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`Case 2:18-cv-00568-TLN-CKD Document 36 Filed 10/01/20 Page 1 of 11
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`BRENDAN PEACOCK, on behalf of
`himself and all others similarly
`situated,
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`No. 2:18-cv-00568-TLN-CKD
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`ORDER
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`PABST BREWING COMPANY, LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`This matter is before the Court on Defendant Pabst Brewing Company, LLC’s
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`(“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 31.) Plaintiff Brendan Peacock (“Plaintiff”)
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`opposes Defendant’s Motion. (ECF No. 33.) Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 35.) For the
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`reasons set forth below, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
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`///
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`Case 2:18-cv-00568-TLN-CKD Document 36 Filed 10/01/20 Page 2 of 11
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`I.
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`FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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`Defendant, a Delaware limited liability company, owns Olympia Beer. (ECF No. 30 at 2.)
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`Originally, the Olympia Brewing Company brewed Olympia Beer in Tumwater, Washington,
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`which borders Olympia, Washington. (Id. at 3.) Defendant acquired the Olympia Brewing
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`Company in 1999 and closed the Olympia brewery in 2003. (Id.) Defendant now contract-brews
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`Olympia Beer at several mega-breweries throughout the country, including a location in
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`Irwindale, California. (Id. at 4.)
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`Plaintiff alleges Defendant deceives consumers by marketing Olympia Beer in a way that
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`“falsely create[es] the impression” the beer is brewed using artesian water from the Olympia area
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`of Washington. (Id. at 2.) More specifically, Plaintiff points to Defendant’s advertising on the
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`beer can itself. (Id. at 4–5.) Plaintiff alleges the product name “The Original Olympia Beer”
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`coupled with the slogan “It’s the Water” and an image of a cascading waterfall (a reference to the
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`site of the original brewery) creates the impression that Olympia beer is brewed with water from
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`the Olympia area of Washington. (Id. at 4–5.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant reinforces this
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`misrepresentation with a post on Defendant’s official Facebook page — a picture showing the
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`product and a waterfall in the background with the caption “It really is the water #OlympiaBeer.”
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`(Id. at 6.) Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that a description of the beer on Defendant’s website similarly
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`misleads consumers. (Id. at 5–6.)
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`On March 15, 2018, Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging Defendant violated
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`California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), codified at California Business & Professions
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`Code § 17200. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on April 27,
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`2018. (ECF No. 12.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (“FAC”) on May 18,
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`2018. (ECF No. 14.) Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the FAC on May 31, 2018. (ECF No.
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`19.) At a hearing on August 20, 2019, the Court granted Defendant’s motion with leave to
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`amend. (ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on
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`September 19, 2019. (ECF No. 30.) Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the SAC on
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`October 3, 2019. (ECF No. 31.)
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`///
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`Case 2:18-cv-00568-TLN-CKD Document 36 Filed 10/01/20 Page 3 of 11
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`II.
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`STANDARD OF LAW
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`A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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`(“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732
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`(9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the
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`claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79
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`(2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice
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`of what the claim...is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
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`544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on
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`liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to
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`dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
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`On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as
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`true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every
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`reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail
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`Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege
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`“‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to
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`relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
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`factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
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`for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
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`Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of
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`factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir.
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`1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an
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`unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading
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`is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements
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`of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare
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`recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
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`suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not
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`alleged or that the defendants have violated the...laws in ways that have not been
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`alleged[.]” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
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`U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
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`Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough
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`facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting
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`Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims...across
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`the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. While
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`the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than “a
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`sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is “a
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`context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
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`common sense.” Id. at 679.
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`If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to
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`amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading
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`could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
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`1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir.
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`1995)); see also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of
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`discretion in denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court
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`should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s
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`discretion to deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended
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`its complaint[.]” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir.
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`2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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`III. ANALYSIS
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`Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s UCL claim for four reasons: (1) Plaintiff fails to
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`allege Defendant’s representations are likely to deceive a reasonable consumer; (2) Plaintiff fails
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`to allege an unlawful predicate act; (3) Plaintiff fails to allege his claim with specificity pursuant
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`to Rule 9(b); and (4) Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. (ECF No. 31-1 at 13, 19,
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`20, and 22.) The Court addresses each argument in turn.
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`///
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`A.
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`The Reasonable Consumer Test
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`The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal.
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`Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s deceptive advertising is unlawful,
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`unfair, and fraudulent in violation of all three prongs of the UCL. (ECF No. 30 at 11–12.) The
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`UCL’s “unlawful” prong permits a cause of action if a “business act or practice” violates some
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`other law. Kaski v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 949 (2002) (quoting Cel-Tech Communications,
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`Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). Here, Plaintiff
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`predicates his “unlawful” UCL claim on Defendant’s alleged violation of California’s False
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`Advertising Law (“FAL”), codified at California Business & Professions Code § 17500, which
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`prohibits any “untrue or misleading” advertising. (ECF No. 30 at 11.) Moore v. Mars Petcare
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`US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Cal. Bus. § Prof. Code § 17500).
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`However, a violation of the FAL is also a per se violation of the UCL. Williams v. Gerber
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`Products Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008).
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`Claims under the UCL and FAL are governed by the “reasonable consumer test.” Id.
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`Under this test, a plaintiff must show that members of the public are likely to be deceived. Id.
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`(quoting Freeman v. Time, 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`“California courts . . . have recognized that whether a business practice is deceptive will usually
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`be a question of fact not appropriate for decision on demurrer.” Id. at 938. Because this
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`determination requires consideration and weighing of evidence, courts rarely grant a motion to
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`dismiss under the reasonable consumer test. Id. at 939.
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`Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated the UCL and FAL through its false and misleading
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`advertising of Olympia Beer. (ECF No. 30 at 11.) Defendant’s labeling at the top of the Olympia
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`Beer can displays the phrase “The Original Olympia Beer.” (Id. at 4–5.) Beneath this text is an
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`image depicting waterfalls similar to those at the site of the original brewery in Washington. (Id.
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`at 5.) At the bottom of the can is the slogan “It’s the Water.” (Id. at 4–5.) Taken together,
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`Plaintiff alleges he was deceived by the labeling on the can that Olympia Beer is brewed with
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`water from the Olympia area of Washington. (ECF No. 30 at 8.)
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`Defendant contends there is nothing misleading about Olympia Beer’s logo because the
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`“phrase ‘The Original’ used in connection with the product name ‘Olympia Beer’ [do] not make
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`any representation[s] of fact regarding the source of the water used to brew Olympia Beer.” (ECF
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`No. 31-1 at 13–14.) Defendant relies on Carrea v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 475 Fed.
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`App’x 113 (9th Cir. 2012) to support its contention. In Carrea, the plaintiff alleged the
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`“Original” and “Classic” statements on Dreyer’s ice cream packaging as well as the reference to
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`the original 1928 recipe misled the public into thinking Drumsticks were more nutritious than
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`brands made by Dreyer’s competitors. Id. at 115. In affirming dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims,
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`the court stated, “It is implausible that a reasonable consumer would interpret ‘Original Sundae
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`Cone,’ ‘Original Vanilla,’ and ‘Classic,’ to imply that Drumstick is more wholesome or nutritious
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`than competing products.” Id. The court also noted there were no other terms “that might
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`suggest that the modern Drumstick is identical in composition to its prototype.” Id.
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`Carrea is distinguishable from the instant case. First, in Carrea, Dreyer’s packaging
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`lacked “specific claims about content or ingredients” in relation to the “Original” and “Classic”
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`statements, while Plaintiff in this case alleges the labeling on the Olympia Beer can — namely,
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`the phrase “It’s the Water” in conjunction with the “The Original,” “Olympia Beer,” and the
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`image of a waterfall from the area — implies the water used in Olympia Beer comes from its
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`original source in the Olympia area of Washington. Second, this case turns on the geographical
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`source of Olympia Beer’s ingredients, while the allegations in Carrea related to the nutritional
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`value of the product. Lastly, unlike here, the claim at issue in Carrea was not a close call. The
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`Carrea court emphasized “it strains credulity to claim that a reasonable consumer would be
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`misled to think that an ice cream dessert with ‘chocolate coating topped with nuts,’ is healthier
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`than its competition simply by virtue of these ‘Original’ and ‘Classic’ descriptors.” Id. The
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`Court cannot dismiss Plaintiff’s claim so easily.
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`Defendant also relies on Maeda v. Kennedy Endeavors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 3d 953 (D.
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`Haw. 2019) for the proposition that no reasonable consumer would make a geographical
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`inference from Olympia Beer’s labeling. (ECF No. 31-1 at 16–17.) In Maeda, the defendant’s
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`products included the word “HAWAIIAN” at top with a variety of Hawaii-related imagery
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`beneath (e.g., “hula dancers, canoes, beaches, palm trees, and volcanoes”). Id. at 970–971. The
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`court found that “the word ‘Hawaiian,’ even when accompanied by the subject images, does not
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`represent that the Hawaiian Snacks are from Hawai’i.” Id. at 973. Defendant argues that, like in
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`Maeda, Olympia Beer’s packaging at most evokes the “spirit” of the Northwest (ECF No. 31-1 at
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`17), which “is insufficient to confuse a reasonable consumer.” Id.
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`Maeda is also distinguishable from the instant case. The Maeda Court found the
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`“exclusive use of the word ‘Hawaiian’ and associated imagery” to be non-actionable because the
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`advertising lacked any geographic specificity. 407 F. Supp. 3d at 972. In contrast, Defendant’s
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`advertising not only alludes to a geographically specific area, it also draws on the historical
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`brewing location and once-unique ingredient in Olympia Beer — the water. (ECF No. 30 at 5–6.)
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`As Plaintiff alleges, the slogan “It’s the Water” denotes the quality of the naturally filtered,
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`artesian water from the Olympia area of Washington. (ECF 30 at 3.) Unlike Maeda, the
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`phrasing on the can and depiction of waterfalls at the site of the original brewery goes much
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`further than “merely referencing or evoking the spirit” of the Northwest. 407 F. Supp. 3d at. 973.
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`Notably, none of Defendant’s cited authority is binding on this Court. Further, at this
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`early stage, the Court must take Plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences
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`in his favor. Although Olympia’s packaging does not contain a map pinpointing the alleged
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`misrepresentation1 or an explicit statement regarding origin,2 Plaintiff alleges enough facts to
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`draw a reasonable inference that a reasonable consumer would believe Olympia Beer is brewed
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`1
`See, e.g., Broomfield v. Craft Brew All., Inc., No. 17-CV-01027-BLF, 2017 WL 3838453
`at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2017) (holding alleged misleading representations printed on beer label
`included a map of Hawai’i marking the location of the brewery and invitation to visit the
`brewery); Peacock v. 21st Amendment Brewery Cafe, LLC, No. 17-CV-01918-JST, 2018 WL
`452153 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2018) (map of San Francisco Bay Area with an “x” marking the
`brewery location is likely to deceive a reasonable consumer).
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`See Marty v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1340–42 (S.D. Fla. 2014)
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`(finding “Originated in Germany” and “German quality” would mislead a reasonable consumer);
`Reed v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. C19-0005-JCC, 2019 WL 2475706 at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. June 13,
`2019) (the phrases “VISIT OUR HOME FARM” and “SKAGIT VALLEY, WA” were sufficient
`to withstand a motion to dismiss.)
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`with water from the Olympia area of Washington.3 It is plausible that a reasonable consumer
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`could see the phrase “The Original Olympia Beer” and the waterfall image on the can and
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`associate Olympia Beer with the Olympia area of Washington, especially in light of Plaintiff’s
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`allegation that the waterfall image “look[s] just like the waterfalls” associated with the original
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`brewery in the Olympia area of Washington State. Further, a reasonable consumer could construe
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`the phrase “It’s the Water” — when taken with the can’s labeling as a whole — to suggest that
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`Olympia Beer is brewed using water from the Olympia area.4
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`In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff plausibly alleges a reasonable consumer would likely
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`be deceived by the Olympia Beer labeling into believing Olympia Beer is brewed with water from
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`the Olympia area of Washington State.5
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`B.
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`UCL’s “Unlawful” Predicate Act
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`Defendant contends Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled an “unlawful” predicate act on
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`which to base a violation of the UCL. (ECF No. 31 at 19–20.) As stated above, the UCL’s
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`unlawful prong “borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the
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`[UCL] makes independently actionable.” Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 4th at 180 (internal quotation marks
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`omitted). Here, Plaintiff predicates his “unlawful” UCL claim on Defendant’s alleged violation
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`of the FAL. (ECF No. 30 at 11.) Having found that Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a violation
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`of the FAL, the Court also finds his UCL claim is properly premised on that violation.
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`3
`See, e.g., Shalikar v. Asahi Beer U.S.A., Inc., No. LA CV17-02713 JAK (JPRX), 2017
`WL 9362139 at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2017) (the word “Asahi”, which means “morning sun” in
`Japanese, and the Japanese katakana kanji characters describing the name and characteristics of
`the beer could mislead reasonable consumers.)
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` 4
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`Defendant also contends the phrases “The Original” and “It’s the Water” are non-
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`actionable puffery. (ECF No. 31-1 at 19.) “Advertising that amounts to ‘mere’ puffery is not
`actionable because no reasonable consumer relies on puffery.” Haskell v. Time, Inc., 857 F.
`Supp. 1392, 1399 (E. D. Cal. 1994). Puffery consists of statements that are “vague, highly
`subjective claims as opposed to specific, detailed factual assertions.” Id. Drawing all reasonable
`inferences in Plaintiff’s favor and for the reasons already discussed, the Court finds the Olympia
`Beer label, taken as a whole, makes a sufficiently measurable and specific claim that Olympia
`Beer is brewed with water from the Olympia area of Washington State.
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` 5
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`Because the Court finds the labeling on the can is dispositive, the Court need not and does
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`not address the allegations regarding Defendant’s website or social media post.
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`C.
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`Rule 9(b)’s Pleading Standard
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`Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to meet the pleading requirements of
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`Rule 9(b). (ECF No. 31-1 at 20.) A claim grounded in fraud “must state with particularity the
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`circumstances constituting fraud . . ..” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). A court may dismiss a claim for
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`failing to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. See Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp.
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`USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003). Under this heightened pleading standard, a party must
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`“identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is
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`false or misleading about the purportedly fraudulent statement, and why it is false.” Moore v.
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`Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Davidson v. Kimberly–
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`Clark, 889 F.3d 956, 964 (9th Cir. 2018)). The complaint must contain enough detail to put a
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`defendant on notice of the alleged misconduct so they may “defend against the charge and not
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`just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106.
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`Defendant contends the SAC fails to meet Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirements because
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`Plaintiff allegedly fails to (1) plead his injury with particularity, (2) allege when he first
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`discovered that Olympia Beer is brewed in Irwindale, CA, (3) identify which particular
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`advertisements he viewed — including when, where, and how he viewed them — and, (4) state
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`that he actually viewed the Defendant’s Facebook post referenced in the SAC.
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`The Court disagrees with Defendant and finds Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy Rule 9(b).
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`Plaintiff alleges Defendant (the “who”) misled Plaintiff into believing that Olympia Beer is
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`“exclusively brewed using water from the Olympia area of Washington State” (the “what”).
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`(ECF No. 30 at 7.) Plaintiff further alleges he purchased Olympia Beer on April 21, 2017 (the
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`“when”) from a Grocery Outlet located at 2801 Zinfandel Drive in Rancho Cordova, California
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`(the “where”).6 (Id. at 7.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant deceptively markets its product as
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`“The Original Olympia Beer” with the slogan “It’s the Water” and an image of the waterfalls
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`associated with the original brewery in Washington State, which is likely to mislead a reasonable
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`Plaintiff also alleges in the two years preceding this purchase, he was directly exposed to
`Defendant’s allegedly misleading advertising on his smartphone and purchased the same product
`at other retailers like Total Wine. (ECF No. 30 at 7.)
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`Case 2:18-cv-00568-TLN-CKD Document 36 Filed 10/01/20 Page 10 of 11
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`consumer into thinking the beer is brewed with water sourced from the Olympia area of
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`Washington State (the “how”). (Id. at 8–9.) As to his injury, Plaintiff alleges he paid a premium
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`price for Olympia Beer and would not have purchased the product had he known Defendant’s
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`marketing was false. (Id.)
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`Defendant contends that under Rule 9(b), Plaintiff must specify the “actual price” paid
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`and what he “believes he should have paid.” (ECF No. 31-1 at 21.) However, Defendant does
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`not provide authority to support the contention that Plaintiff is required to make those specific
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`allegations. Defendant also faults the SAC for failing to precisely identify when Plaintiff “first
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`discovered that Olympia beer is brewed in . . . California” and “which particular advertisements
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`or marketing messages [Plaintiff] viewed, where he viewed them, or how he viewed them.” (Id.)
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`(emphasis in original.) Again, Defendant provides no authority requiring Plaintiff to make these
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`precise allegations. To the contrary, Ninth Circuit precedent suggests a plaintiff need not allege
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`facts showing when he first discovered — or “came to believe” — a product is allegedly
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`misrepresented. Davidson, 889 F.3d at 966. Here, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s
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`allegations are specific enough to put Defendant on notice of the particular misconduct alleged so
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`Defendant may defend itself. See Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106. The Court therefore concludes
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`Plaintiff has satisfied Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.
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`D.
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`Article III Standing
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`Finally, Defendant contends Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. (ECF No.
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`31-1 at 22.) For Article III standing, a plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that
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`is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed
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`by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) as revised
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`(May 24, 2016). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof and must “clearly . . . allege facts
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`demonstrating each element.” Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)). An
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`injury in fact is one that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent. Lujan v.
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`Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). In other words, the injury “must affect the plaintiff in
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`a personal and individual way” and “must actually exist.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. “Even
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`named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they personally have been
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`Case 2:18-cv-00568-TLN-CKD Document 36 Filed 10/01/20 Page 11 of 11
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`injured.” Id. at 1547 n.6 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20
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`(1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`In Davidson, the Ninth Circuit held a “previously deceived plaintiff may have standing to
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`seek injunctive relief” based on allegedly false advertising. 888 F.3d at 969–970. The court
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`listed two ways such a plaintiff may allege standing to seek injunctive relief, “even though the
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`consumer now knows or suspects that the advertising was false at the time of original
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`purchase[.]” Id. at 969. First, the plaintiff may allege he wishes to buy the same product again
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`but is “unable to rely on the products advertising or labeling in the future[.]” Id. at 970. Second,
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`the plaintiff may allege he may purchase the same product again in the future, even if “marred by
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`false advertising or labelling,” under the reasonable — but incorrect — assumption the product
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`has improved. Id.
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`Here, Plaintiff adequately alleges a threat of future harm as articulated in Davidson. More
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`specifically, Plaintiff alleges he “wishes and is likely” to continue purchasing Defendant’s
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`product if “he could rely with confidence on [Defendant’s] marketing and advertising and make
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`an informed decision regarding the source of the water in Olympia Beer.” (ECF No. 30 at 8.) As
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`such, the Court finds this alleged harm is sufficient to confer standing to pursue injunctive relief.
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`See Davidson, 888 F.3d at 969–970; see also Broomfield v. Craft Brew All., Inc., No. 17-CV-
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`01027-BLF, 2018 WL 4952519 at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018).
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31) is hereby
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`DENIED. Defendant shall file a responsive pleading within twenty-one (21) days of the date of
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`electronic filing of this Order.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`DATED: September 30, 2020
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