Case 2:11-cv-05379-CJC-AGR Document 695 Filed 10/08/19 Page 1 of 16 Page ID
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`IN RE CONAGRA FOODS, INC.
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`ROBERT BRISEÑO, et al., individually
`and on behalf of all others similarly
`situated,
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`CONAGRA FOODS, INC.,
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`Defendants.
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`Case No.: CV 11-05379-CJC(AGRx)
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`MDL No. 2291
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`ORDER GRANTING FINAL
`APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION
`SETTLEMENT [Dkt. 660] AND
`DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE [Dkt.
`684]
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`In this 2011 class-action lawsuit, Plaintiffs challenge Defendant ConAgra Foods,
`Inc.’s allegedly deceptive marketing of its Wesson Oil products as “100% Natural.”
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`Case 2:11-cv-05379-CJC-AGR Document 695 Filed 10/08/19 Page 2 of 16 Page ID
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`After years of investigation and litigation, including extensive mediation efforts with two
`separate judges, the parties reached a settlement, which this court preliminarily approved.
`(Dkt. 654.) Plaintiffs now ask the court to grant final approval of the settlement and the
`requested attorney fees, costs, and incentive awards. For the following reasons, the
`motion is GRANTED.
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`II. BACKGROUND
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`For over ten years, bottles of ConAgra’s Wesson Oil had a label calling the product
`“100% Natural.”1 Plaintiffs sued in 2011, alleging that the “natural” claim was false and
`misleading because the oil contains genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and that
`they paid more for the oil because of that false and misleading claim. After another judge
`of this court certified eleven consumer classes and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, see Briseño
`v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017); Briseño v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,
`674 F. App’x 654 (9th Cir. 2017), the parties conducted extensive settlement negotiations
`before both retired Judge Edward A. Infante and Magistrate Judge Douglas McCormick.
`(Dkt. 652 [Joint Declaration of Henry J. Kelston & Adam J. Levitt, hereinafter
`“Kelston/Levitt Decl.”] ¶¶ 51–65.)
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`The resulting settlement—reached after a mediator’s proposal from Judge
`McCormick—provided that Defendant will not label, advertise, or market Wesson Oils as
`“natural,” absent future legislation or regulation. (Dkt. 652, Ex. 1 [Settlement Agreement
`and Release, hereinafter “Settlement Agreement”] ¶ 3.3.) It also provided class members
`the following monetary benefits:
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`1 In July 2017, Conagra Foods, Inc. removed the “100% Natural” claim from all Wesson labels.
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`(a) $0.15 for each unit of Wesson Oils purchased to households submitting
`valid claim forms (to a maximum of thirty units without proof of
`purchase, and unlimited units with proof of purchase),
`(b) an additional fund of $575,000 to be allocated to New York and Oregon
`class members submitting valid claim forms, as compensation for
`statutory damages under those states’ consumer protection laws, and
`(c) an additional fund of $10,000 to compensate those in all classes
`submitting valid proof of purchase receipts for more than thirty
`purchases, at $0.15 for each such purchase above thirty, with Class
`Counsel paying any non-funded claims (i.e. claims above the $10,000
`provided by ConAgra) from any attorney fees awarded in this case.
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`(Id. ¶ 3.1.)
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`After the parties reached a settlement in principle, ConAgra sold the Wesson brand
`to Richardson International. The parties thus revised the terms of the agreed injunctive
`relief to apply to ConAgra only in the event it reacquires the Wesson brand. Plaintiffs’
`counsel represents, however, that “pursuant to industry custom and related facts,” “it is
`virtually certain that Richardson will not restore the allegedly false ‘100% Natural’ claim
`to the Wesson Oil packaging.” (Mot. at 4; see Dkt. 661-1 [Declaration of Larry
`Kopald].)
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`The Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement on April 4,
`2019, and appointed JND Legal Administration (“JND”) as settlement administrator.
`(Dkt. 654.) JND provided notice calculated to reach the class in all eleven states via print
`and digital publications, a press release, and a hotline, as outlined in the Settlement
`Agreement. (Dkt. 661-2 [July 23, 2019 Declaration of Jennifer M. Keough Regarding
`Settlement Administration and Notice Plan, hereinafter “Keough 7/19 Decl.”] ¶¶ 8–16;
`Exs. B–H.) JND received 97,880 timely claims for 2,792,794 units, and one untimely
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`claim for 10 units. (Dkt. 688-1 [September 24, 2019 Declaration of Jennifer M. Keough
`Regarding Settlement Administration and Notice Plan, hereinafter “Keough 9/19 Decl.”]
`¶ 10.) One plaintiff opted-out, and one plaintiff objected. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9; Dkt. 666.)
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`Plaintiffs now move for final approval of the Settlement Agreement, attorney fees
`and costs, and incentive awards. (Dkts. 660–661 [hereinafter “Mot.”]; Dkt. 662
`[hereinafter “Fee Mot.”].)
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`A. Motion to Strike
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`As a preliminary matter, Objector M. Todd Henderson moves to strike two expert
`declarations from Colin B. Weir filed in support of Plaintiffs’ motion (Dkts. 652-4 and
`674-1). (Dkt. 684 [Motion to Strike Declaration of Mr. Colin Weir Under Daubert,
`hereinafter “Strike Mot.”].) Henderson argues these declarations fail to meet the
`standards for admissible expert opinions because they “do not hinge on any scientific
`methods or data,” but rather are “based on an ipse dixit,” “false assumption,” and
`“methodology [that] unscientifically and impermissibly gerrymanders data to avoid
`risking falsification of his hypothesis.” (Strike Mot. at 1, 6.)
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`Specifically, Henderson contends that Weir’s opinion rests on the “false
`assumption” that the injunction prohibits anyone from advertising Wesson Oils as natural
`in the future. (Strike Mot. at 3–5.) He maintains this assumption is false because the
`Settlement Agreement binds only ConAgra, and since ConAgra no longer owns Wesson
`Oil, “[t]he injunction is no more meaningful than an injunction against Ford Motor on the
`marketing of the Edsel.” (Id. at 3.) Without a meaningful prospective prohibition on
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`labeling Wesson Oil as natural, Henderson argues, consumers receive no benefit
`whatsoever from the injunction. (Id. at 4.)
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`The Court is not persuaded that it should strike Weir’s declarations. Henderson’s
`contention that Weir’s declarations “cannot help the Court,” (id. at 6), is simply incorrect.
`Indeed, it is difficult for courts to “judge with confidence the value of the terms of a
`settlement agreement, especially one in which, as here, the settlement provides for
`injunctive relief.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 959 (9th Cir. 2003). Having one
`expert’s opinion—however purportedly flawed—on the value of that injunction helps the
`Court develop its own view. Similarly, the arguments presented in the motion to strike
`help the Court determine how much weight to give Weir’s opinions. The Court thus
`DENIES the motion to strike.
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`B.
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`Fairness of the Settlement
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`The Court now evaluates the fairness of the settlement. Although there is a “strong
`judicial policy that favors settlements, particularly where complex class action litigation
`is concerned,” Linney v. Cellular Alaska P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 1998), a
`settlement of class claims requires court approval. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). This is because
`“[i]ncentives inhere in class-action settlement negotiations that can, unless checked
`through careful district court review of the resulting settlement, result in a decree in
`which the rights of class members, including the named plaintiffs, may not be given due
`regard by the negotiating parties.” Staton, 327 F.3d at 959 (alterations and quotations
`omitted).
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`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Court must “determine whether a
`proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Staton, 327 F.3d at
`959 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In considering whether this standard is met,
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`a district court must consider a number of factors, including “the strength of the
`plaintiff’s case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the
`risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in
`settlement; the extent of discovery completed, and the stage of the proceedings; the
`experience and views of counsel; . . . and the reaction of the class members to the
`proposed settlement.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Having considered the
`Staton factors, the Court finds this Settlement Agreement fundamentally fair and
`reasonable.
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`1. Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case and the Risk, Expense, Complexity, and
`Likely Duration of Further Litigation
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`The strength of Plaintiffs’ case and the obstacles inherent in continued litigation
`weigh heavily in favor of granting final approval of the Settlement Agreement. See In re
`Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended (June 19,
`2000) (affirming final approval where, among other reasons, “[t]he district court properly
`found that the Plaintiffs’ case was weak and the risk, expense, and complexity of trial
`weighed against them”); In re Omnivision Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1041–42
`(N.D. Cal. 2008) (discussing how a class action settlement offered an “immediate and
`certain award” in light of significant obstacles posed through continued litigation); In re
`Portal Software, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2007 WL 4171201, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“Additional
`consideration of increased expenses of fact and expert discovery and the inherent risks of
`proceeding to summary judgment, trial and appeal also support the settlement.”).
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`This case had difficulties from the beginning, including problems of proof—on
`both liability and damages—and problems of management. Indeed, Plaintiffs wisely
`acknowledge that the path to recovery was not without significant risk. (Mot. at 12.)
`ConAgra has challenged Plaintiffs’ case at every turn over the past eight years, (see Fee
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`Mot. at 4), beginning with its challenge to the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
`ConAgra first moved to dismiss the case in August 2011. (Dkt. 24.) After Judge
`Margaret Morrow granted that motion (Dkt. 54), Plaintiffs amended their complaint (Dkt.
`80), and ConAgra once again moved to dismiss in February 2012 (Dkt. 84). Judge
`Morrow granted in part and denied in part this second motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 138.)
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`Then, there was extensive discovery, including multiple discovery motions filed
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`over the years. (See, e.g., Dkts. 196, 202, 426, 511, 550; see generally Kelston/Levitt
`Decl. [describing history of case, including discovery].) Plaintiffs’ first motion for class
`certification (Dkt. 241)—which was denied (Dkt. 350)—involved dozens of under-seal
`documents and related filings, on top of the already-complex issues related to class
`certification. Its second (Dkt. 363), which Judge Morrow granted in part and denied in
`part (Dkt. 545), was a similarly protracted effort. ConAgra appealed this decision, and
`the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a 24-page opinion (Dkt. 595) and a separate 6-page
`memorandum disposition (Dkt. 596). The initial grant of ConAgra’s motion to dismiss,
`and the initial denial of the class certification motion, reflect that Plaintiffs’ claims were
`less than airtight.
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`Here, continued litigation would involve not only cost—for example, of updating
`discovery and further motion practice—but also risk. (See Mot. at 12-13.) Indeed, the
`Court was seriously considering decertifying one or more classes because of the difficulty
`managing them as currently certified. At the hearing, ConAgra also represented they
`were considering a motion for summary judgment, and motions to sever and remand to
`the different states. The Court also has reservations regarding Plaintiffs’ price premium
`damages methodology.
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`Given the substantial cost and risks of further litigation, and the Court’s serious
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`doubts about the strength of Plaintiff’s case, this factor weighs in favor of approving the
`settlement.
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`2. Amount Offered in Settlement
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`Although at first blush the $0.15 per unit award appears modest, this amount is
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`more than fair and reasonable in this case. Plaintiffs sought a “price premium” for the
`damages caused by ConAgra’s alleged misleading labeling, rather than a full refund for
`products purchased. This theory alone would have yielded a relatively low award. But
`Judge Morrow narrowed the theory even further, ruling that the appropriate measure of
`damages was not the full price premium paid, but rather only the portion of that premium
`attributable to consumers’ belief that “100% Natural” meant that the products were
`GMO-free. (Dkt. 350 at 61–62.) Given this ruling and other weaknesses in Plaintiffs’
`case, the per-unit award reflected in the Settlement Agreement is substantial.
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`In addition to this award, there is also a $575,000 fund to be allocated among New
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`York and Oregon class members for statutory damages under those states’ consumer
`protection laws, and ConAgra’s $10,000 contribution to help pay those who can show
`they purchased more than 30 units. The settlement amount offered provides an
`immediate and tangible benefit to class members and eliminates the risk that they could
`receive less than that amount, or nothing at all, if litigation continued. Moreover, it is not
`irrelevant that Judge McCormick carefully oversaw this settlement, and that the precise
`value of the settlement was reached by accepting a mediator’s proposal. (See Mot. at 3;
`Fee Mot. at 3.)
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`Aside from monetary relief, Plaintiffs also secured injunctive relief. Although
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`there is vigorous dispute over the precise valuation of the injunctive relief—with
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`Plaintiffs’ expert valuing it at tens of millions and the Objector valuing it at nothing—the
`Court finds the injunction adds at least some value to the amount offered in settlement.
`(Mot. at 15; (Dkt. 666 [Objection to Proposed Settlement and to Fee Request, hereinafter
`“Obj.”].) at 7–8.) But even if there were no injunctive relief, the Court would likely find
`that the amount offered in settlement was fair and reasonable given the likely obstacles to
`Plaintiffs recovering, including those described in Section III.B.1.
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` In the Court’s view, the amount offered in settlement—even when not giving the
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`injunctive relief the valuation Plaintiffs urge—is more than reasonable. This factor
`weighs in favor of approving the settlement.
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`3. Extent of Discovery Completed, Stage of Proceedings, and Experience
`and View of Counsel
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`The Settlement Agreement is also reasonable in light of the advanced stage of this
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`litigation. Where the “parties have sufficient information to make an informed decision
`about settlement,” this factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement. See In re
`Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citation and
`quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[a] settlement following sufficient discovery and
`genuine arms-length negotiation is presumed fair.” Chambers v. Whirlpool Corp., 214 F.
`Supp. 3d 877, 889 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
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`The parties here gathered more than enough information over nearly eight years of
`substantial discovery and litigation to make an informed decision about whether the terms
`of this Settlement Agreement were fair. Plaintiffs’ counsel are experienced class-action
`litigators from multiple firms, the parties conducted extensive discovery and motion
`practice, and there were multiple mediations with multiple mediators. These facts,
`among others, make the Court confident that the parties were able to realistically value
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`ConAgra’s liability and assess the risk of continuing to litigate. The parties’ extensive
`litigation and negotiation allowed them to reasonably evaluate the cost, duration, and risk
`of further litigation. That evaluation was further supported by the recommendation of an
`experienced mediator, who set the settlement amount in a mediator’s proposal.
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`The Court is satisfied that the parties reached the Settlement Agreement after
`developing a full and fair understanding of the merits and risks of the case, and
`negotiating at arm’s length. This factor weighs in favor of approving the settlement.
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`4. Reaction of Class Members
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`Following the Court’s preliminary approval, JND used a multi-pronged notice
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`campaign to reach people who purchased Wesson Oils. According to JND’s CEO, it:
` Created a settlement website with links to the claim form, notice, pleadings, and
`other litigation documents, and frequently-asked questions, which tracked 168,165
`unique visitors who registered 786,246 page views as of September 19, 2019,
`Keough 7/19 Decl. ¶¶ 15–16; Keough 9/19 Decl ¶¶ 1–2;
` Launched a print effort by having the Publication Notice published in the Los
`Angeles Daily News and People magazine, Keough 7/19 Decl. ¶ 8;
` Launched a digital effort by promoting posts about the settlement on Google
`Display Network and Facebook, delivering 205,946,126 impressions, id. ¶ 9,
`Exhibit C, and causing paid ads to appear on results pages when people Googled
`keywords or phrases related to the lawsuit, like “canola oil settlement” or “Wesson
`cooking oil,” delivering 27,000 impressions in class states, id. ¶ 10, Exhibit D;
` Distributed a press release about the settlement to about 11,000 English and 150
`Spanish media outlets nationwide, yielding 244 pickups with an estimated potential
`audience of over 59.8 million, id. ¶ 11, Exhibits E–F; and
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` Created a toll-free helpline where class members could get more information about
`the Settlement Agreement and request a copy of the class notice that, as of
`September 19, 2019, had received 327 calls for approximately 847 minutes,
`Keough 7/19 Decl. ¶¶ 13–14; Keough 9/19 Decl. ¶¶ 2–3.
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`Separately, class action and financial websites picked up news of the settlement,
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`creating 30 additional public mentions with a potential reach of over 16.7 million people.
`(Keough 7/19 Decl. ¶ 12, Exhibits G–H.)
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`The deadline for class members to submit a claim form was August 22, 2019.
`(Keough 9/19 Decl. ¶ 10.) JND received 97,880 timely claims for 2,792,794 units, and
`one untimely claim for 10 units. (Id.) Of the timely claims, 247 have claimed more than
`30 units. (Id.)
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`As of September 19, 2019, only one class member requested to opt out of the
`settlement class, with another class member objecting to the settlement. The reaction of
`the class has thus been overwhelmingly positive, and this factor favors final approval.
`See In re Mego Fin. Corp., 213 F.3d at 459 (concluding that this factor supported
`conclusion that district court did not abuse its discretion in approving settlement where
`“[o]nly one of the 5,400 potential class members to whom notice of the
`proposed Settlement and Plan of Distribution was sent chose to opt-out of the class”);
`Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 529 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
`(“[T]he absence of a large number of objections to a proposed class action settlement
`raises a strong presumption that the terms of a proposed class action settlement are
`favorable to the class members.”). Accordingly, the Court finds the Settlement
`Agreement fair, adequate, and reasonable under the Staton factors.
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`5. Rule 23(e)(2) Factors
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`The Court must also find the settlement “fair, reasonable, and adequate after
`considering whether:
`(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the
`class;
`(B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length;
`(C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account:
`(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal;
`(ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the
`class, including the method of processing class-member claims;
`(iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of
`payment; and
`(iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and
`(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other.”
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). There is substantial overlap between these factors and the
`Staton factors, so the Court does not repeat itself here. The Court has considered these
`factors and finds that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
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`C. Attorney Fees and Costs & Plaintiffs’ Incentive Award
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`Plaintiffs’ counsel also seek final approval of their proposed attorney fees and
`expenses (a total of $6.85 million), and the representative plaintiffs’ service awards (a
`total of $25,000). (Dkt. 662.) The Court found at the preliminary approval stage that the
`request for attorney fees and incentive awards was reasonable, (Dkt. 654 at 6–7), and the
`Court makes the same finding here.
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`Case 2:11-cv-05379-CJC-AGR Document 695 Filed 10/08/19 Page 13 of 16 Page ID
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`#:20297
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`1. Attorney Fees and Costs
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`
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`A district court has the authority and the duty to determine the fairness of attorney
`fees in a class action settlement. See Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d
`1323, 1329 (9th Cir. 1999). The amount of fees awarded rests ultimately in the court’s
`sound discretion. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 736 n.26 (1986), superseded by statute
`on other grounds.
`
`Plaintiffs’ counsel seek $6,875,000 for attorney fees, expenses, and incentive
`awards. (Fee Mot. at 1.) The attorney fees and costs will be paid separate from and in
`addition to the settlement proceeds given to class members. (Fee Mot. at 2.) Plaintiffs
`justify the amount of fees under the settlement on both a percentage-of-the-fund method
`and a lodestar method. (See Fee Mot. at 2.) Given the difficulty of valuing the injunctive
`relief obtained, the Court relies on the lodestar method.
`
`As the Court recognized at the preliminary approval stage, Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks
`only about half of their actual lodestar. (Dkt. 654 at 6–7.) Plaintiffs represent that the
`actual time spent and fees Plaintiffs’ counsel incurred creates a lodestar of nearly $11.5
`million. They seek $6.85 million. The Court finds this amount is both fair and
`reasonable given factors including the amount of hours reasonably spent on the litigation,
`counsel’s efforts in litigating this years-long complex action, the results achieved, and the
`risks inherent in continued litigation. Plaintiffs’ counsel in this case took claims saddled
`with problems of proof and management, and managed to negotiate a settlement of
`significant monetary and injunctive relief. Although $0.15 per Wesson Oil product
`purchased may seem negligible, the fact that Defendant is willing to pay anything at all
`given the many liability and damages issues this case has had from the beginning is
`noteworthy.
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`Case 2:11-cv-05379-CJC-AGR Document 695 Filed 10/08/19 Page 14 of 16 Page ID
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`#:20298
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`2. Plaintiffs’ Incentive Award
`
`
`Plaintiffs also seek an incentive award to reward representative plaintiffs for their
`time and effort, in the amount of $3,000 for each of the six plaintiffs deposed in this case,
`and $1,000 for each of the seven plaintiffs not deposed, for a total incentive award of
`$25,000. Courts routinely approve this type of award to compensate representative
`plaintiffs “for the services they provide and the risks they incurred during the course of
`the class action litigation.” Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482, 499
`(E.D. Cal. 2010). When evaluating the reasonableness of an incentive award, courts may
`consider several factors, including “the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the
`interests of the class, the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions,” and
`the time the plaintiff spent pursing the litigation. Staton, 327 F.3d at 977 (citation and
`quotation marks omitted).
`
`Plaintiffs have devoted substantial time and effort to monitoring the litigation and
`assisting their counsel. They reviewed pleadings, helped respond to discovery requests,
`prepared for and testified at depositions, communicated with counsel, and evaluated the
`terms of the settlement agreement. (Fee Mot. at 20.) Under comparable circumstances,
`courts have approved similar awards to lead plaintiffs. See, e.g., Vasquez, 299 F.R.D. at
`491 (awarding $5,000). The Court finds, as it did at the preliminary approval stage (Dkt.
`654 at 7), that the requested $25,000 aggregate award is reasonable in light of the
`significant time and effort Plaintiffs expended over this eight-year litigation.
`
`
`D. The Objection
`
`
`
`Objector Professor M. Todd Henderson objects to the settlement and the proposed
`fee request. Henderson contends that the injunction has no value at all because ConAgra
`no longer owns Wessen Oil, and thus, according to Henderson, the settlement “provides a
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`Case 2:11-cv-05379-CJC-AGR Document 695 Filed 10/08/19 Page 15 of 16 Page ID
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`#:20299
`
`speculative, nearly illusory, injunction.” (Obj. at 7.) Henderson also maintains that the
`disproportionate attorney fee award under the settlement renders the entire settlement
`unfair. (Obj. at 10–11.) Although the Court appreciates Objector’s high-level concerns
`regarding an apparent trend trend toward class action settlements disproportionately
`benefitting attorneys, the Court is not persuaded that this Settlement Agreement is unfair,
`inadequate, or unreasonable. This is especially true given that the classes were certified
`before the settlement was reached. See In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654
`F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that before class certification, “there is an even
`greater potential for a breach of fiduciary duty owed the class during settlement,” so
`agreements reached before that stage “must withstand an even higher level of scrutiny for
`evidence of collusion or other conflicts of interest than is ordinarily required under Rule
`23(e) before securing the courts approval as fair”).
`
`First, as discussed in more detail Section III.B.1., supra, this was a weak case, with
`
`difficulties of proof relating to liability and damages, and issues of management. That
`Plaintiffs’ counsel secured any relief at all on behalf of the class is an impressive result.
`
`Second, setting a precise value on the benefits achieved for class members is
`
`difficult. See Staton, 327 F.3d at 959 (“[A]ssessing the fairness, adequacy and
`reasonableness of the substantive terms of a settlement agreement can be challenging,”
`given that “the very essence of a settlement is compromise, a yielding of absolutes and an
`abandoning of highest hopes.”). This endeavor is doubly difficult where, “as here, the
`settlement provides for injunctive relief.” Id. But the benefits achieved here—both
`injunctive and monetary—were substantial. And the Court is assured that the fee here is
`“not unreasonably excessive in light of the results achieved.” See Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at
`941.
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`Case 2:11-cv-05379-CJC-AGR Document 695 Filed 10/08/19 Page 16 of 16 Page ID
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`#:20300
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`Finally, the amount of attorney fees in the Settlement Agreement, while high,
`
`reflects the long history of this case and the impressive result achieved given the
`weakness of Plaintiffs’ case. The Court appreciates proportionality concerns, but the
`record in this case sufficiently “dispel[s] the possibility that class counsel bargained away
`a benefit to the class in exchange for their own interests.” Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 938.
`
`The law favors settlements in complex class action litigation. Linney, 151 F.3d at
`
`1238 (9th Cir. 1998). “In most situations, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its
`acceptance and approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain
`results.” Nat’l Rural Telecommunications, 221 F.R.D. at 526 (quoting 4 A Conte & H.
`Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 11:50 at 155 (4th ed. 2002)). The Objection fails
`to persuade the Court that this Settlement Agreement is clearly inadequate.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`
`For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of the Settlement
`
`Agreement is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s counsel are awarded $6,850,000 in attorney fees
`and costs, and Plaintiffs Robert Briseño, Michele Andrade, Jill Crouch, Pauline Michael,
`Necla Musat, and Maureen Towey are awarded $3,000 each, and Plaintiffs Julie Palmer,
`Cheri Shafstall, Dee Hooper-Kercheval, Kelly McFadden, Erika Heins, Rona
`Johnston, and Anita Willman are awarded $1,000 each for their service as class
`representatives.
`
`
`
`
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`
`
` __________________________________
`
`
`CORMAC J. CARNEY
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
`
`
`
`DATED: October 8, 2019
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