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`Case 2:21-cv-00054-KJM-DB Document 21 Filed 03/31/22 Page 1 of 9
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`Sonia Randhawa,
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`No. 2:21-cv-00054-KJM-DB
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`Plaintiff,
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`ORDER
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`v.
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`Intel Corporation,
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`Defendant.
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`Sonia Randhawa alleges Intel Corporation, her former employer, fired her because of her
`race, color, sex, and age. She also alleges Intel was motivated by her longstanding complaints of
`sexual harassment by a coworker. Intel moves to dismiss the retaliation claims. It argues
`Randhawa did not include those claims in the charge she filed with the relevant regulatory
`agencies, which is a prerequisite of any lawsuit. The motion is denied. An investigation of
`retaliation could “reasonably be expected to grow out of” the investigation of Randhawa’s other
`allegations, so the prerequisite is satisfied. See Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1062 (9th
`Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted) (quoting B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th
`Cir. 2002)).
`I.
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`ALLEGATIONS
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`At this stage, the court assumes the following allegations are true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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`Case 2:21-cv-00054-KJM-DB Document 21 Filed 03/31/22 Page 2 of 9
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`Intel hired Randhawa in early 2015. First Am. Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 9. She consistently
`earned awards and accolades, and the company told her a promotion was in her future. Id. ¶¶ 16–
`17. But not long after she was hired, a coworker began to harass her, and she complained to the
`company’s human resources department. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. Soon after her complaint, the company
`issued an “Improvement Required Notice” that falsely accused her of poor performance. Id.
`¶¶ 20–21. She filed a further complaint about the false notice, and it was removed from her file.
`Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
`Randhawa moved into a new group and position but faced new problems. Id. ¶ 25. Her
`new supervisor discriminated against her in assigning work, id. ¶¶ 27–28, and the old coworker
`also continued to harass her, see id. ¶ 29. The harassment continued unabated despite complaints.
`Id. She was also denied a promised promotion. Id. ¶ 30. She tried unsuccessfully to raise
`complaints with a vice president and other Intel management, but her complaints and appeals
`went unanswered. Id. ¶¶ 31–33.
`Intel then began a reorganization effort, which included layoffs. Id. ¶ 34. To decide
`which employees would be laid off, managers assigned scores based on job codes. See id. ¶ 35.
`Intel gave Randhawa the wrong job code, and her score was lower as a result, and in fact was the
`lowest among her group. See id. ¶¶ 36–38. She alerted the company to the mistake, but no one
`corrected it. See id. ¶¶ 36–37. She was terminated, effective several weeks later. Id. ¶ 41. The
`only other person in the group to be fired was an unnamed Caucasian man, but Randhawa
`suspected the company had invented him to lend an appearance of neutrality to its decision; there
`was not any Caucasian man of his age on her team. See id. ¶¶ 39–40. And rather than
`eliminating the position Randhawa was vacating, as might be expected if her job had truly
`become redundant, the company began recruiting someone to take her place. Id. ¶ 42.
`Before her termination’s effective date, Randhawa began looking for a new position
`within the company. She applied for more than fifty jobs at Intel through its internal career
`services system. Id. ¶ 43. One opening was promising. See id. ¶ 44. But a condition of that
`position required her to remain an Intel employee after the day of her scheduled termination. See
`/////
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`Case 2:21-cv-00054-KJM-DB Document 21 Filed 03/31/22 Page 3 of 9
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`id. Intel had a policy permitting its hiring managers to extend layoff dates in this situation, but
`Randhawa’s request for an extension was denied, and she was not rehired. Id. ¶ 45.
`After she left Intel, Randhawa filed complaints with the California Department of Fair
`Employment and Housing and with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See
`id. ¶ 47 & Ex. A. In her California complaint, she checked the boxes for discrimination on the
`basis of race, color, sex, national origin and age, and explained what had happened:
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`I was hired as a Technical Project Manager. I had excellent performance. Without
`notice I was told my position was being eliminated. I am 43 years old. I am aware
`that several white and southern Indian folks stayed on.
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`I applied for various positions within Intel before I would be terminated but Brian
`Staab [an Intel manager] would not keep me employed long enough to continue
`competing internally, therefore I lost all chances of staying with Intel. I found this
`discriminatory again as it would not have been a hardship to keep me on for another
`month to ensure I would continue to work at Intel.
`In 2015, I began to complain of stalking and sexual harassment by a coworker. The
`complaints continued until the end of 2016, but HR never took action.
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`I believe I was terminated based on my sex (female) race (North Indian), national
`origin (Australia), [and] color in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
`1964, as amended.
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`I believe I was terminated based on my age (43) in violation of the Age
`Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended.
`Req. J. Notice Ex. A, ECF No. 10-1.1 The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter in October 2020, and
`Randhawa filed this action within the applicable 90-day period. See First Am. Compl. ¶ 48
`& Ex. A; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In her current complaint, she alleges several discrimination,
`harassment, retaliation, and wrongful termination claims against both Intel and several Doe
`defendants.2 See generally First Am. Compl.
`
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`1 The block quotation above preserves the inconsistent paragraph separations in the
`charge. The court takes judicial notice of this document for the limited purpose of ascertaining its
`contents. See Hellmann-Blumberg v. Univ. of Pac., No. 12-286, 2013 WL 1326469, at *1 (E.D.
`Cal. Mar. 29, 2013).
`2 If defendants’ identities are unknown when the complaint is filed, plaintiffs have an
`opportunity through discovery to identify them. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.
`1980). But the court will dismiss such unnamed defendants if discovery clearly would not
`uncover their identities or if the complaint would clearly be dismissed on other grounds. Id. The
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`Case 2:21-cv-00054-KJM-DB Document 21 Filed 03/31/22 Page 4 of 9
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`Intel moves to dismiss the retaliation claims, which Randhawa asserts under both Title VII
`of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. See Mot.,
`ECF No. 10; First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65–80 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and Cal. Gov’t Code
`§ 12940(h)). Intel argues Randhawa did not include retaliation claims in the charges she filed
`with the California or federal authorities. See id. at 7–13. If that is correct, then the retaliation
`claims would not have been exhausted. See id. Randhawa opposes the motion, which is now
`fully briefed. See Opp’n, ECF No. 14; Reply, ECF No. 15. The court submitted the matter after a
`combined hearing and scheduling conference. Luke Peters and Marta Vanegas appeared at the
`hearing for Randhawa, and Scott Jang and Hardev Chhokar appeared for Intel.
`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
`granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint lacks a
`“cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal theory.
`Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). The court
`assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the light most favorable to the
`nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019).
`If the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief,” the motion
`must be granted. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
`A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
`pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl.
`Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule demands more than unadorned
`accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
`678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic recitations elements do not alone suffice. Id.
`(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). This evaluation of plausibility is a context-specific task
`drawing on “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
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`federal rules also provide for dismissing unnamed defendants that, absent good cause, are not
`served within 90 days of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
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`Case 2:21-cv-00054-KJM-DB Document 21 Filed 03/31/22 Page 5 of 9
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`III. ANALYSIS
`A plaintiff who alleges employment discrimination under either Title VII or the California
`Fair Employment and Housing Act must first file a charge with the relevant administrative
`agency. See Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C.
`§ 2000e-16(c)); Yurick v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 1120–21 (1989). The relevant
`federal and California agencies have a work-sharing agreement under which the exhaustion of
`Title VII remedies also exhausts Fair Employment and Housing Act remedies. McCarthy v. R.J.
`Reynolds Tobacco Co., 819 F. Supp. 2d 923, 935 (E.D. Cal. 2011). The California law also
`“mirrors” the federal law in its exhaustion requirements. See Josephs, 443 F.3d at 1062 n.4
`(quoting Couveau v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 218 F.3d 1078, 1082 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)).
`The court therefore considers both the state and federal claims together, as have the parties.
`See Mot. at 7–13; Opp’n at 3–7.
`The purposes of Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirement are to give employers
`notice of the claims against them and to “narrow[] the issues for prompt adjudication and
`decision.” B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1099 (quoting Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir.
`1995)). A pre-litigation charge permits the administrative agency to investigate and to mediate.
`See id. The scope of any lawsuit that follows the charge is therefore limited to (1) the scope of
`the agency’s “actual investigation” plus (2) whatever investigation could “reasonably be expected
`to grow out of the charge.” Josephs, 443 F.3d at 1062 (emphasis omitted) (quoting B.K.B.,
`276 F.3d at 1100). In some older cases, courts described this prerequisite as jurisdictional. See,
`e.g., B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1099–1100. The Supreme Court has since clarified that it is not. Fort
`Bend Cty., Texas v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1850 (2019).
`The charge-filing rule has often been expressed in quite permissive terms. The Ninth
`Circuit has said, for example, that a plaintiff’s new allegations are within the scope of the original
`charge if they are “like or reasonably related to” the allegations in the charge. Green v. Los
`Angeles County Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475–76 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Brown
`v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Tr., 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984)). A new
`allegation can reasonably be expected to have grown out of another charge if the new allegation is
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`Case 2:21-cv-00054-KJM-DB Document 21 Filed 03/31/22 Page 6 of 9
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`at least “consistent with the plaintiff’s original theory.” Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist.,
`291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100). Both the Circuit and the
`Supreme Court have also directed district courts to construe administrative charges “liberally,”
`Josephs, 443 F.3d at 1061—even with the “utmost liberality,” B.K.B., 176 F.3d at 1100 (citation
`omitted)—so as to “protect the employee’s rights and statutory remedies,” Fed. Exp. Corp. v.
`Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 406 (2008).
`In some cases, a new allegation is unquestionably related to the original administrative
`charge. That is true, for example, of a plaintiff who originally charges his employer with
`wrongful termination and who later alleges the employer also refused to reinstate him. See
`Josephs, 443 F.3d at 1062; Couveau, 218 F.3d at 1082. In other cases the question is more
`difficult. If so, a court can consider the basis of the original charge, the dates of the
`discrimination alleged in the charge, who allegedly perpetrated the discrimination, and the
`locations where the discrimination allegedly occurred. See Freeman, 291 F.3d at 636 (citing
`B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100). The focus is the factual statement in the charge: who did what, when,
`where, and why? Id. For example, in Freeman, a teacher had filed an administrative charge
`alleging discrimination in the appointment of a school administrative council, but his federal
`lawsuit added allegations about teaching assignments, class sizes, and other matters, which had
`all occurred much later. See id. at 637. The district court held these allegations were not
`“reasonably related” and therefore not exhausted, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. See id. at 635,
`637–38.
`The parties’ burdens of proof add one final layer to these rules. The exhaustion of
`administrative remedies “is an affirmative defense, [so] the defendant bears the burden of
`pleading and proving it.” Kraus v. Presidio Tr. Facilities Div./Residential Mgmt. Branch,
`572 F.3d 1039, 1046 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Bowden v. United States,
`106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). As a result, when a defendant moves to dismiss on the basis
`of a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust, the motion cannot be granted unless it is “obvious” or “clear”
`that the claims were not exhausted. See Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892, 902
`(9th Cir. 2013) (“When an affirmative defense is obvious on the face of a complaint, . . . a
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`Case 2:21-cv-00054-KJM-DB Document 21 Filed 03/31/22 Page 7 of 9
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`defendant can raise that defense in a motion to dismiss.”); Diunugala v. Dep’t of Conservation,
`No. 16-3530, 2016 WL 11520821, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2016) (“If a failure to exhaust is not
`clear on the face of the complaint, the appropriate procedure is to permit a party to move for
`summary judgment . . . .” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
`In sum, Intel can prevail only if it is obvious or clear from the face of Randhawa’s
`complaint that her retaliation claim is inconsistent with or not reasonably related to her
`administrative charge. The court cannot reach that conclusion. Randhawa’s administrative
`charge encompasses her retaliation claims. She alleged in her charge that she had complained to
`Intel about her coworker’s stalking and sexual harassment but that Intel did not respond. Req. J.
`Not. Ex. A at 1. She also alleged in her charge that Intel had suddenly eliminated her position
`after she raised her complaints. Id. A supervisor then refused to delay her termination so that she
`could move to a new role, and she was fired. Id. These claims are consistent with and reasonably
`related to her current allegations of retaliation. Both the administrative charge and the federal
`complaint describe the same scenario, the same timeframe, the same position, and the same
`adverse actions: a high-performing woman of a different race and heritage than others at the
`company was terminated with neither a warning nor justification after her persistent complaints of
`sexual harassment went unanswered.
`It is true, as Intel argues, that Randhawa’s administrative charge could have been clearer.
`She did not check the box for “retaliation,” and she did not use the word “retaliation” in her
`narrative. But a plaintiff’s administrative claims must be interpreted liberally to protect employee
`rights and remedies. See Fed. Exp. Corp., 552 U.S. at 406; Josephs, 443 F.3d at 1061. And at
`this stage, the court must accept Randhawa’s allegations, view those allegations in a favorable
`light, and draw all reasonable inferences from them. Randhawa’s charge is clear enough when
`construed liberally, as required. For the same reason, the court cannot conclude at this stage that
`a retaliation allegation is unlike and unrelated to Randhawa’s other allegations just because she
`was not fired quickly after her harassment complaints or because she did not consistently name
`the same Intel employees. See Reply at 3–6.
`/////
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`Intel relies primarily on analogies to two decisions by other district courts to advocate the
`opposite conclusion, see Mot. at 9–10, but these decisions do not support its position. In the first
`case, the plaintiff had filed a charge of race and disability discrimination and had described
`“abusive and demeaning verbal remarks” before his termination. See Schneider v. City & Cty. of
`San Francisco, No. 97-2674, 1999 WL 144878, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1999).
`“[N]owhere in his written description” did he “mention or refer to any acts of retaliation,” but he
`asserted a retaliation claim in his lawsuit nevertheless. Id. at *11. The district court granted
`summary judgment of that claim, explaining that “[i]f the EEOC had investigated . . . , it is
`unlikely that it would have uncovered [the] retaliation claim.” Id. at *12. Here, by contrast, Intel
`has moved to dismiss, not for summary judgment, and as summarized above, Randhawa has
`alleged her termination followed her complaints of sexual harassment. An investigation would
`likely have reached retaliation.
`In the second case Intel cites, decided in the District of New Mexico, the court applied
`Tenth Circuit precedent under which a plaintiff’s failure to check a box on the relevant charging
`form created a presumption that the plaintiff was not asserting the “claims represented by that
`box.” Gerald v. Locksley, 785 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1091 (D.N.M. 2011) (quoting Jones v. U.P.S.,
`Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007)). A plaintiff could overcome that presumption only if
`“the text of the charge clearly sets forth the basis of the claim.” Id. (quoting Jones, 502 F.3d at
`1186). The plaintiff in Gerald had not checked the box for retaliation, and he had not described
`retaliation in his narrative. See id. at 1111–14. Nor did the narrative even allege that he had been
`terminated; he had alleged only that management had done nothing after he complained about
`threats and abuse. See id. at 1114. The court therefore dismissed his claim. See id. Here, this
`court is not bound by Tenth Circuit precedent, so the Jones box-checking presumption is not
`decisive. But even if that presumption were in force, Randhawa’s allegations would overcome it.
`She alleged she was terminated after making complaints of sexual harassment. Those allegations
`clearly set up a retaliation claim.
`/////
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`IV. CONCLUSION
`The motion to dismiss is denied. This order resolves ECF No. 10.
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`DATED: March 30, 2022.
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