxury states that it is prepared to post a supersedeas bond in the amount
`
`of $386,000.00 and has prepared a sample bond. See Doc. 504-1. Walmart does not
`
`object to London Luxury’s proposed security, and the Court approves both London
`
`Luxury’s request for a stay