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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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` Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`LUIS M. SALAS RAZO, on his own behalf of
`and all others similarly situated,
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`AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES, LLC, and
`DOES 1 through 100
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`Defendants.
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`Case No.: 1:20-cv-0172 JLT HBK
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`ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
`PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS
`SETTLEMENT
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`(Doc. 72)
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`Luis Salas Razo asserts AT&T Mobility Services failed to comply with California’s wage and
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`hour laws by failing to pay all wages due and provide proper meal and rest breaks. Razo now seeks
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`preliminary approval of a settlement reached in this action. Specifically, Razo seeks: (1) conditional
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`certification of the settlement class; (2) preliminary approval of the settlement terms; (3) appointment
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`of Razo as the class representative; (4) appointment of the firm of Bradley/Grombacher LLP as class
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`counsel; (5) approval of the class notice materials; (6) appointment of Atticus Administration, LLC, as
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`the settlement administrator; and (7) scheduling for final approval. (Doc. 72.)
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`The Court reviewed the proposed settlement between the parties, as well as the moving papers,
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`and finds the matter suitable for decision without oral arguments pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For
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`the following reasons, the Court finds conditional certification of a settlement class is not appropriate
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`and preliminary approval of the class settlement is DENIED.
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`I.
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`Background
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`Razo was employed a sales representative at the AT&T Mobility Store located in Madera,
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`California. (Doc. 41 at 4, ¶ 11.) Razo asserts he worked for AT&T “for approximately eleven years”
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`until his termination in June 2018. (Id.) He alleges AT&T “routinely failed to properly calculate the
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`overtime and double time rate of pay.” (Id. at 6, ¶ 25.) Razo asserts AT&T “failed to include its
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`employees’ total compensation including bonuses and commissions when calculating the regular rate
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`for the purposes of determining overtime wages owed and thus routinely underpaid employees for
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`overtime wages owed.” (Id.) Razo contends this underpayment was “evidenced in [his] paycheck and
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`accompanying wage statement issued June 13, 2018.” (Id., ¶ 26.)
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`He alleges the wage statements also “failed to properly list all hours worked which again resulted
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`in an underpayment of wages including overtime and double time wages to employees.” (Doc. 4 at 6,
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`¶ 27.) He contends, “[t]his resulted in failure to pay wages for all hours worked at appropriate rates,
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`and overtime violations for work performed over eight (8) hours per day and/or forty (40) hours per
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`week.” (Id.) For example, Razo asserts his wage statement from June 13, 2018, “incorrectly reflects
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`that the total hours worked because the hours associated with all of the line items add up to 106.08, but
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`the total hours worked line item only lists 81.98 hours.” (Id. at 7, ¶ 27.)
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`Razo asserts he and others “received paychecks without proper wages, as meal period
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`premiums were not paid at the proper rate, and the regular rate of pay was miscalculated.” (Doc. 41 at
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`7, ¶ 28.) Razo contends AT&T paid premiums for missed meal periods at his “base hourly rate, rather
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`than the regular rate of pay.” (Id.) According to Razo, the miscalculation was “evidenced in [his]
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`paycheck and accompanying wage statement issued June 1, 2018, which shows the untaken meal
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`break premium is paid at [the] base hourly rate,” without incorporating his commission in the premium
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`Razo contends “on routine basis he and all other aggrieved employees received wage
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`statements in violation of Labor Code §226, as hours and rates were not properly shown on wage
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`statements.” (Doc. 41 at 7, ¶ 29 (emphasis omitted).) He alleges, “where there are payments for items
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`such as cash awards, commission, taxable non-cash-awards, miscellaneous payment, or overtime ‘true
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`up’ payments, there are no specific details as to rate or hours in the description or analysis that make
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`Case 1:20-cv-00172-JLT-HBK Document 74 Filed 05/02/22 Page 3 of 11
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`up the payment.” (Id.) He asserts the wage statements also violated California law because:
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`“premium pay for meal period violations were paid at the… base hourly rate, rather than his regular
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`rate of pay; the total hours listed are incorrect because the hours associated with the wage statement’s
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`line items exceed the number of total hours worked listed; and the wage statements list improper
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`overtime rates because [AT&T] omitted items such as “COMMISSION (MOBILITY)” when
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`calculating its employee’s regular rate of pay.” (Id. at 7-8, ¶ 31.)
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`According to Razo, due to the miscalculated wages, AT&T also failed “to pay for all wages due
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`prior to termination.” (Doc. 41 at 8, ¶ 32.) In addition, Razo alleges that his “ last day of work was in
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`June 2018, but since such date four additional payments were made with the latest payment made as
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`late as August 2018 well more than thirty (30) days after he ceased employment.” (Id., ¶ 35.) He
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`reports these “payments consisted of the final payment of wages described as (1) Cash Awards, (2)
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`Commission, (3) Taxable non-cash Awards, (4) Misc. Payment, and (5) recalculation of overtime
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`differential pay.” (Id. at 9, ¶ 36.) Razo contends that AT&T “knew or should have known, that all
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`other employees, including Plaintiff, were entitled to receive all wages at appropriate rates, all overtime
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`at appropriate rates, and all commissions due at the time their employment ceased,” and knowingly and
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`willfully failed to pay the wages due upon termination. (Id., ¶¶ 36-37.)
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`On May 29, 2019, Razo provided notice to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency and
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`AT&T “of the specific provisions of the California Labor Code alleged to have been violated, including
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`the facts and theories to support the alleged violations.” (Doc. 41 at 9, ¶ 42 (emphasis omitted).) He
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`asserts the LWDA did not respond to the notice. (Id., ¶ 43.)
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`On August 27, 2019, Razo initiated this action by filing a class complaint in Madera County
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`Superior Court, Case No. MCV081925. (Doc. 1-4 at 5.) Razo filed an amended complaint in the state
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`court on January 8, 2020. (Doc. 1-9.) AT&T initiated the matter before this Court by filing a notice
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`of removal on January 31, 2020. (Doc. 1.) Razo further amended the pleadings on July 30, 2020, and
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`October 15, 2021. (Docs. 9, 41.) The Third Amended Complaint is now the operative pleading.
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`Razo identifies the following causes of action in the TAC: (1) failure to pay for all hours
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`worked; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to pay wages due at termination in violation of
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`Cal. Labor Code §§ 201-203; (4) failure to furnish accurate, itemized wage statement in violation of
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`Case 1:20-cv-00172-JLT-HBK Document 74 Filed 05/02/22 Page 4 of 11
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`Cal. Labor Code § 226; (5) unlawful and unfair conduct in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §
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`17200, et seq.; and (6) civil penalties under California’s Private Attorney General Act. (Doc. 41 at 13-
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`23.) Razo asserted the claims were brought on behalf of himself and classes including:
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`1. “The Plaintiff Class”: All persons who have been, or currently are, employed
`by Defendant and who held, or hold, job positions which Defendant have
`classified as “non-exempt” personnel in the State of California. (The Class
`Period is the period from August 27, 2015, through and including the date
`judgment is rendered in this matter).
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`2. “The Terminated Sub Class”: All members of the Plaintiff Class whose
`employment ended during the Class Period (The Class Period is the period
`from August 27, 2015, through and including the date judgment is rendered in
`this matter).
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`(Id. at 10.) AT&T filed its answer on October 28, 2021. (Doc. 46.)
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`While this matter was pending, AT&T settled a separate class action addressing “the same
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`claims” as those raised by Razo, in Samuel Wallack, et al. v. AT&T Mobility Services, LLC, San
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`Bernardino County Superior Court Case No. CIVSB2117915.1 (Doc. 72 at 4; see also Doc. 50 at 2.)
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`The Wallack court denied Razo’s motion to intervene. (Doc. 49.) The Wallcack proposed settlement
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`class included “persons who worked for AT&T Mobility Services LLC in the State of California, while
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`classified as non-exempt, at any time from August 1, 2015 through November 2, 2021. (Doc. 72 at 6.)
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`On March 8, 2022, Razo filed the motion for preliminary approval of the settlement with AT&T
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`in this action. (Doc. 72.) In seeking approval of the settlement, Razo acknowledged: “[o]nce the
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`Wallack Court grants final approval, the only remaining claims in this matter will be those Razo has
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`asserted on behalf of those who worked for Defendant in a non-exempt role in California from
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`November 2, 2021, onwards.” (Id. at 6.) Thus, Razo and AT&T agreed to settle the claims of a class
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`1 The Court may take judicial notice of a fact that “is not subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) is generally known
`within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
`cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201; see also United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir.
`1993). The official records of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, as contained in the court’s official website, are
`sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, and judicial notice may be taken of documents on the website of
`a state court. See Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (judicial notice may be taken of
`“undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in federal or state courts”); O’Toole v. Northrop
`Grumman Corp., 499 F.3d 1218, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) (“It is not uncommon for courts to take judicial notice of factual
`information found on the world wide web”). Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the San Bernardino County
`Superior Court docket in Case No. CIVSB2117915, including the filing dates and documents publicly available. This
`docket is available at https://www.sb-court.org, and through the court’s online portal at https://cap.sb-court.org.
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`Case 1:20-cv-00172-JLT-HBK Document 74 Filed 05/02/22 Page 5 of 11
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`defined as: “All persons who worked for AT&T Mobility Services LLC in the State of California,
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`while classified as non-exempt, at any time from November 2, 2021, to the date the Court grants
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`preliminary approval of this Settlement.” (Id. at 7; see also Doc. 72-4 at 4, Settlement ¶ 2.)
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`The settlement in Wallack received final approval on March 18, 2022, and an “Amended Order
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`Nunc Pro Tunc Granting Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Judgment”
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`was issued on April 19, 2022. The Wallack class was confirmed to include: “All persons who worked
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`for AT&T Mobility Services LLC in the State of California, while classified as non-exempt, at any time
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`from August 1, 2015 through November 2, 2021.” (Wallack, Case No. CIVSB2117915, Amended
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`Order, p. 2.)
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`II.
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`The Proposed Settlement Terms
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`Pursuant to the proposed “Class Action and PAGA Action Settlement Agreement (“the
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`Settlement”), the parties agree to a gross settlement amount of $575,000.00 for the class including: “all
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`persons who worked for AT&T Mobility Services LLC in the State of California, while classified as
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`non-exempt, at any time from November 2, 2021, to the date the Court grants preliminary approval of
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`this Settlement.” (Doc. 72-4 at 4-5, ¶¶ 2, 6.)
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`A.
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`Payments
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`The parties propose the settlement fund cover payments to class members, including enhanced
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`compensation to Razo as the Class Representative. (Doc. 74-2 at 9, Settlement ¶ 24.) In addition, the
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`Settlement provides for payments to Class Counsel for attorneys’ fees and costs, to the Settlement
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`Administrator, and the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency. (Id. at 5, ¶ 6.)
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`Specifically, the Settlement provides for the following payments from the gross settlement amount:
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`• The Class Representative will receive a service payment of $10,000;
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` Class counsel will receive $191,666.76 in attorneys’ fees, which equals 33 1/3 %
`of the gross settlement amount, and expenses up to $10,000.00;
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` The California Labor and Workforce Development Agency shall receive $7,500
`from the total PAGA payment of $10,000; and
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` The Settlement Administrator will receive up to $30,000 for fees and expenses.
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`(Id. at 5, 8-9, Settlement ¶¶ 6, 23-24.) After these payments, the remaining money (“Net Settlement
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`Amount”) would be distributed as settlement shares to class members. (Id. at 5, Settlement ¶ 10.)
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`Case 1:20-cv-00172-JLT-HBK Document 74 Filed 05/02/22 Page 6 of 11
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`B.
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`Releases
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`The Settlement provides that Razo and class members, other than those who elect not to
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`participate in the Settlement, shall release AT&T from claims. (Doc. 72-4 at 10-11.) Specifically, the
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`release for class members provides:
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`Upon the Court’s final approval of this Settlement, the Class Members (other than
`those who timely and validly elected not to participate in the Settlement) fully
`release and discharge Defendant and the Released Parties of any and all known and
`unknown claims as alleged in, and that could have been alleged based on the facts
`of, the operative Third Amended Complaint. This includes, but is not limited to,
`statutory, constitutional, contractual or common law claims for wages, damages,
`unpaid costs or expenses, penalties, liquidated damages, unitive damages, interest,
`attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, restitution, or equitable relief, arising out of or based
`upon any provision of the California Labor Code, California Industrial Welfare
`Commission Wage Orders, and California Business and Professions Code § 17200,
`et seq.; including, without limitation, the following categories of allegations, to the
`fullest extent such claims are releasable by law: (a) all claims for failure to pay
`wages, including overtime premium pay and the minimum wage; (b) all claims for
`the failure to provide meal and/or rest periods in accordance with applicable law,
`including payments equivalent to one hour of the employee’s regular rate of pay for
`missed meal and/or rest period and alleged non-payment of wages for meal periods
`worked and not taken; (c) all claims for the alleged omission of any kind of
`remuneration when calculating an employee’s regular rate of pay; and (d) any and all
`claims for recordkeeping or pay stub violations, claims for timely payment of wages
`and associated penalties, and all other civil and statutory penalties. The Class
`Members understand and agree that this release includes a good-faith compromise of
`disputed wage claims.
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`(Id. at 11, Settlement ¶ 30.)
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`The release for Razo encompasses more claims than those identified for Settlement Class
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`Members, because he agreed to release any claims known and unknown against AT&T, not just those
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`claims constrained to the facts alleged in this lawsuit. Specifically, Razo’s release provides:
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`In consideration of the Service Payment to Razo, his Settlement payments, and the
`other terms and conditions of the Settlement, Luis M. Salas Razo hereby releases any
`and all of his known and unknown claims against Defendant and any of Defendant’s
`present and former parents, subsidiaries and affiliated companies or entities, and their
`respective officers, directors, employees, partners, shareholders and agents, and any
`other successors, assigns and legal representatives and its related persons and entities
`(“Released Parties”) and waives the protection of California Civil Code section 1542.
`Razo understands and agrees that this release includes a good-faith compromise of
`disputed wage claims.
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`(Id. at 10, Settlement ¶ 29.) Thus, claims released by Razo—but not the Settlement Class—include any
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`claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
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`U.S.C. § 1981, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.
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`Case 1:20-cv-00172-JLT-HBK Document 74 Filed 05/02/22 Page 7 of 11
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`C. Objections and Opt-Out Procedure
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`The parties agreed class members would not be required to take any action to receive their
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`settlement shares. (See Doc. 74-2 at 10, Settlement ¶ 34.) However, any class member who wishes
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`may file objections or elect not to participate in the Settlement. (Id.; see also Doc. 72-4 at 29.) The
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`proposed notice for class members explains the procedures to object to the terms or elect not to
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`participate in the Settlement Class, and includes a form to be completed by a class member seeking
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`exclusion. (Doc. 72-4 at 35, 38.)
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`III.
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`Preliminary Approval of a Class Settlement
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`When parties settle the action prior to class certification, the Court has an obligation to “peruse
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`the proposed compromise to ratify both the propriety of the certification and the fairness of the
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`settlement.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003). Preliminary approval of a class
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`settlement is generally a two-step process. First, the Court must assess whether a class exists. Id.
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`(citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)). Second, the Court must
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`“determine whether the proposed settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” Id.
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`(citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 2998)). The decision to approve or
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`reject a settlement is within the Court’s discretion. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.
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`A.
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`Conditional Certification of a Settlement Class
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`Class certification is governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
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`provides that “[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
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`of all.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). As noted above, the proposed Settlement Class includes: “all persons
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`who worked for AT&T Mobility Services LLC in the State of California, while classified as non-
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`exempt, at any time from November 2, 2021, to the date the Court grants preliminary approval of this
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`Settlement.” (Doc. 72-4 at 4-5, ¶¶ 2, 6.)
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`Razo seeks to “certify a class conditionally for settlement purposes only” pursuant to Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 23. (Doc. 72 at 13.) Parties seeking class certification bear the burden of demonstrating the
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`elements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, and “must affirmatively demonstrate … compliance with the
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`Rule.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011); Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell,
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`Inc., 563 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1977). If an action meets the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the Court
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`must consider whether the class is maintainable under one or more of the three alternatives set forth in
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`Rule 23(b). Narouz v. Charter Communs., LLC, 591 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 2010).
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`B.
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`Rule 23(a) Requirements
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`The prerequisites of Rule 23(a) “effectively limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed
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`by the named plaintiff’s claims.” General Telephone Co. of the Southwest. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,
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`155-56 (1982). Certification of a class is proper if:
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`(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there
`are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
`representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
`representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). These prerequisites are generally referred to as numerosity, commonality,
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`typicality, and adequacy of representation. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156.
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`1.
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`Numerosity
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`This prerequisite requires the Court to consider “specific facts of each case and imposes no
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`absolute limitations.” General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980). Although there is
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`not a specific threshold, joining more than one hundred plaintiffs is impracticable. See Immigrant
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`Assistance Project of Los Angeles Cnt. Fed’n of Labor v. INS, 306 F.3d 842, 869 (9th Cir. 2002)
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`(finding the numerosity requirement … “satisfied solely on the basis of the number of ascertained
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`class members”); see also Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 549 F.2d 1330, 1332 n.7 (9th
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`Cir. 1977) (a proposed class with 110 members “clearly [included] a sufficient number to meet the
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`numerosity requirements”). Razo reports “there are approximately 3,900 class members, all of whom
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`were subject to AT&T’s allegedly commonly applied unlawful policies, among other derivative wage
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`and hour claims.” (Doc. 72 at 13.) Therefore, joinder of all identified class members as plaintiffs is
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`impracticable, and the numerosity requirement is satisfied.
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`2.
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`Commonality
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`Rule 23(a) requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
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`To satisfy the commonality requirement, the plaintiff must demonstrate common points of facts and
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`law. See Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 350. Thus, “commonality requires that the class members’
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`claims depend upon a common contention such that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an
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`Case 1:20-cv-00172-JLT-HBK Document 74 Filed 05/02/22 Page 9 of 11
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`issue that is central to the validity of each claim in one stroke,” and the “plaintiff must demonstrate the
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`capacity of classwide proceedings to generate common answers to common questions of law or fact
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`that are apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581,
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`588 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks, citations omitted).
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`Razo asserts the commonality requirement is satisfied because “the class claims of Defendant’s
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`employees turn upon answers to overarching common questions regarding Defendant’s policies and
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`procedures that are capable of class-wide resolution for settlement purposes.” (Doc. 72 at 14.)
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`According to Razo, “[f]or settlement purposes,” the common issues include:
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`(1) whether Defendant’s timekeeping policies resulted in compensable off-the-
`clock work and subsequent failure to pay all regular and overtime hours worked;
`(2) whether Defendant’s omission of certain types of remuneration when
`calculating its employee’s regular rate of pay resulting in a failure to pay all wages
`owed; (3) whether Defendant provided its employees with all requires meal and
`rest periods; (4) whether Defendant paid its employees a penalty equivalent to one
`hour of their regular rate of compensation whenever that worker missed a meal or
`rest period; (5) whether Defendant failed to pay all owed wages timely; and
`(6) whether Defendant failed to provide employees with wage statements
`compliant with California law.
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`(Id.) Because it appears resolution of the issues—including whether AT&T’s policies violated
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`California wage and hour law—would apply to the claims of each of the Class Members, the Court
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`finds the commonality requirement is satisfied.
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`3.
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`Typicality
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`This requirement demands that the “claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
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`of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). A claim or defense is not required to
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`be identical, but rather “reasonably coextensive” with those of the absent class members. Hanlon, 150
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`F.3d at 1020. “The test of typicality is whether other members have the same or similar injury,
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`whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other
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`class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976
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`F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks, citation omitted); see also Kayes v. Pac.
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`Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995) (the typicality requirement is satisfied when named
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`plaintiffs have the same claims as other members of the class and would not be subject to unique
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`defenses).
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`Importantly, class membership is a minimal prerequisite to a finding of typicality. Falcon, 457
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`U.S. at 156 (“We have repeatedly held that a class representative must be part of the class”). As a
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`result, “typicality will not be satisfied if[] the class representative is not a member of the class []he
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`purports to represent.” Urena v. Cent. Cal. Almond Growers Assoc., 2020 WL 3483280, at *4-5 (E.D.
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`Cal. June 26, 2020), quoting 7 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 23:23 (5th ed.)
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`(internal quotation marks omitted). Courts cannot certify a proposed class “where the representative
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`plaintiff is not a member of the class.” Jackson v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs. 227 F.R.D. 284, 288 (N.D.
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`Ill. 2005), citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975); see also Bentley v. Verizon Bus. Global,
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`LLC, 2010 WL 1223575, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[a] determination that the named plaintiff is not a
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`member of the class … is dispositive”).
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`Razo asserts the typicality requirement is satisfied because “[he] and the Class Members all
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`worked for Defendant as non-exempt employees.” (Doc. 72 at 14.) Significantly, however, Razo does
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`not address—or even acknowledge—the fact that he is not a member of the proposed settlement class.
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`As discussed above, the proposed class includes California non-exempt employees who worked for
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`AT&T “at any time from November 2, 2021.” (See Doc. 72-4 at 4, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).) Razo
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`reported his employment with AT&T ended in June 2018. (Doc. 41 at 4, ¶ 11; see also id. at 8, ¶ 35.)
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`Based upon Razo’s identified termination date, he clearly cannot be a member of the class. Because
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`the sole named plaintiff is not a member of the proposed settlement class, the Court is unable to find
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`the typicality prerequisite of Rule 23 is satisfied. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350 (2011).
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`4.
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`Adequacy
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`them. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). This prerequisite is satisfied if the representative
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`party “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The
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`Court must evaluate whether the named plaintiff has any conflict of interest with the proposed class,
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`and whether he will “prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class” In re Mego Fin. Corp.
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`Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020).
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`Significantly, to satisfy the adequacy requirement, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, belong to
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`the proposed class he seeks to represent. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156; see also East Tex. Motor
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`Freight Sys. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403-404 (1977). Because Razo is not a member of the
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`proposed settlement class, he is also unable to show the adequacy requirement is satisfied.
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`IV. Conclusion and Order
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`Razo fails to carry the burden to show the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied for the
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`proposed settlement class, and the Court is unable to certify the class. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350; see
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`also Lindblom v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 2018 WL 573356, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2018)
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`(“A bedrock requirement running through the Rule 23(a) framework is that class certification is not
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`appropriate unless one or more class representatives actually belong to the proposed class.”).
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`Based upon the foregoing, the Court ORDERS: The motion for preliminary approval of the
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`class settlement (Doc. 72) is DENIED.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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` Dated: May 2, 2022
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